tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-89900577542403363852024-03-18T04:01:56.375+01:00DeltaPatents Case Law blogSummary of recent decisions by boards of appeal of the European patent office (EPO).DeltaPatentshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07830354704918972593noreply@blogger.comBlogger542125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-17524218577468117042023-11-01T09:54:00.014+01:002023-11-01T10:10:34.337+01:00No more 10 days :(<p><br /></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhdJ1ObR5OOyKAsFB9ZjTer_QtAHKAQdRwADqZLCkGFeTWwRT7B331zIOMILw9BV4dfhLMBxuGWGLWb9P-4a0QTBKaqBtTC7Mieg535Aj_K4B85dwVQwRLO5hP8Kt_OWHRVXD2Ghpb0sDjkvY7vyg49k2XAzmgwIBByeb1i6IGeMlZI02Q9UAb3s3utwAmd/s1947/a29-image1_en.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1132" data-original-width="1947" height="233" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhdJ1ObR5OOyKAsFB9ZjTer_QtAHKAQdRwADqZLCkGFeTWwRT7B331zIOMILw9BV4dfhLMBxuGWGLWb9P-4a0QTBKaqBtTC7Mieg535Aj_K4B85dwVQwRLO5hP8Kt_OWHRVXD2Ghpb0sDjkvY7vyg49k2XAzmgwIBByeb1i6IGeMlZI02Q9UAb3s3utwAmd/w400-h233/a29-image1_en.png" width="400" /></a></div><p style="text-align: center;"><span face=""Open Sans", sans-serif" style="background-color: white; color: #21252c; font-weight: 600;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>Overview of notification and time-limit calculation rules before and after 1 November 2023</i></span></span></p><p style="text-align: center;"><span face=""Open Sans", sans-serif" style="background-color: white; color: #21252c; font-weight: 600;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span></span></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVsEqb0jmbRAvtwc884Q5KR5gqNz9jPBQu4rjTZ863h35ZjKdUrmTieIQI7l-fJ8WtLBVvkQGluQU-tTvnLhnNgEWe4Iqyd-p4xOOeX-4jlbjlEffH9FUbWjXXmdLrCVZszhie7H8XL1bqvXjIwY_qv-HK-GjTmbUkmpB1ay0g_qiIaA6MbrWErLiI35gL/s1947/a29-image2_en.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1132" data-original-width="1947" height="233" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVsEqb0jmbRAvtwc884Q5KR5gqNz9jPBQu4rjTZ863h35ZjKdUrmTieIQI7l-fJ8WtLBVvkQGluQU-tTvnLhnNgEWe4Iqyd-p4xOOeX-4jlbjlEffH9FUbWjXXmdLrCVZszhie7H8XL1bqvXjIwY_qv-HK-GjTmbUkmpB1ay0g_qiIaA6MbrWErLiI35gL/w400-h233/a29-image2_en.png" width="400" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span face=""Open Sans", sans-serif" style="background-color: white; color: #21252c; font-weight: 600; text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><i>Application of the transitional provision</i></span></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><p>Today, amended Rules 126(2)/127(2)/131(2) EPC entered into force, <span style="color: #990000;"><b>abandoning the 10-day legal fiction for deemed notification</b></span> as applicable for time limits triggered by a notification, and replacing it by the date of dispatch and a compensation for late receipt (similar as in PCT Rule 80.6).</p><p>See:</p><p></p><ul style="text-align: left;"><li><a href="https://www.epo.org/en/legal/official-journal/2022/11/a101.html" target="_blank">OJ 2022, A101 Decision of the Administrative Council of 13 October 2022 amending Rules 46, 49, 50, 57, 65, 82, 126, 127 and 131 of the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention (CA/D 10/22)</a>, article 1.10-12, art 2 second sentence and art 3 second sentence</li><li><a href="https://www.epo.org/en/legal/official-journal/2022/12/a114.html" target="_blank">OJ 2022, A114 Notice from the European Patent Office dated 25 November 2022 concerning legal changes to support digital transformation in the patent grant procedure</a>, section IV.</li><li><a href="https://www.epo.org/en/legal/official-journal/2023/03/a29.html" target="_blank">OJ 2023, A29 Notice from the European Patent Office dated 6 March 2023 concerning amended Rules 126, 127 and 131 EPC</a></li></ul><p></p><span><a name='more'></a></span><p><br /></p><p>OJ 2023, A29 provides:</p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;"> <b>II. Fiction of notification on the date of the document</b></p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p>Amended Rules 126(2) and 127(2) EPC introduce a new notification fiction, according to which <span style="color: #990000;"><b>postal and electronic notification are deemed to occur on the date of the document</b></span>. As a result, the current notification fiction by which a document is deemed to be delivered to the addressee on the tenth day following its handover to the postal services or on the tenth day following its transmission by means of electronic communication <span style="color: #990000;"><b>("ten-day rule") will be abandoned from 1 November 2023</b></span>.</p><p>According to established EPO practice,<span style="color: #990000;"><b> the date of the document is the date on which it is handed over to a postal service provider in the case of postal notification or the date of its electronic transmission to the Mailbox in the case of electronic notification</b></span>. To ensure this, the EPO post-dates its documents to allow them to be processed internally and issued on the date they bear. The EPO also has a reliable system for tracking documents dispatched using postal services or transmitted electronically via the Mailbox.</p><p>In the case of <span style="color: #990000;"><b>postal notification under Rule 126(2) EPC, the relevant date for the purpose of applying the notification fiction is the date printed on a document</b></span>, e.g. a communication from the EPO, and not any other date possibly stamped on the envelope carrying that document by a postal service provider. To reflect this, the word "letter" has been replaced with the word "document" in the first sentence of amended Rule 126(2) EPC.</p><p>As is the case today, electronic notification under Rule 127(2) EPC will not occur before the date of the document. Accordingly, even if the addressee can access the document via the Mailbox before this date, the decisive date for the purpose of the notification fiction under Rule 127(2) EPC is the date of the document.</p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;"> [...] </p></blockquote><p> </p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p><b>IV. Calculation of periods in proceedings before the EPO</b></p><p>The notification fiction provided for in Rules 126(2) and 127(2) EPC is relevant in the context of time-limit calculation under Rule 131(2) EPC. Since these provisions are intrinsically linked, some clarification has been provided in Rule 131(2) EPC to take better account of the revised notification fiction.</p><p>Under amended Rule 131(2) EPC, in the case of notification, it is the deemed receipt of the document notified that will constitute the relevant event for the purpose of time-limit calculation. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>As a result, periods triggered by notification will start running from the deemed receipt of a document, i.e. the date of the document under Rules 126(2) and 127(2) EPC.</b></span></p><p>As the EPO will continue to apply a notification fiction, as is the case today, it will be relieved from establishing the actual date of receipt of each document for the purpose of Rule 131(2) EPC, apart from in exceptional cases of dispute.</p></blockquote><p> </p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p><b>V. Entry into force and transitional provision</b></p><p>The amendments to Rules 126(2), 127(2) and 131(2) EPC will enter into force on 1 November 2023. They will apply to documents notified by postal services or electronic means on or after this date. Since the issuing of a document is the event triggering the notification process, the decisive date for determining whether the revised notification and time-limit calculation rules apply to a specific document notified is the date of that document. Examples 2 and 3 of OJ 2023, A29 illustrate the application of this transitional provision.</p></blockquote><p> </p><br /><p></p><h3><a name="_Toc147839778"></a><a name="_Toc149722508"><span lang="EN-GB">Annexes</span></a></h3><h3><a name="_Toc149722508"><span lang="EN-GB">A) Amended Rules 126(2), 127(2) and 131(2) EPC as
in force as of 1/11/2023</span></a><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></h3><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%;"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%;">Amended Rule 126(2) EPC as
in force <b>as of </b>1/11/2023:</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%; margin-left: 36pt;"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%;">(2) Where notification is
effected in accordance with paragraph 1, t</span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: #990000; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">he document shall be deemed to be delivered to the
addressee<b> on the date it bears</b>, unless it has failed to reach the
addressee</span><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%;">. In the event of any dispute concerning the delivery of the document,
it shall be incumbent on the European Patent Office to establish that the
document has reached its destination and to establish the date on which the
document was delivered to the addressee. If the European Patent Office
establishes that the document was delivered to the addressee </span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: #990000; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">more than seven days
after the date it bears, a period for which the deemed receipt of that document
is the relevant event under Rule 131, paragraph 2, shall expire later by the
number of days by which the seven days were exceeded</span><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%;">.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%;"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%;">Amended Rule 127(2) EPC as
in force <b>as of</b> 1/11/2023:</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%; margin-left: 36pt;"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%;">(2) Where notification is
effected by means of electronic communication, </span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: #990000; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">the electronic document
shall be deemed to be delivered to the addressee <b>on the date it bears</b>,
unless it has failed to reach its destination</span><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%;">. In the event of any dispute
concerning the delivery of the electronic document, it shall be incumbent on
the European Patent Office to establish that the document has reached its
destination and to establish the date on which it reached its destination. If
the European Patent Office establishes that the electronic document has reached
its destination </span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: #990000; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">more than seven days after the date it bears, a period for which the
deemed receipt of that document is the relevant event under Rule 131, paragraph
2, shall expire later by the number of days by which the seven days were
exceeded</span><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%;">.</span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%;"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%;">Amended Rule 131(2) EPC as
in force <b>as of</b> 1/11/2023:</span></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%; text-align: left;"><span face="Calibri, sans-serif" style="font-size: 13.3333px; line-height: 107%;">(2) Computation shall start on the day following the day on which the relevant event occurred, the event being either a procedural step or the expiry of another period. <span style="color: #990000;">Where the procedural step is a notification, the relevant event shall be the <u>deemed </u>receipt of the document notified, unless otherwise provided</span>.</span></p></blockquote><p><br /></p><p></p><h3><a name="_Toc147839777"></a><a name="_Toc149722507"><span style="mso-bookmark: _Toc147839777;"><span lang="EN-GB">B) Rules 126(2), 127(2) and 131(2) EPC as in force
until and on 31/10/2023</span></span></a><span lang="EN-GB"><o:p></o:p></span></h3>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%;"><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium;">For <b><span style="color: #990000;">documents send before today</span></b>, the <b><span style="color: #990000;">previous versions of the rules continue to apply:</span></b></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%;"><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">Rule 126(2) EPC as in force
<b>until and on</b> 31/10/2023:<br style="mso-special-character: line-break;" /></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%; margin-left: 36pt;"><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">(2) Where notification is
effected in accordance with paragraph 1, </span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: #990000; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">the letter shall be deemed to be
delivered to the addressee <b>on the tenth day following its handover to
the postal service provider</b></span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">, </span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: #990000; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">unless it has failed to reach the addressee or has
reached him at a later date</span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">; in the event of any dispute, it shall be
incumbent on the European Patent Office to establish that the letter has
reached its destination or to establish the date on which the letter was
delivered to the addressee, as the case may be.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%;"><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">Rule 127(2) EPC as in force
<b>until and on</b> 31/10/2023:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%; margin-left: 36pt;"><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">(2) Where notification is
effected by means of electronic communication,</span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: #990000; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"> the electronic document shall
be deemed to be delivered to the addressee <b>on the tenth day following
its transmission</b>, unless it has failed to reach its destination or has
reached its destination at a later date</span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">; in the event of any dispute, it shall be
incumbent on the European Patent Office to establish that the electronic
document has reached its destination or to establish the date on which it
reached its destination, as the case may be. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%;"><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">Rule 131(2) EPC as in force
<b>until and on</b> 31/10/2023:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 107%; margin-left: 36pt;"><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">(2) Computation shall start
on the day following the day on which the relevant event occurred, the event
being either a procedural step or the expiry of another period. </span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: #990000; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;">Where the procedural step
is a notification, the relevant event shall be the receipt of the document
notified, unless otherwise provided. </span><span face=""Calibri",sans-serif" style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; line-height: 107%; mso-ascii-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-bidi-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-hansi-theme-font: minor-latin;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><br /><p></p><div><i>Figures taken from the Notice in <a href="https://www.epo.org/en/legal/official-journal/2023/03/a29.html" target="_blank">OJ EPO 2023, A29</a> (no changes made). The top figure (Annex 1 of the Notice) provides a graphical overview of the notification and time-limit calculation rules before and after the entry into force of the amendments. The lower figure (Annex 2 of the Notice) illustrates the applicable transitional provision. The term "document" used in the notice covers decisions, summonses, notices and communications, which the EPO is obliged to notify ex officio in accordance with Article 119 EPC.</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div>NB: For <b><span style="color: #990000;">EQE 2024 (taking place in March 2024)</span></b>: In view of the change of R.126(2)/127(2)/131(2) per 1 November 2023, while the IPREE defines the texts as in force on 31 October 2023 to be the relevant legal texts for EQE 2024, the Supervisory Board of the EQE decided that:</div><div><ol style="text-align: left;"><li>Candidates sitting the EQE 2024 (pre-exam and main examination) can use as legal basis Rules 126, 127 and 131 EPC as in force on 31 October 2023 or Rules 126, 127 and 131 EPC as in force on 1 November 2023.</li><li>In the main exam papers, the <i><u>default Rules 126, 127 and 131 EPC</u></i> to be applied are those in force on <i><u>1 November 2023</u></i>. If the candidate chooses to apply Rules 126, 127 and 131 EPC as in force on 31 October 2023, this must be clearly indicated.</li><li>Candidate papers will be marked accordingly.</li></ol></div><div>See <a href="https://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponot.nsf/0/3DF1386F02482A6EC12589DE0046B393/$FILE/Notice_SB_Notification_EQE2024_EN.pdf" target="_blank">here </a>for the decision of the SB dd 26 June 2023.</div><div><br /></div>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-2548412357908018512023-10-11T10:23:00.001+02:002023-10-11T10:23:15.982+02:00G 1/22 and G 2/22 decided - Competence of EPO to assess whether a party is entitled to priority & possible implicit agreement of a transfer of priority<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGw2OydZQ4E7OAb8YDr0x-NaEnTrOpnvtHlZQG1n1Xftm2HXKh4oK3GEuqMCCsS-YVyEhoM903ODh5ibvwJo7cB8f493Hh7INoLB9UJM1fDEtU3opwZQBrdVwn-f76RSPW0tPPnRgMe8Z_By2YvZMR4dUYtbMzgbdblGgcd2oN90hsVJhFyA7Esjd7rwnv/s1127/G1-22%20figure%20at%20reason%2074.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="555" data-original-width="1127" height="198" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgGw2OydZQ4E7OAb8YDr0x-NaEnTrOpnvtHlZQG1n1Xftm2HXKh4oK3GEuqMCCsS-YVyEhoM903ODh5ibvwJo7cB8f493Hh7INoLB9UJM1fDEtU3opwZQBrdVwn-f76RSPW0tPPnRgMe8Z_By2YvZMR4dUYtbMzgbdblGgcd2oN90hsVJhFyA7Esjd7rwnv/w400-h198/G1-22%20figure%20at%20reason%2074.png" width="400" /></a></div><i><p><i>Yesterday, a Press Communiqué was published as the Enlarged Board had issued its decision in consolidated cases G 1/22 and G 2/22 and the decision became available in the register, and today on the Recent Decisions page. T</i><i>he Enlarged Board </i><i>concluded, in the order, that:</i></p></i><p></p><p><i>"I. The European Patent Office is competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC. </i><i>There is a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Article 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations is entitled to claim priority." <br /></i><i>"I</i><i>I. The rebuttable presumption also applies in situations where the European patent application derives from a PCT application and/or where the priority applicant(s) are not identical with the subsequent applicant(s). </i><i>In a situation where a PCT application is jointly filed by parties A and B, (i) designating party A for one or more designated States and party B for one or more other designated States, and (ii) claiming priority from an earlier patent application designating party A as the applicant, the joint filing implies an agreement between parties A and B allowing party B to rely on the priority, unless there are substantial factual indications to the contrary."</i></p><p><span></span></p><a name='more'></a><b style="color: #0e2034; font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", Arial, "Noto Sans", "Liberation Sans", sans-serif, "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Noto Color Emoji"; font-size: small;"><br /></b><p></p><p><b style="color: #0e2034; font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", Arial, "Noto Sans", "Liberation Sans", sans-serif, "Apple Color Emoji", "Segoe UI Emoji", "Segoe UI Symbol", "Noto Color Emoji"; font-size: small;">Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></p><div>[...]</div><div><br /></div><div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">THE REFERRED QUESTIONS</span></b></div><div><br /></div><div>1. By the interlocutory decision dated 28 January 2022 in consolidated proceedings T 1513/17 and T 2719/19 (the "referring decision", published in OJ EPO 2022, A92), Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.04 (the "referring board") referred, on the basis of Article 112(1)(a) EPC, the following questions of law (the "referred questions") to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (the "Enlarged Board") for decision:</div><div><br /></div><div>I. Does the EPC confer jurisdiction on the EPO to determine whether a party validly claims to be a successor in title as referred to in Article 87(1)(b) EPC?</div><div><br /></div><div>II. If question I is answered to the affirmative</div><div><br /></div><div>Can a party B validly rely on the priority right claimed in a PCT-application for the purpose of claiming priority rights under Article 87(1) EPC</div><div><br /></div><div>in the case where</div><div><br /></div><div>1) a PCT-application designates party A as applicant for the US only and party B as applicant for other designated States, including regional European patent protection and</div><div><br /></div><div>2) the PCT-application claims priority from an earlier patent application that designates party A as the applicant and</div><div><br /></div><div>3) the priority claimed in the PCT-application is in compliance with Article 4 of the Paris Convention?</div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The patent and the opposition proceedings underlying appeal T 1513/17</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>2. European patent application No. 05 779 924.9, published as international application WO 2005/110481 with the filing date of 16 May 2005 (the "PCT application"), claims priority of the US provisional patent application No. 60/571,444, filed on 14 May 2004 (the "priority application"). The priority application was filed in the name of R.P. Rother, H. Wang and Z. Zhong, the inventors. The PCT application names the three inventors as inventors and as applicants for the United States of America (US) only. For all designated States except the US, it names Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the University of Western Ontario as applicants. European patent No. 1 755 674 (the "patent in suit"), was granted on the basis of application 05 779 924.9 on 19 November 2014. Since the University of Western Ontario had assigned their right to the patent application to Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 2007, the patent in suit names the latter as the sole patent proprietor (the "patent proprietor", later the "appellant") and R.P. Rother, H. Wang and Z. Zhong as inventors.</div><div><br /></div><div>3. The patent in suit was revoked after opposition proceedings instituted by Novartis AG ("opponent 1", later "respondent I") and F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG together with Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (jointly, "opponent 2", later "respondent II"). The grounds of opposition included lack of novelty over the disclosure in documents D10, D20 and D21, all published after the filing date of the priority application but prior to the filing date of the patent in suit. The validity of the priority claim was contested, inter alia because the applicants, Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the University of Western Ontario were alleged not to be the applicants or the successors in title of the applicants of the priority application.</div><div><br /></div><div>4.<span style="color: #990000;"> The priority right was found to be invalid because only the priority right of one of the three inventors had been assigned to the patent proprietor. An assignment of the other two inventors to the patent proprietor or to the University of Western Ontario had not taken place prior to the filing of the PCT application. As a consequence of the invalid priority right, the opposition division found, inter alia, that claim 1 of the main request lacked novelty over D20 and D21.</span></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></b></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">The patent application and the examination proceedings underlying appeal T 2719/19</span></b></div><div><br /></div><div>5. European patent application No. 16 160 321.2 (the "application in suit") was filed as a divisional application of an earlier divisional application derived from application EP 05 779 924.9 (the application to the patent in suit). Based on the same PCT application as the patent in suit, the application in suit also claimed priority from US provisional application No. 60/571,444, referred to above in the context of appeal case T 1513/17 as the "priority application".</div><div><br /></div><div>6. During the examination proceedings, the same issues concerning the priority claim were invoked as in the opposition proceedings concerning the patent in suit (see above points 3 and 4). The same documents D20 and D21 as used in the opposition proceedings concerning the patent in suit were invoked against the subject-matter of the application in suit. <span style="color: #990000;">For the same reasons as in the opposition proceedings underlying T 1513/17, the priority was found to be invalid. Consequently, the application in suit was refused because intermediate publications D20 and D21 were found to be novelty-destroying prior art.</span></div><div><br /></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">Appeal proceedings and referring decision</span></b></div><div><br /></div><div>7. Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. as applicant of the refused application in suit and proprietor of the revoked patent in suit, filed appeals (ex-parte appeal T 2719/19 and inter partes appeal T 1513/17) allocated to the same board of appeal. <span style="color: #990000;">In both cases, the appellant argued that the priority right derived from the priority application was valid and documents D20 and D21 were thus not prior art.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>8. The board summoned for oral proceedings on 8 December 2021 for both cases. At the hearing the board decided to deal with both appeal cases in consolidated proceedings pursuant to Article 10(2) RPBA. Both the appellant (in both cases) and respondent II in T 1513/17 requested, inter alia, that questions concerning the validity of priority rights be referred to the Enlarged Board. At the end of the oral proceedings, the chair announced that the board was seriously contemplating referring questions to the Enlarged Board concerning issues related to the entitlement to priority.</div><div><br /></div><div>9. The referring decision was issued as a joint decision in T 1513/17 and T 2719/19 on 28 January 2022. The board found both appeals to be admissible. <span style="color: #990000;">A request of the appellant for correction of designation of the applicants for all designated States except the US in form PCT/RO/101 under Rule 139 EPC - which would have resolved the entitlement to priority issue - was not allowed (Reasons, points 4 to 9).</span></div><div><br /></div><div>10.<span style="color: #990000;"> The referring decision then discusses the point which is decisive for the board's final decision in both cases, namely the entitlement to priority under the "joint applicants approach". As described in the referring decision, the "joint applicants approach" concerns, in the most simple case, the situation where a party A is applicant for the priority application and parties A and B are applicants for the later application for which the priority is claimed. In this situation, party B can benefit from the priority right to which its co-applicant A is entitled; a separate transfer of the priority right to party B is not needed according to this approach which was found to be undisputed in the referring decision (Reasons, points 15 and 16, referring to T 1933/12</span>).</div><div><br /></div><div>11. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The appellant argues that the joint applicants approach should not only apply to European patent applications with a plurality of applicants but also to PCT applications having different applicants for different designated States. This approach is referred to in the referring decision as "PCT joint applicants approach" (Reasons, point 17).</b></span> I<span style="color: #990000;">t implies that in a PCT application where parties A and B are applicants for different designated States, both applicants may rely on the priority right derived from a priority application filed by only one of the applicants without the need for any transfer of priority rights from party A to party B.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>12. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The referring decision noted that the "PCT joint applicants approach" was a disputed concept. </b></span>In accordance with the requests of all parties to the referral case, <span style="color: #990000;"><b>it was decided to refer "a question concerning the PCT joint applicants approach" (referred question II) to the Enlarged Board (Reasons, point 19).</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>13. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The parties further took the position that the questions to the Enlarged Board should include a question regarding the jurisdiction of the EPO to decide on the entitlement to the priority right.</b></span> The referring board noted that the jurisdiction of the EPO to decide on the entitlement to the priority right had been extensively addressed and supported in T 844/18 while the opposite position was not explicitly taken in appeal decisions but in certain communications of boards in cases that were eventually resolved without taking a decision on the issue of entitlement to priority. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Considering that the issue would arise in other cases, the referring board took the opportunity to seek a final decision on the "jurisdiction issue" as well (Reasons, point 26; referred question I).</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Proceedings before the Enlarged Board of Appeal</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>14. In accordance with Article 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (RPEBA), the Enlarged Board decided on 21 March 2022 to consider the points of law referred to it by the board in case T 1513/17 (G 1/22) and in case T 2719/19 (G 2/22) in consolidated proceedings.</div><div><br /></div><div>15. In March 2022, a communication from the Enlarged Board concerning cases G 1/22 and G 2/22 was published (OJ EPO 2022, A36), inviting third parties to file written statements in accordance with Article 10 RPEBA by 29 July 2022. Thirteen amicus curiae briefs were received in response (which were published on the internet website of the Enlarged Board under "www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/eba.html"):</div></div><div><br /></div><div>[...]</div><div><br /></div><div><div>19. In preparation for the oral proceedings, the Enlarged Board issued a communication on 21 March 2023. Based on the comments received in the referral proceedings, a few questions were formulated which, in the Enlarged Board's view, could help to facilitate the discussion on the merits of the referred questions. All parties as well as the President of the EPO responded to the Enlarged Board's communication on or before 5 May 2023.</div><div><br /></div><div>20. During oral proceedings held on 26 May 2023, the representatives of all parties and of the President of the EPO addressed the Enlarged Board.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Summary of the stakeholders' positions</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>21. The parties to the referral case, the President of the EPO as well as most of the amicus curiae took the position that the referral should be admissible. A few amicus curiae briefs (Vossius & Partner, G.W. Schlich, Grund IP Group) questioned the admissibility of question I, mainly because they saw no need to ensure uniform application of the law in view of case law they found to be long-standing and consistent. After the Enlarged Board gave its preliminary view in its communication of 21 March 2023 that the referral should be admitted, neither the parties nor the President of the EPO wished to address the admissibility issue in the oral proceedings.</div><div><br /></div><div>22. As far as the merits of question I are concerned, the opinions were split. While the appellant, respondent II and the President of the EPO supported an affirmative answer, respondent I - even though in the same procedural position as respondent II - took the clear position that the EPC did not confer jurisdiction to determine whether a party validly claims to be a successor in title as referred to in Article 87(1) EPC. Out of the amicus curiae contributions, about half supported a positive answer while the other half supported a negative answer.</div><div><br /></div><div>23. The stakeholders supporting the EPO's jurisdiction mainly argued (i) on the basis of legal certainty and uniformity across all Contracting States and (ii) that entitlement to priority concerned a patentability requirement and that the EPC did not foresee any exception from its jurisdiction in this context. The opposite view was mainly supported by the argument that the EPC lacked the conflict of laws rules necessary to determine the applicable national laws relevant for succession. It was also argued, inter alia, that there was no public or third-party interest in the assessment of a succession that has never been challenged by any party involved in the succession and that the assessment of the entitlement to priority was an assessment of entitlement to the patent, or an analogous assessment, which was prohibited under Article 60(3) EPC.</div><div><br /></div><div>24. Almost all stakeholders who took the position that question II should be answered by the Enlarged Board supported a positive answer. They argued mainly based on the purpose of the priority system, namely, to facilitate international patent protection. In this context, the "PCT joint applicants approach" was widely supported but also other lines of reasoning such as the concept of an "implied transfer" of priority rights. More emphasis was placed on a benevolent assessment of the applicant's right to priority than on specific legal considerations. For example, CIPA in its amicus curiae brief (point 2.19) wrote that it was "of the view that it would be beneficial for applicants and proprietors if a generous approach is adopted by the EPO when considering entitlement to priority."</div></div><br /><b>Reasons for the Decision</b><div><b><br /></b><div>5. <span style="color: #990000;">Articles 87 to 89 EPC form Chapter II (titled "Priority") of Part III of the EPC. They provide a complete, self-contained code of rules of law on the subject of claiming priority for the purpose of filing a European patent application (G 1/15, OJ EPO 2017, A82, Reasons, point 5.2.3; J 15/80, OJ EPO 1981, 213, Headnote I)</span>. Since the EPC constitutes, according to its preamble, a special agreement within the meaning of Article 19 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention"), the EPC provisions on priority are intended not to contravene the basic principles concerning priority of the Paris Convention (see G 3/93, OJ EPO 1995, 18, Reasons, point 4; G 2/98, OJ EPO 2001, 413, Reasons, point 3).</div><div><br /></div><div>26. Article 87 as well as Articles 88(2), (3) and (4) EPC pertain to the <span style="color: #990000;">material conditions</span> under which priority rights may be derived from an earlier application. Article 88(1) EPC concerns the <span style="color: #990000;">procedural requirements</span> to be met by an applicant desiring to take advantage of the priority of an earlier application, namely the filing of a declaration of priority and other documents with the EPO. These procedural requirements are further specified in the Implementing Regulations (Rules 52 to 54 EPC). Article 89 EPC prescribes the effect of a priority right, i.e. that the priority date shall count as the date of filing of the European patent application for the purposes of the delimitation of the prior art under Articles 54(2) and (3) EPC. In other words, the priority right allows the exclusion of everything that has become prior art between the priority date and the filing date (often referred to as "intermediate prior art") for the assessment of patentability.</div><div><br /></div><div>27. Article 87(1) EPC provides that "[a]ny person who has duly filed, in or for (a) any State party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property or (b) any Member of the World Trade Organisation, an application for a patent, a utility model or a utility certificate, or his successor in title, shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing a European patent application in respect of the same invention, a right of priority during a period of twelve months from the date of filing of the first application" (emphasis added). Article 87(1) was amended in the context of EPC 2000, inter alia, by the introduction of the reference to applications filed in a Member of the World Trade Organisation in order to align the provision with the TRIPS Agreement (bullet point (b) in Article 87(1) EPC, see OJ EPO Special Edition 4/2007, p. 88).</div><div><br /></div><div>28. The "same invention" criterion of Article 87(1) EPC (often referred to as "substantive priority" or "substantive validity of the priority") is regularly an issue in examination and opposition proceedings, and it was underlying two referrals to the Enlarged Board: G 2/98 (OJ EPO 2001, 413) and G 1/15 (OJ EPO 2017, A82). The present referral concerns the question whether the applicant of the later application is entitled to claim the priority of the earlier application, in particular as a successor of the applicant of the priority application (often referred to as "formal priority" or formal validity of the priority; for the terminology see e.g. the comments of the President of the EPO of 8 July 2022, footnote 1).</div><div><br /></div><div>29. Hereafter, to maintain consistency with the referring decision and existing case law (e.g. T 844/18), the application from which priority is claimed ("first application" in Article 87(1) EPC, "previous application" in Article 88(1) EPC) shall be referred to as the "priority application". Any application claiming priority from a priority application shall be referred to as a "subsequent application". Accordingly, the respective applicant shall be the "subsequent applicant" and the applicant of the priority application the "priority applicant".</div><div><br /></div><div>30. Article 4A(1) Paris Convention provides: "Any person who has duly filed an application for a patent, or for the registration of a utility model, or of an industrial design, or of a trademark, in one of the countries of the Union, or his successor in title, shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the other countries, a right of priority during the periods hereinafter fixed." (emphasis added) The extension of the priority entitlement to the successor in title (i.e. the second underlined passage in the quote above) was introduced at the Washington Conference in 1911 (Bodenhausen, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Geneva 1968, p. 37). With respect to the definition of the parties entitled to claim priority from an earlier patent application ("any person who has duly filed an application (...) or his successor in title"), the provisions of Article 4A(1) Paris Convention and of Article 87(1) EPC are identical.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Interpretation and scope of the referred questions</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Question I</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>31. Question I ("Does the EPC confer jurisdiction on the EPO to determine whether a party validly claims to be a successor in title as referred to in Article 87(1)(b) EPC?") refers to Article 87(1)(b) EPC only, where reference is made to priority filings in or for Members of the World Trade Organisation. Article 87(1)(a) EPC refers to priority filings in or for States party to the Paris Convention. The "successor in title" passage in Article 87(1) EPC is not specific to one of the groups of states referred to in Article 87(1)(a) and (b) EPC. These groups overlap to a large extent, and the legal issues are the same for both groups. Moreover, question II refers to "claiming priority rights under Article 87(1) EPC". It is therefore assumed that the reference to sub-paragraph (b) of Article 87(1) EPC in question I is of no relevance.</div><div><br /></div><div>32. <span style="color: #990000;">The wording of question I with respect to the jurisdiction of the EPO is clear in that it addresses the competence of the EPO (i.e. of the examining and opposition divisions and also the boards of appeal) to assess the entitlement to claim priority of the party filing the subsequent application</span>.</div><div><br /></div><div>33. <span style="color: #990000;">There may be uncertainties about the entitlement to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC also in cases where not the succession in title but the identity of the person having filed the priority application is in dispute.</span> In T 844/18, concerning a situation where four inventors were applicants of the priority application and only three of them filed the subsequent European application and claimed priority, the board took the position that succession in title was not an issue in this case (see Reasons, point 21). In the Reasons (point 9 and 23) of T 844/18, reference is made to the jurisdiction to examine "who is entitled to the right of priority" (Reasons, points 9 and 23). The discussion of the EPO's jurisdiction in T 844/18 consequently encompasses the determination of both the person who filed the priority application and its successor in title. Similar to the facts underlying T 844/18, a legal entity consisting of a plurality of persons or entities (such as a partnership) may be the applicant of a priority application, and the same entity with a changed composition or membership may claim priority from this application. In such situations, it may be difficult to distinguish between the determination of the personal identity between the two applicant entities and the assessment of a succession in title.</div><div><br /></div><div>34. To cover all situations where the right of an applicant to claim priority is relevant in proceedings before the EPO, <b><span style="color: #990000;">question I is rephrased</span></b> as follows: <b><span style="color: #990000;">"Is the EPO competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC?"</span></b>. As explained in the communication of the Enlarged Board of 21 March 2023, <span style="color: #990000;">question I refers to the EPO's competence to assess the entitlement to claim priority for the subsequent application and it encompasses<b> all situations where the applicant claiming priority for its subsequent application is not clearly identical with the applicant of the priority application</b>.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>35. As has long been pointed out in the discussions on entitlement to priority, the issue of entitlement not only arises with respect to a patent or patent application examined or opposed to in proceedings before the EPO. <span style="color: #990000;">The issue equally arises with respect to prior art, namely patent documents forming prior art under Article 54(3) EPC and relying on a priority date prior to the effective date of the European patent application or European patent under consideration (see e.g. T 493/06, Reasons, points 1 to 11; T 382/07, Reasons, point 9). <b>Question I is understood to cover both cases; the objection that an applicant was not entitled to claim priority can equally be raised by an opponent (if the priority issue concerns the opposed patent) or by a patent proprietor (if the priority issue concerns a prior art document).</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Question II</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>36. Question II is understood to concern proceedings before any instance or department of the EPO where the situation described in question II occurs. According to the referring decision, the question needs to be answered only "[i]f question I is answered in the affirmative".</div><div><br /></div><div>37. <span style="color: #990000;">The question covers a special situation occurring where a party, typically the inventor(s), files a US priority application (also in the form of a provisional application) which is then used as priority application for a later PCT application designating one party (typically still the inventor(s)) for the US only and another party (typically the employer of the inventor(s)) for regional European patent protection.</span> Before the "America Invents Act" (AIA) of 2011 entered into force, only the inventor(s) could be applicants in a US patent application (see e.g. Druschel/Kommer, Die formelle Priorität europäischer Patente, GRUR 2022, 353). The priority application underlying the present referral (filed in 2004) had to be filed by the inventors under the then applying laws.</div><div><br /></div><div>38. <span style="color: #990000;">As implied by the referring decision (see Reasons, point 43), the wording of question II is addressing the facts underlying the referral and the "PCT joint applicants approach" (see above point 11) in a general way but <b>it is not to be understood as being further limited to specific factual circumstances (e.g. to a number of parties).</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>39. As pointed out in the referring decision (Reasons, point 18), confusion should be avoided between the "PCT joint applicants approach" mentioned above and the "all applicants approach" used, for example, in decision T 844/18 (Facts and Submissions, point VIII). In this case, four inventors were applicants of the priority application and only three of them filed the subsequent PCT application (encompassing the European application) and claimed priority. The priority claim failed to meet the requirement that all applicants of the priority application must also be applicants of the subsequent PCT application for which the priority is claimed.</div><div><br /></div><div>40. The referring decision critically summarises various possible legal bases for the "PCT joint applicants approach" (Reasons, points 28 to 39). <span style="color: #990000;">However, the referring board <b>did not limit</b> its question II to the viability of the "PCT joint applicants approach", thereby <b>leaving open the possibility that question II could be answered in the affirmative with another reasoning (for example, by acknowledging that the joint filing of a PCT application is sufficient proof for the validity of the priority claim).</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>41. As far as the reference to Article 4 of the Paris Convention at the end of question II is concerned, it is understood that this refers to compliance with all provisions of Article 4 Paris Convention except for the entitlement to priority as addressed in Article 4A(1) Paris Convention (see above point 30).</div><div><br /></div><div>42. The referring decision addresses the conflict of laws rules applicable to the transfer of priority rights, noting that a separate question was not necessary "because it is inherently contained in the questions posed and it will be addressed in the considerations of the EBA, as needed" (Reasons, point 37).</div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Admissibility of the referral</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Requirements for admissibility</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>43. According to Article 112(1)(a) EPC, "[i]n order to ensure uniform application of the law, or if a point of law of fundamental importance arises", a board of appeal "shall, during proceedings on a case and either of its own motion or following a request from a party to the appeal, refer any question to the Enlarged Board of Appeal if it considers that a decision is required for the above purposes."</div><div><br /></div><div>44. The Enlarged Board must examine the above admissibility requirements with respect to each referred question individually (G 1/19, OJ EPO 2021, A77, Reasons, point 56, with further references).</div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Question I - Jurisdiction of the EPO</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>45. Since the Enlarged Board takes the position that question II should be admitted (see below points 49 ff), question I should also be admitted for the sole reason that the questions are interlinked insofar as an affirmative answer to question I is a precondition for approaching question II. However, question I in itself already fulfils the requirement of Article 112(1) EPC that an answer is required to ensure uniform application of the law or because a point of law of fundamental importance arises.</div><div><br /></div><div>46. The issue of entitlement to priority arises with every patent application for which priority from an earlier application is claimed or which is confronted with prior art patent documents claiming priority. Where priority entitlement is disputed in any proceedings, the EPO instance addressing the issue must (at least implicitly) decide on question I. The question - or an affirmative answer thereto - thus can be viewed as fundamental for any investigation of priority entitlement under Article 87(1) EPC. The discussion concerning question I in the present referral proceedings shows that fundamental questions of law are touched upon, such as the extent of the EPO's jurisdiction for questions of civil law or the right of a third party to challenge entitlement to priority rights to which the third party cannot claim any entitlement.</div><div><br /></div><div>47. It has been argued in certain amicus curiae briefs (Vossius & Partner and Grund IP Group) that question I should not be admitted because there was no conflicting case law on the issue of the EPO's jurisdiction. However,<span style="color: #990000;"> diverging decisions are not a requirement for the admissibility of a referral if a board is referring a question to the Enlarged Board</span> (Article 112(1)(a) EPC). R<span style="color: #990000;">egardless of whether or not any decisions are in direct conflict with e.g. T 844/18, the EPO's jurisdiction concerning the entitlement to the priority right has been questioned by boards of appeal in several cases (see the referring decision, Reasons, point 26), and the issue is arising in various other cases before different boards. <b>The condition that an answer of the EPO is required to ensure uniform application of the law is therefore met.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>48. The Enlarged Board is satisfied that <span style="color: #990000;">both of the alternative conditions of Article 112(1)(a) EPC are met (point of law of fundamental importance and necessity to ensure uniform application of the law).</span> The condition that an answer to question 1 is needed for the referring board to decide is met because an answer is needed to question II (above point 45). For these reasons, referred question I is admissible.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Question II - Validity of the priority in the specific case</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>49. Question II mirrors the facts underlying the referring decision (see above point 38). An answer to question II is therefore required for the referring board to decide in the two pending appeal cases.</div><div><br /></div><div>50. As described above (point 37), question II concerns a specific situation related to US law where only inventor(s) could file a patent application. This requirement has ceased to exist. However, apart from the two cases underlying this referral, there are still a significant number of cases pending where the application was filed while only inventors could apply for a US patent (see e.g. case T 419/16, where an interlocutory decision was taken on 3 February 2022 to stay the appeal proceedings until a decision is issued in the present referral). Moreover, inventors still act as applicants for the US only in cases where the PCT application is filed both for the US and for protection in Europe under the EPC.</div><div><br /></div><div>51. <span style="color: #990000;">While the question refers to a specific situation, the answer would not necessarily be limited to the viability of the "PCT joint applicants approach" and it may cover other situations where the applicant's entitlement to the priority right is challenged. However, even if the answer covered only the situations described in question II, the question is considered to touch a point of law of fundamental importance in the terms of Article 112(1) EPC.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>52. The Enlarged Board is not aware of any case law challenging the viability of the "PCT joint applicants approach". However, it is noted that the possible legal bases for this concept have been questioned even in the referring decision (Reasons, points 28 to 33). <span style="color: #990000;">The fact that there are different legal bases proposed for the "PCT joint applicants" approach already shows that there is no uniform approach to this concept.</span> Moreover, decisions of national courts (see Reasons of the referring decision, points 40 and 41) and various amicus curiae briefs base their positions supporting an applicant's right to priority on other arguments than the "PCT joint applicants approach" (see above point 24). I<span style="color: #990000;">n view of future case law, it is desirable that not only the answer to question II is uniform but also the basic reasoning behind such answer.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">53. Since an answer to question II is necessary for the referring board to decide the pending appeal cases and at least the criterion of "a point of law of fundamental importance" under Article 112(1)(a) is met, question II is admissible.</span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The "right of priority" and its assignment under Article 87 EPC</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Purpose of priority rights</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>54. The basic purpose of the right of priority is to safeguard, for a limited period, the interests of patent applicants in their endeavour to obtain international protection for their inventions, thereby alleviating the negative consequences of the principle of territoriality in patent law (T 15/01, OJ EPO 2006, 153, Reasons, point 32, with references to the relevant literature). The priority provisions contained in the Paris Convention should not be regarded as a body of exception clauses which should be interpreted strictly (see in this respect T 998/99, OJ EPO 2005, 229, Reasons, point 3.1; see also T 1201/14, Reasons, point 3.2.1.3). To the contrary, the Rules of the Paris Convention and the self-contained priority system of the EPC should be construed in a manner which ensures that the above-mentioned general purpose is fulfilled as far as possible (T 15/01, Reasons, point 34, confirmed in T 5/05, Reasons, point 4.4; see also Straus, The Right to Priority in Article 4A(1) of the Paris Convention and Article 87(1) of the European Patent Convention, JIPLP 2019, 687, 688/689).</div><div><br /></div><div>55. For the person filing a patent application in a state addressed in Article 87(1) EPC, the priority system means that it has the option to file a bundle of subsequent applications for the same invention in a freely selected group of other territories where each of the later (national or regional) applications may benefit from the priority date of the first application. The priority period of twelve months on the one hand allows for an evaluation by the applicant as to where patent protection should be sought. On the other hand, the clear limitation of the period provides legal certainty to third parties who ought to know the geographical limitations of the patent protection they may be confronted with.</div><div><br /></div><div>56. The effect of the priority right (namely, the exclusion of intermediate prior art; see above point 26) often concerns publications originating from the priority applicant or persons connected with it. The priority right thus also protects an applicant from its own intermediate prior art and allows it to publish the content of the priority application before the subsequent applications are filed. This aspect is of particular relevance in a patent system like the European patent system that generally does not provide grace periods prior to filing a patent application during which publications of the applicant are non-prejudicial.</div><div><br /></div><div>57. Only the subsequent application (for which priority is claimed) and the respective applicant may benefit from the priority right. For the priority application, the priority right derived therefrom is irrelevant since for the priority application there is no period between the priority date and the application date (and, consequently, no intermediate prior art).</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>EPO case law under Article 87 EPC</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Jurisdiction of the EPO</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>58. In <span style="color: #990000;">most of the cases</span> where the boards had to assess whether the applicant of a subsequent application was entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC, <span style="color: #990000;">the boards tacitly assumed that they had jurisdiction for such assessment</span>. In T 844/18, where this jurisdiction was challenged, the board affirmed its jurisdiction, primarily because it saw no reason why it should concern itself with three of the requirements for priority under Article 87(1) EPC (where? / what? / when?) but not with the first requirement (who?) (see Reasons, points 11 to 14). The board also did not see a possibility for applying Article 60(3) EPC (i.e. the presumption that the applicant is entitled to exercise the right to a European patent) by analogy to the right to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC (Reasons, point 15). These views in T 844/18 were confirmed in T 2431/17, see Reasons, point 1.5.2).</div><div><br /></div><div>59. However, deviating positions have been discussed within the boards of appeal, as shown in the non-binding preliminary view of the board in the communication of 14 June 2017 in case T 239/16. (The priority issue was not relevant for the final decision.) There is more widespread scepticism concerning the EPO's jurisdiction for determining entitlement to priority. This has also been demonstrated by the positions taken in the amicus curiae briefs and by the different positions taken by the two opponents in the inter partes case underlying this referral (see above point 22).</div><div><br /></div><div>60. From the case law quoted by the different stakeholders, the conclusion could be drawn that before T 62/05 and T 788/05, the entitlement to priority was not regularly questioned, which would mean that the EPO's jurisdiction in this respect was not an issue in most cases. Earlier decisions quoted in this context (most notably T 1008/96) appear to be isolated cases. Another early decision, J 11/95 is even quoted as a counterexample since it held that the EPO had no jurisdiction to decide claims to the right to national patent applications or priority rights derived therefrom (Reasons, point 4). In an amicus curiae brief (efpia) it was noted that attacks on formal priority started to become routine in EPO oppositions from about 2010, and it was speculated that such objections became popular after practitioners became alerted through some decisions of national courts in the United Kingdom and because they offered a simple way to invalidate patents whenever there was intervening prior art. In response to a question in the Enlarged Board's communication of 21 March 2023, respondent I provided, in its letter of 5 May 2023, statistical evidence supporting the assertion that there has been a "dramatic increase in frequency" of priority entitlement challenges from 2015 onwards.</div><div><br /></div><div>61. <span style="color: #990000;">Considering the rarity of priority entitlement challenges during the first decades of the EPO, it can be concluded that the boards' case law is substantially uniform (at least during the past 10 or 15 years) insofar as the EPO is viewed to have jurisdiction to decide who is entitled to claim priority. When it comes to how the EPO should decide disputes on entitlement to priority, the case law is diverging or has not developed much in many aspects.</span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Application of national law to assess succession under Article 87(1)EPC</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>62. According to consistent case law, national law is applicable to the succession in title addressed in Article 87(1) EPC (see e.g. T 1201/14, Reasons, point 3.1.2, with further references). The EPC contains no conflict of laws rules for the determination of the applicable national laws except for the provision in Article 60(1) EPC that for employee inventions the right to a European patent shall be determined in accordance with the law of the State in which the employee is mainly employed or in accordance with the law of the State in which the employer has the place of business to which the employee is attached. This rule is addressed to the national courts of the Contracting States assessing disputes concerning the right to a European patent as addressed in Article 61(1) EPC. The EPC does not contain, in particular, any conflict of laws rules applicable to the transfer of rights from an applicant other than the inventor(s) to the successor(s) of such applicant (see e.g. T 205/14, Reasons, point 3.6.5; T 725/14, Reasons, point 4.3; T 1201/14, Reasons, point 3.1.2).</div><div><br /></div><div>63. Conflict of laws rules concerning the succession under Article 87(1) EPC could refer to a range of different national laws. In T 1201/14 the following possibilities were listed (Reasons, point 3.1.2):</div><div><br /></div><div>a) the law of the country where the first application was filed ("lex originis");</div><div><br /></div><div>b) the law of the country where the subsequent application was filed ("lex loci protectionis");</div><div><br /></div><div>c) the law of the country which is agreed upon in the relevant contract ("lex loci contractus");</div><div><br /></div><div>d) the law of the country where at least one of the parties to the transfer has its residence ("lex domicilii").</div><div><br /></div><div>64. Any one of these options is related to specific issues which may imply further uncertainties. For example, the freedom to choose the applicable law of a contract (e.g. an employment contract) may be limited and choice of law rules tied to the territory of the priority application or of the subsequent application (options a) and b) listed above) are difficult to apply where a patent territory does not coincide with the territory in which the relevant law applies (in the territory of US patents federal law and state laws apply, the territory of a European patent encompasses a multitude of jurisdictions with different laws). In sum, the private international law aspects of Article 87(1) EPC can be described as complex (see Moufang, in Schulte (ed.), Patentgesetz mit EPÜ, 11th ed., Hürth 2022, § 41 N 28).</div><div><br /></div><div>65. So far, no clear preference has been expressed for any choice of law rule in the EPO case law (see Maibaum, Die rechtsgeschäftliche Übertragung des Prioritätsrechts bei europäischen Patenten, Hürth 2021, p. 24-30). In several cases before the boards of appeal, the succession under Article 87(1) EPC was assessed under different national laws for the same set of facts with the same result, and, as a consequence, the board did not have to decide which law was applicable. For example, in T 577/11, the board found that none of the appellant's lines of argument, which were based on the applicability of Italian and Dutch law, led to a finding favourable for the applicant (Reasons, point 6.3). In T 1201/14 (see Reasons, point 3.2), the appellant relied on four lines of arguments to support its entitlement to priority: a (retroactive) nunc pro tunc assignment under US law, an implicit transfer by virtue of a general policy under German law, a "direct transfer" under US law and an implicit transfer by virtue of a general policy under Taiwanese law. Since none of these lines of arguments was both admitted and accepted by the board, there was no reason to determine the applicable national law (Reasons, point 3.3).</div><div><br /></div><div>66. <span style="color: #990000;">In cases where the applicable national law is determined, national provisions are regularly applied by the boards of appeal.</span> For example, the board in T 205/14, found that Israeli law was applicable and, relying on opinions of experts in that law, that Israeli law on service inventions did not provide for formal requirements to be fulfilled in the context of the transfer of the rights related to service inventions (Reasons, point 3.7). Parties are regularly requested to file evidence (such as a legal opinion from an independent law expert) concerning the effects of the applicable national laws (see already J 19/87, Facts and Submissions, point VIII).</div><div><br /></div><div>67. For the referring board, it was "far from clear" that the legal requirement for the transfer of priority rights by agreement should be assessed under national law, as the EPC does not contain any conflict of laws rules (referring decision, Reasons, point 37). The referring board drew the conclusion from earlier case law that the EPC did not seem to impose any formal requirements for the transfer of priority rights by agreement. Consequently, it envisaged - at least for the situation addressed in question II - that an implicit agreement could be sufficient to bring about the transfer of the priority right for the EPC territory (Reasons, point 38).</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Autonomous considerations discussed while assessing succession under Article 87(1) EPC</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>68. <span style="color: #990000;">It has been deduced from the wording of Article 87(1) EPC (without reference to national law) that the transfer of the right of priority has to have been concluded before the filing of the subsequent European patent application (T 1201/14, Reasons, point 3.1.1.1; T 577/11, Reasons, point 6.5, Catchword 3; T 1946/21, Reasons, point 2.3). The requirement that the right of priority has to be transferred before the filing of the subsequent application can be described as a requirement based on autonomous substantive law under the EPC.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>69. Another autonomous rule has been discussed in view of Article 72 EPC, although with different outcomes. In T 62/05, the board required an equally high standard of proof for the transfer of priority rights as the one required for the assignment of a European patent application, i.e. that the assignment of priority rights had to be in writing and had to be signed by or on behalf of the parties to the transaction (Reasons, point 3.9). In T 205/14, on the other hand, t<span style="color: #990000;">he application of Article 72 EPC to the transfer of a right of priority was rejected </span>(Reasons, point 3.6; see also T 517/14, Reasons, point 2.7.1).</div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>National case law under Article 87 EPC</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>70. If questions of entitlement to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC arise in national proceedings, the court seised needs to address all issues concerning the applicant's identity or succession, including the determination and application of foreign laws. However, in proceedings before national courts, conflict of laws issues and the related application of foreign law tend to cause less concern than in proceedings before the EPO. On the one hand, national courts can rely on their applicable conflict of laws rules and the respective case law. On the other hand, the domestic (substantive) laws of the national court are often applicable, either because the applicable conflict of laws rules refer to it or because conflict of laws issues are not relevant in cases not having connections to more than one jurisdiction.</div><div><br /></div><div>71. If the facts of a case involve one or more jurisdictions other than the court's own jurisdiction, the court's set of conflict of laws rules is applied by first qualifying the legal relationship at issue in view of the individual conflict of laws rule that may be applicable. Specific statutory conflict of laws rules for the transfer of priority rights do generally not exist in national legislations on private international law. German courts have found, for example, that the validity of the transfer of a right to claim priority is subject to the laws of the state of the priority application (lex originis) while the obligations between the assignor and the assignee are subject to the laws applicable to the contractual relationship between these parties (lex contractus) (see the summary in German Federal Court of Justice X ZR 14/17 - Drahtloses Kommunikationsnetz, point 68).</div><div><br /></div><div>72. The referring decision (in Reasons, point 40) cited another decision of the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) where the German conflict of laws rules, including the Rome I Regulation (see below point 80) pointed to the applicability of German law, which did not require any particular formalities for the transfer of priority rights. In view of the relationship between the parties to the transfer and a research and development agreement concluded between them, the German Federal Court of Justice accepted that there was an implicit agreement ("konkludente Einigung") between the parties, which was sufficient to acknowledge priority for the European patent (BGH, X ZR 49/12 - Fahrzeugscheibe, points 12 to 18).</div><div><br /></div><div>73. In a decision of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales (Accord v RCT [2017] EWHC 2711 (Ch)), entitlement to priority was critical because it could not be shown that the applicant's entitlement to priority had been secured by the date of the subsequent application (point 66). Reference was made to earlier case law which "accepted a significant softening to what otherwise might have been the rigour of the rule that the title must be secured by the time the international application is made, by accepting an analysis based on common law principles distinguishing the equitable and legal title to property". If such distinction could be made, it was sufficient for the applicant to hold "the equitable or beneficial title to the priority right" at the date of the application (point 67).</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Transfer of different rights to the subsequent applicant claiming priority</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>74. The figure below shows in a simplified manner how an inventor (or their employer or other legal successor) may obtain international patent protection, using the priority system established under the Paris Convention.</div><div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiKEunsgLvU5r-L3XJSS3DNcIK8SnLFCZpV4vGE3bERU2AEZ6jfDnkdYmwAOeukO5AjPwVmiu6x-HYXQjIXjGdU_mJQk-7Qp0whD8m0BPOYxyfMOM7GedWbC5awoxx0MK_-8N8YX0QnxMrwfB1h90gnfZhLYvswofUqaXRkhD9kqHU70x4qirAK5m8SYWNZ/s1127/G1-22%20figure%20at%20reason%2074.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="555" data-original-width="1127" height="198" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiKEunsgLvU5r-L3XJSS3DNcIK8SnLFCZpV4vGE3bERU2AEZ6jfDnkdYmwAOeukO5AjPwVmiu6x-HYXQjIXjGdU_mJQk-7Qp0whD8m0BPOYxyfMOM7GedWbC5awoxx0MK_-8N8YX0QnxMrwfB1h90gnfZhLYvswofUqaXRkhD9kqHU70x4qirAK5m8SYWNZ/w400-h198/G1-22%20figure%20at%20reason%2074.png" width="400" /></a></div><br /><div><br /></div><div>75. The inventor may apply for a patent in every territory or may transfer the right to obtain a patent to separate applicants for the different territories. Inventors often assign the right to the patents in all territories to a single applicant who then files a priority application. Within the priority period, the priority applicant or other applicants may file patent applications in other territories which benefit from the application date of the priority application (i.e. the priority date).</div><div><br /></div><div>76. The dashed and the dotted lines represent the right to file a patent (evolving into the title to the patent application after filing in the respective territory). Applicant B may obtain the right to file a patent for territory 2 from the priority applicant who acquired the rights for all territories from the inventor. Applicant B may also acquire the right to file a patent for territory 2 directly from the inventor. Within international groups of companies, the inventor's employer company may acquire the rights for all territories and then vest its subsidiaries in the different territories with the patent rights for the respective territories. These possibilities reflect the fact that the title to a patent application is a property right that is established and may be transferred for each territory in accordance with the laws of the respective territory.</div><div><br /></div><div>77. <span style="color: #990000;">The priority right (straight lines) may be obtained only as a consequence of the filing of the priority application (see below points 83 ff). The priority applicant needs to provide any subsequent applicant with the documents required in the respective territory for claiming priority. The priority right remains relevant for the subsequent application and any patent based thereon but it is not relevant for the priority application.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>78. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>If the priority applicant (Applicant A) transfers the title to the subsequent application to the subsequent applicant (Applicant B), this transfer is normally realised together with the transfer of the priority right (encircled arrows). </b>In the agreements discussed in priority entitlement cases, no distinction is usually made between the two transfers (see below points 93 ff). Also in the existing EPO case law under Article 87(1) EPC (see above points 58 ff), it is <b>not always clear whether the transfer at issue encompasses only the priority right or also the title to the subsequent European application.</b> However, the fact that different parties are potentially involved in the transfer of the different rights already shows that a clear distinction should be made between the title to the subsequent application and the priority right, i.e. the right to attribute the date of the priority application to this application. <b>As will be shown in the following paragraphs, only the transfer of the priority right (straight line) is relevant for the proceedings before the EPO for the purposes of Article 87(1) EPC.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Competence and applicable law for the transfer of the different rights invoked by the subsequent applicant</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Title to the subsequent application</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>79. In proceedings before the EPO, the applicant shall be deemed to be entitled to exercise the right to the European patent (Article 60(3) EPC). The EPO has no power to decide a dispute as to whether a particular applicant is legally entitled to apply for and be granted a European patent in respect of the subject-matter of a particular application. The determination of questions of entitlement to the right to the grant of a European patent prior to grant is governed by the "Protocol on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Decisions in respect of the Right to the grant of a European patent" (the "Protocol on Recognition"), which is an integral part of the EPC (G 3/92, OJ EPO 1994, 607, Reasons, point 3). The Protocol on Recognition governs the jurisdiction of the national courts of the Contracting States for disputes on entitlement to European patent applications. After grant, the national courts are competent to decide on disputes on the title to the European patent for each of the designated Contracting States. During disputes on the right to the grant of a European patent, the proceedings for grant before the EPO are regularly stayed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14 EPC.</div><div><br /></div><div>80. Disputes on the title to a European patent application or patent are resolved by the national courts by first determining the applicable law, applying their conflict of laws rules. These rules form part of the respective legislation on private international law but there are attempts to harmonise conflict of laws rules. For example, EU Regulation 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I Regulation) provides uniform conflict of laws rules for contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters.</div><div><br /></div><div>81. Article 60(3) EPC applies to the applicant of any European patent application, regardless of whether it is a priority or first application or a subsequent application. In the case depicted in the figure above (point 74), assuming that the subsequent application is a European patent application, the national courts would be competent to decide on the title to this European patent application in accordance with the Protocol on Recognition.</div><div><br /></div><div>82. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>As far as the title to the priority application is concerned, Article 60(3) EPC is not directly applicable, unless the priority application is a European application.</b></span> If the title to the subsequent European patent application has been acquired from the priority applicant, national courts may have to assess under the applicable national laws who was entitled to the priority application in order to establish the chain of transfers leading to the subsequent applicant.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Right to claim the priority date for the subsequent application</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>83. According to decision T 205/14 (Reasons, point 3.3), the right to priority, that is, the right to claim priority for a European patent application from the filing date of an eligible "first application" or "previous application" originates in the applicant of the first application. The prevailing literature also assumes that the first application, not only a subsequent application, establishes the priority right under the Paris Convention (see Wieczorek, Die Unionspriorität im Patentrecht, Köln etc. 1975, p. 21, with further references). <span style="color: #990000;">The filing of a first application may be seen as the creation of a bundle of potential priority rights that come into existence and may be examined only when they are invoked in a subsequent application.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">84. For the subsequent application, priority rights are governed exclusively by Articles 87 to 89 EPC (see above point 25). It may be discussed whether the priority right with the priority applicant is established under Article 87(1) EPC or under the Paris Convention.<b> In any case, no national laws are involved when a priority right is created or claimed for a subsequent application. </b>This is a significant difference to the title to a European patent application or patent, which depends upon national laws (for example, employment law or property law).</span></div><div><br /></div><div>85. Since the creation, the existence and the effects of the priority right are governed only by the EPC (and by the Paris Convention through its relationship with the EPC), <span style="color: #990000;"><b>priority rights are autonomous rights under the EPC and should be assessed only in the context of the EPC, regardless of any national laws.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>86. Consequently, <span style="color: #990000;"><b>the entitlement to claim priority (and any related assignments of priority rights) should also be assessed under the autonomous law of the EPC</b></span>. <span style="color: #990000;">There are decisions that have approached the transfer of priority rights under autonomous rules (see above point 68 for the requirement that the priority right is assigned before the filing of the subsequent application and point 69 for the requirement of a written agreement). The Enlarged Board endorses the assessment of priority entitlement under the autonomous law of the EPC but not necessarily all rules discussed in this context in the existing case law. The autonomous requirements for the valid transfer of priority rights should not be stricter than national rules applicable to the transfer of priority rights or other property rights. As the referring board noted, the EPC does not impose any formal requirements for the transfer of the priority right by agreement (referring decision, Reasons, point 38).</span></div><div><br /></div><div>87. A decision of the Court of Appeal of the Hague in the case Biogen/Genentech v Celltrion of 30 July 2019 quoted in the referring decision (Reasons, point 36) applied the EPC as the lex loci protectionis for the assessment of the validity of a priority claim. From the perspective of the EPC, the legislation of the EPC and related international treaties, such as the Paris Convention and the PCT, is autonomous.</div><div><br /></div><div>88. It has often been discussed whether Article 60(3) EPC could be applied by analogy to the "right of priority" addressed in Article 87(1) EPC. Such application by analogy would result in a legal fiction (for the purposes of the proceedings before the EPO) that the subsequent applicant is deemed to be entitled to exercise the "right of priority" if the formal requirements are fulfilled. The main argument supporting such application by analogy was that the difficulties related to an assessment of the title to the application by the EPO (applicability of national laws, lack of conflict of laws rules etc.) would apply equally to the assessment of entitlement to priority. This argument in favour of an application of Article 60(3) EPC by analogy is of course not pertinent if entitlement to priority is assessed exclusively under the autonomous law of the EPC.</div><div><br /></div><div>89. It is undisputed that Article 60(3) EPC is not directly applicable to disputes about the transfer of the "right of priority". In a codified system that has adopted the principles set forth in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a judge can establish rules going beyond the literal meaning of a legal provision (whether by analogy or otherwise) only if there is a lacuna in the law, in particular where situations arise for which the legislator has omitted to provide (see G 1/97, OJ EPO 2000, 322, Reasons, point 3(b)). If the legislator did not want to include a provision for certain situations, there is no lacuna to fill (see G 2/04, OJ EPO 2005, 549, Reasons, point 2.1.2; see also Schachenmann, Die Methoden der Rechtsfindung der Grobetaen Beschwerdekammer, GRUR Int. 2008, 702, section IV). <span style="color: #990000;">As has been shown by many contributors to the discussions in the present referral, the drafters of the EPC did consider that disputes about the entitlement to priority could arise (e.g. by discussing whether subsequent applicants should be obliged to file specific evidence of their right to claim priority). The Enlarged Board thus concludes that the drafters intentionally left open the question of the EPO's competence to decide on the priority entitlement. Consequently, there is no lacuna in this respect that could be filled by an application by analogy of Article 60(3) EPC.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>90. Another argument invoked by many stakeholders against the EPO's competence to assess entitlement to priority is the separation of powers between national courts and the EPO enshrined in Article 60(3) EPC, which avoids the need for the EPO to apply national laws (see e.g. Bremi, A New Approach to Priority Entitlement: Time for Another Resolving EPO Decision, GRUR Int. 2018, 128, 130).<span style="color: #990000;"> Such separation of powers can be respected even when the EPO is competent to assess priority entitlement if a clear distinction is made between, on the one hand, the priority right and its transfer as a matter governed by the autonomous law of the EPC and assessed by the EPO, and, on the other hand, the title to the subsequent application and its transfer, which is governed by national laws and assessed by national courts.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>91. Furthermore, <span style="color: #990000;">acknowledging the EPO's competence to assess priority entitlement respects the argument that the EPO, in view of Article 87(1) EPC, has to assess all aspects of the right of priority and that no distinction should be made between the "where", "what" and "when" requirements on the one hand and the "who" requirement on the other hand (T 844/18, Reasons, points 12 to 20)</span>. If all four requirements relevant under Article 87(1) EPC are assessed by the EPO, the EPO is competent for all aspects that may be relevant to determine the prior art, enabling it to assess all aspects of patentability. In contrast, national courts would remain competent to assess entitlement to the patent application or patent without getting involved in any questions related to patentability.</div><div><br /></div><div>92. <span style="color: #990000;">Even if the "who" requirement underlying Article 87(1) EPC is related to entitlement issues, it is clearly a criterion relevant for the validity of the patent based on the subsequent application since it is relevant for the delimitation of the prior art.</span> Entitlement may be relevant in other contexts of prior art determination, e.g. where it is disputed whether certain information or use of items was made available to the public in the terms of Article 54(2) EPC. If the EPO can assess all aspects of the determination of prior art, the EPO's finding on patentability is based on a comprehensive assessment. <span style="color: #990000;">If the EPO was barred from assessing priority entitlement, situations could arise in which the EPO has evidence potentially affecting the patentability of an invention but cannot use such evidence in its decision on patentability. </span>Disputes on the entitlement to the patent, on the other hand, do not affect the EPO's findings on the patentability of the invention and the evidence and assessments underlying such findings, such as the EPO's determination of the relevant prior art.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>National and autonomous considerations on the succession under Article 87(1) EPC</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Priority entitlement and contractual succession assessed under national laws / by national courts</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>93.<span style="color: #990000;"> </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">Agreements under which the subsequent applicant acquires the title to the subsequent application and the right of priority usually fail to distinguish between the two rights.</span> </b>For example, most employment agreements under which inventors who filed the priority application assign their rights to a subsequent applicant describe the object of the assignment in a very generic way (e.g. "any and all rights related to the invention in any jurisdiction". The agreement quoted in T 1201/14 (Reasons, point 3.2.1.1) refers to "the entire right, title and interest throughout the world in and to the invention" and adds "including ... the right to claim priority based on the filing date of the [priority application]". Such clause could be read as distinguishing between the title to the subsequent European application ("title ... throughout the world") and the right to claim priority based on the earlier US application. However, such specific references to the priority right are rare, particularly in employment agreements which are often the basis for the transfer of the right to the patents and of the respective priority rights.</div><div><br /></div><div>94. In a decision of 2018, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, case X ZR 14/17 - Drahtloses Kommunikationsnetz) analysed the differing views on the nature of the priority right in different Contracting States of the EPO: German literature and jurisprudence, on the one hand, consider the priority right to be an independent property right that may be assigned from the applicant of the priority application to a third party as its successor in title. In the English jurisprudence, on the other hand, the person having the rights to the invention is considered to be the "successor in title" for the purposes of the priority right (point 62). The German Federal Court of Justice concluded, however, that both views led to the same result in cases where, after the filing of the priority application, the title to the invention is transferred from the applicant of the priority application to the applicant of the subsequent application since the transfer agreement for the subsequent application regularly has to be interpreted in a way that it tacitly encompasses the right to claim priority for the subsequent application (point 63).</div><div><br /></div><div>95. In the treaty of Bodenhausen on the Paris Convention (above point 30, see p. 37) and in an amicus curiae brief (IP Federation), reference was made to a French decision of 1962 (TGI Valence of 16 February 1962, Ann. 1963, 313-328). This decision found that the priority right is not an independent right which can be assigned on its own but a right that can only be assigned simultaneously with the right for the assignee to file a patent application in another country. In one of the English decisions referred to in "Drahtloses Kommunikationsnetz", the court held that the "successor in title" in Article 4A(1) Paris Convention must mean successor in title to the invention (High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Edwards v Cook [2009] EWHC 1304 (Pat), point 93). The High Court of Justice of England and Wales later held that "[u]sually the right to claim priority goes with the right to the invention" (High Court of Justice of England and Wales (Accord v RCT [2017] EWHC 2711 (Ch), point 75).</div><div><br /></div><div>96. Also national statutes implementing Article 4(1) Paris Convention appear to be based on the assumption that the acquisition of the title to the subsequent application automatically entitles the respective applicant to claim priority (see Article 18(2) Swiss Patent Act: "The right of priority may be claimed by the first applicant or the person who has acquired the right belonging to the first applicant to file a patent application in Switzerland for the same invention."). Other Contracting States of the EPC have not adapted their national laws to the 1911 amendment of the Paris Convention (above point 30); the "successor in title" is still missing from e.g. § 41 of the German Patent Act and Article 9 of the Dutch Patent Act).</div><div><br /></div><div>97. Thus, it may be concluded that within Europe there are differing views on the relevance of the "right of priority" addressed in Article 87(1) EPC as a property right separate from the title to the subsequent application for which the priority is claimed. There is a widespread view that the priority right is a mere ancillary right to the right to the subsequent patent application or patent which automatically follows any transfer of the title to the patent application or patent or, depending on the jurisdiction, that the title to the subsequent application automatically implies priority entitlement. These views however do not consider the possibility that the title to the subsequent application has not been acquired from the priority applicant (see above the figure in point 74). They also do not sufficiently reflect the fact that the priority applicant does not just transfer a right but needs also to provide active support to the subsequent applicant wishing to benefit from this right.</div><div><br /></div><div>98. Such disregard for the priority right or its interpretation as a mere ancillary right to the right to the subsequent application may however partly explain why the priority right is rarely addressed in agreements on the transfer of the patent right. If a priority right is tacitly transferred together with the right to the corresponding patent or patent application, it may be assumed that the same conditions and formal requirements apply to the transfer of both rights. If a transfer of a priority right is not considered necessary in view of the priority entitlement, there cannot be any formal requirements for such transfer. In any case, the Enlarged Board is not aware of national statutes or case law setting higher formal requirements for the transfer of the priority right than for the transfer of the right to the patent application.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Consequences for the autonomous assessment of transfers of priority rights</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>99. <span style="color: #990000;">In most jurisdictions, rights to obtain a patent can be transferred without any written agreement or other formalities (e.g. from an employee inventor to the employer who wishes to obtain patent protection in multiple territories). The right to priority automatically follows the title to the subsequent patent application in many jurisdictions and may thus also be transferred informally. If national laws establish low or no formal requirements for the transfer of priority rights, the autonomous law of the EPC should not establish higher formal requirements than those established under national laws that may be relevant in the context of a European application. <b>To the contrary, the EPO should adapt itself to the lowest standards established under national laws and accept informal or tacit transfers of priority rights under almost any circumstances.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>100. For example, the autonomous law of the EPC should not require that the assignment of priority rights has to be in writing and/or has to be signed by or on behalf of the parties to the transaction (see above point 69 for the diverging case law on this issue) since this would establish a high threshold in view of the national laws. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Even the requirement that the transfer of the right of priority needs to be concluded before the filing of the subsequent European patent application (above point 68) is questionable in the Enlarged Board's view.</b></span> If there are jurisdictions that allow an ex post ("nunc pro tunc") transfer of priority rights (see the extensive discussion of such transfers under US law in T 1201/14), the EPO should not apply higher standards. The "rigour of the rule" that the transfer must be completed before the filing of the subsequent application underwent a "significant softening" also in a 2017 decision of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales (see above point 73).<span style="color: #990000;"> However, the allowability of a retroactive transfer of priority rights may have limited practical relevance if priority entitlement is presumed to exist on the date on which priority is claimed for the subsequent European application (see below point 109).</span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Rebuttable presumption of entitlement to claim priority</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>101. <span style="color: #990000;">Low standards for a valid transfer of priority rights not only serve the purpose of harmonisation with national laws that could be applicable instead of the autonomous law of the EPC. They serve the purpose of priority rights, namely to facilitate international patent protection, by reducing the risk that the inventors' (or their legal successors') interest in obtaining patent protection in multiple jurisdictions is jeopardised by formal requirements they may inadvertently fail to meet.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>102. <span style="color: #990000;">Any party transferring the right to a subsequent application wishes, under normal circumstances, that the subsequent applicant may benefit from the priority right. </span>The Enlarged Board agrees with respondent I in that it is difficult to imagine a realistic scenario in which a party would transfer their rights to the invention but intentionally withhold the relevant priority right (see p. 8 of respondent I's letter of 5 May 2023). <span style="color: #990000;"><b>This applies also in cases where the title to the subsequent application is not transferred from the priority applicant (see the figure in point 74). The title to the priority application and the title to the subsequent application originate from the same inventor who normally desires that the priority is valid for all subsequent applications. In this context, it must be assumed that the priority applicant who has not acquired the right to the subsequent application accepts or at least tolerates the use of the priority by the subsequent applicant.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>103. The content of the priority application is, in general, not published or otherwise made accessible to third parties before the expiry of the twelve-month time limit for filing subsequent applications. A copy of the priority application must be filed with the EPO within sixteen months after the filing of the priority application under Rule 53(1) EPC while the publication of the priority application normally occurs eighteen months after its filing date. Moreover, the applicant of the subsequent European application must provide documentation that cannot normally be obtained without the cooperation of the priority applicant. In particular, a copy of the priority application certified as correct by the authority where the priority application was filed, must be filed with the EPO (Rule 53(1) EPC, see also Article 4D(1) Paris Convention).</div><div><br /></div><div>104. <span style="color: #990000;">These formal requirements for claiming priority in accordance with Article 88(1) EPC</span> can only be met by the subsequent applicant if the priority applicant provides the necessary support completely and in time. T<span style="color: #990000;">he fulfilment of these requirements can thus be seen as strong factual evidence of the priority applicant's approval of the subsequent applicant's entitlement to priority.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>105. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The Enlarged Board comes to the conclusion that entitlement to priority should in principle be presumed to exist to the benefit of the subsequent applicant of the European patent application if the applicant claims priority in accordance with Article 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations. This conclusion is reached taking into account (i) that the priority applicant or its legal predecessor must under normal circumstances be presumed to accept the subsequent applicant's reliance on the priority right, (ii) the lack of formal requirements for the transfer of priority rights and (iii) the necessary cooperation of the priority applicant with the subsequent applicant in order to allow the latter to rely on the priority right.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>106. <span style="color: #990000;">The presumption also applies if the title to the subsequent application has not been acquired from the priority applicant but from a third party having the right to the invention in the respective territory (for example, from the inventor, see above the figure in point 74). Also in this situation, the priority applicant must provide the necessary support under Article 88(1) EPC, and the common predecessor with respect to the title to the two applications must be deemed to consent to the subsequent applicant's reliance on the priority right like any priority applicant assigning the title to the subsequent applicatio</span>n.</div><div><br /></div><div>107. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The considerations leading to the presumption of priority entitlement apply to any case in which the subsequent applicant is not identical with the priority applicant but receives the support of the priority applicant required under Article 88(1) EPC. It does not matter whether the subsequent European application stems from a PCT application. It is also not relevant whether and to which extent the members of a plurality of co-applicants for the priority application overlap with the group of co-applicants for the subsequent application.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>108. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The presumption should be rebuttable since in rare exceptional cases the priority applicant may have legitimate reasons not to allow the subsequent applicant to rely on the priority.</b></span> Such circumstances could, for example, be related to bad faith behaviour on the side of the subsequent applicant or to the outcome of other proceedings such as litigation before national courts about the title to the subsequent application.</div><div><br /></div><div>109. Priority entitlement is not relevant before the priority is claimed by the subsequent applicant in accordance with Rule 52 EPC, normally at the filing date of the subsequent application or otherwise within sixteen months from the filing date of the priority application. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Consequently, the presumption of entitlement exists on the date on which the priority is claimed and the rebuttal of the presumption must also relate to this date. Later developments cannot affect the rebuttable presumption.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>110. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The rebuttable presumption involves the reversal of the burden of proof, i.e. the party challenging the subsequent applicant's entitlement to priority has to prove that this entitlement is missing.</b></span> If there is a strong presumption, the hurdle for rebutting it is higher than in the case of a weak presumption (see T 63/06, Reasons, point 3.2 for the rebuttal of the presumption of sufficiency of disclosure). The presumption that the subsequent applicant is entitled to the priority right is a strong presumption under normal circumstances since the other priority requirements (which establish the basis for the presumption of priority entitlement) can usually only be fulfilled with the consent and even cooperation of the priority applicant (see above points 104 ff). The party challenging the entitlement to priority can thus not just raise speculative doubts but must demonstrate that specific facts support serious doubts about the subsequent applicant's entitlement to priority.</div><div><br /></div><div>111. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Like the priority entitlement in general (see above points 85 f), the presumption of its existence and the rebuttal of this presumption is subject to the autonomous law of the EPC only. Consequently, there is no room for the application of national laws on legal presumptions and their rebutta</b></span>l.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Specific arguments forwarded during the referral proceedings in the context of question I</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Legal certainty and uniform legal situation in the designated Contracting States</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>112. <span style="color: #990000;">The Enlarged Board has come to the conclusion that the EPO is competent to assess priority entitlement and that a rebuttable presumption in favour of the applicant's entitlement to priority is justified in view of the purpose of the priority rights, the lack of formal requirements for the transfer of priority rights and the presumed common interest of the priority applicant and the subsequent applicant (who have to cooperate when the priority is invoked).</span></div><div><br /></div><div>113. In the context of priority entitlement, the requirement of legal certainty would be best served if third parties could easily, based on publicly available data, assess whether the subsequent applicant is the successor in title addressed in Article 87(1) EPC. This assessment is difficult for third parties already because the relevant documents are normally non-public and in the possession of the applicant or patent proprietor only. The rebuttable presumption of priority entitlement serves the purpose of legal certainty insofar as the applicant or patent proprietor as well as third parties can or should rely on the subsequent applicant's entitlement to priority unless specific facts support serious doubts about such entitlement.</div><div><br /></div><div>114. The requirements of legal certainty and fairness in the individual case may conflict, and it may be argued that the presumption of a priority entitlement that is unjustified in a specific case disadvantages third parties, i.e. potential opponents. In this context it should be considered that even if a "wrong applicant" claims priority for its subsequent application, this does not necessarily mean that the priority right cannot be relied on. In national proceedings concerning the title to the subsequent application or the priority application, the priority entitlement issue can be resolved, for example if the outcome of such national proceedings is that the priority applicant and the subsequent applicant are found to be identical. In this context, it may be noted that the EPC explicitly foresees the ex tunc assignment of priority rights, at least in the context of disputes on the right to the patent before national courts: if a person other than the original applicant is found to be entitled to the grant of the European patent, this person may choose to file a new European patent application in respect of the same invention under Article 61(1)(b) EPC. To such new applications, Article 76(1) EPC "shall apply mutatis mutandis" according to Article 61(2) EPC. Under Article 76(1) EPC, "[t]he divisional application shall be deemed to have been filed on the date of filing of the earlier application and shall enjoy any right of priority". This means that the new application filed by the rightful applicant under Article 61(1)(b) EPC is deemed to have been filed on the date of filing of the earlier application and to have the benefit of any right of priority (G 3/92, OJ EPO 1994, 607, Reasons, point 5.4). <span style="color: #990000;">In view of legal certainty, it should thus be considered that there is always a party who is entitled to claim priority - even if this party must be determined in national proceedings. Consequently, third parties can never fully rely on the invalidity of a priority and on the potential invalidity of a patent which may result from such lack of priority entitlement.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>115. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The EPO's competence to assess priority entitlement does of course not imply that national courts are bound by the EPO's assessments. </b></span>In national proceedings concerning the validity of a European patent, relevant priority rights can be assessed taking into account all aspects, i.e. not only in view of the "same invention" criterion but also with respect to priority entitlement. <span style="color: #990000;">A uniform legal situation in all designated Contracting States can therefore never be guaranteed. However, challenges to priority entitlement before national courts are subject to national restrictions (such as rules affecting the right of third parties to challenge entitlement to priority) - regardless of how the EPO assesses priority entitlement.</span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Interest of third parties to challenge entitlement to priority</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>116. Unlike disputes on the title to the patent application, in which normally only the applicant and other parties claiming rights to the invention are involved, challenges to the entitlement to claim priority are usually instituted by third parties, in particular by opponents. It has been argued that in a situation where the priority applicant and the subsequent applicant are in "perfect all-time agreement" on the transfer of the priority right, it was absurd that the priority could be declared invalid and a patent be revoked as a consequence (Bremi, A New Approach to Priority Entitlement: Time for Another Resolving EPO Decision, GRUR Int. 2018, 128, 131). The question whether there can be a public interest in allowing a third party to invalidate patents based on legal flaws related to the entitlement to priority arises both in proceedings before national courts and in proceedings before the EPO. In a decision of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales (Accord v RCT [2017] EWHC 2711 (Ch)), it was held that there was "no obvious public interest in striking down patents on this ground, unlike all the other grounds of invalidity" (point 77).</div><div><br /></div><div>117. <span style="color: #990000;">It is a matter of national law whether national courts should acknowledge a legitimate interest of a third party to obtain a decision on who is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC. In the EPC however, there are no restrictions on who can file an opposition. If the EPO is competent to assess all aspects of priority (above point 91) together with all patentability requirements ex officio in examination proceedings or on the request of an opponent, the EPO cannot refuse to assess a priority entitlement objection based on who raised the objection. The rebuttable presumption concerning priority entitlement however substantially limits the possibility of third parties, including opponents, to successfully challenge priority entitlement.</span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Entitlement to priority in the context of PCT applications</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The "PCT joint applicants approach"</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>118. The PCT joint applicants approach implies that in a PCT application where parties A and B are applicants for different designated States, both applicants may rely on the priority right derived from a priority application filed by only one of the applicants, without the need for any transfer of priority rights (above point 11). Even if the "joint applicants approach" is acknowledged for regular European patent applications (see above point 10, T 1933/12), the use of this approach for a PCT application with different applicants for different designated territories is questionable and has been questioned in the referring decision (see Reasons, points 30 to 33).</div><div><br /></div><div>119. <span style="color: #990000;">Under Article 118 EPC - a provision regularly quoted in support of the "joint applicants approach" -, different applicants for different designated Contracting States shall be regarded as joint applicants or proprietors for the purposes of the proceedings before the EPO, and the patent shall be uniform for all designated States.</span> Exceptions from the uniformity of the European patent are foreseen in Article 118 EPC and may be justified, for example, by prior rights based on national patent applications (Article 139(2) EPC).</div><div><br /></div><div>120. T<span style="color: #990000;"><b>he PCT does not contain a provision like Article 118 EPC, which would impose a common procedural role throughout the grant proceedings to a plurality of applicants and prescribe the uniformity of the patent for different designated territories.</b></span> A PCT application, after being accorded an international filing date, has the effect of a regular national application in each designated State (Article 11(3) PCT) which is prosecuted by the respective applicant for each designated State. The examination is carried out by the patent offices of each designated territory according to its own rules. <span style="color: #990000;">The PCT does not exclude that different priority rights exist for different designated territories, be it for material reasons (e.g. the "same invention" criterion may be interpreted differently and is dependent on the subject-matter claimed before the respective patent office), be it for formal reasons (e.g. the applicant for one territory may not be entitled to a priority right while another applicant for another territory is entitled to claim priority stemming from the same priority application).</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">121. <b>However, a general decision on the viability of the PCT joint applicants approach is not needed. The concept of an implied agreement (below points 122 ff) should allow an assessment leading to the same result as the PCT joint applicants approach in most cases</b>.</span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The concept of an implied agreement</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>122. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Where no formal requirements for the transfer of priority rights exist, priority rights can be transferred under an informal or implicit agreement </b></span>(see the German case referred to above in point 72, where an implicit agreement was found to be sufficient to acknowledge priority entitlement). <span style="color: #990000;">In the situation addressed in question II, the priority applicant (party A) actively presents itself together with the other subsequent applicant (party B) as an applicant to the office where the subsequent application is filed. Together they claim priority from the priority application of party A to the benefit of both parties. Even if the subsequent PCT application may be filed by a joint representative, the priority applicant should know about the details of this application and the related proceedings, including the claiming of priority that also benefits its co-applicant.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>123. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The Enlarged Board concurs with the referring board in that in the circumstances described in question II, the mutual filing demonstrates - absent indications to the contrary - the existence of an implicit agreement between party A and party B, conferring party B the right to benefit from the priority for the EPC territory (referring decision, Reasons, point 38).</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>124. <span style="color: #990000;">The joint filing of the PCT application <b>cannot in every case</b> establish final proof of the existence of an implied agreement. </span>However, under normal circumstances it can be assumed that the priority applicant and co-applicant for the subsequent application (party A) agrees that the subsequent application should take the full benefit of the priority for all applicants. Party A or its predecessors (including the inventor) normally have a common interest with party B in the validity of the priority for all territories encompassed by the subsequent PCT application.</div><div><br /></div><div>125. T<span style="color: #990000;"><b>he Enlarged Board concludes that, in the absence of clear indications to the contrary, the joint filing of the subsequent PCT application sufficiently proves that the parties entered into an implied agreement allowing party B to rely on the priority right established by the filing of the priority application by party A. Since the considerations leading to this conclusion not only apply in the context of PCT applications, the concept and the conditions for an implied agreement equally apply to co-applicants directly filing a subsequent European application if at least one of the co-applicants was an applicant for the priority application.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>126<b>. <span style="color: #990000;">To put into question the implied agreement, evidence would be needed that an agreement on the use of the priority right has not been reached or is fundamentally flawed</span></b>. For example, party B could act in bad faith to the detriment of party A who may then not be fully informed about the subsequent PCT application. A dispute between the parties at the relevant filing date was mentioned in an amicus curiae brief (efpia) as a further example (point 3.2). Factual indications putting into question the implied agreement have to be of a substantial nature and have to be presented by the party questioning the implied agreement. <span style="color: #990000;">The implied agreement is to be assessed under the autonomous law of the EPC, which does not foresee any formal requirements for the transfer of priority rights (above point 86). Assessing the existence of an implied agreement under the autonomous law of the EPC is consistent with the approach chosen for the rebuttable presumption for the priority entitlement (above point 86) and appropriate in view of the object of the implied agreement, which is governed by the EPC and the Paris Convention only.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>127. Transfers of private rights and underlying agreements are normally subject to national civil laws, but there are instances where the EPC regulates aspects of national civil laws in order to establish uniform standards (see e.g. Article 72 EPC on the form of the assignment of a European patent application or the development of an autonomous concept of universal succession in T 2357/12). <span style="color: #990000;"><b>In this context, it is justified in the Enlarged Board's view to consider the agreement implied by the joint filing of a subsequent application to be an agreement governed only by the autonomous law of the EPC.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>128. An agreement (regardless of its form) can only be held against parties who were involved in the facts establishing the agreement. C<span style="color: #990000;"><b>o-applicants for the priority application who were not involved in the subsequent application may not be deemed to have consented to the reliance on the priority right by the other co-applicants for the priority application (a situation underlying e.g. T 844/18).</b></span> <span style="color: #990000;">The subsequent applicant(s) may however still be entitled to claim priority since the rebuttable presumption of entitlement does not depend on whether the involved applicants acted as co-applicants at any stage.</span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Implications for the referred questions</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Question 1 - Competence of the EPO to assess priority entitlement</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>129. The subsequent applicant wishing to file a European patent application should not only hold the title to that European application (i.e. the right to the European patent) but also the priority right if such right is claimed for the European application. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>In the context of the EPC and the proceedings before the EPO, a strict distinction should be made between the two rights. The title to the subsequent application, on the one hand, is subject to national property laws.</b> Its transfer is governed by national laws (to be determined in accordance with national conflict of laws rules) and assessed by national courts in view of Article 60(3) EPC (above points 79 ff). <b>The right to claim the priority date for the subsequent European application, on the other hand, has been shown to be a right created under the autonomous law of the EPC and the Paris Convention, the transfer of which should also be assessed under the autonomous law of the EPC (above points 83 ff).</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>130. The exclusive application of the autonomous law of the EPC to the transfer of priority rights removes the need for conflict of laws rules and the application of national laws, thereby eliminating two main reasons invoked against the EPO's competence to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>After evaluating various arguments supporting and denying this competence of the EPO (above points 83 ff, 93 ff), the Enlarged Board concludes that the EPO is competent to assess priority entitlement.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>131. In view of the interests of the parties involved, the lack of formal requirements for the transfer of priority rights and the necessary cooperation between the priority applicant and the subsequent applicant in the context of the procedural requirements under Article 88(1) EPC, <span style="color: #990000;"><b>the Enlarged Board concludes that the entitlement to priority should be presumed to exist. This presumption should be rebuttable to take into account rare exceptional cases in which the claiming of the priority by the subsequent applicant appears to be unjustified (above points 101 ff).</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>132. If the requirements under Article 88(1) EPC are not fulfilled, the subsequent applicant is barred from claiming priority for this reason alone. The fulfilment of these procedural requirements is not covered by the rebuttable presumption. This is reflected in the order where compliance with Article 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations is set as a condition for the rebuttable presumption of priority entitlement. The referral is not addressing any aspect of how these procedural requirements are addressed by the EPO.</div><div><br /></div><div>133. Like the nature and the effects of the priority right and the entitlement to priority,<span style="color: #990000;"><b> the rebuttable presumption in favour of the priority entitlement is subject to the autonomous law of the EPC. It cannot be excluded, however, that in the context of the rebuttal of the presumption national laws need to be considered as well. </b></span>For example, the existence of legal entities being parties in transfers of priority rights may be relevant and may need an assessment under national laws.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Question 2 - Priority entitlement in the situation addressed in question II</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>134. Question II addresses a specific situation in which the EPO has to assess priority entitlement (given the positive answer to question I). The question concerns a group of cases where an applicant other than the priority applicant wishes to rely on the priority right for a subsequent application jointly filed by both applicants. The considerations leading to the rebuttable presumption of priority entitlement apply regardless of whether the subsequent application is a PCT application and in any case where the priority applicant (as an individual or a group) is not identical with the subsequent applicant(s) (above points 101 ff, 107). <span style="color: #990000;">The rebuttable presumption that the subsequent applicant is entitled to rely on the priority right derived from the priority application therefore fully applies to the situation addressed in question II.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>135. For the situation addressed in question II, it has been proposed to extend the acknowledged "joint applicants approach" to a "PCT joint applicants approach" which has been questioned in the referring decision and by the Enlarged Board (above points 118 ff). As an alternative reasoning for a positive answer to question II, the concept of an implied agreement has been proposed not only by the referring board but also in certain amicus curiae briefs. The Enlarged Board concurs with the referring board in that in the circumstances described in question II, the mutual filing demonstrates - absent indications to the contrary - the existence of an implicit agreement between party A and party B, conferring party B the right to benefit from the priority for the EPC territory (referring decision, Reasons, point 38).</div><div><br /></div><div>136. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The Enlarged Board leaves open the validity of the "PCT joint applicants approach" but endorses the concept of an implied agreement. It therefore concludes that, in the absence of substantial factual indications to the contrary, the joint filing of the subsequent PCT application sufficiently proves that the parties entered into an implied or informal agreement allowing party B to rely on the priority right established by the filing of the priority application by party A.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>137. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>An agreement cannot be implied if not all of a plurality of priority applicants are applicants or co-applicants for the subsequent application (the situation underlying e.g. T 844/18, above point 128).</b> However, the rebuttable presumption of priority entitlement can be applied also in situations where one of the priority applicants is not involved in the filing of the subsequent application. In specific contexts, a priority applicant missing from the subsequent application may have reasons to claim the title to the subsequent application (in proceedings before national courts) or may possess evidence to rebut the presumption of priority entitlement in proceedings before the EPO.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>138. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The interpretation of a joint filing as sufficient proof for an implied agreement on the joint use of the priority right in the context of a joint PCT application may apply independently from the rebuttable presumption addressed in connection with referred question I. An implied agreement in the situation addressed in question II can however reinforce the presumption of entitlement to priority stipulated in view of referred question I.</b></span></div><br /><b>Order</b><div><div>For these reasons, it is decided that the questions of law referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal are answered as follows:</div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>I. The European Patent Office is competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC.</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>There is a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Article 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations is entitled to claim priority.</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>II. The rebuttable presumption also applies in situations where the European patent application derives from a PCT application and/or where the priority applicant(s) are not identical with the subsequent applicant(s).</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>In a situation where a PCT application is jointly filed by parties A and B, (i) designating party A for one or more designated States and party B for one or more other designated States, and (ii) claiming priority from an earlier patent application designating party A as the applicant, the joint filing implies an agreement between parties A and B allowing party B to rely on the priority, unless there are substantial factual indications to the contrary.</b></span></div><br /><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span><a href="https://www.epo.org/en/boards-of-appeal/decisions/g220001ex1" target="_blank">G 0001/22 (Competence of the European Patent Office to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC (Entitlement to priority))</a> dd10-10-2023<span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://legacy.epo.org/boards-of-appeal/decisions/pdf/g220001ex1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span></span></i></span><i>ECLI:EP:BA:2023:G000122.20231010</i><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span>The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP05779924&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> Figure taken from reason 74 of the decision.</span></i></div></div>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-44101099186200517412023-06-29T09:29:00.011+02:002023-06-29T16:32:09.474+02:00New referral to the Enlarged Board by T 0438/19 - is product on the market prior art if undue burden to analyse composition? (G 1/13)<p><i> T 0438/19 of 27-06-2023 referred the following questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal for decision:</i></p><p><i>1. Is a product put on the market before the date of filing of a European patent application to be excluded from the state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC for the sole reason that its composition or internal structure could not be analysed and reproduced without undue burden by the skilled person before that date?</i></p><p><i>2. If the answer to question 1 is no, is technical information about said product which was made available to the public before the filing date (e.g. by publication of technical brochure, non-patent or patent literature) state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC, irrespective of whether the composition or internal structure of the product could be analysed and reproduced without undue burden by the skilled person before that date?</i></p><p><i>3. If the answer to question 1 is yes or the answer to question 2 is no, which criteria are to be applied in order to determine whether or not the composition or internal structure of the product could be analysed and reproduced without undue burden within the meaning of opinion G 1/92? In particular, is it required that the composition and internal structure of the product be fully analysable and identically reproducible?</i></p><div><i>The decision discusses alleged conflicting or at least diverging application of G 1/92, as well as G 1/92 itself, in detail. The reasons from the decision are cited below (no changes made except for highlighting in <span style="color: #990000;">color</span>).</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i>The referral is <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/eba/pending.html" target="_blank">pending </a>under G 1/23 "solar cell".</i></div><div><br /></div><div><span><a name='more'></a></span></div><div><b>Reasons</b></div><div><b><br /></b></div><div><div>Admittance of D18</div><div><br /></div><div>1. The appellant filed document D18 with letter of 10 September 2018, in preparation of the oral proceedings scheduled before the opposition division, and resubmitted it with the statement of grounds of appeal. The appellant requested that the decision of the opposition division not to admit document D18 into the proceedings be overturned.</div><div><br /></div><div>1.1 This request is subject to the Board's discretionary power to hold inadmissible facts, evidence and requests which could have been presented or were not admitted in the first instance proceedings (Article 12(4) RPBA 2007, which applies in view of Article 25(2) RPBA 2020). According to the established case law, in particular decision G 7/93 (OJ EPO 1994, 775), point 2.6 of the Reasons, a Board of Appeal should only overturn discretionary decisions of first instance departments if it concludes that the first instance department has not exercised its discretion in accordance to the right principles or it has exercised its discretion in an unreasonable way.</div><div><br /></div><div>However, even if the opposition division applied the correct criteria in a non-unreasonable way, the Board has nevertheless to independently exercise its own discretion under Article 12(4) RPBA 2007, since the document was resubmitted and its admittance in appeal was requested by the appellant on the basis of additional submissions and changed circumstances. In this context, the Board, following the line adopted in T 971/11 of 4 March 2016, considers that a document which would have been admitted into appeal proceedings if it had been filed for the first time at the outset of those proceedings should not be held inadmissible for the sole reason that it was already filed before the department of first instance (and not admitted) (see point 1.3 of the Reasons).</div><div><br /></div><div>1.2 In this respect, at the oral proceedings before the opposition division, after the division had decided not to admit D18 into the proceedings, the patent proprietor argued for the first time in the proceedings that example 3 of D1, considered by the opponent to represent the closest prior art, could not be reproduced and hence was not a suitable starting point for assessing inventive step (minutes, page 4, lines 6-10). Referring to point 1.4 of the Reasons for opinion G 1/92 and decision T 23/11 of 13 February 2014, the patent proprietor submitted that the disclosure of said example was not enabling, since D1 did not disclose the polymerisation process resulting in ENGAGE® 8400. The opposition division, however, decided that example 3 of D1 using ENGAGE® 8400 was a suitable starting point for assessing inventive step, without dealing with that argument (Reasons for the decision, page 9, lines 6-16).</div><div><br /></div><div>In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant preemptively dealt with the enablement of the disclosure of example 3 of D1 and submitted that D18 is cross-referenced in the paragraph bridging pages 14 and 15 of D1 as a document describing the preparation of ENGAGE® polymers. D1 describes in said passage that homogeneously branched, substantially linear ethylene/alpha-olefin polymers, for which AFFINITY® and ENGAGE® polyethylene available from The Dow Chemical Company are given as examples, are especially preferred and are more fully described in three US patents, one corresponding to reference D18.</div><div><br /></div><div>Accordingly, the resubmission of document D18 with the statement of grounds of appeal in connection with the argument that this document would demonstrate the enabling character of the disclosure of ENGAGE® 8400 with the consequence that example 3 of D1 can be taken as the closest prior art is a legitimate reaction, at the earliest possible stage, to the new submissions made by the patent proprietor during the oral proceedings after the opposition division had already decided not to admit D18. This, in the Board's view, constitutes a sufficient reason to admit D18 into the proceedings.</div><div><br /></div><div>1.3 Contrary to the respondent's argument, it could not be expected that the appellant would immediately react to this new and brief submission by requesting anew, during the oral proceedings, to admit D18 into the proceedings. Not allowing at the onset of the appeal proceedings submissions in direct response to this new circumstance and evidence brought forward would be contrary to procedural fairness. In this context the respondent's argument that an objection as to lack of enablement of a disclosure would be nothing out of the ordinary, is thus irrelevant. The respondent's argument that D18 would not be part of the common general knowledge and cannot demonstrate an enabling character of ENGAGE® 8400 actually pertains to the merits of the discussion and is therefore not relevant for the admittance of D18.</div><div><br /></div><div>1.4 Under these circumstances, the Board has no reason to make use of its discretionary power under Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 to hold D18 inadmissible. D18 is therefore admitted into the appeal proceedings.</div><div><br /></div><div>Sufficiency of disclosure</div><div><br /></div><div>2. According to the established jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO a European patent complies with the requirements of sufficiency of disclosure, if a skilled person, on the basis of the information provided in the patent specification and, if necessary, using common general knowledge, is able to carry out the invention over the whole area claimed without undue burden, i.e. with reasonable effort. This means in the present case to prepare a material that meets the parametric and structural definition of present claim 1, in particular the content of aluminium.</div><div><br /></div><div>The objection of the appellant concerns the ability of the skilled person to accurately and reliably determine that amount of aluminium in the ethylene/alpha-olefin copolymer. The appellant argues that, owing to the absence of sufficient information on how to determine that amount, claim 1 lacks sufficiency of disclosure.</div><div><br /></div><div>2.1 It is undisputed that the presence of aluminium in the ethylene/alpha-olefin copolymer is taught to find its origin in the use of an organic aluminumoxy compound or organic aluminium compound added as co-catalyst for the polymerisation of the ethylene/alpha-olefin copolymer (page 4, lines 12-15 and paragraph 44 of the patent in suit), paragraph 44 describing that the aluminium content is dependent on the concentration of said co-catalyst added during the polymerisation process. It is also uncontested that general guidance for producing the claimed ethylene olefin copolymer is provided in paragraphs 81 to 93 of the patent in suit, including a description of the amount of catalyst and co-catalyst to be used (see paragraphs 86 and 87 of the patent in suit).</div><div><br /></div><div>2.2 The respondent pointed out in section 51 of their rejoinder that the disputed patent describes several synthesis examples providing a detailed description of catalysts and reaction conditions used for the preparation of the material of claim 1. Indeed, specific preparation methods are described in paragraphs 186 to 198 of the patent in suit for thirteen copolymers for which the feed rates for ethylene, the comonomer, the catalyst and aluminium-based co-catalyst compounds, as well as the amount of aluminium residue in the produced copolymers, are indicated.</div><div><br /></div><div>Despite the fact that some of the copolymers produced are not in accordance with the present invention, as they do not meet all properties recited in claim 1, these preparation methods nevertheless show how the skilled person wishing to prepare a copolymer comprising an amount of aluminium residue as required by granted claim 1 would adjust the feed rates of ethylene, alpha-olefin, catalyst and aluminium-based co-catalyst compounds so as to obtain the copolymers defined in claim 1 of the patent in suit.</div><div><br /></div><div>The appellant did not argue, let alone provide any evidence, that the skilled person, repeating the teaching provided in the patent in suit and using a reasonable amount of experimentation, would not be in the position to obtain the ethylene/alpha-olefin copolymer meeting the parametric definition of claim 1, including the amount of residual aluminium.</div><div><br /></div><div>2.3 The appellant's objection that the skilled person is not in a position to perform the invention rather concerns the ability of the skilled person to accurately determine the amount of aluminium in an ethylene/alpha-olefin copolymer, when aiming at verifying whether the amount of residual aluminium targeted is in accordance with granted claim 1.</div><div><br /></div><div>It is however not contested that the skilled person would find in paragraph 172 of the patent in suit the relevant teaching for said measurement, according to which the ethylene/alpha-olefin copolymer is decomposed by a wet process and then diluted with pure water to a given final volume, the amount of aluminium being quantified using a specific spectrometer. It is therefore concluded that the skilled person would find, after performing a few experiments, suitable conditions (particle size of copolymer sample to be analysed, type of acid, concentration, temperature and time) to effectively decompose the ethylene/alpha-olefin copolymer in order to reliably measure the content of aluminium in a given copolymer sample. Reference is made in this respect to D12 (see D12a and D12b), D13 (see D13a and D13b) and D16, which provide general guidance on how to decompose organic material such as plastics (D12 and D16) for the purpose of determining the content of metal elements comprised therein.</div><div><br /></div><div>2.4 The argument concerning the difficulty in exactly determining the amount of aluminium in a given ethylene/alpha-olefin copolymer in the absence of any indication of said specific experimental conditions boils down to the argument that the boundaries of granted claim 1 are not clearly defined. This a matter of clarity, which, in view of the ruling of G 3/14 (OJ EPO 2015, A102), cannot be examined.</div><div><br /></div><div>The alleged lack of accuracy for the measurement of the content of aluminium residue, however, has not been argued to constitute an obstacle for the skilled person seeking to reproduce the claimed material when using a specific set of conditions for decomposing the ethylene/alpha-olefin copolymer. The Board has no reason to take a different view. It is observed in this context that Synthesis Examples 2 and 13 of the patent in suit show that copolymers meeting all other requirements of claim 1 can be prepared, even if the amount of aluminium residue is outside the range defined in operative claim 1. This shows that an achievement of the exact amount of aluminium residue defined in granted claim 1 is not critical in order to meet the other parametric requirements of claim 1 when ethylene/alpha-olefin copolymers are prepared in accordance with the instructions given in the patent in suit.</div><div><br /></div><div>2.5 The appellant's argument that the amount of aluminium would be the only novel parameter of the present invention or would be critical to its inventiveness has no bearing on the assessment of sufficiency of disclosure, which constitutes a separate requirement of the EPC.</div><div><br /></div><div>2.6 In view of the above analysis, it is concluded that the subject-matter of the granted patent fulfills the requirements of sufficiency of disclosure.</div><div><br /></div><div>Inventive step</div><div><br /></div><div>3. The appellant objects that the claims as granted lack inventive step in view of the disclosure of document D1, particularly its Example 3 with the commercially available product ENGAGE® 8400.</div><div><br /></div><div>Closest prior art</div><div><br /></div><div>3.1 In this respect, the appellant submits that ENGAGE® 8400, which is described in D1 in Example 3 (page 30) and Tables 1 and 7 (pages 31 and 39) as being suitable for the manufacture of solar cell modules, represents an appropriate starting point for the present invention and therefore the closest prior art for assessing inventive step. According to the appellant ENGAGE® 8400, an ethylene/1-octene copolymer having an MI of 30 g/10 min and a density of 0.870 g/cm**(3), fulfills all the requirements of claim 1, with the exception of the content of aluminium which is indicated to be 4.4 ppm (point 31 of the statement of grounds of appeal). The appellant refers in this respect to the experimental report submitted with the letter of the respondent (then applicant) of 20 February 2015.</div><div><br /></div><div>3.2 The reproducibility of ENGAGE® 8400 is questioned by the respondent with reference to opinion G 1/92. The respondent accordingly also contests that this product, as described in D1, could be regarded as the closest prior art for the assessment of inventive step.</div><div><br /></div><div>3.3 The appellant dismisses the respondent's argument that ENGAGE® 8400 is itself somehow insufficient under opinion G l/92 (point 40 of the statement of grounds of appeal). As submitted at the oral proceedings, the appellant does not accept that the product reproduced should be exactly the same, as this would represent in the present technical field an insurmountable hurdle. According to the appellant, irrespective of the extent in which the ENGAGE® 8400 polymer can be reproduced, certain properties of that material, which are covered by the claimed subject-matter, such as the density, MFR, shore hardness, and comonomer content together with the product itself have been placed in the public domain, as shown by D1, D2 and D5/D5a. It would be incorrect and unreasonable if such publically available information of a commercially available product could be disregarded on the basis that the specific commercial material could not be exactly reproduced.</div><div><br /></div><div>3.4 While the respondent does not dispute that ENGAGE® 8400 was commercially available and fulfilled all properties of claim 1 as granted, with the exception of the content of aluminium, it argued, relying on paragraph 1.4 of the Reasons for opinion G 1/92 and decision T 23/11, that the commercial product ENGAGE® 8400 had not been made available to the public within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC.</div><div><br /></div><div>According to the respondent's submissions based on the above mentioned opinion and decision, the availability to the public within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC of the commercial product ENGAGE® 8400 would require that the skilled person is able to produce a polymer that it is not somewhat similar to, but is exactly ENGAGE® 8400 and this without undue burden (points 75 to 79 of the rejoinder). The Board notes that this argument of the respondent also implies that an exact analysis of the commercial product ENGAGE® 8400 can be carried out. The respondent submits that reverse-engineering a commercial polymer without knowledge of the synthesis conditions, in particular the specific catalysts and reaction conditions would require an extensive research programme, for which success is not even guaranteed. The need to perform such a research programme would represent an undue burden (respondent's letter of 18 August 2022, page 3, 4th paragraph), with the consequence that the commercial product ENGAGE® 8400 could not be considered enabled and thus could also not constitute prior art. The respondent is therefore of the view that the closest prior art is the generic disclosure of D1, which is, however, structurally more remote than the examples of D1 using ENGAGE® 8400, as it does not provide any limitation on MFR or Shore A hardness (point 88 of the rejoinder).</div><div><br /></div><div>4. It follows that in the present case the determination of the closest prior art, which is the first stage of so-called "problem-solution approach" used for an objective and predictable assessment of inventive step (G 1/19, OJ EPO 2021, A77, point 26 of the Reasons), depends on the application of opinion G 1/92.</div><div><br /></div><div>5. However, as shown in detail below, diverging approaches by the Boards of Appeal exist with regard to the application of opinion G 1/92. In addition, in line with the appellant's submissions during the oral proceedings and in letter dated 12 July 2022, the determination of which features of ENGAGE® 8400 can be considered to be known to the skilled person, either by analysis or through indications in documents which have been published before the filing date of the patent in suit, is also dependent on the application of opinion G 1/92.</div><div><br /></div><div>For the reasons set out in detail below, the Board therefore considers it necessary to seek clarification by the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the questions referred to in the Order of the present decision (Article 112(1)(a) EPC).</div></div><div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Reasons for the referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>6. Under Article 112(1)(a) EPC, the board of appeal shall, during proceedings on a case and either of its own motion or following a request from a party to the appeal, refer specific questions of law to the Enlarged Board of Appeal if it considers that a decision of the Enlarged Board is required in order to ensure a uniform application of the law or it considers that clarification of the referred questions concerns a point of law of fundamental importance.</div><div><br /></div><div>As to the admissibility of a referral, it is generally considered necessary that the decision of the Enlarged Board on the questions referred to it be decisive for the outcome of the referral case.</div><div><br /></div><div>7. With regard to the present case, the appellant only raised objections under Article 100(b) EPC and Article 100(a) in conjunction with Article 56 EPC against the patent as granted. After acknowledging sufficiency of disclosure (see point 2. and following above), the sole issue to be decided upon for the main request is thus the appellant's objection of lack of inventive step, based on the product ENGAGE® 8400, described in example 3 of document D1, as the closest prior art. As indicated above, clarification regarding the application of G 1/92, particularly as to the extent to which the commercial product ENGAGE® 8400 must be reproducible by the skilled person in order to constitute prior art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC, appears decisive for assessing inventive step of claim 1 as granted. Since the Board follows the appellant's argument that the product ENGAGE® 8400, if acknowledged as prior art, is likely to prejudice inventive step of claim 1 as granted, also on account of D18, which it admitted into the appeal proceedings (see point 1.4 above) and which teaches a level of aluminium overlapping with the range defined in claim 1 as granted, the question to be clarified is essential for the outcome of the present case.</div><div><br /></div><div>The Board further notes that the question at stake is of considerable practical relevance, rather than merely theoretical, as it potentially arises whenever the assessment of prior art involves the possibility to analyse and reproduce the chemical composition of a commercially available product. The Board therefore finds that the requirements of Article 112(1)(a) EPC are met.</div><div><br /></div><div>Opinion G 1/92</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>8. Opinion G 1/92 concerns the interpretation of the requirement "made available to the public" referred to in Article 54(2) EPC in relation to the prior use of a product (point 1.1 of the Reasons for the opinion). In line with the absence of a distinction in the EPC, the opinion concerns any product such as chemical products and mechanical or electrical articles. The conclusion and the corresponding headnote of the opinion read:</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>"1. The chemical composition of a product is state of the art when the product as such is available to the public and can be analysed and reproduced by the skilled person, irrespective of whether or not particular reasons can be identified for analysing the composition.</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>2. The same principle applies mutatis mutandis to any other product."</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>8.1 Paragraph 1.4 of the Reasons for the opinion reads: "An essential purpose of any technical teaching is to enable the person skilled in the art to manufacture or use a given product by applying such teaching. Where such teaching results from a product put on the market, the person skilled in the art will have to rely on his general technical knowledge to gather all information enabling him to prepare the said product. Where it is possible for the skilled person to discover the composition or the internal structure of the product and to reproduce it without undue burden, then both the product and its composition or internal structure become state of the art".</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>8.2 Having regard to the meaning of the expression "the state of the art" used in Article 54(2) EPC, the last sentence of paragraph 1.4 of the Reasons for the opinion G 1/92 could appear to indicate that a product put on the market becomes state of the art and therefore available to the public only when the composition or internal structure of the product can be discovered and reproduced without undue burden. The reproducibility of the product as a criterion for its availability to the public also appears in the first sentence of paragraph 2.1 of the Reasons for the opinion, in which it was held that taking into account any particular reasons for the public to identify the composition or internal structure of a product put on the market "would remove a commercially available and reproducible product from the public domain".</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>8.3 The question, however, arises whether the exclusion of a product put on the market as regard to its availability to the public within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC could have been meant by the Enlarged Board, since the precondition of the analysis of said product as appearing in the conclusion of G 1/92 is that "the product as such is available to the public".</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>This would also appear to be in contradiction with the statement of the Enlarged Board in point 10 and point 8 of the Reasons for decisions G 2/88 and G 6/88 (OJ 1990, 93 and 114), respectively, regarding the meaning of the term "available" when defining what constitutes the state of the art in accordance with Article 54(2) EPC.</div><div><br /></div><div>8.4 Article 54(2) EPC reads: "The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the European patent application."</div><div><br /></div><div>As highlighted in the first paragraph of point 2.1 of the Reasons of T 952/92 (OJ 1995, 755) dealing with the interpretation of opinion G 1/92, the Enlarged Board stressed in decisions G 2/88 and G 6/88 that the word "available" within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC carried with it the idea that, for lack of novelty to be found, all the technical features of the claimed invention in combination must have been communicated to the public, or laid open for inspection.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">8.5 The mere fact that a product was put on the market would therefore appear to result in that product being laid open for inspection (and therefore "available"), which obviously constitutes a logical requirement or precondition for analysing the product in accordance with the requirements indicated in opinion G 1/92, as reflected in point 1 of the conclusion of the opinion and the corresponding headnote by the wording "when the product as such is available to the public".</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">8.6 The respondent submits that the condition "when the product as such is available to the public" defined in the headnote of opinion G 1/92 is meant to define "when the product is accessible to a member of the public", so that an analysis and attempt of reproduction can be performed (see items 9 and 12 of the annex to the respondent's letter of 18 August 2022). Following that reading, no possible contradiction would be present between the headnote and paragraph 1.4 of the Reasons.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>8.6.1 The respondent's view is based on a passage of point 6.5.4 of the Reasons of decision T 1553/06 of 12 March 2012, quoting point 2.1 of the Reasons for T 952/92. This passage reads: "whatever the means of disclosure (written description, oral description, use, etc.), availability in the sense of Article 54(2) EPC involves two separate stages: availability of the means of disclosure, and availability of information which is accessible and derivable from such means."</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">8.6.2 Accordingly, the respondent is of the view that opinion G 1/92 should be interpreted as to stipulate three essential criteria for a product to become "available to the public" in the sense of Article 54(2) EPC (see item 14 of the annex to the respondent's letter of 18 August 2022):</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">1. a member of the public is able to access the product;</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">2. a skilled person must be able to analyse the composition or internal structure (i.e. must be able to access the information that is inherent to the product); and</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">3. a skilled person must be able to reproduce the product based on common knowledge and without undue burden, as only then it represents a complete technical teaching.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>8.6.3 Regarding the first criterion, the respondent submits that access by the public of the product, i.e. availability for an analysis, is similar to the availability of a written document to the public from which information can be gained.</div><div><br /></div><div>The Board can follow the respondent's position in that the possibility of a direct and unambiguous access to some particular means of disclosure, in the present case a commercial product, is a logical precedent to its analysability.</div><div><br /></div><div>8.6.4 Concerning the third criterion, the respondent generally refers to the section of the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO in its 9th version which has the title "Reproducibility of the content of the disclosure" and which is to be found under the same numbering I.C.4.11 in its 10th edition of 2022 (in the following "Case Law"). The respondent specifically refers to decision T 206/83 (OJ EPO 1987, 5).</div><div><br /></div><div>9. It may indeed be useful for the purpose of better understanding the enablement criterion set out in opinion G 1/92 and its implications concerning the assessment of patentability to consider the existing case law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO at the date of the opinion concerning enablement of a disclosure in relation to patentability requirements. The decisions which are relevant in this respect and which address the meaning of "available to the public" are T 206/83 cited by the respondent, as well as T 26/85 (OJ 1990, 22).</div><div><br /></div><div>9.1 The Board stated in section 2 of the Reasons for decision T 206/83 that "...a compound defined by its chemical structure can only be regarded as being disclosed in a particular document if it has been "made available to the public" in the sense of Article 54(2) EPC." The Board added in the same section that "This need for an enabling disclosure not only applies to documents cited under Article 54(2) and (3) EPC but is also in conformity with the principle expressed in Article 83 EPC for patent applications which must, accordingly, "disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art" (emphasis added). The requirements as to the sufficiency of disclosure are, therefore, stated to be identical in all these instances."</div><div><br /></div><div>It was concluded in T 206/83 that the compounds described in a prior art document cited under Article 54(3) EPC and which were alleged to be novelty destroying were not effectively disclosed in view of the insufficiency of the disclosure (points 11 and 12 of the Reasons).</div><div><br /></div><div>9.2 In T 26/85 the Board held in point 8 of the Reasons that the wording in Article 54 EPC "an invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art" which "shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by means of a written ... description ..." was not to be interpreted to apply only to the means of disclosure (e.g. the written description). It should equally apply "to the content, in the sense that anything comprised in the state of the art can only be regarded as having been made available to the public in so far as the information given to the person skilled in the art is sufficient to enable him to practice the technical teaching which is the subject of the disclosure, taking into account also the general knowledge in the field to be expected of him".</div><div><br /></div><div>9.3 These two decisions therefore convey the idea that the enablement of a disclosure is a necessary condition for this disclosure to have been made available to the public within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC. In other words, a disclosure which is not enabling would not be comprised in the state of the art defined in Article 54(2) EPC. This appears also to be the rationale underlying the reasoning of the Enlarged Board in point 1.4 of the Reasons for opinion G 1/92.</div><div><br /></div><div>Meaning of "available to the public" according to the Travaux Préparatoires to the EPC</div><div><br /></div><div>10. In order to understand the legislative intent underlying the expression "available to the public", it appears helpful to consult the historical documentation related to the genesis of Article 54 EPC, whose parts mentioned below have been identified as particularly relevant.</div><div><br /></div><div>10.1 Proceedings of the 1st meeting of the Patents Working Party held at Brussels from 17 to 28 April 1961 (LT 234/82, Section 5, IV/2767/61-E)</div><div><br /></div><div>According to the minutes of the meeting on 18 April 1961 in which Article 14 of the Preliminary Draft concerning novelty was discussed (page 12, second paragraph), "the Working Party decided to adopt the wording "available to the public". The word "available" emphasised the possibility of taking note of the invention." According to the third paragraph on the same page, "the Chairman stated that an invention was only disclosed if, by virtue of the disclosure, a person skilled in the art could carry out the invention. It did not seem necessary for this principle to be expressly stated in the Convention. If the matter made available to the public did not allow the invention to be carried out, the invention remained novel."</div><div><br /></div><div>The Working Party instructed the Drafting Committee to draw up the text of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 14 in accordance with the results of the discussions (page 12, fifth paragraph of the document). The text of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 14 defining novelty was adopted in the meeting of 20 April 1961 (page 47). Its wording on page 5 of document IV/2498/1/61-E is essentially the same as that of Article 54(2) EPC. It reads:</div><div><br /></div><div>"(1) An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art.</div><div><br /></div><div>(2) The state of the art shall comprise everything made available to the public before the date of filing of the European patent application, by means of a written or oral description, by use or in any other way."</div><div><br /></div><div>That text of the Working Party is the same (apart from a reordering of the wording in paragraph (2)) as that comprised in the Preliminary Draft Convention for a European System for the Grant of Patents (BR/6/69, page 19).</div><div><br /></div><div>10.2 Proceedings of the 5th meeting of the Patents Working Party held at Brussels from 2 to 18 April 1962 (LT 234/82, Section 4, 3076/IV/62-E)</div><div><br /></div><div>The relevant passages of that document are the last paragraph of page 141 and the three first paragraphs of page 142 which read:</div><div><br /></div><div>"Regarding paragraph 2 of Article 14, Mr. Fressonnet drew attention to the French proposal which specified that the prior art had to be made available in a manner adequate to enable a skilled person to produce the subject-matter of the publication.</div><div><br /></div><div>Mr. van Benthem pointed out that that proposed wording amounted to a change of substance. The condition proposed by Mr. Fressonnet was to be found in the Netherlands law and in practice it was a very strict criterion. Very often the descriptions given in patent applications were not sufficient to carry out the inventions. If the French wording were adopted, such prior applications and patents could not be regarded as forming part of the state of the art. Furthermore, there were also purely theoretical publications which could not technically be carried out directly. They were, however, still part of the state of the art.</div><div><br /></div><div>Mr. Fressonnet said that it was not the intention of the French delegation to change the substance of Article 14(2). He therefore agreed with the majority of the Working Party.</div><div><br /></div><div>Article 14 was adopted without any change beyond those agreed on earlier."</div><div><br /></div><div>10.3 Proceedings of the 10th meeting of the Patents Working Party held at Brussels from 16 to 27 September 1963 (LT 234/82, Section 11, 9081/IV/63-E)</div><div><br /></div><div>The relevant part of that document is to be found on page 66 (highlighting by the Board). It reads:</div><div><br /></div><div>"AIPPI wanted formal proof to be required of the content and date of oral disclosure.</div><div><br /></div><div>UNICE felt that a general description of an inventive idea should not destroy its novelty and proposed the following wording: "the state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public, in a manner sufficient to enable the invention to be carried out ... ". Finally UNION would like the term "public" to be defined.</div><div><br /></div><div>The views of the Austrian Government were similar to those of UNION.</div><div><br /></div><div>The Chairman summarised the problems regarding paragraph 2:</div><div><br /></div><div>1. Additional evidence is wanted in connection with oral disclosure.</div><div><br /></div><div>2. Further definition is wanted of the description.</div><div><br /></div><div>3. Further definition of the word "public" is also wanted.</div><div><br /></div><div>Regarding the first problem, the Working Party was unanimous that there was no need for specific evidence regarding oral disclosure.</div><div><br /></div><div>The question could safely be left to the courts which were used to such evidence.</div><div><br /></div><div>The Working Party also rejected the second suggestion. It preferred the current, more objective wording."</div><div><br /></div><div>10.4 Based on the above documents relating to the genesis of Article 54 EPC, it would therefore appear that the expression "available to the public" in Article 54(2) EPC was intended to express the possibility of the public to take note of the prior art, i.e. the accessibility to the public of the prior art, without any requirement as to its enablement. The requirement to reproduce the product without undue burden in section 1.4 of the Reasons of opinion G 1/92 would appear to go beyond the intended meaning of "available to the public" in Article 54(2) EPC.</div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">10.5 This could be seen to imply that any element of the composition or internal structure of a product put on the market which can be discovered by the skilled person per analysis is state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC, irrespective of the reproducibility of the product by the skilled person.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>Diverging applications of opinion G 1/92 in the case law and relevance for the present case</div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>11. In the case law of the Boards of Appeal, diverging approaches have been adopted in applying opinion G 1/92. The present Board has identified divergent decisions with regard to the following aspects:</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>(i) interpretation of "available to the public" leading to the exclusion from the state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC of the product itself (including its chemical composition/internal structure) or only of its chemical composition/internal structure,</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>(ii) the degree of detail required for the analysis of said product and</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>(iii) the requirements for its reproducibility.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>As shown below, a proper application of opinion G 1/92 in relation to these three aspects is essential for the present case.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">(i) Exclusion of the state of the art</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">12. The Boards have reached diverging conclusions when it was found that the product put on the market could not be analysed or reproduced, deciding either that (a) its chemical composition (or internal structure) was not state of the art (T 946/04 of 2 March 2006, point 3.31 of the Reasons; T 1666/16 of 23 January 2020, point 11 of the Reasons), i.e. adopting the wording of the conclusion of opinion of G 1/92, or that (b) the product itself was not state of the art, thus including its chemical composition or internal structure (T 370/02 of 14 December 2006, point 8.8 of the Reasons; T 2045/09 of 14 May 2014, points 29 to 39 of the Reasons; T 1833/14 of 7 December 2017, points 1.9 and 1.10 of the Reasons; T 23/11, point 2.5 of the Reasons) based on the wording in point 1.4 of the Reasons for opinion G 1/92.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">12.1 While the difference may seem of theoretical interest at first sight, it may lead in practice to significantly different conclusions. As a direct example related to the present case, if in application of opinion G 1/92 a product is not state of the art pursuant to Article 54(2) EPC, that product cannot be used as starting point for assessing inventive step.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">If the conclusion is only that its composition is not state of the art, but the product itself is still state of the art as commercially available, it could be used as a starting point for the assessment of inventive step, should technical information about that product reported in documents of the state of the art, including its potential uses and advantages, make it of particular interest for the skilled person. This is the case in the present appeal, as the commercial product ENGAGE® 8400 is shown in the examples of D1 to be suitable for the same purpose as the present invention, namely as an encapsulating material for solar cells and solar cell modules.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>12.2 The mere fact that the chemical composition of a product proposed as starting point for assessing inventive step would not be state of the art, for example because it could not be fully analysed or exactly reproduced, does not necessarily mean that a different claimed composition which solves a particular problem over said commercial product is necessarily inventive.<span style="color: #990000;"> This rather depends on the peculiarities of the case at issue. This would be particularly relevant in a situation like the present one in which leaflets for a sold product are available providing information on it, which would already be sufficient for comparing the product with the subject-matter claimed, without further analysis of the product's exact composition. It is undisputed in the present case that the leaflets available for ENGAGE® 8400 do not disclose the aluminium content of that product, but that they demonstrate that said commercial product fulfills all the other requirements of claim 1.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>12.3 Accordingly, as shown in the present case and also illustrated by certain decisions of the Boards (T 505/15 of 11 July 2017, points 2 to 3.1 of the Reasons; T 2458/09 of 30 June 2014, point 6.1 of the Reasons) the question of applying opinion G 1/92 in order to assess the availability of the chemical composition of a product put on the market in relation to inventive step issues, in particular to decide whether said product could constitute the closest prior art, is not only theoretical.</div><div><br /></div><div>(ii) and (iii) Analysability and reproducibility</div><div><br /></div><div>13. Concerning the ability to analyse and reproduce a commercial product such as ENGAGE® 8400 which is a polyolefin it is important to bear in mind, as outlined by the respondent in point 78 of their rejoinder that "a polymer is a complex material and a mixture of different molecules of different weights and structures that interact with each other in certain ways".</div><div><br /></div><div>13.1 Indeed like many other synthetic polymers, polyolefins exhibit complex molecular structures. They do not consist of a single molecular compound whose composition and structure can be easily determined and defined, but, at a molecular level, of a complex mixture of heterogeneous polymeric chains, e.g. in terms of molar mass, the incorporation of the comonomer between the chains and within the chains, branching and stereoregularity. At a larger scale, the definition of the polymer includes other aspects such as the orientation of the various polymeric chains which fill the available space and entangle. This is the reason why polyolefins, although their monomers are composed of only carbon and hydrogen atoms, have a complex three dimensional structure. For these reasons, polyolefins are usually defined in terms of various properties and statistical parameters at a macroscopical level which relate to their structure.</div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">13.2 A decision on the ability of the skilled person to reproduce a product put on the market (as a condition according to the Headnote of G 1/92), which one could understand as the ability to reproduce it identically, in the sense that the product put on the market and that reproduced are indistinguishable for the skilled person, would not only require an assessment of the level of detail or type of characterisation required for analysing a given product, but also a definition of the degree of variance which can be accepted in order to qualify the product reproduced to be identical to that put on the market.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>13.2.1 In this respect, the difficulty in fully defining a polyolefin would reside in the apparent absence of a generally recognised definition in the art of what would constitute a comprehensive analysis of such a type of polymer. While the assessment of whether a product falls within the ambit of what is claimed is based on an objectively defined reference, i.e. the combination of features claimed, assessing whether a commercial product has been reproduced would necessitate first a definition of that product which would appear to be dependent on deliberate choices concerning the aspects of the composition or structure to be analysed and the level of identity required.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">13.2.2 Accordingly, if the assessment of whether a product put on the market and its chemical composition/internal structure belong to the state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC were made dependent on the possibility to exactly replicate that product, this assessment would appear to entail, at least in the present field, the use of subjective criteria, resulting in legal uncertainty when novelty and inventive step need to be examined in the light of said product. It is however clear from opinion G 1/92 that the Enlarged Board, for reasons of legal certainty, did not wish to provide a definition of the state of the art which would result in a subjective assessment of novelty (see last sentence of point 2.1 of the Reasons for the opinion). There is also no apparent reason why this should be different when the ability to analyse and reproduce a commercial product becomes critical for assessing inventive step, e.g. when said product is proposed as the closest prior art.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>13.2.3 Taking into account that the Enlarged Board stated that the same principle should apply mutatis mutandis to any other product, this would be also pertinent for example for mechanical or electrical products made of a large amount of various components. Should the analysis in that case be confined to some structural elements? To what extent? Should the analysis comprise the chemical composition of those components and to what extent? Should this be required even if some of these characteristics are not relevant for the subject-matter under examination? These questions constitute only examples illustrating the difficulty in appreciating the level of information needed for the analysis and the reproduction of a product put on the market in order to apply what could seemingly appear to be a criterion for assessing whether the product or its chemical composition/internal structure become state of the art (i.e. is available to the public within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC).</div><div><br /></div><div>14. The Boards have taken diverging views regarding the degree of analysis required for a commercial product to determine its composition or internal structure in the sense of opinion G 1/92. Whereas some Boards took as a criterion the exact composition of the product, in other decisions such a strict condition was not required.</div><div><br /></div><div>14.1 In T 946/04 (points 3.8.3, 3.8.4 and 3.9 of the Reasons) the Board required that the exact composition of the sold product be determinable, i.e. that a complete analysis had been carried out. This was considered to be in line with the requirements set out in G 1/92.</div><div><br /></div><div>In T 2068/15 of 25 January 2017 (points 2.6 to 2.6.4 of the Reasons), the Board considered that the condition of analysability of G 1/92 was met as the skilled person at the priority date of the patent would have been able to determine the exact composition of the product sold.</div><div><br /></div><div>Novelty was denied in T 877/11 of 30 September 2014 (points 2.4 and 2.5 of the Reasons) on the ground that a detailed and precise analysis regarding the composition of the commercial product could indeed be carried out without difficulty in order to determine at least the main components of that product.</div><div><br /></div><div>14.2 Instead, in decision T 952/92 (point 4.4 of the Reasons) the Board, also relying on opinion G 1/92, took the view that a complete analysis of a product put on the market was not required to take away the novelty of the claimed subject-matter, but that it was sufficient to inform a person skilled in the art that the product had a composition falling within the terms of the claimed subject-matter.</div><div><br /></div><div>This approach was also followed in T 1452/16 of 20 September 2017 (points 4.4 and 4.5 of the Reasons).</div><div><br /></div><div>In T 2048/12 of 19 January 2016 (point 2.4.3 of the Reasons) it was held that opinion G 1/92 did not imply that the commercial availability of a chemical product as such necessarily amounted to a disclosure of (also) all the impurities contained therein without being mentioned in the context of the product's commercialisation, let alone of their respective relative amounts, merely because it was possible to identify and quantify these impurities by analytical means.</div><div><br /></div><div>In decision T 2458/09 (point 6.1 of the Reasons, last but one paragraph) in which the commercial product Omnic® had been taken as closest prior art (see above point 13.3), it was held that the absence of certainty about the knowledge of some structural elements of Omnic® did not disqualify that product as the closest prior art. The skilled person would take the information that had been made publicly available when selecting a particular prior art as starting point. This was the case for the publicly available commercial product Omnic®, and it would have also been the case if the disclosure was in a written prior-art document. It was held that these findings were not in contradiction with the principles set out in Enlarged Board of Appeal opinion G 1/92 and applied in decision T 952/92.</div><div><br /></div><div>15. The situation is similar with regard to the reproducibility condition. Whereas some Boards have taken as a criterion the ability to exactly reproduce the product, in other decisions such a strict condition has not been required.</div><div><br /></div><div>15.1 In T 977/93 (OJ 2001, 84, points 11.1 to 13 of the Reasons) the reproducibility condition according to opinion G 1/92 was considered not met as it was impossible to establish the identity of the reproduced vaccine with the starting vaccine.</div><div><br /></div><div>In T 1833/14 (points 1.4 to 1.7 of the Reasons), when analysing whether the reproducibility condition in opinion G 1/92 had been met, the Board stated that the relevant question was whether or not the skilled person would have been in the position to prepare the product as such, i.e. a sample identical to the product of the prior use in all its properties and not only in those specified in the relevant claim.</div><div><br /></div><div>15.2 The need for a complete analysis, so as to enable an exact reproduction of the product in question, was instead not considered necessary in T 952/92. In a detailed analysis of opinion G 1/92, the Board firstly stated in point 2.1 of the Reasons that "the disclosure of a product which has been used is the information that a skilled person can learn from it, either visually or by analysis for example". It then added in point 2.2 of the Reasons that "it is the fact that direct and unambiguous access to information concerning the composition or internal structure of a prior used product is possible, for example by means of analysis, which makes such composition or internal structure "available to the public" and thus part of the state of the art for the purpose of Article 54(2) EPC" and concluded in the last paragraph of point 2.3 of the Reasons that "The novelty of a claimed invention is destroyed by the prior use of a product, for example, sale of a product, if an analysis of a product using available analytical techniques is such as to inform the skilled person of an embodiment of the product which falls within the claim of the patent" thereby not accepting "the patent proprietor's submissions to the effect that a complete analysis of a prior used product must be possible, so as to enable an exact reproduction of such product, in order to destroy the novelty of the claimed product."</div><div><br /></div><div>In T 1540/21 of 23 February 2023 (points 3.8.5 to 3.8.9 of the Reasons) the Board, following T 952/92, considered that the reproducibility condition in opinion G 1/92 did not require a full reproduction of the product in question.</div><div><br /></div><div>In T 1452/16 (point 4.5 of the Reasons) the reproducibility addressed was that of the combination of features of the claim under consideration which had been identified (analysed) to be present in the commercial product.</div><div><br /></div><div>15.3 In other decisions some Boards relying on opinion G 1/92 have considered that a product put on the market was novelty destroying or represented the closest prior art without explicitly addressing or only partially addressing its reproducibility.</div><div><br /></div><div>In T 510/10 of 17 April 2012 (point 2.3 to 2.7 of the Reasons) and T 326/01 of 23 November 2005 (points 4 to 6 of the Reasons), it was considered in the Reasons whether the features defined in the claim could be identified in the commercial product by analysis, which had been contested by the patentee. There is no indication as to whether the patentee also contested the reproducibility of the product, whether that condition was implicitly considered to be met or whether it did not play any role in the Board's reasoning.</div><div><br /></div><div>In T 877/11 (points 2.4 and 2.5 of the Reasons) it was held that a detailed and precise analysis regarding the composition of the chewing gum Nicotinell® could indeed be carried out without difficulty in order to determine at least the main components of the chewing gum. Reproducibility was mentioned as a precondition, but not addressed in any detail.</div><div><br /></div><div>In decision T 2458/09 (point 6.1 of the Reasons) in which the commercial product Omnic® had been taken as the closest prior art, the reproducibility of the commercial product was not addressed.</div><div><br /></div><div>16. The existence of diverging interpretations of opinion G 1/92 can also be illustrated by reference to the decision of the High Court of England and Wales TAKEDA UK LTD v F. HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE AG [2019] EWHC 1911, in particular its sections 119 to 135. The Court considered that the correct approach to read opinion G 1/92 regarding the question of how exact the reproduction of the product must be, was that, as long as the information the skilled person could obtain by analysing the product enabled the skilled person to produce a version of the product anticipating the claim, it would lack novelty (see in particular points 122, 130 and 193). The fact that other characteristics of a product could not be determined or reproduced did not mean that no information about the product (composition) at all had been put into the state of the art by the prior use (point 125). This was particularly valid if the feature which could not be reproduced had nothing to do with the invention (point 126). The Court not only identified the divergent approaches in the EPO case law, but clearly considered the one interpreting G 1/92 as requiring that for a product to be state of the art the skilled person would have to be in the position to prepare the product as such, in all its properties (not only those specified in the claimed subject-matter), as going beyond the spirit of G 1/92 (point 124).</div><div><br /></div><div>17. A similar conclusion is drawn in some literature, which considers the approach of the "full reproducibility" of the marketed product (as endorsed for instance in T 977/93 and T 1833/14) as not mandatorily required by G 1/92 (see Moufang in Schulte, Patentgesetz mit EPÜ, 11. Auflage, § 3 Rn 56, footnote 172). It is observed that following this approach a patent applicant would have the possibility of obtaining patent protection for a product despite this having being on the market for a long time. Commercially available products should not become subsequently object of patent protection.</div><div><br /></div><div>18. On the basis of the analysis in above points 14 to 17, the Board cannot follow the respondent's submission (points 43 to 51 of the annex to their letter of 18 August 2022) that no divergence would be present in the case law regarding the reproducibility condition, this condition requiring the ability to exactly reproduce the product in question.</div><div><br /></div><div>Additional considerations</div><div><br /></div><div>19. The respondent addressed in point 54 of the annex to their letter of 18 August 2022 (page 18) the situation of a commercial product whose production would require know-how that the manufacturer willingly kept secret resulting in said product not being enabled without that information. According to the respondent, considering in this case said product to be comprised in the state of the art under Article 54(2) EPC would result in an inventor to be deprived of their just reward for their contribution to the art which resides in disclosing to the public how the commercial product can actually be prepared. This touches upon the points addressed in the historical documentation related to the genesis of Article 54 EPC which are mentioned in above points 10 to 10.5. The question would arise in this case whether the just reward for the inventor's contribution to the art would be the product itself or the process for the manufacture of the product.</div><div><br /></div><div>20. In order to counter the position of the respondent and illustrate the case at hand, the appellant referred to the recipe for Coca Cola known to be secret. In the hypothetical situation of a claim merely defining a caramel color containing fizzy drink, could Coca Cola which undoubtedly falls within such definition, not be seen to anticipate such subject-matter? Could it be said that it is not state of the art that Coca Cola contains water, carbon dioxide and caramel color?</div><div><br /></div><div>21. The submissions of the parties on the issue underline the need to resolve the diverging views identified above regarding what is available to the public and the conditions of analysability and reproducibility. In answering the relevant questions it has to be taken into account that, other than in the case of a paper invention for which the product itself cannot be materialised, if the invention lacks enablement, a commercial product has come into existence and is accessible to the public for use and analysis.</div><div><br /></div><div>22. As an additional aspect, it appears of relevance to note that partial properties or structural information of a product put on the market are frequently reported in documentation such as technical leaflets, patents or scientific journals published before the relevant filing date. Comprehensive information about the composition or internal structure of those products is de facto never provided in said documentation. There is no apparent reason why such partial information about products put on the market reported in said literature without any information as to the reproducibility of said product, which information might even be the result of a partial analysis of said product performed by the authors of the publication, should be treated differently from any information which could be gained from a partial analysis of the same commercial product.</div><div><br /></div><div>23. An application of opinion G 1/92 requiring a full analysis of the product and its reproducibility without burden would have the consequence that the information about a characteristic of a commercial polymer which can be easily determined, e.g. its density or comonomer content, would be excluded from the state of the art, if it was not demonstrated that the product itself can be analysed and reproduced without undue burden, although this information might already have been made available to the public before the filing date by standard analysis or through product leaflets or patents.</div><div><br /></div><div>23.1 The respondent submits in this respect that such public information found for example in datasheets should not be treated differently and therefore should not be considered for the assessment of novelty and inventive step if the commercial product cannot be exactly reproduced. The appellant does not share this view and considers that it would be wrong for measurable or disclosed features of a known material to be considered invisible to the skilled person on the basis that they are measured or disclosed in connection with a commercial material whose specific preparation is a secret.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">23.2 This question is of particular relevance for the present appeal, as partial information about ENGAGE® 8400, which reflects its structure and composition and which is relevant for the features of the present claim 1, i.e. melt flow rate, density, Shore A hardness and octene content, is described in D1, D2 and D5/D5a (point 30 of the statement of grounds of appeal and point 85 of the rejoinder).</span></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></b></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">Conclusion</span></b></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></b></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">24. From the above, it can be seen that opinion G 1/92 has given rise to diverging interpretations by the Boards of Appeal over the past 30 years, leading to legal uncertainties when it comes to assessing what constitutes state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC in relation to a commercially available product. This results in the need to refer a number of questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal, both to ensure uniform application of the law and because points of law of fundamental importance have arisen. A decision as to under which conditions for a product put on the market before the filing date, as is the case for ENGAGE® 8400, the product itself and partial information about its composition published prior to the filing date is state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC is relevant to the present case, as the possibility to use such a product in the analysis of inventive step is decisive to determine the outcome of the case. In addition, the diverging interpretations made of G 1/92 are of considerable practical relevance in a large number of cases as illustrated by the various decisions mentioned above, and a mere theoretical importance is excluded.</span></b></div><div><br /></div><div><b>Order</b></div><div><b><br /></b></div><div>For these reasons it is decided that:</div><div><br /></div><div>The following questions are referred to the Enlarged Board of</div><div><br /></div><div>Appeal for decision:</div><div><br /></div><div>1. Is a product put on the market before the date of filing of a European patent application to be excluded from the state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC for the sole reason that its composition or internal structure could not be analysed and reproduced without undue burden by the skilled person before that date?</div><div><br /></div><div>2. If the answer to question 1 is no, is technical information about said product which was made available to the public before the filing date (e.g. by publication of technical brochure, non-patent or patent literature) state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC, irrespective of whether the composition or internal structure of the product could be analysed and reproduced without undue burden by the skilled person before that date?</div><div><br /></div><div>3. If the answer to question 1 is yes or the answer to question 2 is no, which criteria are to be applied in order to determine whether or not the composition or internal structure of the product could be analysed and reproduced without undue burden within the meaning of opinion G 1/92? In particular, is it required that the composition and internal structure of the product be fully analysable and identically reproducible?</div></div><div><br /></div><div><div><i>European Case Law Identifier ECLI:EP:BA:2023:T043819.20230627</i></div></div><div><i>For the full decision: refer to <a href="https://new.epo.org/en/boards-of-appeal/decisions/t190438ex1.html">https://new.epo.org/en/boards-of-appeal/decisions/t190438ex1.html</a> </i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i>Also refer to <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2023/20230629.html">https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2023/20230629.html</a> "Referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal – G 1/23 ("solar cell")" dd </i><i>29 June 2023.</i></div>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-78065189296611173212023-05-09T08:43:00.004+02:002023-05-09T08:43:44.692+02:00T 2432/19 - Right to oral proceedings in form of a videoconference (no)<p><i>In the present opposition appeal case, the Board issued a summons to oral proceedings in Haar. The appellant (patent proprietor) requested that the oral proceedings be held by videoconference. No reasons were given for this request. </i><i>The Board then issued a communication containing its provisional opinion. The parties were also informed that if the Board found it appropriate to do so, the oral proceedings might be held by videoconference. The parties were also asked to inform the Board if they wished to invoke any reasons against holding the oral proceedings by videoconference, for the case that the Board decided to use that format. The appellant repeated its request for oral proceedings by videoconference and stated that it knew of no reason why the oral proceedings could not be held by videoconference. </i><i>The respondent invoked no reasons against holding oral proceedings by videoconference, but requested that the Board inform the parties as soon as possible if it decided to hold the oral proceedings by videoconference. </i><i>Oral proceedings took place on the 25 April 2023 in person at the premises of the EPO in Haar. The Board argued that: 1. although the order of G 1/21 refers to an emergency situation, it follows from the ratio decidendi of this decision that in-person oral proceedings can only be denied under very limited conditions, even in a situation of general emergency such as a pandemic; 2. d</i><i>ue to the fact that videoconferences, at least with current technology, can only provide a suboptimal form of communication, parties have a right to the optimum format for oral proceedings, i.e. in-person oral proceedings, that can only be denied under very limited conditions; and 3. e contrario it also follows from the reasons underlying the Enlarged Board's decision, that parties cannot force Boards to conduct videoconferences instead of in-person oral proceedings.</i></p><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b style="background-color: transparent;">Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></div></div></div><div>I. An appeal was filed by the appellant (patent proprietor) against the decision of the opposition division revoking European Patent No. 2 087 873. The appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and the patent be maintained as granted or, in the alternative, on the basis of one of the first to ninth auxiliary requests.</div><div><br /></div><div>II. The respondent (opponent) requested that the appeal be dismissed.</div><div><br /></div><div>III. The Board issued a summons to oral proceedings in Haar.</div><div><br /></div><div>IV. With letter of 21 December 2022, the appellant requested that the oral proceedings be held by videoconference. No reasons were given for this request.</div><div><br /></div><div>V. The Board then issued a communication containing its provisional opinion, in which it indicated inter alia that the opposition ground under Article 100(c) EPC was considered to be prejudicial to maintenance of the patent as granted and that claim 1 of the first to ninth auxiliary requests were considered not to fulfil the requirement of Article 123(2) EPC. The parties were also informed that if the Board found it appropriate to do so, the oral proceedings might be held by videoconference. The parties were also asked to inform the Board if they wished to invoke any reasons against holding the oral proceedings by videoconference, for the case that the Board decided to use that format.</div><div><br /></div><div>VI. With letter dated 23 March 2023, the appellant filed new third to eighth auxiliary requests replacing its previous third to ninth auxiliary requests filed with the grounds of appeal. In the same letter, the appellant repeated its request for oral proceedings by videoconference and stated that it knew of no reason why the oral proceedings could not be held by videoconference.</div><div><br /></div><div>VII. The respondent invoked no reasons against holding oral proceedings by videoconference, but requested that the Board inform the parties as soon as possible if it decided to hold the oral proceedings by videoconference.</div><div><br /></div><div>VIII. Oral proceedings took place on the 25 April 2023 in person at the premises of the EPO in Haar.</div><div><br /></div><div>IX.-XII.[...]</div><div><br /></div><b>Reasons for the Decision</b><br /><br /><div>1. Request for oral proceedings by videoconference</div><div><br /></div><div>1.1 The Board summoned the parties to oral proceedings at the EPO premises.</div><div><br /></div><div>1.2 The appellant had however r<span style="color: #990000;">equested that the oral proceedings be held by videoconference </span>with its letters dated 21 December 2022 and 23 March 2023 but <span style="color: #990000;">had not given any arguments as to why the oral proceedings should take place by videoconference</span>. At the beginning of the oral proceedings before the Board, the Chairman addressed this issue and the appellant made no further arguments in this regard.</div><div><br /></div><div>1.3 According to <span style="color: #990000;">Article 15a(1) RPBA 2020, the Board may decide to hold oral proceedings by videoconference if the Board considers it appropriate to do so, </span>either upon request by a party or of its own motion.</div><div><br /></div><div>1.4 From the expression "if the board considers it appropriate", <span style="color: #990000;">it is evident that the Board has discretion to decide whether to hold oral proceedings by videoconference or not. <b>Nevertheless, the Board is of the view that the Enlarged Board of Appeal decision G 1/21 puts certain limits on how this discretion is to be exercised.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.5 <span style="color: #990000;">When interpreting Article 15a RPBA 2020, i</span>t must be borne in mind that provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal <span style="color: #990000;">are to be interpreted in a way that is compatible with the spirit and purpose of the Convention (cf. Article 23 RPBA 2020).</span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.5.1 <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The Enlarged Board of Appeal set out in G 1/21 the conditions under which a party's request for in-person proceedings may be denied. Accordingly, it set out principles which follow from the spirit and purpose of the Convention and which must therefore be taken into account when exercising discretion under Article 15a RPBA 2020. </b></span>The fact that Article 15a RPBA 2020 was not referred to specifically is of no relevance, since <span style="color: #990000;"><b>the Enlarged Board's decision was of a fundamental nature when exercising discretion on the issue of whether to hold oral proceedings via videoconference or not.</b></span> Moreover it is noted that A<span style="color: #990000;"><b>rticle 15a RPBA 2020 could easily be interpreted in a restrictive manner </b></span>so that it is compatible with the principles of G 1/21, which is anyway the mode of interpretation foreseen in Article 23 RPBA 2020.</div><div><br /></div><div>1.5.2 Of course G 1/21 is to a large degree directed to the situation of a general emergency (such as the pandemic situation prevailing at the time of its issue), but <span style="color: #990000;"><b>the overall understanding of the right to oral proceedings as provided for in the EPC underlying this decision is clearly derivable from the general considerations contained in the Reasons of that decision. As detailed below, the Enlarged Board's basic reasoning used in arriving at its final conclusion is quite general and unrelated to any general emergency considerations.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.6 In a recent case, the view has been expressed with regard to Article 15a RPBA 2020 that the exercise of discretion in deciding on the format of the oral proceedings was to be based on the criterion of the "appropriateness" of the format only - as set out in that provision -, and that no further criteria are binding for the exercise of discretion (see T 0618/21, point 2.3.1b)ii) of the Reasons). <span style="color: #990000;"><b>In the present Board's view, however, G 1/21 has established general criteria which need to be taken into account for the denial of a request for in-person oral proceedings, which apply not only to a situation of general emergency, but are valid also in non-emergency times.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.7 <b><span style="color: #990000;">G 1/21 states that in-person oral proceedings are the optimum format and that videoconferences - at least according to the current state of technology - do not meet this standard, i.e. </span>are not equivalent <span style="color: #990000;">[emphasis by the Board] to in-person oral proceedings</span></b>. T<span style="color: #990000;">his is <b>explicitly </b>stated in G 1/21 at several junctures such as:</span></div><div><ul style="text-align: left;"><li>point 44 of the Reasons:<br />"..oral proceedings by videoconference are oral proceedings within the meaning of Article 116 EPC and, although not fully equivalent to oral proceedings held in person.."<br /> </li><li>point 38 of the Reasons:<br />".. communicating via videoconference cannot, at least for the time being, be put on the same level as communicating in-person.";<br />"In terms of communication, in-person oral proceedings are for now the optimum format."; "Video technology has certainly improved in recent times, but cannot yet be said to provide the level of communication which is possible when all participants are physically present in the same room."<br /> </li><li>point 45 of the Reasons:<br />"As stated earlier, a hearing in person is the optimum format or, to use a term well known in the field of European patent law, it is the gold standard.";<br />"Therefore, in-person hearings should be the default option";<br />"Parties should only be denied this option for good reasons."<br /> </li><li>point 46 of the Reasons:<br />".. at this point in time videoconferences do not provide the same level of communication possibilities as in-person oral proceedings."</li></ul></div><div>1.8 Not least from the general applicability of the statements above, it is evident that this holds true regardless of the existence of an emergency situation, i.e. even in 'normal times'. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The present Board considers this to be the key ratio (<i>ratio decidendi</i>) underlying G 1/21</b></span>, the validity of which is <span style="color: #990000;"><b>not limited</b> to any emergency situation.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>The Board thus concludes that the <i>ratio decidendi </i>underlying G 1/21 at least in regard to a party's request for in-person oral proceedings cannot be simply assigned to situations of general emergency but are instead <span style="color: #990000;"><b>generally valid.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.9 Due to the deficiencies in the level of communication in a videoconference compared to in-person oral proceedings, t<span style="color: #990000;">he Enlarged Board of Appeal came to the conclusion that only in a situation of general emergency impairing the parties' possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises (cf. wording of the order of G 1/21) is it (exceptionally) possible to deny a party's wish to have in-person oral proceedings.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.9.1 Although the concept of a situation of general emergency was thus already defined quite narrowly (indeed even restricted to those situations impairing the parties' possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises), <span style="color: #990000;">the Enlarged Board explained by way of example which criteria are to be used in the exercise of discretion and which should in any case play no role (cf. ibid., point 49 of the Reasons: "This decision should not be influenced by administrative issues such as the availability of conference rooms and interpretation facilities or intended efficiency gains.").</span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.9.2 It follows from the above that <span style="color: #990000;"><b>even </b></span>in the circumstances of a general emergency, the Enlarged Board of Appeal still imposed strict conditions on the possibility of denying a party's wish to hold oral proceedings in-person. A<span style="color: #990000;"> fortiori, it is therefore hardly justifiable why less strict requirements could apply for denying parties in-person oral proceedings in non-emergency times, in particular considering that <b>the Enlarged Board found that videoconferences offer suboptimal communication possibilities compared to in-person hearings, that there are currently no obstacles for the parties and the members of the Board to attend the oral proceedings on EPO premises and that the Enlarged Board acknowledged in principle the parties' right to choose the format of oral proceedings (</b>cf. ibid., point 46 of the Reasons).</span></div><div><br /></div><div>In addition, it must be borne in mind that the Enlarged Board justified the denial of in-person oral proceedings in order to avoid the administration of justice being seriously impaired during a pandemic (cf. ibid., point 51 of the Reasons). <span style="color: #990000;">However, comparable risks do not exist in non-emergency times. <b>The Board therefore can only understand the decision in such a way that, in principle, oral proceedings in person can exceptionally be denied in a situation of general emergency in order to prevent serious impairment of the administration of justice.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">1.10 In summary, the following can therefore be stated:</span></b></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>1.10.1 Although the order of G 1/21 refers to an emergency situation, it follows from the <i>ratio decidendi </i>of this decision that in-person oral proceedings can only be denied under very limited conditions, even in a situation of general emergency such as a pandemic.</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>1.10.2 Due to the fact that videoconferences, at least according to current technology, can only provide a suboptimal form of communication, parties have a right to the optimum format for oral proceedings, i.e. in-person oral proceedings, that can only be denied under very limited conditions.</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>1.10.3 Further, e contrario it also follows from the reasons underlying the Enlarged Board's decision, that parties do not have a right to a format having deficiencies (e.g. the "shortcomings" of such a format as mentioned in G 1/21, point 40 of the Reasons), i.e. parties cannot force Boards to conduct videoconferences instead of in-person oral proceedings.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">1.11 Hence, in a non-emergency situation, such as in the present case before the Board, where the parties are able to travel and no other restrictions exist (see G 1/21, point 49 of the Reasons), the general considerations underlying G 1/21 are to be taken into account.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>It can be added that, in the present case the appellant also did not invoke any reasons which would have prevented it from attending the oral proceedings in person, and indeed it was able to do so.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">1.12 As stated in G 1/21 (see e.g. points 38, 45 and 46 of the Reasons), a hearing in person is for now "the optimum format, or to use a term well known in the field of European patent law, it is the gold standard". Although oral proceedings by videoconference have proven suitable in many cases, albeit with certain disadvantages (which may depend on several factors, for example sometimes lasting longer than oral proceedings in person and requiring several hours of staring at screens leading to fatigue, etc.) that format has nevertheless regularly been used by the present Board where the parties consent to same.<b> Nevertheless, the Board concludes that communicating via videoconference cannot, at least for the time being, be put on the same level as communicating in person.</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>1.12.1 In particular, the Board cannot recognise any improvements that can be said to provide the level of communication which is possible when all participants are physically present in the same room.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">1.12.2 <b>Unlike </b>found in T 758/20 (cf. point 1.4.7(b) of the Reasons) and further elucidated in T 618/21 (cf. point 4.1.3 to 4.1.5 of the Reasons), t<b>his Board finds that the situation for the time being has not changed since the issue of G 1/21.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.12.3 Here it is first noted that in G 1/21 (cf. point 46 of the Reasons) the Enlarged Board held that "at this point in time" videoconferences did not provide the same level of communication possibilities as in-person oral proceedings. The point in time referred to by the Enlarged Board (G 1/21 bears the date 16 July 2021 and was issued on 28 October 2021), was thus the time when the use of "ZOOM" (i.e. the current platform still used by the Boards) had already been introduced. Furthermore, even the Enlarged Board itself used it for part of the proceedings in G 1/21 (see e.g. the summons to oral proceedings dated 1 June 2021 stating specifically that the "ZOOM" platform would be used).</div><div><br /></div><div>1.12.4 As such, <span style="color: #990000;"><b>the parties rely on the same kind of hardware and software as were available at the time of G 1/21, i.e. the picture and sound quality is basically the same. The Board cannot recognize any significant improvement in the oral or visual level of communication between the parties that would result, for example, in an increased "immediacy" to the level of oral proceedings in person. </b></span>The technological developments in telecommunications which may bring about this level of communication are still awaited. Some communication aspects of body language and expression, are often difficult or simply impossible to discern on camera, not least due to the limited field of view and image quality available, often only the party's face or head and shoulders being visible and the image of all parties contributing becoming even smaller as the number of parties increases. Whilst not necessarily affecting the right to be heard, these type of issues may well affect the immediacy and smooth running of the oral proceedings which itself may cause distraction for the Board and the parties. Likewise, when interpreters are present, for example in two or three language directions, then the technology has a significant lag which again reduces immediacy even further. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The advantages of the gold standard thus remain as they were at the time of decision G 1/21.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.12.5 In addition, although the Boards have had the time and opportunity to familiarise themselves with the tools necessary for videoconferencing, this was also true at the time of issue of G 1/21. In some cases, the parties may also have acquired such familiarisation themselves, albeit some may only have recourse to videoconference oral proceedings sporadically. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Obviously the Boards should ensure that factors such as the level of familiarity/experience with a particular software as such should not put a party at a disadvantage. If the parties themselves request oral proceedings by videoconference, or consent thereto, it can generally be assumed that they accept any such shortcomings that exist.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.13 In the present case, one party requested oral proceedings by videoconference. Thus,<span style="color: #990000;"> it is necessary to consider Reasons point 46 of G 1/21, where it is stated that "The vast majority of oral proceedings are held upon request by a party. It therefore makes sense that the choice of format for these oral proceedings can be made by a party who requested them and not by the board of appeal."</span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.14 For the reasons discussed under item 1.10.3 above, t<span style="color: #990000;">he "choice of format" of oral proceedings via videoconference cannot be limiting on the Board, which may always decide to hold the proceedings in person. This is exactly the situation in the present case, where the Board, despite the request of one party did not accede to that</span> request and maintained the format of oral proceedings as indicated in the summons, i.e. "in-person". Whilst the Board accepts that if there are no objections to holding the proceedings via videoconference, or if all parties request this, the Board can exercise its discretion to hold the oral proceedings via videoconference (as regularly happens), notwithstanding the fact that the Board must additionally consider it "appropriate to do so" (also stated in Article 15a RPBA 2020) when selecting the format.</div><div><br /></div><div>1.15 In the present case, and despite the party's request, the Board found that in the circumstances of the case, and in particular in regard to the substantive issue of the "side portions" and the structural and functional aspects regarding the inclusion of the leak barrier sheets in a flexible and elastically stretchable area of the product where the "side portions" were located, the parties may well (as is often the case in the Board's experience in such technology) have resorted to detailed explanations revolving around the Figures of the published divisional and parent applications during the oral proceedings, including the movements and relative movements of various parts during wearing. Of course, it could be argued (as the Board did in T 618/21) that a party wishing to refer to such matters could simply file adapted drawings in advance. Notwithstanding the additional work required from both the Board and the other party(ies) in this regard however, experience of appeal cases in the technical field of the case in question has shown that a party wishing to explain functional effects of structural features can often do this more easily by use of the flip chart, gradually building up features whilst explaining them in a dynamic situation of use, and of course allowing the same sketches to be used by the opposing party(ies). Likewise, filing such sketches by email during a videoconference oral proceedings, results in further delays as these are received and then distributed further by another email amongst the Board and parties (and often the interpreters), which may well break the flow of a party's submissions and which inevitably (when being displayed) reduces other available screen space used for documents or for viewing the parties. The Board also notes that the appellant itself argued that there were a high number of complex objections to be dealt with (see also point 5.3 below). Therefore, the complexity of the case also spoke for oral proceedings in person.</div><div><br /></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">1.16 For the reasons discussed above, the Board did not change the format of the oral proceedings, which remained as summoned.</span></b></div><div><br /></div><div>2. Main request - Article 100(c) EPC</div><div><br /></div><div>[...]</div><div><br /></div><div><div>2.8 The amendments made to claim 1 before grant do therefore result in subject-matter which extends beyond the content of the parent application as originally filed, such that the ground for opposition under Article 100(c) EPC is prejudicial to maintenance of the patent. Thus, the main request is not allowable.</div><div><br /></div><div>3. First and second auxiliary requests - Article 123(2) EPC</div></div><div><br /></div><div>[...]</div><div><br /></div><div><div>3.5 At least for this reason, the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary requests 1 and 2 does not fulfil the requirement of Article 123(2) EPC. Auxiliary requests 1 and 2 are not allowable.</div><div><br /></div><div>4. Third and fourth auxiliary requests - Article 123(2) EPC</div></div><div><br /></div><div>[...]</div><div><br /></div><div><div>4.4 Leaving the question of admittance of the third and fourth auxiliary requests aside (the admittance of these requests into the appeal proceedings having been contested by the respondent), the subject-matter of claim 3 of the third and fourth auxiliary requests does not fulfil the requirement of Article 123(2) EPC for the reasons stated above. The third and fourth auxiliary requests are thus not allowable.</div><div><br /></div><div>5. Fifth to eighth auxiliary requests - admittance</div></div><div><br /></div><div>[...]</div><div><br /></div><div><div>5.4 For all the above reasons, the Board exercised its discretion under Article 13(1) RPBA 2020 not to admit the fifth to eighth auxiliary requests into the proceedings.</div><div><br /></div><div><b>Order</b></div><div><br /></div><div>For these reasons it is decided that:</div><div><br /></div><div>The appeal is dismissed.</div></div><div><br /></div><div><b><br /></b></div><div><b><br /></b></div><div><div><b>Keywords:</b><span style="font-weight: bold; white-space: pre;"> </span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">Right to oral proceedings in form of a videoconference (no)</span></div><div>Amendments - main request and auxiliary requests 1 to 4</div><div>Amendments - added subject-matter (yes)</div><div>Late-filed auxiliary requests 5 to 8</div><div>Late-filed auxiliary requests - procedural economy (no)</div></div><div><b><br /></b></div><div><div><b>Catchwords:<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span></b></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">1. Although the order of G 1/21 refers to an emergency situation, it follows from the <i>ratio decidendi </i>of this decision that in-person oral proceedings can only be denied under very limited conditions, even in a situation of general emergency such as a pandemic.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">2. Due to the fact that videoconferences, at least with current technology, can only provide a suboptimal form of communication, parties have a right to the optimum format for oral proceedings, i.e. in-person oral proceedings, that can only be denied under very limited conditions.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">3. Further, e contrario it also follows from the reasons underlying the Enlarged Board's decision, that parties cannot force Boards to conduct videoconferences instead of in-person oral proceedings.</span></div><br /><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t192432eu1.html" target="_blank">T 2432/19 () of 25.4.2023</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t192432eu1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span></span></i></span><i>ECLI:EP:BA:2023:T243219.20230425</i><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span>The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP09156501&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></i></div>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-58285009415214108312023-03-23T15:11:00.003+01:002023-03-23T15:38:46.950+01:00BREAKING NEWS: G 2/21 decision is out - Plausibility<p><i>Today, the Boards of Appeal have published the <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2023/20230323.html" target="_blank">News message</a> shown below (no changes made, except emphasis added):</i></p><h1 style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 32px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 40px; margin: 38px 0px 50px; padding: 0px;">Press Communiqué of 23 March 2023 on decision G 2/21 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal</h1><p><a name="Content" style="background-color: white; background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px;"></a><span face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 15px;"></span></p><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p class="alternative" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-weight: bold; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">23 March 2023</p><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;">Background</h3><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The Enlarged Board of Appeal is the highest judicial authority under the European Patent Convention (EPC). Its main task is to ensure the uniform application of the EPC.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.02 referred questions on the principle of free evaluation of evidence and the notion of "plausibility" in the context of inventive step to the Enlarged Board of Appeal. With regard to the latter, the referring board identified three different lines of case law (see interlocutory decision <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t180116ex1.html" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">T 116/18</a>, Reasons 13.4-13.6).</p><span><a name='more'></a></span><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">European patent <a href="https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP12002626&tab=main" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">EP 2 484 209</a> concerns an insecticide composition for controlling an insect pest. According to the patent, two compounds which were already known for their respective insecticidal activity have more than a purely additive effect when used as a mixture, i.e. a synergistic effect.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Determining the technical effect of an invention plays an important role when applying the so-called "problem and solution approach". This approach is regularly applied by the boards of appeal and the administrative departments of the EPO in the course of deciding whether or not the claimed subject matter involves an inventive step.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">According to established case law, it rests with the patent applicant or proprietor to properly demonstrate that the purported technical effects or results of the claimed invention have successfully been achieved. In the case underlying the referral, the patent proprietor relied on test data filed and published after the filing date of the patent (post-published evidence) in support of the alleged synergistic effect. According to the referring board, it is decisive for the assessment of inventive step whether or not this post-published evidence is to be taken into account as proof for the alleged synergistic effect.</p><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;">Key considerations</h3><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">In its decision, the Enlarged Board of Appeal qualified </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">the principle of free evaluation of evidence as a universally applicable principle</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> in assessing any means of evidence under the EPC. </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">Hence</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">, </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>evidence </b></span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">submitted by a patent applicant or proprietor to </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>prove the technical effect relied upon</b></span><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> for acknowledgement of inventive step m</span><b><span style="color: #990000;">ay not be disregarded solely on the ground that such evidence had not been public</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> before the filing date of the patent in suit and was filed after that date.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">The Enlarged Board further considered that </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">the term "plausibility" </span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">did </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">not </span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">amount to </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">a distinctive legal concept</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> or a specific patent law requirement </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>under the EPC</b></span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">According to the Enlarged Board, the relevant standard for the reliance on the purported technical effect when assessing whether or not the claimed subject matter involved an inventive step under Article 56 EPC concerns the question of </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>what the skilled person</b></span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">, with common general knowledge in mind, </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">would understand at the filing date</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> from the application </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">as originally filed as the technical teaching of the claimed invention</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">. The </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">technical effect</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> relied upon, even at a later stage,</span><span style="color: #990000;"> <b>needs to be encompassed by <i>that</i> technical teaching</b></span><span style="color: #0b2a43;"><b>.</b></span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">The Enlarged Board of Appeal held that </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>these guiding principles would allow the competent board</b></span><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> of appeal o</span><b><span style="color: #990000;">r other deciding body to take a decision on whether or not post-published evidence may or may not be relied upon in support of an asserted technical effect</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> when assessing whether or not the claimed subject-matter involves</span><b><span style="color: #990000;"> an inventive step</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The order issued by the Enlarged Board of Appeal reads as follows:</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">1. Evidence submitted by a patent applicant or proprietor to prove a technical effect relied upon for acknowledgement of inventive step of the claimed subject-matter may </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">not </span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">be disregarded </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>solely </b></span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">on the ground that such evidence, on which the effect rests, had not been public before the filing date of the patent in suit and was filed after that date.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">2. A patent applicant or proprietor may rely upon </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>a technical effect for inventive step</b></span><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> if the skilled person, having the common general knowledge in mind, and </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">based on the application as originally filed</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">, would derive said effect </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">as being encompassed by the technical teaching and embodied by the <i>same</i> originally disclosed invention</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">.</span></p><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;">Contact</h3><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Nikolaus Obrovski<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />Jeannine Hoppe<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />Spokespersons of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" /><a href="mailto:BOA-PRESS@epo.org" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">boa-press@epo.org</a></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i style="box-sizing: border-box;">This press release is a non-binding document for media use.</i></p><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;">Further information</h3><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><a class="pdf" href="https://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/C620B61029205275C125897B002BEDCF/$File/G2_21_Decision_%20of_the_Enlarged_Board_of_Appeal_of_23_March_2023_EN.pdf" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer; margin-left: 1.5em; position: relative;" target="_blank" title="G 2/21 - Decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of 23.03.2023 (PDF, 523 kB)">Full text of decision G 2/21</a></p></div>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-18225681928965582402023-02-15T15:21:00.004+01:002023-02-15T15:22:32.408+01:00T 2303/19 - In person oral proceedings are for now (no Covid-19 related travel restrictions) the optimum format as expressed in decision G 1/21<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhCsaYD4dkRvw7Lhi-NwFzRJrQpgcirUKGiUvdMCfs1g3tp4Lda8ZkEcxi_eQrDzQjReNLKKTbs8jO9NEDfP5t2p8nyokA5yakt3zujTS6lWpz0LdF-Xe-YZJYjrjryHVTWWL66fzW8XY-NJ_oyhvIjniv6pm4Oco7_A1G0mc43TIyihKQmDkn2vVPetw/s1920/2023.02.15%20meeting-room-g6edade7b5_1920.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1440" data-original-width="1920" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhCsaYD4dkRvw7Lhi-NwFzRJrQpgcirUKGiUvdMCfs1g3tp4Lda8ZkEcxi_eQrDzQjReNLKKTbs8jO9NEDfP5t2p8nyokA5yakt3zujTS6lWpz0LdF-Xe-YZJYjrjryHVTWWL66fzW8XY-NJ_oyhvIjniv6pm4Oco7_A1G0mc43TIyihKQmDkn2vVPetw/w400-h300/2023.02.15%20meeting-room-g6edade7b5_1920.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;"><i>In the present opposition appeal case, the</i><span style="text-align: center;"><i> parties were summoned to attend oral proceedings at the EPO premises. The appellant requested that the oral proceedings take place by videoconference. The respondent did not consent to this request and suggested a mixed mode format. The Board decided to hold the oral proceedings in person, as </i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i>at the relevant time there were no Covid-19 related travel restrictions which would impair the parties' possibilities to attend in person oral proceedings at the EPO premises, and that in person oral proceedings are for now the optimum format as expressed in decision G 1/21 (see <a href="https://dp-patentlaw.blogspot.com/2021/10/g-121-op-by-vico-full-decision-is-out.html" target="_blank">here</a>).</i></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">I. European patent No. 2 851 087 was granted on the basis of a set of 13 claims.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Independent claim 1 as granted read as follows:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"1. A freeze-dried composition comprising a live, attenuated flavivirus vaccine, one or more stabilizers, lactose, amorphous mannitol, and one or more buffer components."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">II. An opposition was filed under Article 100 (a), (b) and (c) EPC against the granted patent on the grounds that the subject-matter of the granted patent lacked novelty and inventive step, was not sufficiently disclosed, and extended beyond the content of the application as filed.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">III. The appeal lies from the decision of the opposition division to revoke the patent.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">IV. The decision was based on the claims as granted as main request and eight auxiliary requests.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">V. The documents cited during the opposition proceedings included the following:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D1 [...] - </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">D24 [...]</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VI. According to the decision under appeal, claims 4 and 5 of the main request complied with Articles 76(1) and 123(2) EPC. As the new objections under Article 100(c) EPC against claims 1, 2, 10 and 12 were late filed and prima facie not relevant, the opposition division disregarded these objections under Article 114(2) EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D3 did not anticipate the claimed subject-matter.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">With regard to inventive step, [...]</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The objections raised by the opponent under [...] </span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Auxiliary request 2 was not inventive. [...]</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Auxiliary requests 3-6 were not admitted into the opposition proceedings under Rule 116(1) EPC. Auxiliary request 7 was not inventive and auxiliary request 8 contravened Article 76(1) EPC .</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VII. The patent proprietor (hereinafter the appellant) filed an appeal against said decision. With the statement setting out the grounds of appeal dated 24 October 2019, the appellant submitted auxiliary requests 1-9 and the following item of evidence:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D28: [...]</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 read as follows, the difference(s) compared with claim 1 as granted shown in bold: [...]</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VIII. With a letter dated 19 February 2020, the opponent (hereinafter the respondent) submitted the following evidence:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D29: [...]</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">IX. A communication from the Board, dated 18 August 2022, was sent to the parties. In it the Board expressed its preliminary opinion that inter alia, the main request was not inventive.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">X. With a letter dated 3 November 2022, the appellant submitted an annex which contained an annotated version of Figure 1 of document D9.w</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XI. </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The parties </b><b>were summoned to attend oral proceedings at the EPO premises</b><b>. The appellant requested in its letter dated 3 November 2022 that the oral proceedings take place by videoconference. The respondent did not consent to this request and suggested a mixed mode format. </b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;">Thereafter the appellant indicated that if the hearing were to take place in mixed mode the appellant's representative would attend in person, and asked for the appellant's in-house Counsel to attend remotely. </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>In a communication dated 24 November 2022 the Board informed the parties that it had decided to hold the oral proceedings in person.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XII. </span><span style="color: #990000;">Oral proceedings took place at the premises of the EPO on 7 December 2022. At the beginning the Chairman asked the parties whether they wished to <b>comment </b>on the format of the oral proceedings. The parties said that they did not.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XIII. The arguments of the appellant may be summarised as follows:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Admission of D28 into the appeal proceedings</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">[...]</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Main request - Inventive step</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;">[...]</div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XIV. The arguments of the respondent may be summarised as follows:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Admission of D28 and D29 into the appeal proceedings</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">[...]</span></div></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Main request - Inventive step</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">[...].</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XV. Requests</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The appellant (patent proprietor) requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and the patent be maintained as granted (main request), or that the patent be maintained on the basis of one of auxiliary requests 1-9 filed with the statement of grounds of appeal dated 24 October 2019.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">They also requested that document D28, also filed with the statement of grounds of appeal, be admitted into the proceedings.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The respondent (opponent) requested that the appeal be dismissed. They also requested that D28 not be admitted into the proceedings. They furthermore requested that D29 be admitted in case D28 is admitted.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Reasons for the Decision</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. Format of the oral proceedings</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The appellant's reasons for requesting that the oral proceedings take place by videoconference were two-fold. Firstly, this format would facilitate attendance at the hearing by the appellant's in-house counsel. Secondly, it would reduce the risk of any last minute travel disruption which may occur due to the uncertainty surrounding Covid-19 cases.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">The Board agrees with the respondent that <b>at the relevant time there were no Covid-19 related travel restrictions which would impair the parties' possibilities to attend in person oral proceedings at the EPO premises</b>, and that <b>in person oral proceedings are for now the optimum format as expressed in decision G 1/21</b>. The Board also considers that the <b>possible attendance of an accompanying person cannot determine the format of the oral proceedings</b>. <b>The Board thus decided that the oral proceedings take place in person.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.-[5] </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">[...]</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Order</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For these reasons it is decided that:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. The decision under appeal is set aside.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. The case is remitted to the opposition division with the order to maintain the patent on the basis of auxiliary request 1 filed with the statement of grounds of appeal dated 24 October 2019 and a description to be adapted thereto.</span></div></div></div></div><br /><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t192303eu1.html" target="_blank">T 2303/19 (Stabilization of vaccines by lyophilization/ SANOFI) of 7.12.2022</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t192303eu1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span></span></i></span><i><span><span>ECLI:EP:BA:2022:T230319.20221207.</span></span></i><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span>The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP14180710&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> Photo</span><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> "meeting room" by </span><a href="https://pixabay.com/users/cdu445-1170660/?utm_source=link-attribution&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=image&amp;utm_content=828547" target="_blank">cdu445 </a></span></i><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">via <a href="https://pixabay.com//?utm_source=link-attribution&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=image&amp;utm_content=828547" target="_blank">Pixabay</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">under </span><a href="https://pixabay.com/en/service/terms/#usage" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">CC0 license</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (no changes made).</span></i><div><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div><br /></div>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-60813045979966863272022-11-04T09:36:00.002+01:002022-11-04T09:36:22.464+01:00T 2194/19 - The "invention" is not necessarily and always to be equated with the "invention claimed", not required that all described "embodiments" must fall within the scope of the amended independent claims<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1Ok88w2sizbukETkjUQZvSbFmUcNplAiVnHZ66jMbhyDM-1URq6WFgyehlFAzl6PDUPoZ00xgeS9br0QKQ6IMSOnY_KBgyCXQEcOe5ZXGjXCXonV3lazW1rxLV8iHaaN8PoRBxrQ6b3MdnYyajUO01cGmRNRXhb54Xy0ZQOo3XYIfzWRn863EpQm56A/s864/t192194eu1-6.2.3-snapshot.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="168" data-original-width="864" height="78" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg1Ok88w2sizbukETkjUQZvSbFmUcNplAiVnHZ66jMbhyDM-1URq6WFgyehlFAzl6PDUPoZ00xgeS9br0QKQ6IMSOnY_KBgyCXQEcOe5ZXGjXCXonV3lazW1rxLV8iHaaN8PoRBxrQ6b3MdnYyajUO01cGmRNRXhb54Xy0ZQOo3XYIfzWRn863EpQm56A/w400-h78/t192194eu1-6.2.3-snapshot.png" width="400" /></a></div><p><i>In the present case, the </i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>examining division regarded several </i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i> paragraphs of the description </i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i>to be at odds</i></span><i> with independent claim 1, as amended. The</i><span style="text-align: center;"><i> examining division equated the term "embodiment" with subject-matter that has to fall "within the scope of the invention as defined by the claims", and concluded that the description so adapted was not in conformity with the independent claims, contrary to Rule 42(1)(c) EPC, because the term "embodiment" was used in parts of the description that describe subject-matter that was not part of the subject-matter of these independent claims. Moreover, the examining division held that the "invention" must always be the "invention claimed" and the "invention" was defined by the independent claimws. The Board did not agree and held:<br /></i></span><span style="font-style: italic;">1)</span><span style="font-style: italic; white-space: pre;"> </span><span style="font-style: italic;">the EPC does not define that </span><span style="font-style: italic;">“the "invention" is necessarily and always to be equated with the "invention claimed"”, <br /></span><span style="font-style: italic;">2)</span><span style="font-style: italic; white-space: pre;"> </span><span style="font-style: italic;">concluding from Art. 84 EPC that "embodiments" of the description of a patent application have to be within the scope of the (independent) claim cannot be derived from the EPC and can also also not be derived from the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal, and <br /></span><span style="font-style: italic;">3)</span><span style="font-style: italic; white-space: pre;"> </span><span style="font-style: italic;">in particular Rule 42(1)(c) EPC cannot be the legal basis for establishing such a general and broad requirement for an adaptation of the description to the claims. It is simply not what this provision says.”<br /></span><span style="font-style: italic;">Herein, the Board deviates from the strict practice that the first instance nowadays applies as well as from Guidelines (2022) F-IV, 4.3. The Board does however not address the Guidelines, although that could have been expected in view of Art. 20(2) RPBA2020. Also, the Board hardly addresses the case law that the EPO considers to support the “delete all non-covered embodiments" approach that is used by the drafters of the Guidelines, and as a consequences do not discuss whether a referral to the Enlarged Board would be necessary acc Art. 20(1) RPBA2020. Note that the Board also does not mention </span><a href="https://dp-patentlaw.blogspot.com/2021/12/t-198918-as-general-rule-not-required.html" style="font-style: italic;" target="_blank">T 1989/18 of 16.12.2021</a><span style="font-style: italic;"> that concluded that, as a general rule, not is not required to bring the description in line with (amended) claims intended for grant.</span></p><div style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: center;"><i><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div></i></span></div></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">I. The appeal is against the decision of the examining division to refuse the present application based on a sole claim request. The examining division did not deem this request allowable in view of Articles 84 and 123(2) EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">II. The appellant was summoned to oral proceedings before the board. The board issued a communication under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020 including its negative preliminary opinion concerning added subject-matter (Article 123(2) EPC) and support by the description (Article 84 EPC).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">III. Oral proceedings before the board were held on 24 October 2022 by videoconference. At their end, the board announced its decision.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">IV. The appellant's final requests were that the decision under appeal be set aside and that a patent be granted on the basis of the claims of a sole claim request. The claims of this claim request were filed as a "sixth auxiliary request" during the oral proceedings before the board.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">V. Claim 1 of the<b> claim request underlying the decision under </b>appeal reads as follows (labels (a) to (d) introduced by the board):</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(a) "A method for conducting convolutional interleaving of symbols of an error-correcting code having I symbols in a set, the method comprising:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(b) setting a placeholder (400, 500, 600) to an initial location in a memory of size (I(I-1)*J)/2+1, wherein J is a delay value;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(c) setting a read pointer to at least one of a write pointer or a write pointer-1 for every I symbols received:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(d) repetatively [sic] counting from a step of 0 to a step of I-1, performing the following:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">a) setting a write pointer equal to said placeholder;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">b) if step is 0, setting (404) said placeholder equal to a read pointer;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">c) if step is not 0, advancing (406) said placeholder step*J memory locations, wrapping around if said placeholder value would be past an end of said memory;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">d) setting said read pointer (408) equal to said placeholder;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">e) reading out (410, 504, 604) from a location in said memory indicated by said read pointer; and</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">f) writing a next (412, 506) of said I symbols to a location in said memory indicated by said write pointer, unless step is 0, in which case it is bypassed".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VI. Claim 1 of the sole <b>claim request on file r</b>eads as follows (amendments vis-a-vis claim 1 of the claim request underlying the appealed decision highlighted by the board):</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"A method for conducting convolutional interleaving of symbols of an error-correcting code having I symbols in a set, the method comprising:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">setting a placeholder (400, 500, 600) to an initial location in a memory of size (I(I-1)*J)/2+1, wherein J is a delay value;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">setting a read pointer to<i> [deleted: at least one of ] </i>a write pointer <i>[deleted: or a write pointer -1 ] </i>for every I symbols received:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">repe<i>t[deleted: a]</i>itively counting from a step of 0 to a</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">step of I-1, performing the following:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">a) setting a write pointer equal to said placeholder;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">b) if step is 0, setting (404) said placeholder equal to <i>[deleted: a ]</i><u>the </u>read pointer;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">c) if step is not 0, advancing (406) said placeholder step*J memory locations, wrapping around if said placeholder value would be past an end of said memory;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">d) setting said read pointer (408) equal to said placeholder;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">e) reading out (410, 504, 604) from a location in said memory indicated by said read pointer, <u>unless step is 0, in which case the reading out is bypassed;</u> and</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">f) writing a next (412, 506) of said I symbols to a location in said memory indicated by said write pointer, unless step is 0, in which case<i> [deleted: it]</i><u>the writing</u> is bypassed".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VII. Independent claim 5 of the sole <b>claim request on file</b> reads as follows:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"An apparatus for conducting convolutional interleaving of symbols of an error-correcting code having I symbols in a set, the apparatus comprising:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">means (704, 804) for setting a placeholder to an initial location in a memory of size (I(I-1)*J)/2+1, wherein J is a delay value;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">means for setting a read pointer to a write pointer for every I symbols received and,</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">for every I symbols received:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">means (706, 806) for repetitively counting from a step of 0 to a step of I-1, performing the following:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">a) setting a write pointer equal to said placeholder;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">b) if step is 0, setting said placeholder equal to the read pointer;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">c) if step is not 0, advancing said placeholder step*J memory locations, wrapping around if said placeholder value would be past an end of said memory;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">d) setting said read pointer equal to said placeholder;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">e) reading out from a location in said memory indicated by said read pointer, unless step is 0, in which case the reading out is bypassed; and</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">f) writing a next of said I symbols to a location in said memory indicated by said write pointer, unless step is 0, in which case the writing is bypassed".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Reasons for the Decision</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>1. Technical background</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The present application concerns digital communication systems in which communication data is transmitted via interleaving using error correction. According to the application as filed, the invention provides "for a very efficient and reliable use of memory for </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">error-correcting code interleaving" (paragraph [0011]).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>2. Decision under appeal: added subject-matter, clarity and support by the description</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.1 In Reasons 2.1 of the appealed decision, the examining division raised an objection under Article 123(2) EPC against <b>feature (c)</b> of claim 1 (cf. point V above). In particular, the examining division considered that this feature was not disclosed in a combination of original Figures 2 and 3 and it noted that these figures related to realisations of convolutional interleaving using different memory sizes, namely "(I(I-1)*J)/2+1" and "(I(I-1)*J)/2<b><i>+I</i></b>+1" (emphasis added by the board) respectively.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.2 In Reasons 2.2 of the appealed decision, the examining division raised an objection under Article 123(2) EPC against independent claim 5 of the claim request underlying the impugned decision for the same reasons as set out for feature (c) of claim 1.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.3 In Reasons 3.1 of the appealed decision, the examining division justified its objection against reading-out operation e) of <b>feature (d) </b>in view of <i>"an apparent inconsistency between claim 1 on the one hand and §§[0020]-[0026] on the other hand, which inconsistency renders claim 1 unclear and raises doubts about it's support by the description, contrary to the requirements of Article 84 EPC"</i>. The examining division observed in particular that claim 1 required this reading-out operation e) to be performed for each "step" of "0" to "I-1". It considered this to be inconsistent with Table 1 in paragraph [0024] of the present description. From the column labelled by "cycle 0" of this Table, it appeared, in the examining division's view, that no reading-out operation is to be performed when "step" is 0.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.4 In Reasons 3.2 of the impugned decision, the same objection under Article 84 EPC as for claim 1 was raised against independent claim 5.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>3. Communication under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020: added subject-matter and support by the description</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">3.1 In point 4.1.2 of the board's communication under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020, the board considered, in view of the first sentence of original paragraph [0027] of the present application, that the examining division had correctly observed in Reasons 2.1 of its decision that Figures 2 and 3 indeed concern <i>different </i>embodiments which relate to different memory sizes (cf. point 2.1 above).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">3.2 In addition, the board noted in point 4.1.3 of its communication under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020 that the term "a read pointer" occurred not only in feature (c) but also in setting operation b) of feature (d). As a result, two <i>different </i>read pointers could be used according to the claimed method for conducting convolutional interleaving. However, there was no direct and unambiguous disclosure for this in the application as filed.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">3.3 Moreover, in point 4.2.1 of the communication under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020, the board agreed with the examining division that</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- Table 1 in original paragraph [0024] implied, in the case of "step 0", that the read operation is bypassed, i.e. that no read operation is performed</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">and that</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- this was inconsistent with claim 1 requiring reading-out operation e) of feature (d) to be performed also when "step" is "0" (cf. Reasons 3.1 of the appealed decision and point 2.3 above).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>4. Independent claims 1 and 5 of the sole claim request on file - added subject-matter, clarity and support by the description</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">4.1 The subject-matter of claim 1 of the sole claim request on file is disclosed in claim 1, Figure 2 and paragraph [0006] in conjunction with paragraphs [0022] and [0024] to [0026] of the present application as filed. The subject-matter of independent claim 5 of this request is disclosed in original claim 18 and the above-mentioned figure and passages of the original description. The board is also satisfied that independent claims 1 and 5 of the sole claim request on file now are supported by the description and are clear.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">4.2 Regarding the objections referred to in points 2 and 3 above, the board observes the following:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">4.2.1 Concerning the objection mentioned in points 2.1 and 3.1 above, the alternative "a write pointer-1" of <b>feature (c) </b>was struck out in claim 1. As a result, this feature only relates to the embodiment associated with original Figure 2 and no longer to a combination of original Figures 2 and 3.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">4.2.2 The objection referred to in point 3.2 above was overcome by replacing the term "a read pointer" with the expression "the read pointer" in operation b) of <b>feature (d)</b>.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">4.2.3 The objection to which points 2.3 and 3.3 above relate is overcome by introducing the clause "unless step is 0, in which case the reading out is bypassed" in reading-out operation e) of <b>feature (d)</b>. This ensures conformity between this reading-out operation and Table 1 given in paragraph [0024] of the description. It thus resolves the objected-to inconsistency, which, in the examining division's view, rendered claim 1 not clear and raised doubts as to whether the requirement of support by the description was fulfilled.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">4.2.4 Independent claim 5 of the sole claim request on file was amended in a similar way as claim 1. Therefore, the objections mentioned in points 2.2 and 2.4 above are also overcome in relation to that claim.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">4.3 In conclusion, the objections regarding added <span style="background-color: transparent;">subject-matter (Article 123(2) EPC) and lack of clarity and support by the description (Article 84 EPC) raised in Reasons 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2 of the appealed decision and in point 4.1.3 of the board's communication against independent claims 1 and 5 </span><span style="background-color: transparent;">are overcome by the present independent claims of the sole claim request on file.</span></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>5. Reasons 2.3 of the appealed decision: description - added subject-matter</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">5.1 In Reasons 2.3 of the appealed decision, the examining division raised an objection under Article 123(2) EPC related to the insertion of the expression<i> "an embodiment of the present invention alternative to the embodiment as claimed in the present invention"</i> in amended pages 14 and 23 of the description relating to original Figures 3 and 9 respectively. They considered that those figures did not relate to subject-matter that falls within the scope of the invention as claimed in the independent claims.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">5.2 The board does not agree that the mere insertion of this expression adds subject-matter that was not disclosed in the application as filed. This is because it would have been directly and unambiguously apparent to the skilled reader that original Figures 3 and 9 and their respectively associated paragraphs [0027] and [0043] concern convolutional interleaving using a memory size of "(I(I-1)*J)/2<b><i>+I</i></b>+1" (emphasis added by the board). The convolutional interleaving described in these figures and their associated paragraphs therefore differs from the convolutional interleaving that is claimed in independent claims 1 and 5. This remains to be also the case with the expression <i>"an embodiment of the present invention alternative to the embodiment as claimed in the present invention"</i> being inserted in original paragraphs [0027] and [0043]. The board also notes that the examining division did not indicate in Reasons 2.3 of the appealed decision which </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">subject-matter they considered to have been added compared to the application as filed.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">5.3 Consequently, the objection raised in Reasons 2.3 of the appealed decision is unfounded.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><i><span style="color: #990000;">6. Reasons 4 of the appealed decision: adaptation of the description to the claims</span></i></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">6.1 In items (a) and (a1) to (a3) of the Reasons 4 of the appealed decision, th</span><span style="color: #990000;">e examining division observed that the following paragraphs of the description,</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> namely</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">- paragraph [0027], relating to Figure 3;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">- paragraph [0033], relating to Figure 5;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">- paragraph [0035], relating to Figure 6;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">- paragraphs [0039] and [0041], relating to Figure 8;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">- paragraph [0043], relating to Figure 9,</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">concern convolutional interleaving using a memory size of "(I(I-1)*J)/2<i><b>+I</b></i>+1" (emphasis added by the board). T</span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #990000;">he examining division regarded this to be at odds with the smaller memory size of "(I(I-1)*J)/2+1" used in independent claim l.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">It is apparent from item (a6) of Reasons 4 that t<b>he examining division equated the term "embodiment" with subject-matter that has to fall "within the scope of the invention as defined by the claims".</b> <b>They [the Examining Division] concluded that the description so adapted was not in conformity with the independent claims, contrary to Rule 42(1)(c) EPC, because the term "embodiment" was used in parts of the description that describe subject-matter that was not part of the subject-matter of these independent claim</b>s. Moreover, t<b>he examining division held that the "invention" must always be the "invention claimed" and the "invention" was defined by the independent claims</b> (cf. Reasons 1, referred to in Reasons 4, item (b2) of the appealed decision).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">6.2 The board does not endorse the objection raised in Reasons 4 of the impugned decision for the following reasons:</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>6.2.1 First, the board is not convinced that, according to the EPC, the "invention" is necessarily and always to be equated with the "invention claimed"</b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> (see e.g.<b> T 944/15</b>, Reasons 17).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>6.2.2 Secondly, this board takes issue with the conclusion that the requirement that the claims are to be supported by the description (Article 84, second sentence, EPC) necessarily means that all the "embodiments" of the description of a patent application have to be covered by the (independent) claims, i.e. that all the embodiments must fall within the scope of those claims. </b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;">This conclusion </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">cannot be derived from the EPC</span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;">. It </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">can also not be derived from the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal, </span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;">according to which merely inconsistencies or contradictions between the claims and the underlying description are to be avoided in that context (see e.g. <b>T 1808/06,</b> Reasons 2; <b>T 2293/18,</b> Reasons 3.3.5). </span><span style="color: #990000;">The board considers that it may well be that, in a given case, there is such an inconsistency or contradiction between the claims and an "embodiment" of the description. But <b>this has to be justified by the examining division. The mere indication that the embodiment does not or no longer fall under the respective claim(s) is not sufficient in this regard.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">6.2.3 Thirdly, the board considers that in particular Rule 42(1)(c) EPC cannot be the legal basis for establishing such a general and broad requirement for an adaptation of the description to the claims. It is simply not what this provision says.</span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;"> Rule 42(1)(c) EPC requires that the description discloses the invention, as claimed, in such terms that the technical problem and its solution can be understood, and that it states any advantageous effects of the invention with reference to the background art. </span><span style="color: #990000;">These requirements set out in Rule 42(1)(c) EPC, however, <b>cannot be taken to mean that all the embodiments described in the description of a patent application have to fall within the scope of the claims.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">6.3 Hence, the objections raised in Reasons 4 of the appealed decision are likewise unfounded.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i><br /></i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>7. Remittal to the examining division</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">7.1 For the reasons set out above, the board holds that the objections raised in the decision under appeal do not apply to independent claims 1 and 5 of the sole claim request on file. Hence, the grounds for refusal are considered to be overcome and therefore cannot carry the refusal of the present application.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">7.2 Given that the appealed decision was confined to the assessment of compliance with Article 123(2) EPC and Article 84, second sentence, EPC, the board deems "special reasons" to present themselves which justify a remittal of the case to the examining division under Article 11 RPBA 2020 for further prosecution on the basis of the claims of the sole claim request on file (Article 111(1) EPC).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">7.3 The board notes in passing that, in this further prosecution, the examining division should not only consider the compliance with Articles 54 and 56 EPC of the independent claims but should examine the set of claims as to all requirements of the EPC. For example, the board did not have to address, and indeed did not decide on, the following points:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- whether the dependent claims, especially dependent claims 4 and 8, comply with Articles 84 and 123(2) EPC;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- whether the provision of Article 83 EPC is met, particularly regarding whether there is sufficient disclosure in the application for choosing any arbitrary "next (412, 506) of said I symbols" in writing operation f) of the present independent claims.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Order</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For these reasons it is decided that:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. The decision under appeal is set aside.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. The case is remitted to the examining division for further prosecution.</span></div></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><br /></div></div></div><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span>T 2194/19 (Error correction/TERAYON) of 24.10.2022<span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t192194eu1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span></span></i></span><i>ECLI:EP:BA:2022:T219419.20221024</i><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span>The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP04720810&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>. Figure: snapshot from reason 6.2.3 on page 11 of the decision.</i></span>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-35576313180098330222022-10-15T10:55:00.013+02:002022-11-21T09:31:10.317+01:00Deemed date of receipt looses 10 days per 1 November 2023: shortens times to respond to communications!<p style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="color: red; font-size: x-large;"><strike><b><br /></b></strike></span></i></p><p style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="color: red; font-size: x-large;"><strike><b>10 days</b></strike></span></i></p><p style="text-align: center;"><i><span style="color: red; font-size: x-large;"><strike><b><br /></b></strike></span></i></p><p><i>A <a href="https://patentepi.org/en/epi/news/d4fb268f-0072-467b-ba53-9951b3838407" target="_blank">news message on the epi website</a> indicates that the Administrative Council of the EPOrg decided to amen to Rule 126(2) EPC relating to the date on which a document sent by the EPO is deemed to be delivered. Currently, a documnt is deemed delivered 10 days after the date on the document. This will changer per 1 November 2023: as of that date, the date on which the document is deemed to be delivered is the date on the document, similarly to <a href="https://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/rules/r80.html#_80_6" target="_blank">PCT Rule 80.6, second part</a> (with with some differences, in particular the EPO keeping the burden of proving the date of delivery in the event of dispute, whereas under PCT that burden is with the applicant). </i></p><p><i>I heard that, surprisingly, only one delegation voted against the change. Even though the entry into force of the amended Rule is about a year away, changing such a well-established rule that is know world-wide to the disadvantage and risk of the applicant may cause some accidents, which cannot in all cases be repaired: not knowing that the rule has changed will make a request for re-establishment of missing, for example, the appeal period, have hardly any chance of success.</i></p><p><i>Note that the change has no impact on the 9m opposition period (triggered by the mention of the grant in the bulletin), the 1m period for paying the filing and search fee (triggered by the filing), the 6m period to pay the examination fee and file the request for examination (triggered by the mention of the publication of the search report in the bulletin), the 31m period for EP entry (triggered by the earliest priority date), nor any other periods that are triggered by an event other than notification. <br />It does however affect all periods for responding to an invitation to remedy a formal deficiency (in most cases, 2m), an office action (usually 4m, sometimes 2m; extendible), a R.161/162 communication (6m), invitations to pay claims fees in case of non-unity (2m), the period for requesting further processing (2m), the appeal periods (2m for notice & fee, 4m for grounds), and all other periods that are triggered by the notification of letter/invitation/communication! </i></p><p><i>So, when, a communication is issued </i><i>on 17 November 2023</i><i> under Rule 58 to file a missing translation:<br /></i><i>- if the current Rule would still have applied, a response would need to be filed by<br /></i><i> 17/11/2023 + 10d + 2m -> 27/1/2024 (Saturday) [R.134(1)] -> 29/1/2024 (Mon);<br /></i><i>- with the amended Rule however, </i><i>a response is to be filed by<br /></i><i> 17/11/2023 + 2m -> 17/1/2024 (Wed)</i></p><p><i>The Administrative council documents are currently not yet available on the EPO website (<a href="https://www.epo.org/about-us/governance/documentation/ac-documents.html" target="_blank">here</a>).</i></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p><i>Update 21 November 2022: t</i><i>he Administrative council documents are now available on the EPO website:</i></p></blockquote><p style="text-align: left;"></p><ul style="text-align: left;"><ul><li><i><a href="https://www.epo.org/modules/epoweb/acdocument/epoweb2/592/en/CA-D_10-22_en.pdf" target="_blank">CA/D 10/22</a> </i><i>Decision of the Administrative Council of 13 October 2022 amending Rules 46, 49, 50, 57, 65, 82, 126, 127 and 131 of the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention; amended </i><i>Rules 46, 49, 50, 57, 65, 82 in force as of 1.2.2023; amended Rules 126, 127 and 131 in force as of 1.11.2023;</i></li><li><i> <a href="https://www.epo.org/modules/epoweb/acdocument/epoweb2/591/en/CA-30-22_Rev._2_en.pdf" target="_blank">CA/30/22 Rev. 2 </a>Legal changes to support digital transformation in the patent grant procedure (first basket): amendments to the EPC Implementing Regulations (Preparatory documents for the decision)</i></li></ul></ul><p></p><p><span></span></p><p><i>The <a href="https://patentepi.org/en/epi/news/d4fb268f-0072-467b-ba53-9951b3838407" target="_blank">epi news message</a> is cited below (no changed made): </i></p><p><span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><h1 style="background-color: white; border-bottom: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); color: #009fe3; font-family: "Open Sans", sans-serif; font-size: 32px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: 400; line-height: 46px; margin: 0px 0px 0.4em; padding-bottom: 6px;">The ten day rule is living its last months</h1><h3 style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: "Open Sans", sans-serif; font-size: 18px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: 400; line-height: 26px; margin: 0px 0px 0.4em;">October 14, 2022</h3><div class="news-body" style="background-color: white; color: #333333; font-family: Verdana, sans-serif; font-size: 14px;"><p style="margin-top: 0px;">Yesterday, the Administrative Council of the EPOrg passed a package of rule changes requested by the EPO "<em>to adapt the rules of the EPC to the digital age</em>". Included in this package was a change to Rule 126(2) EPC relating to the date on which a document sent by the EPO is deemed to be delivered. This used to be 10 days from the date on the document. This has been changed so that the date on which the document is deemed to be delivered is the date on the document, with some safety nets copied from the PCT.</p><p>Amended Rule 126(2) shall read as follows:</p><p><em>(2) Where notification is effected in accordance with paragraph 1, the document <strong>shall be deemed to be delivered to the addressee on the date it bears</strong>, unless it has failed to reach the addressee. In the event of any dispute concerning the delivery of the document, it shall be incumbent on the European Patent Office to establish that the document has reached its destination and to establish the date on which the document was delivered to the addressee. If the European Patent Office establishes that the document was delivered to the addressee more than seven days after the date it bears, a period for which the deemed receipt of that document is the relevant event under Rule 131, paragraph 2, shall expire later by the number of days by which the seven days were exceeded</em>.</p><p>There are therefore safeguards in the rule for the case where a document sent by registered post is not delivered within 7 days or not delivered at all. If a recipient indicates that a document was not delivered on time, it will be up to the EPO to prove when it was delivered.</p><p>The new rule does NOT come into force immediately. It will only come <strong>into force on 1st November 2023</strong> . This gives all concerned just over a year to adapt their processes and update their computer systems to be in conformity with the amended rule. The EPO promised to institute a publicity campaign to assist in dealing with this rule change.</p><p>[end citation]</p><p><br /></p></div>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-16704202722437858742022-09-21T09:22:00.003+02:002022-09-21T09:22:40.648+02:00T 17/22 - On the "Invitation pursuant to Rule 137(4) EPC and Article 94(3) EPC"<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtQHestGmxqYxxamwnD3ihFRkddUepMDTZBedkCtcIn6eMr7UaXBFKLS-s5QG8ood2QjV2rR1V9iKjjnm6EjIVmttAzvtb0izPY8OD1PhDJomnVFZhDiu9DLZJmVxfh1-8UjwQL9bczjcsOMHoXYG7hFaOFMYvMcvOO-GK5VZOzfCYF_aeFJTppCRHhQ/s1376/R.137(4)%20for%20T%2017_22%20(case%20law%20blog%2021-09-2022)%20-%2018750027%20-%20snapshot.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="685" data-original-width="1376" height="199" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtQHestGmxqYxxamwnD3ihFRkddUepMDTZBedkCtcIn6eMr7UaXBFKLS-s5QG8ood2QjV2rR1V9iKjjnm6EjIVmttAzvtb0izPY8OD1PhDJomnVFZhDiu9DLZJmVxfh1-8UjwQL9bczjcsOMHoXYG7hFaOFMYvMcvOO-GK5VZOzfCYF_aeFJTppCRHhQ/w400-h199/R.137(4)%20for%20T%2017_22%20(case%20law%20blog%2021-09-2022)%20-%2018750027%20-%20snapshot.png" width="400" /></a></div><p><i>In the present case, t</i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>he examining division issued a decision to refuse the application based on the ground under Article 123(2) EPC and on lack of novelty, lack of inventive step and lack of clarity.</i></span><i> However, the examining division had issued only two communications before deciding to refuse the application:</i><i> the first was a communication under Rules 161(1) and 162 EPC, inviting the applicant to correct any deficiencies noted in the written opinion raised by the EPO as ISA in the international phase, and</i><i> the second was a communication under Rule 137(4) EPC headed "Invitation pursuant to Rule 137(4) and Article 94(3) EPC", accompanied by an annex raising an objection under Article 123(2) EPC and the statement: </i><i>"nota bene: The amendment appears also not suitable to remedy the deficiencies". In the statement setting out the grounds of appeal, "the appellant contended among others that the examining division had committed a substantial procedural violation as,</i><i> in the proceedings before the examining division, the appellant never had the opportunity to address the objections as expressed in the appealed decision. Moreover, with the invitation pursuant to Rule 137(4) EPC, the appellant had only been alerted that certain amendments had not been sufficiently identified and/or their basis in the application as filed has not been sufficiently indicated. The subsequent decision to refuse the European patent application without any further ado had come completely to the surprise of the appellant. </i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>Thus, the appellant submitted that the right to be heard under Article 113(1) EPC had been violated.".<br /></i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i>The Board considered the scope of Art. 94(3) EPC in detail and considered that </i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i>at least one substantive communication pursuant to Art. 94(3) EPC and Rule 71(1) EPC is required before a decision to refuse the application on substantive grounds is issued (or, exceptionally, summons for OP). </i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i>The Board addressed in detail whether a</i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i> communication under Rules 161(1) and 162 EPC can/cannot be considered a communication under Article 94(3) EPC and whether an </i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i>"Invitation pursuant to Rule 137(4) EPC and Article 94(3) EPC" can/cannot considered a substantive communication under Article 94(3) EPC.</i></span></p><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">I. The appeal was filed by the applicant (appellant) against the decision of the examining division to refuse the European patent application 18750027.7 (hereinafter "the application"), filed under the PCT as PCT/US2018/042697.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The decision was based on a single request with claims filed on 29 October 2020.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">II. In the PCT phase, the EPO acting as International Search Authority (ISA) had issued a written opinion raising objections of lack of novelty, lack of inventive step and lack of clarity.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">During the European phase, the examining division issued two communications before deciding to refuse the application:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- the first was a communication under Rules 161(1) and 162 EPC, inviting the applicant to correct any deficiencies noted in the written opinion, and</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- the second was<a href="javascript:NewPDFWindow('application?documentId=E5Y2YQ5J4198263&number=EP18750027&lng=en&npl=false%27,%20%27E5Y2YQ5J4198263_EP18750027_en%27)" target="_blank"> a communication under Rule 137(4) EPC headed "Invitation pursuant to Rule 137(4) and Article 94(3) EPC",</a> accompanied by <a href="javascript:NewPDFWindow('application?documentId=E5Y2YK518023DSU&number=EP18750027&lng=en&npl=false%27,%20%27E5Y2YK518023DSU_EP18750027_en%27)" target="_blank">an annex</a> raising an objection under Article 123(2) EPC and the statement:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"nota bene: The amendment appears also not suitable to remedy the deficiencies"</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The examining division then issued the decision to refuse the application. Oral proceedings were neither requested by the appellant nor arranged by the examining division. The <a href="javascript:NewPDFWindow('application?documentId=E6K7I21Z8462DSU&number=EP18750027&lng=en&npl=false%27,%20%27E6K7I21Z8462DSU_EP18750027_en%27)" target="_blank">decision </a>was based on the <a href="javascript:NewPDFWindow('application?documentId=E6K7I2313913DSU&number=EP18750027&lng=en&npl=false%27,%20%27E6K7I2313913DSU_EP18750027_en%27)" target="_blank">ground </a>under Article 123(2) EPC and on lack of novelty, lack of inventive step and lack of clarity.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">III. In the statement setting out the grounds of appeal, the appellant contended among others that the examining division had committed a substantial procedural violation justifying a reimbursement of the appeal fee under Rule 103 EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">According to the appellant, in the proceedings before the examining division, the appellant never had the opportunity to address the objections as expressed in the appealed decision. Moreover, with the invitation pursuant to Rule 137(4) EPC dated 15 March 2021, the appellant had only been alerted that certain amendments had not been sufficiently identified and/or their basis in the application as filed has not been sufficiently indicated. The subsequent decision to refuse the European patent application without any further ado had come completely to the surprise of the appellant.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Thus, the appellant's right to be heard under Article 113(1) EPC had been violated.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">IV. The appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that the case be remitted to the examining division for further prosecution. The appellant further requested that the appeal fee be reimbursed.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Reasons for the Decision</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. Substantial procedural violation</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1.1 </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">According to Article 94(3) EPC,</span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;"> if the examination reveals that the application or the invention to which it relates does not meet the requirements of the EPC, </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>the examining division shall invite the applicant, as often as necessary, to file his observations and, subject to Article 123(1) EPC, to amend the application</b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;">.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">While the expression "as often as necessary" indicates that the examining division has discretion whether to issue more than one communication,</span><span style="color: #990000;"> <b>at least one substantive communication pursuant to Article 94(3) EPC and Rule 71(1) EPC is required before a decision to refuse the application on such substantive grounds is issued (</b>unless the examining division exceptionally decides to issue a summons to oral proceedings as the first action in examination, see the Guidelines C-III, 5 - March 2022 version).</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> Indeed, </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">only if a preceding communication pursuant to Article 94(3) EPC sets out the essential legal and factual reasoning to support a finding that a requirement of the EPC has not been met, can a decision based on such a finding be issued without contravening Article 113(1) EPC (see T 305/14, point 2.3 of the reasons).</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1.2 In the case before the Board, the examining division</span><span style="color: #990000;"> issued two communications before issuing the decision to refuse the application. One was a communication under Rules 161(1) and 162 EPC. The other one was a communication under Rule 137(4) EPC headed "Invitation pursuant to Rule 137(4) EPC and Article 94(3) EPC". <b>For the reasons set out further below, neither of them amounts to a substantive communication under Article 94(3) EPC</b>. </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">The omission of such a communication under Article 94(3) EPC </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>is a substantial procedural violation as it deprived the applicant of the opportunity to react to such a communication.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1.2.1 </span><span style="color: #990000;">Rule 161(1) EPC</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> concerns the reply to the search report. Under Rule 161(1) EPC, the EPO invites the applicant to correct any deficiencies noted in the written opinion established by the EPO acting as ISA under the PCT within a period of six months. </span><span style="color: #990000;">This early stage is characterised by the fact that it is still possible for an applicant to make amendments of its own volition (Rule 137(2) EPC). </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">Rule 137(2) EPC explicitly mentions the response to a Rule 161(1) EPC communication as the appropriate time for such an amendment.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>In the context of the overall examination proceedings, an amendment by the applicant's own volition needs to precede the stage of examination</b>. Thus, a reply to the search opinion and any amendments made by the applicant of its own volition should be on file when the substantive examination starts</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> (see also the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 10**(th) edition, 2022, IV.B.1.1). Pursuant to Rule 137(3) EPC, no further amendment may be made without the consent of the Examining Division.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>A communication under Rules 161(1) and 162 EPC thus cannot be considered a communication under Article 94(3) EPC, or a communication which would obviate the need for a communication pursuant to Article 94(3) EPC.</b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> </span><span style="color: #990000;">This is furthermore confirmed by the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO which state that an application <b>may not be refused directly after the reply</b> to a communication under Rule 161(1) EPC (Guidelines C-V, 14).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1.2.2 </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">The "Invitation pursuant to Rule 137(4) EPC and Article 94(3) EPC" can also not be considered a substantive communication under Article 94(3) EPC.</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">A communication under Article 94(3) and Rule 71(1) EPC is a substantive communication, taking into account any reply to the Rule 161(1) EPC communication. The communication is to give reasons for any objections raised and is <b>to invite the applicant within a specified period to file their observations or submit amendments (Guidelines C-III, 4). Following Rules 71(1) and 132(2) EPC, any period for reply by the applicant must not be shorter than 2 months</b> (see also T 246/08, point 4 of the reasons). </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">The practice is to set a period for reply of four months for communications raising matters of substance (Guidelines E-VIII, 1.2).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The communication under Rule 137(4) EPC, with a period for reply of one month, is, by contrast, of a formal nature. </b>The applicant is merely asked to identify the amendments and to indicate the basis for them in the application as filed, independently of whether these amendments comply with Article 123(2) EPC (Guidelines, H-III, 2.1).<b> The short period of one month specified in Rule 137(4) EPC for a reply is inappropriate for a reply to substantive issues.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">In the case before the Board, </span><span style="color: #990000;">the examining division raised an objection under Article 123(2) EPC in the annex to the communication under Rule 137(4) EPC, and added "nota bene: The amendment appears also not suitable to remedy the deficiencies". <b>This, however, does not turn this Rule 137(4) EPC communication into a substantive communication under Article 94(3) and Rule 71(1) EPC, especially as the period for a reply is still only one month</b>. The <b>mere reference to Article 94(3) EPC in the heading of the communication does affect</b> this conclusion.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Thus, the examining division </span><span style="color: #990000;">failed to issue a substantive communication pursuant to Article 94(3) EPC and Rule 71(1) EPC setting out the grounds for the later refusal, with an appropriate time limit</span><span style="color: #0e2034;">.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1.3 </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">For all these reasons the applicant could have expected a communication under Article 94(3) EPC before the decision was issued. This would have given him the opportunity to respond to the objections made.</span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;"> As it stands, he was not only taken by surprise by the refusal decision, but </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">he also had no opportunity to respond to any of the reasoning in that decision within a correct time limit.</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. Remittal and reimbursement of the appeal fee</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Considering the substantial procedural violation identified above, a reimbursement of the appeal fee under Rule 103(1)(a) EPC is equitable.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Furthermore, this substantial procedural violation constitute special reasons for remitting the case to the examining division in the sense of Article 11 RPBA 2020.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Order</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For these reasons it is decided that:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The decision under appeal is set aside.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The case is remitted to the examining division for further prosecution.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The appeal fee is reimbursed.</span></div></div></div></div><br /><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t220017eu1.html" target="_blank">T 0017/22 (Oral care composition / COLGATE-PALMOLIVE) of 20.9.2022</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t220017eu1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span></span></i></span><i>ECLI:EP:BA:2022:T001722.20220920</i><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span>The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP18750027&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> Figure:snapshot from </span></i><a href="javascript:NewPDFWindow('application?documentId=E5Y2YQ5J4198263&number=EP18750027&lng=en&npl=false%27,%20%27E5Y2YQ5J4198263_EP18750027_en%27)" style="background-color: white;" target="_blank"><i>the communication under Rule 137(4) EPC headed "Invitation pursuant to Rule 137(4) and Article 94(3) EPC" dd 15.03.2021,</i></a>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-68031735521613149022022-09-07T10:24:00.002+02:002022-09-08T15:16:34.513+02:00T 682/22 - No interlocutory revision despite single ground for refusal overcome by amendment: what does the Board say?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiSOtBSvkzrE9ZTWMz04RUmkonO7anMLMBP6CK_gjRtrouolbFy___nYyBWXQalZw1fHgV9tdB8sbg68NMaAY5RWTP2ZOWPMTv2WG0GLic7FqBJKoSvtHLfdy6JE-S-G90ptmPiV12URixNl6S6nXwvsN10rrIY6htq4Hci7s2kAomKQs70mpU1Kt9OBQ/s1279/2022.09.07%20GL2022%20E-XII%207.4.2%20%5B2%5D.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1224" data-original-width="1279" height="383" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiSOtBSvkzrE9ZTWMz04RUmkonO7anMLMBP6CK_gjRtrouolbFy___nYyBWXQalZw1fHgV9tdB8sbg68NMaAY5RWTP2ZOWPMTv2WG0GLic7FqBJKoSvtHLfdy6JE-S-G90ptmPiV12URixNl6S6nXwvsN10rrIY6htq4Hci7s2kAomKQs70mpU1Kt9OBQ/w400-h383/2022.09.07%20GL2022%20E-XII%207.4.2%20%5B2%5D.png" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p><i>In the present case, the application was refused due to lack of novelty. The applicant appealed with a sole request in which the applicant amended the independent claims. The amendments included the addition of a feature to the independent claims which, according to a positive statement in the annex to the summons for oral proceedings before the examining division, made the claim novel. Nevertheless, interlocutory revision was not granted (possibly because the ED considered further amendments to extend subject-matter, but -in accordance with Art.109(2), the reasons were not given). The Board of Appeal discussed the breath and the established case law of Art.109(1) EPC, as well as the Guidelines, and </i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>considers it appropriate to point out that there are (still) some significant inconsistencies between the current Guidelines and the established case law as to the interpretation of Article 109(1) EPC. The Board concluded that "i</i></span><i style="text-align: center;">nterlocutory revision <u>must</u> be granted if the amendments clearly overcome the grounds for refusal, <u>even if</u> further new objections arise, i.e. irrespective of whether new objections under Article 123(2) EPC or whether previous objections referenced in the appealed decision were raised by the first-instance department" and noted that "</i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>the established case law (...) a</i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i>nd the current Guidelines are inconsistent with each other.</i></span><i style="text-align: center;">" The Board conclude that, in the current case, "</i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>the appeal is "well founded" within the meaning of Article 109(1) EPC. There is also no apparent reason to contest that the appeal is "admissible" within the meaning of Article 109(1) EPC. The examining division should therefore have indeed rectified its decision and continued with the examination of compliance with the requirements of the EPC. However, for whatever reasons, they did not do so.</i></span><i style="text-align: center;">"</i></p><br /><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">I. The appeal was lodged against the decision of the examining division to refuse the present European patent application</span><span style="color: #990000;"> for lack of novelty (Article 54(3) EPC) with respect to the independent claims of a sole set of claims (sole request).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">II. During the examination proceedings, the examining division referred inter alia to the following prior-art document:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D5: WO 2015/11978 A1.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">III. The appellant requested that the appealed decision be set aside and that a patent be granted on the basis of the claims of a sole request filed with the statement of grounds of appeal. The appeal further requested rectification of the impugned decision under Article 109(1) EPC and the reimbursement of the appeal fee under Rule 103(1)(a) EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">IV. In a communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA 2020, the board stated its intention to remit the case to the examining division, the only remaining issue for discussion during oral proceedings being the appellant's request for reimbursement of the appeal fee under Rule 103(1)(a) EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">V. In response to the board's communication, the appellant indicated that it would not be attending the scheduled oral proceedings and requested partial reimbursement of the appeal fee.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VI. Claim 1 of the sole request reads as follows:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"A method for controlling access of a Closed Subscriber Group, CSG, in a dual-connection architecture, the dual-connection architecture referring to a User Equipment, UE, simultaneously maintaining connections with two different eNBs, wherein the UE is connected to a master eNB, MeNB, which is adapted to determine a CSG status of the UE, and based on the determination, a secondary eNB, SeNB, is added for simultaneous connection between the MeNB, the SeNB and the UE,</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">the method comprising:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">the SeNB acquiring CSG identity state information of the UE (501); and</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">the SeNB determining a CSG access policy of the UE according to the acquired CSG identity state information of the UE (502), wherein the CSG identity state information comprises: a CSG identity state, wherein the CSG identity state is a member or a</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">non-member;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">characterized in that,</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">the SeNB determining the CSG access policy of the UE according to the acquired CSG identity state information of the UE comprises: if determining that the UE cannot access the SeNB, the SeNB refusing an SeNB adding request transmitted by the MeNB;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">wherein a message for the SeNB refusing the adding request contains a cause value indicating that the SeNB refuses to be added or the CSG identity state information of the UE."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Independent claim 11 of the sole request reads as follows:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"A system for controlling access of a Closed Subscriber Group, CSG, in a dual-connection architecture, applied to a second eNB, the</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">dual-connection architecture referring to a User Equipment, UE, simultaneously maintaining connections with two different eNBs, wherein the UE is connected to the MeNB which is adapted to determine a CSG status of the UE, and based on the determination, the secondary eNB, SeNB, is added for simultaneous connection between the MeNB, the SeNB and the UE,</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">wherein, the system comprises:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">a communication module (10) configured to acquire CSG identity state information of the UE; and</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">a control module (20) configured to determine a CSG access policy of the UE according to the acquired CSG identity state information of the UE, wherein the CSG identity state information comprises: a CSG identity state, wherein the CSG identity state is a member or a non-member;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">characterized in that,</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">the control module (20) is further configured to: if determining that the UE cannot access the SeNB, refuse an SeNB adding request transmitted by the MeNB;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">wherein a message for the SeNB refusing the adding request contains a cause value indicating that the SeNB refuses to be added or the CSG identity state information of the UE."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Reasons for the Decision</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. Decision in written proceedings</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1.1 According to established case law, where oral proceedings are appointed upon a party's request and that party subsequently expresses its intention not to attend, such statement is normally considered to be equivalent to a withdrawal of the request for oral proceedings.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1.2 As the board does not consider holding oral proceedings to be expedient in this case (cf. Article 116(1) EPC), these were cancelled and a decision is handed down in written proceedings (Article 12(8) RPBA 2020).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. SOLE REQUEST</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Claim 1 of the sole request comprises the following limiting features (board's outline):</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">A method for controlling access of a CSG, in a </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">dual-connection architecture, the dual-connection architecture referring to a UE, simultaneously maintaining connections with two different eNBs, wherein the UE is connected to an MeNB, which is adapted to determine a CSG status of the UE, and based on the determination, an SeNB is added for simultaneous connection between the MeNB, the SeNB and the UE, </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">the method comprising:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(a) the SeNB acquiring CSG identity state information of the UE;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(b) the SeNB determining a CSG access policy of the UE according to the acquired CSG identity state information of the UE, wherein the CSG identity state information comprises: a CSG identity state, wherein the CSG identity state is a member or a non-member;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(c) the SeNB determining the CSG access policy of the UE according to the acquired CSG identity state information of the UE comprises: if determining that the UE cannot access the SeNB, the SeNB refusing an SeNB adding request transmitted by the MeNB;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(d) a message for the SeNB refusing the adding request contains a cause value indicating that the SeNB refuses to be added or the CSG identity state information of the UE.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Independent claim 11 comprises corresponding features in terms of modules of a system carrying out the method of claim 1.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.1 Amendments</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.1.1 The appellant submitted that amended claim 1 was based on a combination of previous claims 1, 4 and 5, which had been deemed to be allowable in the decision under appeal (cf. Reasons 1.2 of the appealed decision). According to the appellant, amended claim 1 "had been subjected to the following amendments" (cf. page 2 of the statement of grounds of appeal):</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div></div></div></div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"(1) deleting the features 'via communication with an MME', 'the MeNB transmitting the CSG identity state information to the SeNB' and 'the MeNB determining whether the UE accesses the SeNB with an identity of a member or a non-member according to the CSG identity state information' which were previously added into claim 1 and did not contribute to patentability in view of the Examining Division. Hence, deleting the above features previously added into claim 1 does not extend the subject matter beyond the content of the application as filed;</span></div></div></div></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(2) adding the last alternative feature of former claim 4 according to which 'if determining that the UE cannot access the SeNB, the SeNB refusing an SeNB adding request transmitted by the MeNB' [feature (c)];</span></div></div></div></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(3) adding <b>all features of former claim 5</b> 'wherein a message for the SeNB refusing the adding request contains a cause value indicating that the SeNB refuses to be added or the CSG identity state information of the UE' [<b>feature (d)</b>];</span></div></div></div></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(4) amending the execution entity 'MeNB' to read as 'SeNB' (basis for the amendment can be found at least in original claim 4 or rather on page 6, line 8 of the description as originally filed).</span></div></div></div></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Further, former claims 4 to 6 have been cancelled.</span></div></div></div></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">In addition, former independent claim 14 (amended independent claim 11) has been brought in line with amended independent claim 1."</span></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.2 Novelty in view of D5 (Article 54(3) EPC)</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.2.1 The appellant submitted that, as already acknowledged by the examining division in the appealed decision, document D5 did not disclose the features of the characterising portion of claim 1 as amended, namely the ones of former claims 4 and 5 as well as former claims 17 and 18, i.e. features (c) and (d).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.2.2 The appealed decision contained novelty objections under Article 54(3) EPC with respect to independent claims 1 and 11 and dependent claims 2 to 4, 6 to 13, 15 to 17 and 19 to 25 of the then sole request. Furthermore, in point 3 of the annex to the summons (with D5 being wrongly referred to as D4, cf. also point 8 of the Facts and Submissions of the appealed decision), the examining division had made the following statements with respect to the features of dependent claims 5 and 18 subject to the appealed decision, i.e.<b> feature (d))</b> vis-à-vis D5 (including the original emphasis):</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div></div></div></div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>"3 <b>Positive statement</b></i></span></div></div></div></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><i style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">3.1 It is noted that <b>claims 6 and 20 </b>are <b>not </b>disclosed by <b>D4</b>, since while paragraph [48], teaches that the SeNB decides whether to admit the UE based on the CSG status, it does <b>not</b> explicitly mention that the SeNB sends a cause value indicating the refusal.</i></div></div></div></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><i style="background-color: transparent;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">It appears hence that the combination of </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;"><b>claims 1+4+5+6</b> currently on file, due to the dependency of claim 6, which depends on 5, which depends on 4, which finally depends on 1, </span><span style="background-color: transparent;"><span style="color: #990000;">would be new over D4.</span></span></i></div></div></div></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><i style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">Claim 15 should be amended accordingly.</i></div></div></div></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><i style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">3.2 It is also underlined that the novelty objections based on document D2 is abandoned, since D2 seems not to disclosed [sic] the sending from MeNB to SeNB of the CSG status."</i></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.3 The board sees no reason to reverse the above assessment of the examining division. </span><span style="color: #990000;">It follows that the subject-matter of independent claims 1 and 11 is new over D5 (Article 54(3) EPC).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">2.4 Interlocutory revision (Article 109(1) EPC)</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">2.4.1 Under Article 109(1) EPC, if the department whose decision is contested considers the appeal to be admissible and well founded, it shall rectify its decision.<b> In the context of Article 109(1) EPC, an appeal is to be considered "well founded" if the main request submitted with the appeal includes amendments which clearly overcome the objections on which the decision relies, such that the examining division could reasonably be expected to recognise this and thus rectify its decision (cf. T 691/18, Reasons 2). </b>The board, to avoid misunderstandings, also notes that in the context of Article 109(1) EPC, an "admissible appeal" is not to be conflated with any admittance considerations whatsoever as regards newly filed claim requests.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">2.4.2<b> It is established case law of the Boards of Appeal that other objections which arise in the current request but which were not the subject of the contested decision cannot preclude the application of Article 109(1) EPC</b> (cf. T 691/18, Reasons 2, citing T 139/87, and Reasons 4; T 1060/13, Reasons 4.1). <b>Thus, even if the amendments raise "new" objections not previously discussed, interlocutory revision must be allowed since the main purpose of this legal instrument is to shorten the appeal proceedings to the benefit of procedural expediency and economy and to avoid unnecessary workload for the Boards of Appeal in the interest of both the appellant and the EPO (see e.g. T 1060/13, Reasons 4.1).</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">2.4.3 The conclusions of point 2.4.2 are i<b>n principle also reflected in the Guidelines for Examination </b>in their edition of March 2022. See e.g. chapter E-XII, section 7.1, 4th paragraph:</span></div></div></div></div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent;"><span style="color: #990000;">"The department concerned will rectify its decision if convinced in the light of the grounds of appeal that the appeal is admissible and well founded. This could arise, for example, because:... (iii) the decision of the department concerned does not appear to be incorrect, but the applicant ... files amendments to the application, which overcome the objections of the decision under appeal (see T 139/87)",</span></span></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">and chapter E-XII, section 7.4.2, 1st sentence:</span></div></div></div></div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0 0 0 40px; padding: 0px;"><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt; text-align: left;"><span style="color: #990000;">"If amendments clearly overcome the grounds for refusal, interlocutory revision is granted even if further new objections arise".</span></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Nonetheless, some passages of those Guidelines are not consistent with those conclusions. </b>Article 20(2) RPBA 2020 stipulates that "[i]f, in its decision, a Board gives a different interpretation of the Convention from that provided for in the Guidelines for Examination, it shall state its grounds for doing so if it considers that the decision will be more readily understood in the light of such grounds". <b>Therefore, this board - as did the deciding board in case T 1060/13 (cf. Reasons 4.3) - considers it appropriate to point out that there are (still) some significant inconsistencies between the current Guidelines and the established case law as to the interpretation of Article 109(1)</b> EPC. <b>More specifically, according to those Guidelines (see e.g. chapter E-XII, section 7.4.2, 6th paragraph), "[i]f amendments made to the independent claims clearly do not meet the requirements of Art. 123(2), interlocutory revision is not granted, but the division sends the file to the boards of appeal</b>. If there are doubts as to whether the amendments meet the requirements of Art. 123(2) or the amendments clearly meet the requirements of Art. 123(2), the division checks whether the amended claims overcome the ground(s) for refusal".</span></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Moreover, in arriving at a decision on granting interlocutory revision, according to those Guidelines (cf. E-XII, section 7.4.2, 5th paragraph), the examiner is supposed to take into account all the grounds mentioned in the original decision, including the main or supporting arguments already raised</b> in<b> previous objections</b> to patentability to which the applicant has had an opportunity to respond and to which reference is made in the grounds of refusal (e.g. objections mentioned in <b>previous communications</b>, during<b> personal consultation</b> or at <b>oral proceedings</b>). <b>Conversely, on the basis of the established case law, interlocutory revision <u>must </u>be granted if the amendments clearly overcome the grounds for refusal, <u>even if</u> further new objections arise, i.e. irrespective of whether new objections under Article 123(2) EPC or whether previous objections referenced in the appealed decision were raised by the first-instance department.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">2.4.4 In that regard, the present board is aware of T 2445/11, which hints at a different approach and disagrees with the approach adopted in T 1060/13 as possibly being "too rigid, as it leaves no room for a pragmatic assessment of the situation with a view to procedural efficiency and may result in a needless repetition of the first-instance proceedings" (cf. Reasons 8). This decision is also referred to in the Guidelines (cf. E-XII, section 7.4.2).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">However, the present board does not follow the conclusions drawn in case T 2445/11. <b>The fact that the first-instance proceedings must be "repeated" is a consequence of the very fact that the examining division decided to refuse an application on specific grounds - and not on others - and that these specific grounds are overcome with the appeal. In such a situation and in line with the established case law, Article 109(1) EPC obliges the examining division to rectify its decision and continue examination of the application.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">2.4.5 Hence, <b>the established case law (see point 2.4.2 above) and the current Guidelines are inconsistent with each other.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">2.4.6 As to the present case, it is apparent to the board that, in view of the statements made by the examining division (cf. point 2.2.2 above), the addition of at least <b>feature (d) </b>(taken from former claims 5 and 18) to the independent claims <b><u>clearly</u> overcomes all the objections raised in the appealed decision.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">2.4.7 It follows that the appeal is "well founded" within the meaning of Article 109(1) EPC. There is also no apparent reason to contest that the appeal is "admissible" within the meaning of Article 109(1) EPC. T<b>he examining division should therefore have indeed rectified its decision and continued with the examination of compliance with the requirements of the EPC. However, for whatever reasons, they did not do so.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.5 Reimbursement of the appeal fee (Rule 103 EPC)</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.5.1 The appellant originally requested the reimbursement of the appeal fee under Rule 103(1)(a) EPC, according to which the appeal fee shall be reimbursed in full in the event of interlocutory revision or where the board deems an appeal to be allowable, if such reimbursement is equitable by reason of a "substantial procedural violation".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.5.2 In response to the board's communication, the appellant requested the partial reimbursement of the appeal fee. The appellant, however, did not specify whether this request was meant to supersede the original one or whether it was meant to be a subsidiary request.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">2.5.3 In any event, the mere fact that the examining division did not rectify its decision cannot constitute a "substantial procedural violation" justifying a reimbursement of the appeal fee under Rule 103(1)(a) EPC (see e.g. T 1060/13, Reasons 4.5 and the further decisions cited therein).</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> The appellant did not explain which specific actions of the examining division should indeed be regarded as a substantial procedural violation. Nor can the board identify any objective deficiencies in the examination proceedings. Thus, a reimbursement of the appeal fee in full under Rule 103(1)(a) EPC is not justified.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2.5.4 However, given that the appellant's indication of </span><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">non-attendance and their request for partial reimbursement was submitted within one month of notification of the board's communication under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020 (see also point 1.1 above), the appeal fee is to be partially reimbursed under Rule 103(4)(c) EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">3. Remittal of the case (Article 111(1) EPC)</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">3.1 It follows from the above that the subject-matter of independent claims 1 and 11 of the main request is new (Article 54(3) EPC) in view of document D5 and that the examining division should have rectified its decision. In the board's view, this represents a "special reason" within the meaning of Article 11 RPBA 2020 for a direct remittal of the case.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">3.2 Consequently, the board remits the case to the examining division for further prosecution under Article 111(1) EPC on the basis of the sole claim request on file.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Order</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For these reasons it is decided that:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. The decision under appeal is set aside.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. The case is remitted to the examining division for further prosecution.</span></div></div></div></div><div><br /></div><div><div><b>Catchwords</b>:<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">Different interpretation of Article 109(1) EPC from that provided for in the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO - application of Article, 20(2) RPBA 2020 (see point 2.4.3 of the Reasons).</span></div></div><br /><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t220682eu1.html" target="_blank">T 0682/22 (Interlocutory revision/ZTE) of 20.7.2022</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t220682eu1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide</span><span><span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span>ECLI:EP:BA:2022:T068222.20220720</span></span></i></span><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span>The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP14889608&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>. Figure: screenshot from Guidelines (2022) E-XII, 7.4.2 (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/e_xii_7_4_2.htm">https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/e_xii_7_4_2.htm</a>) </i></span><div><span><i><br /></i></span></div>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-33959932069094080822022-07-12T09:14:00.007+02:002022-07-12T09:23:40.038+02:00T 3000/19 - Use of video retrieved from the internet as prior-art<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjthX9UUbGxd18AYmH3wbq0PHxCGFk4B0_vOopK3HwvbtoNVqoGIkKjsD6OlzX6YF99Kpp1LegJdHXznWe0YMZtvPmYlEluPCn5dveBps8rxTcwZ6nhaWWvbdvStoms2TWyG_2lHrOWqEyqTBt1iRLpodtpdG1J31newnhINgSFNEXvCbG7j4wvz04xlQ/s1244/VideoNotAvailableAnymore.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="910" data-original-width="1244" height="293" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjthX9UUbGxd18AYmH3wbq0PHxCGFk4B0_vOopK3HwvbtoNVqoGIkKjsD6OlzX6YF99Kpp1LegJdHXznWe0YMZtvPmYlEluPCn5dveBps8rxTcwZ6nhaWWvbdvStoms2TWyG_2lHrOWqEyqTBt1iRLpodtpdG1J31newnhINgSFNEXvCbG7j4wvz04xlQ/w400-h293/VideoNotAvailableAnymore.png" width="400" /></a></div><p></p><div style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;"><i>The grounds for refusal of the decision under appeal are based on lack of inventive step when taking as starting point documents D4 and D5. T</i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>he prior-art evidence cited by the examining division as "document D4" refers to a video titled "Mac OS X Leopard Overview : Mac OS X Leopard Dictionary", retrieved from the YouTube website and, at the same time, a document including a screenshot of a web browser visiting that YouTube website. </i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i>The video of D4 was cited for the first time in the examining division's communication of 24 January 2018, which provided the URL for accessing the video on the internet. </i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i>The document with the screenshot also shows YouTube information about the video, including the publication date of 9 July 2008 used by the examining division. It does not show any other information relevant to the case. The Board discussed </i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i>Internet disclosure as prior-art evidence, </i></span><i>Use of electronic evidence in proceedings and Use of online video evidence in the EPO. The Board considered the procedure in accordance with the Guidelines for Examination, B-X, 11.6 to be insufficient for preserving video evidence and guaranteeing its accessibility over time as needed for EPO proceedings or for further judicial proceedings before the boards of appeal of the EPO or national courts (Article 131(1) EPC). </i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>The Board concluded to be not in a position to make its own assessment of the relevant evidence in its original presentation in an objective and independent manner. </i></span><span style="text-align: center;"><i>In view of this, the Board concludes that the decision under appeal is not sufficiently reasoned and violates Rule 111(2) EPC. This constitutes a substantial procedural violation. The measures recommended by the Guidelines for Examination of November 2018, B-X, 11.6, which were followed by the examining division, did not adequately preserve the relevant electronic evidence to guarantee accessibility over time.</i></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div></div><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">I. The appeal lies from the decision of the examining division to refuse European patent application No. 11741809.5, which was filed as international application PCT/CA2011/050094, published as WO 2011/097741.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">II. The decision under appeal made inter alia reference to the following documents, which were introduced into the proceedings during examination:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">D4 "Mac OS X Leopard Overview: Mac OS X Leopard Dictionary", YouTube, 9 July 2008, retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JskACcyZbMs;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D5 "Exclude directory from Spotlight index via the command line", 5 November 2009, retrieved from https://discussions.apple.com/thread/2223487;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D6 "Policy files enabling Applet access to user files", 13 November 2004, retrieved from http://web.archive.org/web/20041113035245/http://www.ccp4.ac.uk/jwc/image_applet/Policy_file_examps_ccp4.html;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D7 "Ultra-mobile PC", 29 November 2006, retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Ultramobile.PC&oldid=90824861.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">III. The examining division decided that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request and first to fifth auxiliary requests lacked inventive step over documents D4 and D5 "forming a single piece of prior art disclosing the use of 'Spotlight' on 'Mac OS X'", in combination with common general knowledge and notoriously known features. The examining division cited documents D6 and D7 and "Google" to illustrate common general knowledge or notoriously known features.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">IV. In its statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant maintained the requests considered in the decision under appeal and filed new sets of claims as sixth to eighth auxiliary requests.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">The appellant argued that document D4, an educational video for an end-user, was not an enabling disclosure and was therefore not appropriate as a starting point for assessing inventive step. It reasoned in detail that there were further distinguishing features, also with regard to D4, other than those identified in the decision under appeal. The appellant contested that document D5 was an enabling disclosure, that documents D4 and D5 could be considered a single disclosure in combination, and that document D6 represented common general knowledge. It argued that the need to combine so many documents for the inventive-step objection, including documents D4, D5, D6 and D7, reinforced the appellant's position that the claimed subject-matter was inventive.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that a patent be granted on the basis of the main request or one of the first to eighth auxiliary requests. In the notice of appeal, the appellant requested oral proceedings if the board intended to dismiss the appeal.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">V. In a telephone conversation, the appellant was informed that the board intended to remit the case to the department of first instance for further prosecution.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VI. In a letter of reply, the appellant informed the board that it agreed to remittal for further prosecution without holding oral proceedings.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Reasons for the Decision</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. The invention concerns a mobile wireless communications device and a method for searching data on data sources associated with registered applications.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. The grounds for refusal of the decision under appeal are based on lack of inventive step when taking as starting point documents D4 and D5 "forming a single piece of prior art disclosing the use of 'Spotlight' on 'Mac OS X'".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Document D4</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">3. In the decision under appeal, the prior-art evidence cited by the examining division as "document D4" refers to a video titled "Mac OS X Leopard Overview : Mac OS X Leopard Dictionary", retrieved from the YouTube website and, at the same time, a document including a screenshot of a web browser visiting that YouTube website.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">4. <b>The video of D4 was cited for the first time in the examining division's communication of 24 January 2018, which provided the URL for accessing the video on the internet (see section II. above). The document with the screenshot was annexed to the communication and is part of the electronic file. The reproduction of the screenshot is of poor quality, but the first video frame (with time stamp "0:00/1:21") can be seen. The document also shows YouTube information about the video, including the publication date of 9 July 2008 used by the examining division. It does not show any other information relevant to the case.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">5. The decision's reasoning refers to video frames at "0:00", "0:56", "1:02" and "1:11" and video frame sequences "0:29-0:52" and "0:59-1:02". However, the web page corresponding to the URL indicated in the citation of document D4 is no longer functioning, so the board cannot assess on its own the relevant parts of the video evidence D4.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">6.</span><span style="color: #990000;"> Essentially the same situation was dealt with in appeal case T 3071/19 against the decision to refuse a parallel application of the same family as the current application. In that case, the decision to refuse the application was based on the same evidence D4 as in this case (D2 in that decision). As the responsible board explained in T 3071/19, Reasons 6, under these circumstances, the board cannot review the correctness of the contested decision's reasoning in so far as it relies on what is shown in the YouTube video evidence. Nor can the board assess the appellant's arguments that this online video is not an enabling disclosure and that there are further distinguishing features other than those recognised in the decision under appeal.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">7. The board notes that in the novelty analysis of the impugned decision (point 3.4), in essentially the same way as in the communications since 24 January 2018,</span><span style="color: #990000;"> the examining division briefly described the content of some of the cited parts of video D4 and quoted one short sentence of the respective audio at "1:02". In its replies and in the grounds of appeal, the appellant provided comments on the video content and a few screenshots. This, however, does not provide sufficient information about the content of the video and does not allow the board to make its own assessment of the relevant evidence.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">Internet disclosure as prior-art evidence</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">8. An internet disclosure may be regarded as part of the state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC. </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">However, examining divisions should make sure that an internet disclosure used as state of the art is reliable in terms of both the publication date (see decision T 1066/13, Reasons 4 to 4.3; see also the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, G-IV, 7.5.1) and continued accessibility to its content in the version made publicly accessible on that date (see decision T 3071/19, Reasons 5; see also T 0013/20, Reasons 4).</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">9. Due account should be taken of the </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>rights of third parties and the public to inspect the file under Article 128 EPC.</b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> </span><span style="color: #990000;">Since the content on the internet changes over time, when "electronic evidence" such as an internet document or a video is used as prior-art disclosure against the patentability of an application, appropriate measures should be taken for collecting, storing and preserving this evidence and making it accessible under suitable conditions for the judiciary, or interested parties, for example, the applicant, an opponent, their respective representatives or a member of the public.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">Use of electronic evidence in proceedings</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">10. In respect of the quite new field of electronic evidence, </span><span style="color: #990000;">the Council of Europe has published guidelines on using electronic evidence in civil and administrative proceedings (see "Electronic evidence in civil and administrative proceedings - Guidelines and explanatory memorandum") adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 30 January 2019. <b>Even though these guidelines and the explanatory memorandum are not binding on the EPO or the boards of appeal of the EPO, they provide important practical guidance about handling electronic evidence in the jurisdictions of member states.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">10.1 The "Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers to member States on electronic evidence in civil and administrative proceedings" ("guidelines on electronic evidence", pages 5 to 11) and the explanatory memorandum (starting on page 13) </span><span style="color: #990000;">concern the use of electronic evidence, including data from web pages (page 15, point 11). According to the explanatory memorandum, point 28, "electronic evidence, by its very nature, is fragile and can be altered, damaged or destroyed by improper handling or examination" and for these reasons "special precautions may be taken to properly collect this type of evidence".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">10.2 I</span><span style="color: #990000;">t is stated, a<b>s a fundamental principle, that electronic evidence should be collected, structured and managed in a manner that facilitates its forwarding to other courts, in particular appellate courts</b>. It "should be collected in an appropriate and secure manner, and submitted to courts using reliable services, such as trust services" and using procedures established by the member states for its secure seizure and collection (guidelines on electronic evidence, points 10, 11 and 14).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">10.3 </span><span style="color: #990000;">Furthermore, <b>electronic evidence should be stored with standardised metadata so that the context of its creation is clear and the integrity of the evidence is preserved. Readability, integrity and accessibility should be guaranteed over time</b> (guidelines on electronic evidence, points 25 to 27; exploratory memorandum, points 26, 37 and 44 to 46)</span><span style="color: #0e2034;">. Courts are advised, through active management, to restrict the electronic evidence to what is strictly required for deciding a case. </span><span style="color: #990000;">It is also recommended that <b>electronic data be retained in its original format</b>. <b>A screen printout from a web browser is not considered reliable evidence</b> as it is nothing but a copy of a screen display which can be modified in a very simple manner (exploratory memorandum, points 27, 29 and 35).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">Use of online video evidence in the EPO - prior art D4</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">11. In the current case, </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>document D4 consisting of a screenshot (see point 4 above) included in the file is clearly insufficient for the judicial review of the decision under appeal</b>. Furthermore, it is<b> not apparent from the file whether the video's content has been collected, preserved and/or stored in a manner wh</b>ich guarantees accessibility for members of the judiciary or interested parties.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">12. </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The board could also not find publicly available information about whether and how, in proceedings before the EPO, the content of an internet video used as prior-art evidence in examination should be preserved and made accessible to external parties or the boards of appeal.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">12.1 The information about a European patent application or patent is recorded in the European Patent Register which, in accordance with Article 127 EPC, is kept by the EPO and open to inspection by the public. </span><span style="color: #990000;">Following Rule 147(1) and (2) EPC, files relating to a European patent application or patent are constituted, maintained and preserved in electronic form, in accordance with the technical and administrative arrangements determined by the President of the EPO. Any files shall be preserved for at least five years from the end of the year in which the application is refused, deemed withdrawn, or the patent is revoked or lapses (Rule 147(4) EPC). In case appeal or opposition proceedings have taken place, the files will not be destroyed before 25 years after the date of filing (OJ EPO 1990, page 365).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">12.2 </span><span style="color: #990000;">In accordance with Rule 65 EPC, the European search report is to be transmitted to the applicant together with copies of any cited documents. </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">The European Patent Register includes entries for new documents coming to light after the European search report was drawn up (Rule 143(2) EPC, OJ EPO, 2014, A86).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">13. </span><span style="color: #990000;">The Guidelines for Examination in the EPO (G-IV, 7.5) underline that, for the sake of a valid patent, it is often crucial to cite publications only obtainable from internet websites.</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> With regard to the search report, </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>the Guidelines for Examination (B-X, 11.6) indicate that video and/or audio media fragments available on the internet are converted into a non-patent literature citation, and that the bibliographic data contains the URL of the original location on the internet</b>. At the time the decision under appeal was written, <b>the Guidelines for Examination (November 2018, B-X, 11.6) further indicated that such fragments should be cited as a screenshot of the first page of the internet citation.</b> In the present case, the non-patent literature citation is document D4 with a screenshot of the video. <b>The examining division has thus followed the indications in the Guidelines.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">However, a number of screenshots taken from a video, let alone a single screenshot, <b>fail to preserve in its original format the necessary video content </b>to ensure that the video evidence required for review and public inspection is available later. <b>Consequently, the procedure in accordance with the Guidelines for Examination, B-X, 11.6 is insufficient for preserving video evidence and guaranteeing its accessibility over time as needed for EPO proceedings or for further judicial proceedings before the boards of appeal of the EPO or national courts (Article 131(1) EPC).</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">The board could not find any other passages of the Guidelines for Examination describing how to preserve the content of multimedia disclosure used as prior art in the proceedings before the EPO and to guarantee its accessibility for external parties or judicial bodies</span><span style="color: #0e2034;">.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">Combination of documents D4 and D5</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">14. </span><span style="color: #990000;">Since the board does not have access to the content of the video of D4, it cannot fully assess whether documents D4 and D5 can be considered to form a single disclosure.</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> The board notes however that, as explained in decision T 3071/19, Reasons 7, only in exceptional circumstances can two documents be considered to form a single disclosure. In the decision under appeal, the examining division merely stated that document D5 was considered to form a single disclosure with D4 because "it discloses a core feature of Spotlight". This argument is not sufficient, since it does not explain why a skilled person watching the video of D4 would necessarily have been guided to consult document D5 (or vice versa).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Document D6</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">15. Document D6 was cited in the decision under appeal to argue that "the skilled person would be aware of commonly known access control functionality to maintain data security (e.g., as shown in document D6 which discloses the restriction of access to certain local file system locations for certain applications by means of granting access rights associated to these applications, exemplifying common general knowledge)".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">15.1 In its grounds of appeal, the appellant contested that document D6 represented common general knowledge. In the appellant's view, document D6 was an enabling disclosure because it described the use of Java classes and indicated the type of content of the files to be used (and where in the directory the file was to be placed). However, the disclosure was directed to enabling Applet access to user files, and little if any detail was given in relation to the policy files. The disclosure was very narrow and specific to this feature. Such a narrow/specialist disclosure did not represent the common general knowledge of the skilled person.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">15.2 Document D6 discloses two policy files enabling Applet access to user files that the author has "set up for personal use at home". One file is for Windows XP and "enables read access of files in the folder C:\Documents...\image_applet\data". The other file is for Linux and "enables access of files in all subdirectories of /home/jwc as indicated by the '-'."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The board agrees with the appellant that the disclosure of document D6 is too specialised to be proof of "commonly known access control functionality to maintain data security". This does not mean that "access control functionality to maintain data security" is not commonly known, only that using document D6 does not support such a claim by the examining division.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">Substantial procedural violation</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">16. In accordance with Rule 111(2) EPC, decisions open to appeal have to be reasoned. The decision's reasoning should enable the appellant and, in the event of an appeal, the board to assess whether the decision is correct (see decision T 278/00, Reasons 2).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">In the case at hand, the appellant was able to prepare its appeal case because at the time the appeal was filed, it still had access to the video of D4 on which the decision was based. <b>However, the board cannot assess whether the contested decision is correct because that evidence is no longer accessible.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">The electronic file only includes a single screenshot printout, comments about the video content by both the examining division and the appellant, a quote from the audio of D4 provided by the examining division, and a few screenshots included in the appellant's written submissions. <b>The board is hence not in a position to make its own assessment of the relevant evidence in its original presentation in an objective and independent manner.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>In view of this, the board concludes that the decision under appeal is not sufficiently reasoned and violates Rule 111(2) EPC. This constitutes a substantial procedural violation. </b>The measures recommended by the Guidelines for Examination of November 2018, B-X, 11.6, which were followed by the examining division, did not adequately preserve the relevant electronic evidence to guarantee accessibility over time.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Remittal</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">17. In view of the substantial procedural violation, special reasons present themselves for remitting the case to the examining division for further prosecution (Article 11 RPBA 2020).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The case is thus to be remitted to the department of first instance under Article 111(1) EPC. Since the procedural violation resulted in the remittal of the case to the examining division without a substantive review of the merits of the decision, reimbursement of the appeal fee in full is equitable under Rule 103(1)(a) EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Order</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For these reasons it is decided that:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. The decision under appeal is set aside.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. The case is remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">3. The appeal fee is to be reimbursed.</span></div></div></div></div><div><br /></div><div><div><b>Relevant legal provisions:<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span></b></div><div>European Patent Convention Art 111(1)</div><div>European Patent Convention Art 127</div><div>European Patent Convention Art 128</div><div>European Patent Convention R 65</div><div>European Patent Convention R 103(1)(a)</div><div>European Patent Convention R 111(2)</div><div>European Patent Convention R 143(2)</div><div>European Patent Convention R 147</div><div>Rules of procedure of the Boards of Appeal 2020 Art 011</div><div>European Patent Convention Art 131(1)</div><div><br /></div><div><b>Keywords:</b><span style="white-space: pre;"> </span></div><div>Appealed decision - sufficiently reasoned (no)</div><div>Remittal to the department of first instance</div><div>Remittal - fundamental deficiency in first instance proceedings (yes)</div><div>Prior-art evidence - accessibility over time</div><div>Council of Europe: "Electronic evidence in civil and administrative proceedings - Guidelines and explanatory memorandum"July 2019</div><div><br /></div><div><b>Catchwords:<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span></b></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>When a video retrieved from the internet is used as prior-art evidence for refusing a patent application, its content, in a form suitable for reviewing the decision, and metadata evidence demonstrating when and how it was made available to the public should be preserved and made accessible over time to interested parties and judicial bodies.</b></span></div></div><div><br /></div><div><div><b>Cited decisions:</b><span style="white-space: pre;"> </span></div><div><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t000278dp1.html" target="_blank">T 0278/00</a></div><div><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t131066eu1.html" target="_blank">T 1066/13</a></div><div><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t193071eu1.html" target="_blank">T 3071/19</a></div><div><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t200013eu1.html" target="_blank">T 0013/20</a></div></div><div><br /></div><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t193000eu1.html" target="_blank">T 3000/19 (Searching data with registered applications/BLACKBERRY) of 6.7.2022</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t193000eu1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifi<span style="font-family: inherit;">er: </span></span></span></i></span><span><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>ECLI:EP:BA:2022:T300019.20220706</i></span></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span>. </span>The</span> file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP11741809&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> Figure: screenshot from attempt, </span></i><i>on 12 July 2022 by the blog author,</i><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> to retrieve the Youtube video from </span>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JskACcyZbMs.</i>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-29485281423188354832022-02-01T09:32:00.005+01:002022-02-01T09:33:31.359+01:00Referral by T 1513/17 and T 2719/19 - Priority from an earlier application having different applicants for different states<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgVao6awj4XrRER7rWX1M4DqjERQbRCb1WNq0YCUZkEUtrCtah77DQhNOj5mTHjmTMzlS-hg74ey37-KrzSf9hEKLyU7Fii5zKyfG8ywJMJutoxUAyUP9V_NpTbbLlY0ibSbAdOgFt27gFDsaCXSIoN4BVPvtiJZHu3v_WbUtP-cINdmSrCeRiY6vS3Zg=s1280" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="960" data-original-width="1280" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgVao6awj4XrRER7rWX1M4DqjERQbRCb1WNq0YCUZkEUtrCtah77DQhNOj5mTHjmTMzlS-hg74ey37-KrzSf9hEKLyU7Fii5zKyfG8ywJMJutoxUAyUP9V_NpTbbLlY0ibSbAdOgFt27gFDsaCXSIoN4BVPvtiJZHu3v_WbUtP-cINdmSrCeRiY6vS3Zg=w400-h300" width="400" /></a></div><p><i>In the present case (T 1517/17, consolidated with </i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>T 2719/19),</i></span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;"> the patent proprietor filed an appeal to the interlocutory decision of the opposition division revoking its patent. The application on which the patent was granted had originally been filed as an international application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (the PCT application). It claims priority on the basis of the US provisional patent application (the priority application). </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">The priority application was filed in the name of the two inventors </span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">H. Wang and Z. Zhong</span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">. The PCT application names the same two persons as inventors and as applicants with designation for the US only. It also names as applicants Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the University of Western Ontario as applicants for all designated States except the US. The patent in suit names Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. as patent proprietor and R.P. Rother, H. Wang and Z. Zhong as inventors.</span></p><div style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">The Board decided to refer the following questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal:<br /></span><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">I. Does the EPC confer jurisdiction on the EPO to determine whether a party validly claims to be a successor in title as referred to in Article 87(1)(b) EPC?</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">II. If question I is answered in the affirmative [note: which seems likely, in view of it being a substantive requirement in Art.87(1) EPC]</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">Can a party B validly rely on the priority right claimed in a PCT-application for the purpose of claiming priority rights under Article 87(1) EPC</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">in the case where</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">1) a PCT-application designates party A as applicant for the US only and party B as applicant for other designated States, including regional European patent protection and</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">2) the PCT-application claims priority from an earlier patent application that designates party A as the applicant and</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">3) the priority claimed in the PCT-application is in compliance with Article 4 of the Paris Convention?<br />In reason 37, the Board also indicted that "a</span><span style="text-align: center;"><i> separate question relating to conflict of laws-rules to be applied to a transfer of the priority right is nonetheless not necessary because it is inherently contained in the questions posed and it will be addressed in the considerations of the EBA, as needed."</i></span></div></div><br /><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Relating to case T 1513/17</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">I. The appeal of the patent proprietor lies from the interlocutory decision of the opposition division revoking European patent No. 1 755 674 (the patent). The application on which the patent was granted had originally been filed as an international application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) with number PCT/US2005/017048 and published as WO 2005/110481 (the PCT application). It claims priority on the basis of the US provisional patent application No. 60/571,444, filed on 14 May 2004 (the priority application).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">II. The priority application was filed in the name of R.P. Rother, H. Wang and Z. Zhong, the inventors. The PCT application names R.P. Rother, H. Wang and Z. Zhong as inventors and as applicants with designation for the United States of America (US) only. It also names as applicants Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the University of Western Ontario as applicants for all designated States except the US. The patent in suit names Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. as patent proprietor and R.P. Rother, H. Wang and Z. Zhong as inventors.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">III. The patent was opposed on the grounds referred to in Article 100(a) EPC (novelty and inventive step) and Article 100(b) and (c) EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The validity of the priority claim was contested, inter alia because the applicants, Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the University of Western Ontario were alleged not to be the applicants or the successors in title of the applicants of the priority application. As a consequence, the subject-matter of the claims of the patent lacked novelty over the disclosure in documents D10, D20 and D21, all published prior to the filing date of the patent application.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">IV. The opposition division held, as far as presently relevant, the following.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The request of the appellant for correction under Rule 139 EPC of EPO Form 1200, such that the appellant and H. Wang and Z. Zhong were indicated as applicants, was to be interpreted as a request to correct Form PCT/RO/101. The request was not allowable, inter alia because Rule 139 EPC did not provide for corrections of mistakes based on assumptions. Other than in case J 10/87, this mistake could not be considered an excusable oversight.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The priority claim was invalid because only the priority right of the inventor Rother had been assigned to the appellant prior to the filing of the PCT application. An assignment of the priority rights of the inventors Wang and Zhong to the appellant or the University of Western Ontario had not taken place prior to the filing of the PCT application.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The subject-matter of claim 1 (thus) lacked novelty over the disclosure in documents D20 and D21.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Considering document D21 as representing the closest prior art, the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 1 lacked an inventive step.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 2 lacked novelty over the disclosure in document D21 as well.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">V. The opposition division referred to documents D1 to D46 as listed in the annex to its decision. The three declarations and the other documents mentioned in paragraph 11 of the decision are numbered, respectively, D47 to D57 for ease of reference in this appeal proceedings as follows:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D47 Declaration of Y. Wang dated 17 March 2016</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D48 Supplemental declaration of Y. Wang dated 27 February 2017</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D49 Declaration of H. Regele dated 16 January 2017</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D50 Assignment by the inventors to Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc. dated 28.03.2007, 02.04.2007 and 11.09.2007 respectively</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D51 Document supporting the name change from "UDEC Pharmaceuticals,Inc. to "Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc"</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D52 Declaration of S. Jarrett dated 2 November 2016</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D53 Material Transfer Agreement</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D54 Declaration of S.A. Saxe dated 21 October 2016</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D55 Employment agreement between UDEC Pharmaceuticals Inc. and R.Rother</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D56 Quitclaim Assignment dated 31 July 2007</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">D57 President's comments on G 1/12 filed by respondent I with letter of 8 March 2017</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VI. Respondent I (opponent 1) and respondent II (opponent 2) replied to the appeal.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VII. The appellant filed additional submissions dated 28 January 2021 and 5 October 2021. Respondent I filed an additional submission dated 15 September 2021. Respondent II filed additional submissions dated 20 December 2019 and 8 October 2021.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VIII. The documents filed by the parties in the appeal proceedings are numbered as follows:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">A1 Decision Edwards Lifesciences AG v. Cook Biotech Incorporated dated 12 June 2009</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">A2 Decision of the Opposition Division in EP 10 774 475.7</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">A3 Decision of the Opposition Division in EP 08 798 550.3</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">A4 Decision of the Opposition Division in EP 15 165 133.8</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">A5 Decision of the Opposition Division in EP 05 777 317.8</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">A6 Decision of the Opposition Division in EP 09 701 993.9</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">A7 Decision of the Opposition Division in EP 06 837 634.2</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">A8 Decision of the Dutch Court of Appeal in case 200.234.115/01</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">IX. The arguments of the appellant, in so far as relevant to the present decision, may be summarised as follows.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Admissibility of the appeal</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The appeal was admissible for the reasons set out in the board's preliminary opinion (see section XXII, below).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The request for correction of an error</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The request for correction was allowable. The opposition division had incorrectly contrasted the situation dealt with in decision J 10/87 with the present situation. As in case J 10/87, the appellant had relied on information which they believed to be true, namely that the inventors had assigned the invention to their employer. This had been mistakenly assumed however. Thus, there had been an error and not a change of mind. The case law in this field distinguished the two situations.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">It had been the intention to file the application in the name of the correctly entitled party. The statement in the amicus curiae submissions of the President of the EPO made in connection with decision G 1/12 in which it was alleged that the Boards of Appeal had developed a line of case law in which "(a) request to substitute the applicant by a person who at the date of filing of the patent application was never intended to be named as applicant, even if the applicant's intention was based on false assumptions at the time of filing (e.g. a wrong assessment of the factual situation), does not fall within the scope of Rule 139 EPC", was made with "[no] support" and "it plainly does not mean what the opponents and the Board proposed it to mean." Reference was made to decisions J 7/80, J 18/93, J 17/96. Thus, the correction of the error had to be allowed.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Allowing the correction would not affect legal certainty in any way as the public never had any reason to doubt the entitlement to priority.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Priority entitlement</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Where the applicants for a European patent application or proprietors of a European patent were not the same for all designated Contracting States, they were regarded as joint applicants for the purposes of proceedings before the European Patent Office (EPO) according to Article 118 EPC. Thus, the applicants of the priority application introduced the right to claim priority into the later patent application. A transfer of the priority right to any additional applicants of that later patent application was not necessary, even if the applicants were designated for different Contracting States.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">In the absence of any prevailing PCT provision, the same applied to an international (PCT) application with respect to the designation for the European (EP) territory since, as of the date of the filing, the international application had the effect of a regular national application (Article 11(3) PCT and Article 153(2) EPC).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The priority claim of the international application was correctly made under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (the Paris Convention). There was no provision in the Paris Convention or the PCT providing for splitting the priority right between different Contracting States.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Thus, under the PCT and the EPC, in a Euro-PCT application, if one applicant was entitled to priority, the entire application was so entitled, to the benefit of all applicants.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The patent therefore validly claimed priority because the applicants for the priority application were among the applicants of the PCT application.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The validity of the joint applicants approach was a point of law of fundamental importance. Referral of questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) was appropriate. Such questions also had to address the duty and jurisdiction of the EPO to assess the formal entitlement to priority of a PCT application. This latter issue had in particular been raised in the communication of the board in case T 845/19.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For questions formulated by the appellant, see point 20, below.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">X. The arguments of respondent I, in so far as relevant to the present decision, may be summarised as follows.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The request for correction of an error</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The opposition division was right not to allow the appellant's request for correction. Decision G 1/12 set out that for a request for correction to be allowable, the correction had to introduce what was originally intended. In the present case it was not relevant that the appellant had intended to file the PCT application in the name of the correct parties, but whether it had intended to file it in their own name and that of Wang and Zhong. This was not the case: document D54 confirmed that the appellant's in-house patent counsel had instructed the outside counsel to file in their own name and that of the University of Western Ontario. The application had thus been filed as intended. The correction request would therefore not introduce what was originally intended and was not allowable.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Priority entitlement</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The joint applicants approach was valid. Under the PCT, the priority right had a unitary character. As a result, the act of filing an international application together was sufficient to entitle the applicants of a European patent to validly rely on the priority claim of the PCT application, even if not all applicants of the PCT application were applicants for the European patent.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">A referral to the EBA was appropriate because the joint applicants approach concerned a point of law of fundamental importance in the sense of Article 112(1)(a) EPC and was decisive for the outcome of the present case. The referral had to also address whether the EPO had the power to decide on the transfer or introduction of priority rights at all. This was a contested concept as emerged from decision J 11/95 and communications of the boards in cases T 239/16,</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">T 1786/15 and T 419/16.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For questions formulated by respondent I, see point 21 below.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XI. The arguments of respondent II, in so far as relevant to the present decision, may be summarised as follows.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Admissibility of the appeal</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The appeal was not admissible. The decision of the opposition division was based on novelty and inventive step. However, the submissions of the appellant only addressed the validity of the priority right. Lack of priority was not a ground of opposition. Thus, comments focusing exclusively on priority could not overcome the decision to revoke the patent. The failure to address lack of novelty and inventive step made the appeal incomplete, insufficiently reasoned and therefore inadmissible.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Admission of a new request and facts into the appeal proceedings</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The appellant's position that the priority right had to be recognised as valid even without the requested correction had not been advanced in the proceedings before the opposition division and was therefore not subject of the decision under appeal. Only in the appeal proceedings the appellant introduced the new request that the priority right should be held valid even without correction. This could at the same time be considered as a new submission of fact. The request and new facts were to be held inadmissible under Article 12(4) RPBA 2007. The same applied to the new auxiliary requests 1, 3 and 4.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The request for correction of an error</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The requested correction was not allowable. The question was not, as the opposition division had incorrectly reasoned, whether it had been the true intention to file in the name of the "right person", but whether it had been the intention to file in the name of the specific person whose name was to be substituted. At the filing date it was believed that the appellant and the University of Western Ontario were the correct applicants. This was apparently not the case. However, the appellant's filing in these names had been entirely deliberate at the time. The requested correction constituted a change of mind. Allowing the request for correction would introduce something different than what had been originally intended and thus did not fall within the scope of Rule 139 EPC. Allowing the request was incompatible with the principle of legal certainty.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Priority entitlement</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The priority claim was not valid absent the requested correction.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The appellant had conceded that there had been no transfer of rights in the priority year from the inventors Wang and Zhong and therefore neither the appellant nor the University of Western Ontario were successors in title to the inventors.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The inventors, the appellant, and the University of Western Ontario could not be considered as joint applicants for the PCT application as a whole or for the EP designation thereof. There was no suitable legal basis for this approach. Article 118 EPC dealt only with the situation where there were different applicants for different designated Contracting States under the EPC and was only concerned with proceedings before the EPO. Article 118 EPC could not be applied analogously to an international application with the designation EP in proceedings before the EPO as the designated Office.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The joint applicants approach for Euro-PCT applications was a point of law of fundamental importance and required the referral of questions to the EBA, including the question of whether the EPO had the competence to decide on the formal entitlement to the right of priority.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For questions formulated by respondent II, see point 22 below.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Relating to case T 2719/19</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XII. The appeal in this case lies from the interlocutory decision of the examining division refusing European patent application No. 16 160 321.2 ("the patent application"). This patent application is a divisional application of the earlier application EP 14 177 646.8, which in turn is a divisional application of the parent application EP 05 779 924.9, filed as international application PCT/US2005/017048, referred to above in section I in relation to the appeal case T 1513/17 as the "PCT application".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XIII. Also the patent application No. 16 160 321.2 claims priority on the basis of the US provisional patent application No. 60/571,444, referred to above in section I in relation to the appeal case T 1513/17 as the "priority application".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XIV. As in case T 1513/17, the appellant requested that EPO Form 1200 be corrected to indicate that the applicants for the application were the appellant and H. Wang and Z. Zhong.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XV. Third party observations pursuant to Article 115 EPC were filed with a letter dated 28 March 2017. Attention was drawn to the decision of the opposition division at the oral proceedings relating to the patent deriving from the parent application (i.e. the patent being the subject of the appeal proceedings T 1513/17, see above), namely to refuse the requested correction of the applicants' names and to revoke the patent.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XVI. In its communication of 12 June 2017, the examining division preliminarily agreed with the decision of the opposition division in the parent case to refuse the requested correction and concluded that also in the present case the claimed priority was thus invalid. Consequently, documents D20 and D21 were prior art and the subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent application was not novel in the light of the disclosure in these documents.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XVII. In their letter dated 1 May 2018, the appellant argued that the entitlement to priority was not dependent on the requested correction for the same reasons as set out above in section IX in relation to appeal case T 1513/17.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XVIII. In its communication of 20 July 2018, the examining division reiterated its agreement with the decision of the opposition division in the parent case to refuse the requested correction. It furthermore did not acknowledge the validity of the priority claim. As the board understands, this was because the appellant was the sole applicant of the patent application, but was not applicant of the priority application. The examining division referred to the Guidelines for examination in the EPO, edition November 2016, A-III, 6.1 reading: "However, in the case of joint applicants filing the later European patent application, it is sufficient if one of the applicants is the applicant or successor in title to the applicant of the previous application. There is no need for a special transfer of the priority right to the other applicant(s), since the later European application has been filed jointly. The same applies to the case where the previous application itself was filed by joint applicants, provided that all these applicants, or their successor(s) in title, are amongst the joint applicants of the later European patent application" (emphasis added by board).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XIX. The priority claim being invalid, the examining division reiterated its view that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the present application was anticipated by the disclosure of documents D20 and D21.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XX. The appellant was summoned to oral proceedings, but informed the examining division that they would not attend. They requested a decision based on their written submissions. The subsequent decision of the examining division refers to the communication of 20 July 2018 for the grounds.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXI. In the appeal proceedings the appellant put forward essentially the same line of reasoning with regard to the validity of the priority claim as in case</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">T 1513/17. The decision of the examining division to refuse the requested correction was - unlike in case</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">T 1513/17 - not disputed. In the present case the validity of the priority right is therefore the only issue.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Relating to both cases</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXII. The board appointed oral proceedings for 8 December 2021 and with the summons, issued a communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA informing the parties of its preliminary opinion concerning matters relevant for the decision to be taken. The board inter alia was of the preliminary opinion that the appeal in case T 1513/17 was admissible as the statement of grounds of appeal enabled the respondents and the board to understand why, in the appellant's view, the appealed decision should be set aside.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXIII. Oral proceedings took place as scheduled. Appeal case T 1513/17 and the appeal case T 2719/19 were heard in parallel. At the hearing the board decided to deal with both appeal cases in consolidated proceedings pursuant to Article 10(2) RPBA. At the end of the hearing the chair announced that the board was seriously contemplating referring questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal concerning issues related to the entitlement to priority.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXIV. Third party observations pursuant to Article 115 EPC were received on 14 January 2022 and 25 January 2022 in both case T 1513/17 and T 2719/19.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXV. The appellant requested in case T 1513/17 that:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- the decision under appeal be set aside and the patent be maintained on the basis of the set of claims of a main request, or alternatively on the basis of a set of claims of one of four auxiliary requests, all re-filed with the statement of grounds of appeal;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- in case validity of the priority claim was not acknowledged, the PCT form PCT/RO/101 be corrected to indicate as applicants Alexion Pharmaceuticals, Inc., H. Wang and Z. Zhong;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- question(s) be referred to the EBA.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXVI. The appellant requested in case T 2719/19 that:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- the decision under appeal be set aside and the patent application be remitted to the examining division with an order to grant a patent on the basis of the current claims (the main request filed on 8 November 2016);</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- the case be remitted to the examining division in case any other issue than the validity of the priority right would be considered pertinent;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- question(s) be referred to the EBA.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXVII. Respondent I requested in case T 1513/17 that question(s) be referred to the EBA and that the appeal be dismissed.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXVIII. Respondent II requested in case T 1513/17 that:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- the appeal be held inadmissible;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- the new request and related submissions of fact, that the priority right should be recognised as valid even without correction, be held inadmissible in accordance with Article 12(4) RPBA 2007;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- auxiliary requests 1, 3 and 4 be held inadmissible in accordance with Article 12(4) RPBA 2007;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- the opposition division's decision to refuse the correction under Rule 139 EPC of the applicant names on the PCT request form be upheld;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- question(s) be referred to the EBA;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- the appeal be dismissed;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- the case be remitted to the opposition division, should the decision be set aside.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Reasons for the Decision</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>Admissibility of the appeal in case T 1513/17</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. The request by respondent II to hold the appeal in case T 1513/17 inadmissible is based on the argument that the appellant did not address the grounds on which the decision under appeal was based, in this case lack of novelty and inventive step, but that the appellant's submissions were only concerned with the validity of the priority right. Therefore, they could not overcome the decision to revoke the patent.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. This reasoning is not persuasive. The statement of grounds of appeal should enable the respondents and the board to understand why, in the appellant's view, the appealed decision should be set aside. This is the case here. In the proceedings before the opposition division, respondent II argued that documents D20 and D21 were available as prior art for assessing novelty and inventive step because the patent was not entitled to priority. The opposition division in the decision under appeal denied the right to priority and consequently considered documents D20 and D21 to be novelty destroying. There can therefore be no misunderstanding that the appellant requests the decision on the entitlement to priority be reconsidered and as a consequence of this also the decision on the novelty of the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request and of auxiliary request 2.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">3. The appeal in case T 1513/17 therefore complies with Articles 106 to 108 and Rule 99 EPC and is admissible. The appeal in case T 2719/19 is admissible for the same reasons.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>The request for correction pursuant to Rule 139 EPC in case T 1513/17</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">4. The request for correction is conditional on the validity of the priority claim being not acknowledged. However, since a decision on the validity of the priority claim requires guidance of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) as explained below, the board already at this stage has to assess whether the requested correction is allowable. If this were the case, no referral in case T 1513/17 would be needed to decide on the appeal.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">5. The board understands that the requested correction concerns the designation of the applicants for all Designated States except the United States of America, in form PCT/RO/101 which should be corrected to be the appellant, Alexion Pharamaceuticals, Inc., H. Wang and Z. Zhong.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">6. In decision G 1/12 it is explained that Rule 139, first sentence, EPC deals with cases in which an error of expression in a declaration occurred (reasons 34). The EBA endorses case law requiring that the correction must introduce what was originally intended. It cannot be used to enable a person to give effect to a change of mind or development of plans. It is the party's actual intention which must be considered (reasons 37).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">7. </span><span style="color: #990000;">In the present case, this requirement is not fulfilled</span><span style="color: #0e2034;">. The board agrees with the respondents that the form correctly expresses what was actually intended at the time of filing of the PCT application, namely that the applicants for all Designated States other than the United States of America were the appellant and the University of Western Ontario. The appellant's in-house counsel has confirmed this intention in his declaration (document D54). This intention was indeed based on the incorrect impression that Mr Wang and Mr Zhong had assigned their rights in the invention to the university under their employment contract.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">8. The in-house counsel has also stated in his declaration that he intended to name the correct parties. This latter statement is not referring to an error of expression in form PCT/RO/101 but rather to the underlying motives for this expression. However, these motives are not relevant for the application of Rule 139 EPC. Respondent I correctly argued that if a party's intention to take the correct action would be relevant, this would open the door to unlimited possibilities for correction, to the detriment of legal certainty. Such an approach would certainly also be at odds with the principles expressed in decision G 1/12.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">9. The decisions cited by the appellant (J 7/80, J 18/93 and J 19/96) need not to be discussed in detail. They either do not support the appellant's view that Rule 139 EPC does not exclude the correction of the designation of the applicant to a person/legal entity who/which at the date of filing of the patent application was not intended to be designated as applicant or, if they do, these decisions have been superseded by the later decision of the EBA. In view of the foregoing conclusion, it is also not necessary to address the question of whether form PCT/RO/101 can be corrected at all.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>Admittance of the alleged new request and related submissions of fact in case T 1513/17</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">10. In the present case, the statement of grounds of appeal was filed before 1 January 2020 and the replies thereto were filed in due time. Thus, in view of Article 25(2) RPBA 2020, Article 12(4) to (6) RPBA 2020 does not apply, but instead Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 applies to both the grounds of appeal and the replies.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">11. The appellant has argued for the first time in appeal proceedings that the priority is validly claimed, even if the requested correction would not be allowed. The appellant takes the view that in a case like this it is sufficient that all the inventors, named as applicants of the priority application, are among the applicants of the later PCT application, even if for the designation US only. The priority right-owning applicants thus introduced the priority right into the PCT application with full effect for that application as a whole. As the board understands it, the appellant bases this "joint applicants approach" in particular on Article 11(3) PCT and Articles 118 and 153(2) EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">12. This line of argument is not based on any new facts or evidence, but represents a fresh legal view. Neither does this line of argument, as was argued by respondent II, involve a new request to recognise the priority right as valid even without the correction. It is merely another argument why the claimed priority is valid and the claimed subject-matter is novel. The board therefore sees no reason nor power on the basis of Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 to hold the line of argument inadmissible.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>Third party observations received on 14 January 2022 and 25 January 2022 for both cases</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">13. These observations concerning the priority issue were received after the debate had been closed at the conclusion of the oral proceedings in the consolidated cases. The board decided not to take their contents into account in the present proceedings.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>The joint applicants approach in both cases</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">14. In view of the foregoing the assessment of the so-called "joint applicants approach" is decisive for the decision in both cases.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">15. The "joint applicants approach" concerns, in the most simple case, the situation where a party A is applicant for the priority application and parties A and B are applicants for the subsequent application in which the priority right is invoked. Party B can now benefit from the priority right to which their co-applicant party A is entitled. A separate transfer of the priority right to party B is not needed.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">16. The joint applicants approach has been been developed in the case law of the Boards of Appeal, see decision T 1933/12, reasons 2.4. See also the Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office A-III 6.1. As far as the board is aware, this approach to European patent applications has never been contested by any interested party.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>17. The appellant essentially argues that the joint applicants approach, which is applicable to European patent applications, should also apply to PCT patent applications. To distinguish the factual situation from the one that concerns a European patent application, the present situation could be referred to as the "PCT joint applicants approach".</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">18. A further distinction is noted here to avoid confusion about terminology concerning the factual situation underlying for example the CRISPR-Cas case, T 844/18. As apparent from the written reasons for the decision in this case priority was denied based on an extensive analysis of the relevant facts and law. It was decisive that the priority claim failed to meet the requirement that all applicants of the priority application must also be applicants of the subsequent PCT application for which the priority is claimed (the "all applicants approach").</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>19. As to the merits of the appellant's line of argument in the present case, the board is aware of several appeal cases in which the PCT joint applicants approach is (or has been) a disputed concept. </b>The board refers for example to communications issued by the boards in cases T 2749/18, T 2842/18, T 1837/19 and T 845/19. The board is further aware that the approach has been followed in a number of cases before opposition divisions, whether or not referring to the Notice from the European Patent Office concerning the requirements to be observed when filing an international application with the EPO as a PCT receiving Office, OJ 2014, A33, III, 9 (see for example documents A2 to A7, filed by the appellant). The issue therefore concerns a point of law of fundamental importance relevant to a number of cases at present pending before opposition divisions and boards of appeal. <b>Although legal requirements for patent applications in the US have changed, thus leading to a reduction in the number of cases in which the facts are similar to those in the present case in the future, the issue will remain of major importance for many years to come. In addition, the answer to the question of whether the PCT joint applicants approach can be accepted as suggested by the appellant is not clear cut. The board therefore finds it appropriate to refer a question concerning the PCT joint applicants approach to the EBA, as requested by all parties.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><i>Questions to be referred as formulated by the parties</i></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">20. The appellant has requested that the following questions be referred to the EBA:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">i) When acting as a designated or elected office under Art 153 EPC, does the EPO have the jurisdiction to examine the entitlement to and/or the formal validity of a priority claim, as opposed to substantive issues of priority? If no, what is the appropriate legal forum in which a priority claim can be challenged on formal grounds? If yes:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">ii) When acting as a designated or elected office under Art 153 EPC and assessing the entitlement to priority of a Euro-PCT application which claims priority from a first application filed in a member state of the Paris Convention, under which legal framework should the EPO assess priority entitlement (a) if said member state of the Paris Convention is not an EPC contracting state, and (b) if it is?</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">iii) Provided all of the applicants for a priority application are applicants for a PCT application, can priority rights be established by the naming of a joint applicant for the PCT application who is not a joint applicant for the PCT application's EPO designation (the "joint applicants approach")?</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">21. Respondent I requested that the following questions be referred to the EBA:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">iv) When acting as a designated or elected office under Art. 153 EPC in respect of a PCT application, is the EPO competent to determine who is "successor in title" under Art. 87(1) EPC when a first (priority) application was filed in the name(s) of the inventor(s)? If, yes;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">v) Provided all of the applicants for a priority application are applicants for a PCT application, can priority rights under Art. 87(1) EPC be established by the naming of a joint applicant for the PCT application who is not a joint applicant for the PCT application's EPO designation (the "joint applicants approach")?</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">vi) Can a person with no substantiated ownership interest in the priority right derived from a priority application challenge a patentee's status as successor in title to the priority rights derived from that application?</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">22. Respondent II requested that the following questions be referred to the EBA:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">vii) In the case a first application was filed by a plurality of applicants and a subsequent PCT application was filed by the same applicants or successors in title, is a transfer of the right to priority required for the Euro-PCT application in order to be entitled to the priority of the first application, if not all of the applicants of the PCT application are applicants for EP?</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">viii) In the case a first application was filed by an applicant and a subsequent PCT application was filed by a plurality of applicants or successors in title including the applicant of the priority application, is a transfer of the right to priority required for the Euro-PCT application in order to be entitled to the priority of the first application, if the applicant of the first application is not applicant for EP?</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">ix) If the answer to question (1) or (2) is no, are there any requirements to be fulfilled other than that the applications were effectively and timely filed and the requirements of Rules 52 and 53 EPC are met?</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">x) If the answer to question (1) or (2) is yes, are there any possibilities for substituting the formal proof of transfer of the right to priority within the priority year?</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">23. Respondent II supported the requests of the appellant and respondent I that the questions to the EBA should include a question regarding the jurisdiction of the EPO to decide on the entitlement to the priority right, but did not formulate a particular question in this respect.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">24. The jurisdiction of the EPO to decide on the entitlement to the priority right has been addressed extensively in the CRISPR-Cas case, T 844/18. The core of the decision on this point can be found in point 18 where it is reasoned that there is no legal basis to relieve the EPO from the obligation to assess who has performed the act of filing the patent application as required by Article 87(1) EPC. The board in the present composition is inclined to agree with this conclusion. It is also rightly pointed out in decision T 844/18 that "The bar to overturning long established case law and practice should be very high because of the disruptive effects a change may have" (see point 86). Although this remark concerned the application of the "all applicants approach", the same applies to the standing practise of the boards of appeal to decide on the priority rights in general, including the entitlement to the priority right.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">25. In the present case, the jurisdiction of the boards to decide on the entitlement to the priority right had not been explicitly questioned during the written proceedings. Indeed, none of the parties presented arguments in their written submissions why the present standing practise is incorrect or why the reasoning in, for example decision T 844/18, is incorrect other than a reference to decision J 11/95 made by respondent I. This latter decision mentions the issue only in obiter and provides no reasons for the approach taken. It also seems to focus on the ownership of the priority invention rather than on the assessment of the priority claim. The board therefore does not find the position taken in J 11/95 a convincing argument in favour of the view that the EPO has no jurisdiction.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">26. However, the jurisdiction of the EPO to decide on the entitlement to the priority right has been questioned, ex officio, in communications of the respective boards in several cases like T 239/16, T 419/16 and T 845/19 and also in commentaries (see Bremi, in Singer/Stauder/Luginbühl, EPÜ, 8. Auflage, Art. 87, Rdn 61). For example in cases T 239/16 and T 419/16 a parallel was drawn with reference to the Travaux Préparatoires between the power to determine whether a party is entitled to a particular patent application, which the EPO does not have, and the power to decide on the entitlement to the priority right. In view of the above, the issue will therefore, in spite of the decision in case T 844/18, most likely be raised again in other cases. The board is also receptive to the argument of the parties that, if questions regarding priority are to be referred to the EBA on a related matter, this is a convenient opportunity to have a final decision on the "jurisdiction issue" as well. The board therefore decides to include a question addressing the jurisdiction of the EPO to decide on the entitlement to the priority right.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">27. As the further aspects of the PCT joint applicants approach are concerned (such as the status of the party that challenges the priority right or different approaches for a priority right application filed in a EPC Contracting State and for one filed in an non-EPC Contracting State), the board notes that it is appropriate to only refer questions that are relevant for the decision in a given case. These should also be specific enough to allow a clear answer that can be applied directly to the case. Questions ii, vi, ix and x as formulated by the parties (see above) are not relevant in the legal and factual framework of the present cases or need no separate answer beyond that required by the further question as formulated in the Order. Question iii, v, viii and viii address the same aspects as the question formulated by the board, be it in somewhat different wording.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><i><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Legal basis for the PCT joint applicant approach?</b></span></i></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">28. The following sets out the further considerations of the board regarding the issues raised.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">29. During the oral proceedings, three possible legal bases for the PCT joint applicant approach were discussed.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">30. Firstly,</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> the appellant has argued that the joint applicants approach can be applied to the present situation, relying in particular on Article 11(3) PCT and Articles 118 and 153(2) EPC. This was because Article 11(3) PCT provides (inter alia) that the international application shall have the effect of a regular national application in each designated State. This provision is mirrored in Article 153(2) EPC. Article 118 EPC reads: "Where the applicants for or proprietors of a European patent are not the same in respect of different designated Contracting States, they shall be regarded as joint applicants or proprietors for the purposes of proceedings before the European Patent Office. The unity of the application or patent in these proceedings shall not be affected;(...) ". (The board notes that in the present case Article 118 EPC 1973 applies. This provision however is identical to that in the EPC 2000.)</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">31. This line of reasoning does not convince the board.</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> The present situation, where not all of the applicants for the PCT application are applicants for a European patent, is materially different from that of a regular European application. Assuming that Article 118 EPC provides a legal basis for the joint applicants approach, then its effects are limited to the applicants of a European patent, in the present case the appellant and the University of Western Ontario. Neither Article 11(3) PCT nor Article 153(2) EPC provide that PCT applicants for a different territory - in the present case the inventors as applicants for the United States - shall be regarded as applicants for all other designated territories as well. On the contrary, </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>the possibility of designating different applicants for different designated States (see PCT Regulation Article 4.5(d)) must necessarily mean that the status as an applicant is limited to the designated territories. Article 118 EPC can therefore in the opinion of the board not be applied to the present situation.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">32. Secondly,</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> respondent I argued that a PCT joint applicants approach can be based on the unitary character of the priority right in the PCT and thus on the operation of the PCT alone.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">33. The board cannot see merit in this argument either.<b> </b></span><b><span style="color: #990000;">The PCT does not create rules of its own regarding the effect of a priority claim but refers to Article 4 of the Paris Convention (Article 8(2)(a) PCT). The validity of the PCT joint applicants approach should therefore, in the view of the board, be assessed in the light of the Paris Convention, in particular the meaning of term "successor in title", rather than the PCT.</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">34. The appellant furthermore submitted the judgement of the Court of Appeal (CoA) of The Hague in the case Biogen/Genentech v. Celltrion (Gerechtshof Den Haag 30 July 2019 , ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2019:1962). This decision offers</span><span style="color: #990000;"> a third viewpoint </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">that could possibly lead to the conclusion that the PCT joint applicants approach should be acknowledged.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">35. The case concerned the validity of a priority claim invoked by Biogen in a PCT application on the basis of a priority application filed by two other parties. It was argued that the right to priority had been assigned to Biogen. It was undisputed between the parties that the validity of the assignment had to be assessed according the law of Massachusetts.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">36. </span><span style="color: #990000;">The <i>[Dutch]</i> CoA disagreed. It reasoned in essence that the lex loci protectionis was applicable to the right to priority because according to Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention, <b>the requirements for granting and nullification of patents in a particular country were determined in accordance with the national law and the right to priority was part of such requirements</b>. In case of a European patent which was granted on a PCT application the lex loci proctectionis was the EPC. The EPC did not require particular formalities for assignment of the right to priority. Proof of an agreement of assignment of the right to priority sufficed. In the case before the Dutch court, such an agreement was part of an "Employee Proprietary Information and Inventions and Dispute Resolution Agreement"</span><span style="color: #0e2034;">.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">37. </span><span style="color: #990000;">This approach seems appealing as it provides for a harmonised and well founded assessment of an alleged transfer of the priority right. <b>However, an issue with this approach lies in the uncertainty regarding the legal system that is applicable to the assessment of the transfer of the priority right: in several decisions of the boards of appeal, the legal requirements for the transfer of the priority right by agreement have been assessed applying national law. In spite of this, it is far from clear that this is correct, as the EPC does not contain any conflict of laws-rules and this issue has so far not been addressed by the EBA. A separate question relating to conflict of laws-rules to be applied to a transfer of the priority right is nonetheless not necessary because it is inherently contained in the questions posed and it will be addressed in the considerations of the EBA, as needed.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">38. Were the EBA to share the view of the CoA that the legal system to be applied to assess the priority right is solely the EPC, then it seems that the EPC does not, in Article 87 EPC or elsewhere, impose any formal requirements for the transfer of the priority right by agreement (see also decisions T 1201/14, reasons 3.2.1 and T 205/14, reasons 3.6.2 and 3.6.3, dealing with the same issue). [<i>Note from the editor: note that does not imply that the validity of the transfer cannot be assessed by the EPO / under the EPC, as courts can apply the law of other jurisdictions when necessary]. </i><b>In that case it could be argued that the mutual filing of a PCT application by parties A and B, wherein party B is named as the applicant for the EPC territory and party A (who is entitled to the priority right) is named as the applicant for the US, demonstrates - absent indications to the contrary - the existence of an implicit agreement between party A and party B, conferring on party B the right to benefit from the priority for the EPC territory. This implicit agreement could possibly be sufficient to bring about the transfer of the priority right to party B for the EPC territory.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">39. On the other hand, in case a particular national legal system were applicable, then a priority right could still be considered validly transferred to party B if the applicable system does not require any formalities either.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">40. Respondent II referred the board to the judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) of 16 April 2013 in case X ZR 49/12 (Fahrzeugscheibe) which reflects </span><span style="color: #990000;">a similar line of thinking as far as the implicit agreement to transfer the priority right is concerned. </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">The case concerned the validity of the German part of a European patent that claimed priority of a national German patent application, filed by a company within the same group of companies as the patent proprietor. The patent proprietor argued that the priority had been properly transferred as a result of a research and development agreement between the companies. The BGH held (1) that the transfer of the priority right is a matter of the applicable German conflict of laws-rule, in this case, at the time of transfer, Article 33 (2) EGBGB (Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch; translation: Introductory Act to the Civil Code) (until 17 December 2009; later: Article 14(2) Rome I Regulation). It then held (2) that in accordance with the applicable conflict of laws-rule German national law applied to the transfer of the priority right as the law applicable to the priority application and (3) that German law did not require any particular formalities for the transfer. </span><span style="color: #990000;">After having further established that Article 87 EPC does not require such formalities either, the court then assessed the facts of the case that led it to the conclusion that the there was an implied agreement ("konkludente Einigung") between the parties to transfer the priority right to the applicant, which was sufficient to acknowledge priority for the European patent.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">41. </span><span style="color: #990000;">Less illustrative for this approach, but supporting the view that the PCT application could be regarded as proof of an agreement to transfer the priority right is the UK judgment </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">KCI Licensing Inc and others v. Smith & Nephew PLC and others (case HC09C02624) of 23 June 2010, which respondent I has referred to in their submissions. In this case, two European patents claimed priority from a US patent application, filed by the inventor. The subsequent PCT application designated the inventor as the applicant for the US, the proprietor of the subsequent European patents KC Inc as applicant for all designated States except the US and a subsidiary of said proprietor of the patents, Mediscus, as applicant for "GB only". It was concluded that KC Inc had the right to claim priority and that Mediscus was not a co-applicant in respect of the PCT application in so far as it related to the European patents. However, even if Mediscus had to be considered a co-applicant, this would not adversely affect the claim to priority, although there was no evidence of any assignment of the priority right from KC Inc to Mediscus. The reason for this was the implied agreement which could be inferred from the PCT application. The judgment at paragraph 98 states: "Counsel for KCI accepted that he could not point to any written assignment, or even an oral agreement, but argued that the correct inference to be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the filing of the PCT Application was that KC Inc had agreed by conduct to transfer part of its interest in the invention to its subsidiary Mediscus. He submitted that this was sufficient to make Mediscus a successor in title for the purposes of claiming priority, and that no greater degree of formality was required. I accept that submission." </span><span style="color: #990000;">Although this reasoning is an obiter dictum, it does indeed, as respondent I argued, support the qualification, in certain circumstances, of the PCT application as an instrument of transfer of the priority right.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">42. In view of all the foregoing, guidance on the priority issue is needed to come to a decision in the present cases.</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">43. In the following questions reference to "party A" and "party B" is done for ease of understanding and is not intended to a</span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;">s limiting the considerations to scenarios involving only two parties.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Order</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For these reasons it is decided that:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The following questions are referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal:</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>I. Does the EPC confer jurisdiction on the EPO to determine whether a party validly claims to be a successor in title as referred to in Article 87(1)(b) EPC?</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>II. If question I is answered in the affirmative</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Can a party B validly rely on the priority right claimed in a PCT-application for the purpose of claiming priority rights under Article 87(1) EPC</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>in the case where</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>1) a PCT-application designates party A as applicant for the US only and party B as applicant for other designated States, including regional European patent protection and</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>2) the PCT-application claims priority from an earlier patent application that designates party A as the applicant and</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>3) the priority claimed in the PCT-application is in compliance with Article 4 of the Paris Convention?</b></span></div></div></div></div><br /><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t171513ex1.html" target="_blank">T 1513/17 (Prolongation of survival of an allograft/ALEXION)</a> of 28.1.2021<span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t171513ex1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span></span></i></span><i>ECLI:EP:BA:2021:T151317.20210128; t</i><i>he file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP05779924&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>. </i><i>Decision </i><span><i><span> <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t192719ex1.html" target="_blank">T 2719/19 (Prolongation of survival of an allograft/ALEXION) of 28.1.2022</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t192719ex1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span></span></i></span><span><i><span>ECLI:EP:BA:2022:T271919.20220128; t</span>he file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP16160321&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> Photo</span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;"> "Changed priorities ahead sign" by <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/redvers/" target="_blank">R/DV/RS</a> </span></i><i>obtained </i><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">via <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/redvers/532076662/in/photolist-P22Ry-2mkbp9u-2mkiJxN-2mkgwNd-frVsuz-TLdkuk-ScTFEg-2mC8HeF-2mrrpHv-2mUg8hf-MZtLnH-4QZFQL-7nVppz-25rHLaE-RJaLD-8jo3fT-dXSzVP-6EzqKK-7vx86t-bSnkHT-2CEbXn-7Bqv54-GwhqV-2i7nfek-7Bujth-2kbBkjS-4U8LYu-EKA2Nr-9q9moi-dTEz97-6nfjy-3yzVzy-9qcVuq-2kvY47h-7BquwX-7Bugp3-2mdSNEF-qrRP-3p2HYs-7BqpF8-bDsCWd-4Fsjx3-7BqsF4-7Bqtpk-7BuhS7-2j6pzN9-3yzUkh-bSnjbt-7Bqt4e-q7jSWq" target="_blank">Flickr</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/redvers/532076662/in/photolist-P22Ry-2mkbp9u-2mkiJxN-2mkgwNd-frVsuz-TLdkuk-ScTFEg-2mC8HeF-2mrrpHv-2mUg8hf-MZtLnH-4QZFQL-7nVppz-25rHLaE-RJaLD-8jo3fT-dXSzVP-6EzqKK-7vx86t-bSnkHT-2CEbXn-7Bqv54-GwhqV-2i7nfek-7Bujth-2kbBkjS-4U8LYu-EKA2Nr-9q9moi-dTEz97-6nfjy-3yzVzy-9qcVuq-2kvY47h-7BquwX-7Bugp3-2mdSNEF-qrRP-3p2HYs-7BqpF8-bDsCWd-4Fsjx3-7BqsF4-7Bqtpk-7BuhS7-2j6pzN9-3yzUkh-bSnjbt-7Bqt4e-q7jSWq" target="_blank"> </a>under </span><a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">CC BY 2.0 license</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (no changes made).</span></i>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-74051964462709077712021-12-23T10:38:00.003+01:002021-12-23T10:38:33.872+01:00T 1989/18 - As a general rule, not required to bring the description in line with (amended) claims intended for grant<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhcQh7_ECo5lD1Gp_5vCzTVXeu9H8gOGN9uJbl84b3D7C8L2BNQFMN-LcyyigUplwJ3ps43WYhLo8uiFPm-jk3fddU3YuraUWBxVNseh-s4LJwlfZvHsWZ12eFDE3IsG4M545zMjckgBjulKcP5JJZmWrUaxvdix1u78a1aiwCUIQ2ZyyuS3g7eya1Wag=s855" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="453" data-original-width="855" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhcQh7_ECo5lD1Gp_5vCzTVXeu9H8gOGN9uJbl84b3D7C8L2BNQFMN-LcyyigUplwJ3ps43WYhLo8uiFPm-jk3fddU3YuraUWBxVNseh-s4LJwlfZvHsWZ12eFDE3IsG4M545zMjckgBjulKcP5JJZmWrUaxvdix1u78a1aiwCUIQ2ZyyuS3g7eya1Wag=w400-h213" width="400" /></a></div><i><p><i>In the present case, </i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>the examining division </i></span><i style="text-align: center;">found the set of amended claims of the main request to be allowable, but nevertheless it held that the amendments to the description adapted to those claims (submitted with the same letter) did not comply with the requirements of Article 84 EPC, in particular because they related to subject-matter which was broader than the subject-matter of independent claim 17 of the request, and refused the European patent application for that reason. The Board carefully assessed the applicability of Art. 84 EPC as well as of Rule 42(1)(c) and </i><i style="text-align: center;">Rule 48(1)(c) EPC as possible legal basis requiring adaptation of the description, and concluded that such basis does not exist (except possible in the case of non-unity). The Board also argued why it distinguished from earlier decisions (some of whuch being cited in the Guidelines in support of such alleged requirement).</i></p></i><p></p><br /><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><br /></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">I. The appeal lodged by the applicant ("appellant") lies from the examining division's decision to refuse the European patent application No. 12 810 245.6, entitled "Expression vector element combinations, novel production cell generation methods and their use for the recombinant production of polypeptides".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;">II. Although the examining division found the set of claims of the main request (submitted with a letter of 18 January 2018) to be allowable, it held that the amendments on page 9, line 23, page 10, line 19 and page 11, line 1 of the description adapted to those claims (submitted with the same letter) did not comply with the requirements of Article 84 EPC, in particular because they related to subject-matter which was broader than the subject-matter of claim 17 of the request.</div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">III. The relevant amendments on pages 3, 9, 10 and 11 of the description of the main request read as follows (insertions compared with the description as filed are underlined, deletions are crossed out):</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Page 3, line 7:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"The invention is defined by the claims."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Page 9, line 23:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"In one embodiment of the invention the expression vector comprises either [...]"</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Page 10, line 19 and page 11, line 1:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"In one embodiment of the invention [deleted: of all aspects as reported herein] the expression vector comprises [...]"</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Claim 17 of the main claim request reads:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"17. An expression vector comprising</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">a first expression cassette comprising in 5' to 3' direction a hCMV promoter, a nucleic acid encoding an antibody light chain, a bGH polyA signal sequence, and a hGT terminator sequence,</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">a second expression cassette comprising in 5' to 3' direction a hCMV promoter, a nucleic acid encoding an antibody heavy chain, a bGH polyA signal sequence, and a hGT terminator sequence."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">IV. With its statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant re-submitted the amended description dealt with in the decision under appeal as the main request and submitted two further amended descriptions as auxiliary requests 1 and 2. It submitted arguments to the effect that each of the submitted descriptions complied with the requirements of Article 84 EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">V. In a telephone conversation, the rapporteur informed the representative of the board's provisional view that the amendment to the description of the main request on page 3, line 7, i.e. the introduction of the sentence "The invention is defined by the claims" (see section II), introduced ambiguity with respect to other amendments to the description.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VI. By letter dated 19 March 2021, the appellant submitted an amended description as a new main request, in which the amendment on page 3, line 7 of the previous main request had been deleted.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VII. The appellant's arguments relevant to the decision are summarised as follows:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Adapting the description of a patent application to the set of claims on which an examining division intended to grant a patent was governed solely by the requirements of Article 69(1) EPC, Article 84 EPC and Rule 42 EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The amendments to the description were entirely consistent with the claims as found allowable by the examining division and did not cast doubt on the granted patent's scope of protection.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The EPC did not require that parts of the description of an application which were no longer covered by the set of amended claims on which an examining division intended to grant a patent had to be marked as "non-related disclosure" or even had to be deleted when adapting the description to those claims.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VIII. The appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and the case be remitted to the examining division with the order to grant a patent on the basis of the set of claims 1 to 24 filed with the letter of 22 March 2017, the figures 1/15 to 15/15 as published and the description according to the main request, as filed with the letter of 19 March 2021 or, alternatively, the description according to either of auxiliary requests 1 or 2, as filed with the statement of grounds of appeal.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Reasons for the Decision</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Admissibility of the appeal</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. The appeal complies with the requirements of Article 108 EPC and Rule 99 EPC and is admissible.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Adaptation of the description</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>2. The examining division refused the application because it considered that the description of the application in the form of the main request with the amendment</b>s on page 9, line 23, page 10, line 19 and page 11, line 1 (see section II) <b>did not comply with the requirements of Article 84 EPC. The reasons for this were, in particular, that the subject-matter </b>disclosed on page 9, line 23 to page 10, line 18, <b>was "broader than the subject-matter of the allowable claim [sic] claim 17 which concerns the expression vector of the invention" and "[i]t cannot be interpreted that this passage concerns an embodiment which would be a dependent claim of claim 17</b>". <b>Moreover, the passages</b> on page 10, lines 19 to 33 and page 11, lines 1 to 16 d<b>id not "indicate that these embodiments could be embodiments of the vector as stated in claim 17 and further comprising other elements in addition".</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">3. Hence, the examining division took the view that the scope of protection was unclear.</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">4. </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">First and foremost, Article 84 EPC requires that the claims are clear</span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;">, i.e. that they properly define and delimit the subject-matter for which protection is sought in understandable and unambiguous terms. </span><span style="color: #990000;">Claims must be clear in themselves when being read with the normal skills including the knowledge about the prior art, but not including any knowledge derived from the description of the patent application or the amended patent (see e.g. decision T 454/89, Reasons, point 4.1 (vii)).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">5.</span><span style="color: #990000;"> <b>Article 84 EPC only mentions the description in the context of the additional requirement that it must support the claims.</b> Under this requirement, the subject-matter of the claim must be taken from the description, it being inadmissible to claim any subject-matter which is not described. However, when assessing clarity, the description cannot be relied upon to resolve a clarity issue in a claim, nor can it give rise to any such issue if the definition of the subject-matter in a claim is clear per se.<b> In particular, if the claims are clear in themselves and supported by the description, their clarity is not affected if the description contains subject-matter which is not claimed .</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">6. </span><span style="color: #990000;">When assessing clarity, Article 69 EPC is of no relevance since it is only concerned with the extent of protection conferred as one of the effects of an application or patent </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">(chapter III of the EPC) whenever that extent is to be determined by whoever is competent to do so.</span><span style="color: #990000;"><b> Article 69 EPC is not by itself concerned with a requirement of the Convention to be met by an application or patent - in particular, unlike Article 84 EPC it is not concerned with the definition proper of the subject-matter sought to be protected by a claim. </b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;">Moreover, even if it were possible, for the purpose of Article 84 EPC, to interpret the claims in the light of the description and drawings as provided for in Article 69 EPC in order to establish whether the conditions governing clarity have been satisfied, the board fails to see how that approach could lead to a lack of clarity of the claims (as opposed to a lack of clarity of the description) if the clear terms of the claims did not encompass subject-matter disclosed in the application or patent.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">7. </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">Thus, Article 84 EPC cannot serve as a legal basis for the refusal.</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">8. </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">As per Rule 42(1)(c) EPC</span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;"> (Rule 27(1)(d) EPC 1973 and Rule 27(1)(c) EPC 1973, before and as of 1 June 1991, respectively) t</span><span style="color: #990000;">he description shall disclose the invention, as claimed, in such terms that the technical problem, even if not expressly stated as such, and its solution can be understood, and state any advantageous effects of the invention with reference to the background art. </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">In line with the concept of a technical invention on which the EPC is founded, the first half-sentence requires the description to disclose how the invention can be understood as the solution to a technical problem. </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">However, in the absence of an objection of lack of unity under Article 82 EPC, the board fails to see how the above-mentioned provision could be the legal basis for requiring the applicant, as a general rule, to bring the description in line with claims intended for grant, and to remove passages of the description that disclose embodiments which are not claimed. I</span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;">n the case in hand, </span><span style="color: #990000;">the passages objected to by the examining division (the amendments on page 9, line 23, page 10, line 19 and page 11, line 1 of the description) <b>do not impair the understanding of the technical problem and its solution as set forth in the summary of the invention</b> on page 3 of the application as filed. <b>The requirements of Rule 42(1)(c) EPC are thus met, so they cannot form the legal basis for the refusal either.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">9. </span><span style="color: #990000;">The board has also considered <b>Rule 48(1)(c) EPC</b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> (Rule 34(1)(c) EPC 1973) as a possible legal basis requiring the adaptation of the description. </span><span style="color: #990000;">Under Rule 48(1)(c) EPC, a European patent application shall not contain any statement or other matter obviously irrelevant or unnecessary under the circumstances.</span> <b><span style="color: #990000;">According to both the wording and history of this provision, it is concerned not with the contents of granted patents but with patent applications. </span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;">The introductory sentence makes reference to European patent applications as opposed to the contents of the description as in Rule 42 EPC. Paragraphs (2) and (3) mention the publication of those applications. Rule 48 EPC is based on Article 21(6) and Rule 9 PCT, which provide that the international application may not contain matter contrary to morality or public order, disparaging statements or obviously irrelevant or unnecessary matter. Any such matter may be omitted from the publication of the international application.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The preparatory documents provide no guidance as to what could amount to "obviously irrelevant or unnecessary" statements or matter, and Rule 48 EPC is entirely silent on the legal consequences.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">10. </span><span style="color: #990000;">A number of decisions have relied on Rule 48(1)(c) EPC as a (potential) legal basis for requiring the description to be adapted to the subject-matter as claimed (see e.g. decision T 544/88, OJ EPO 1990, 429, point 5; decision T 329/89, point 4.4; decision T 1903/06, point 2; decision T 853/91, point 2; decision T 443/11, point 4).<b> In the board's judgement, however, the purpose of Rule 48(1)(c) EPC cannot be to keep a patent specification free of unnecessary information and to make sure that its content relates only to what protection is sought, for several reasons.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">11. A</span><span style="color: #990000;">s set out in point 9, according to the wording and history of<b> Rule 48 EPC, it does not pertain to patent specifications. Furthermore, points (a) to (c) of Rule 48(1) EPC are in the order of their offensiveness, ranking from high to low.</b> This is reflected in paragraphs (2) and (3) of Rule 48 EPC. A</span><b><span style="color: #990000;">t the Munich diplomatic conference, there was general acceptance that the application should not be refused even if the application as filed contained statements or other matter contrary to "ordre public" or morality. </span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;">Moreover, Rule 48(3) EPC remained optional (see Minutes of the proceedings of Main Committee I of the Munich Diplomatic Conference for the setting up of a European System for the Grant of Patents, document M/PR/I, No. 2225 to 2236). </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>It is therefore difficult to conceive that the legislator intended to impose more severe sanctions on less offensive matter, in particular to provide a ground for refusal based on the inclusion of merely "irrelevant or unnecessary" matter (see also the doubts expressed in decision T 1065/99, point 7).</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">12. </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">Therefore, Rule 48 EPC cannot serve as a legal basis for the refusal either.</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">13. In view of the above considerations,</span><b><span style="color: #990000;"> the board fails to see how the aforementioned provisions of the EPC, or any others, can lead to the requirement that embodiments disclosed in the description of an application which are of a more general nature than the subject-matter of a given independent claim must constitute potential subject-matter of a claim dependent on that independent claim. </span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;">The board accordingly concludes that the decision under appeal is erroneous and is to be set aside.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">14. Support for the claimed subject-matter can be found on page 4, line 5 to page 6, line 20 and on page 9, lines 3 to 4 of the description of the application.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">15.</span><b><span style="color: #990000;"> The claims are thus clear, concise and supported by the description as required by Article 84 EPC.</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">16. In view of the above considerations, the main request is considered to comply with the requirements of the EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Order</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For these reasons it is decided that:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. The decision under appeal is set aside.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. The case is remitted to the examining division with the order to grant a patent in the following version:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- pages 1 to 76 of the description filed with the letter of 19 March 2021</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- claims 1 to 24 filed with the letter of 22 March 2017</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- drawing sheets 1/15 to 15/15 as originally filed</span></div></div></div></div><br /><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t181989eu1.html" target="_blank">T 1989/18 (Adaptation of the description/HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE) of 16.12.2021</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t181989eu1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span></span></i></span><i>ECLI:EP:BA:2021:T198918.20211216</i><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span>The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP12810245&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></i><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Figure: citation from</span><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> "</span><a href="javascript:NewPDFWindow('application?documentId=E1K1OLIH1101DSU&number=EP12810245&lng=en&npl=false%27,%20%27E1K1OLIH1101DSU_EP12810245_en%27)" target="_blank">05.03.2018 Grounds for the decision (Annex)</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="javascript:NewPDFWindow('application?documentId=E1K1OLIH1101DSU&number=EP12810245&lng=en&npl=false%27,%20%27E1K1OLIH1101DSU_EP12810245_en%27)" target="_blank">"</a> to the </span><a href="javascript:NewPDFWindow('application?documentId=E1K1OLEE6221DSU&number=EP12810245&lng=en&npl=false%27,%20%27E1K1OLEE6221DSU_EP12810245_en%27)" target="_blank">05.03.2018 Decision to refuse the application (Examining Division)</a>)<span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span></i><i>obtained from the <a href="https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP12810245&tab=doclist" target="_blank">online EP register</a>.</i>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-91300666465521962162021-12-21T14:18:00.007+01:002021-12-22T08:29:33.746+01:00J 8/20 & J 9/20 - Inventor has to be a person with legal capacity<p>In the oral proceedings before the Legal Board of Appeal in the two DABUS cases earlier today, the Board decided that the appeal is dismissed and that the request for a referral to the Enlarged Board is refused.</p><p>The Board concludes that DABUS, an AI machine, cannot be considered an inventor in the meaning of the EPC, as the Board concluded that <b><span style="color: #990000;">an inventor has to be a person with legal capacity.</span></b></p><p><b><span></span></b></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><p>During the oral proceedings, the appellant gave various arguments as to why a non-person inventor should be possible, including references to national law/rulings of EPC as well as non-EPC states. The appellant also argued that the EPO should not have checked the designation of the inventor (Art.60(3) and Rule 19(1) EPC), also not whether the inventor is a natural person or not, and that an incorrect opposition is also not a ground of revocation in proceedings before the EPO - it being decided under national law and being in the sole competence of the national courts.</p><p>The appellant also indicated that, in his opinion, one reason for the designation of inventor is transparency, and that the designation of DABUS was transparent, correct and in his view according to the relevant principles of law. While the applicant could have prevented the issue by adding himself or another person as an inventor, it would not be have been correct and thus appropriate to incorrectly designate a fictitious person or a person that was not an inventor as the inventor, even though that would not have led to a refusal in view of Art.60(3) EPC. </p><p>The debate address the relevance of Art.60(1) EPC (<i>The right to a European patent shall belong to the inventor or his successor in title</i>), Art.60(3) EPC (<i>In proceedings before the European Patent Office, the applicant shall be deemed to be entitled to exercise the right to a European patent</i>) and Rule 19(2) (<i>The European Patent Office shall not verify the accuracy of the designation of the inventor</i>) as well as Art. 81 first and second sentence (<i>statement to the origin of the right to the European patent</i>) and Rule 19(1) (<i>The request for grant of a European patent shall contain the designation of the inventor. However, if the applicant is not the inventor or is not the sole inventor, the designation shall be filed in a separate document. The designation shall state the family name, given names and country and place of residence of the inventor, contain the statement referred to in Article 81 and bear the signature of the applicant or his representative</i>.) The appellant also submitted that "successor in title" does not need to arise from a transfer, but may also derive from the ownership of DABUS (note: in the case as hand, the applicant did not just own DABUS, but also wrote its source code and operated it, so there was no other person that could be considered to be possibly entitled to the ownership): with DABUS being able to make inventions, its inventions would also be owned by its owner - fructus industriales, "the owner of a tree also owns the fruits of that tree". </p><p>During the oral proceedings, the appellant also indicated was that there was a dilemma: the invention was not a natural person, while EP patents should be grantable for any inventions, also for AI-originated inventions. The appellant asked the Board, in case the would not grant any of the requests, whether the Board would know a solution to the dilemma. After the oral proceedings were closed, the chairman of the Board indicated that the Board did not find a solution for the situation the appellant is in. </p><p>The full reasoning will be provided in the written decision.</p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i>File wrapper: <span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;"> </span><a href="https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP18275163" style="background-color: white; background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">EP 18 275 163</a> (J 8/20)<span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;"> and </span><a href="https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP18275174" style="background-color: white; background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">EP 18 275 174</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;"> (J 9/20)<br />Also refer to our earlier blog post in respect of the refusal by the Receiving Section <a href="https://dp-patentlaw.blogspot.com/2020/01/we-normally-discuss-decisions-of-boards.html" target="_blank">here</a>.<br />The above comments reflect my personal understanding of what was discussed at the oral proceedings.</span></i></span></p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;">----</span></i></span><p></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;">Update 22.12.2021: </span></i></span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;">The EPO published a <a href="https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2021/20211221.html" target="_blank">Press Release "</a></span></i></span><span style="color: #0b2a43;"><i><a href="https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2021/20211221.html" target="_blank">AI cannot be named as inventor on patent applications</a></i></span><i style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;"><a href="https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2021/20211221.html" target="_blank">"</a> dated 21 December 2021, indicating that:</span></i></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;"><span face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 15px;">In public oral proceedings today, in combined cases J 8/20 and J 9/20, the Legal Board of Appeal of the EPO confirmed that under the European Patent Convention (EPC) an inventor designated in a patent application must be a human being. The board dismissed the applicant's appeal. The written decision and reasons will be issued in due course and will be available via the European Patent Register. The Boards of Appeal have issued a communiqué with further details.</span></p></blockquote><p><span style="color: #0b2a43; font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white;"><i>The Boards of Appeal published a </i></span><i><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2021/20211221.html" target="_blank">communiqué</a>, which is cited in full below (emphasis added):</i></span></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><h1 style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 32px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 40px; margin: 38px 0px 50px; padding: 0px;">Press Communiqué on decisions J 8/20 and J 9/20 of the Legal Board of Appeal</h1><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p class="alternative" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: bold; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">21 December 2021</p></div><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">Today, the Legal Board of Appeal announced its decision to dismiss the appeal in cases J 8/20 and J 9/20. The Legal Board of Appeal confirmed the decisions of the Receiving Section of the European Patent Office to </span><span style="color: #990000;">refuse the applications <a href="https://register.epo.org/application?lng=en&number=EP18275163" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; cursor: pointer;">EP 18 275 163</a> and <a href="https://register.epo.org/application?lng=en&number=EP18275174" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; cursor: pointer;">EP 18 275 174</a>, in which an artificial intelligence system called DABUS was designated as inventor in the application forms</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">. The Legal Board of Appeal </span><span style="color: #990000;">also refused the auxiliary request according to which no person had been identified as inventor but merely a natural person was indicated to have "the right to the European Patent by virtue of being the owner and creator of" the artificial intelligence system DABUS.</span></p></div><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Background</span></h3></div><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Under <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2020/e/ar81.html" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">Article 81 EPC</a> the applicant must designate the inventor. According to <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2020/e/ar60.html" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">Article 60(1) EPC</a> the right to a European patent belongs to the inventor or his successor in title.</p></div><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">In cases J 8/20 and J 9/20 the question arose as to whether the applicant, when applying for a European patent, can designate as inventor an artificial intelligence machine which does not have legal capacity.<span style="background-repeat: no-repeat;"><a name="A81" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; cursor: pointer; text-decoration-line: underline;" title="A81"></a></span> Applications designating the AI system DABUS as inventor were filed in multiple jurisdictions, including at the European Patent Office. </span><span style="color: #990000;">The applicant argued that the inventions had been created autonomously by DABUS.</span></p></div><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">According to the European Patent Convention (EPC) the designation of the inventor is a formal requirement which a patent application must fulfil according to Article 81 EPC and <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2020/e/r19.html" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">Rule 19(1) EPC</a>. Assessment of this formal requirement takes place prior to and independently from the substantive examination and involves no consideration as to whether the subject-matter of that application meets the requirements of patentability.</p></div><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">The Receiving Section of the EPO refused both applications.</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> In its decisions it considered the designation submitted by the applicant not to be consistent with Article 81 EPC for two reasons. Firstly, it concluded that </span><span style="color: #990000;">only a human inventor could be an inventor within the meaning of the EPC</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">. For this reason, designating a machine as inventor did not comply with the requirements set out in Article 81 and Rule 19(1) EPC. Secondly, the Receiving Section was of the opinion that </span><span style="color: #990000;">a machine could not transfer any rights to the applicant</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">. The Receiving Section considered therefore that the </span><span style="color: #990000;">statement that the applicant was successor in title because they owned the machine did not satisfy the requirements</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> of Article 81 EPC in conjunction with Article 60(1) EPC.</span></p></div><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Key considerations</span></h3></div><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">At the end of the oral proceedings, </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>the Legal Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal </b>and orally provided the following reasoning in both cases</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">:</span></p></div></blockquote><a name="Content" style="background-color: white; background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px;"></a><span face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 15px;"></span><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative; text-align: left;"><ul style="box-sizing: border-box; list-style: none; margin: -0.5em 0px 1.4em; padding: 0px;"><ul><li style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; list-style-position: outside; list-style-type: unset; margin: 0px 0px 8px; overflow: hidden; padding: 0px 0px 0px 5px; position: relative;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Under the EPC the inventor had to be a person with legal capacity. </b>For this reason at least, the main request was not allowable.</span></li><li style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; list-style-position: outside; list-style-type: unset; margin: 0px 0px 8px; overflow: hidden; padding: 0px 0px 0px 5px; position: relative;"><span style="color: #990000;">Regarding the auxiliary request, a<b> statement indicating the origin of the right to the European patent under Article 81 EPC, second sentence EPC had to be in conformity with Article 60(1) EPC.</b></span></li><li style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; list-style-position: outside; list-style-type: unset; margin: 0px 0px 8px; overflow: hidden; padding: 0px 0px 0px 5px; position: relative;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The EPO was competent to assess whether such statement referred to a situation which was encompassed by Article 60(1) EPC.</b></span></li></ul></ul></div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><div lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The written decision with a detailed reasoning will be sent to the parties in due course and will subsequently be publicly available in the decisions database of the Boards of Appeal.</p></div><div lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;">Contact</h3></div><div lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Nikolaus Obrovski</p></div><div lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Jeannine Hoppe</p></div><div lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Spokespersons of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office</p></div><div lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><a href="mailto:boa-press@epo.org" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">boa-press@epo.org</a></p></div><div lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">This press release is a non-binding document for media use.</p></div></blockquote>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-20469756715293806462021-12-14T15:34:00.001+01:002021-12-14T15:34:01.942+01:00Moving back from Haar?<p>Today, an <a href="https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2021/20211214.html" target="_blank">EPO news message</a> was published in the EPO website indicating that the President of the EPO and the President of the Boards of Appeal have proposed to the Administrative Council to relocate the Boards back from Haar to the city center, more specifically to Pschorr-Höfe 7 in Munich, owned by the EPO (Bayerstrasse area).</p><p>The <a href="https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2021/20211214.html" target="_blank">news message </a>reads:</p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><h1 style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 40px; margin: 38px 0px 50px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: large;">Plan to relocate Boards of Appeal presented to EPO member states</span></h1><h1 style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; line-height: 40px; margin: 38px 0px 50px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: small;">14 December 2021</span></h1><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px; text-align: left;">EPO President António Campinos and President of the Boards of Appeal Carl Josefsson have made a joint proposal today to the EPO's member states to relocate the Boards of Appeal from the Munich district of Haar to the city centre. A detailed proposal for the relocation of the Boards of Appeal will be presented for approval of the EPO member states by spring 2022.</p></div><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">Further information:</b></p></div><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><a class="pdf" href="https://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/0F27EA6176CF9584C12587AB003B864A/$FILE/2021-12-10%20Joint%20Declaration%20of%20the%20President%20of%20the%20Office%20and%20the%20Presdient%20of%20the%20BoA.pdf" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer; font-weight: 700; margin-left: 1.5em; padding-right: 0.6em; position: relative; text-decoration-line: none;">Joint declaration</a></div></blockquote><p> </p><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><ul class="noBullets" style="box-sizing: border-box; list-style: none; margin: -0.5em 0px 1.4em; padding: 0px;"><li style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; list-style-position: outside; list-style-type: unset; margin-bottom: 8px; margin-left: 0px !important; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px; overflow: hidden; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px !important; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px; position: relative;"><span style="background-color: transparent;">The </span><a href="https://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/0F27EA6176CF9584C12587AB003B864A/$FILE/2021-12-10%20Joint%20Declaration%20of%20the%20President%20of%20the%20Office%20and%20the%20Presdient%20of%20the%20BoA.pdf" style="background-color: transparent;" target="_blank">Joint declaration</a><span style="background-color: transparent;"> reads [colour added]:</span></li></ul></div><p><br /></p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>Joint Declaration</b></p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>of the President of the European Patent Office and</b></p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>of the President of the Boards of Appeal</b></p><p style="text-align: center;"><b>on the re-location of the Boards of Appeal</b></p><p></p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p><br /></p><p><span style="color: #990000;">CONSIDERING the decision of the Administrative Council of 30 June 2016 (CA/43/16 Rev.1) on a comprehensive reform of the structures, management and career scheme of the Boards of Appeal aiming at improving the organisational autonomy of the Boards of Appeal and the perception of independence in their activities;</span></p><p><span style="color: #990000;">CONSIDERING the decision of the Administrative Council of 30 June 2016 (CA/D 6/16) amending the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention and establishing the rules governing the organisation and management of the Boards of Appeal and President of the Boards of Appeal;</span></p><p>CONSIDERING the decision of the Administrative Council of 30 June 2016 (CA/D 7/16) setting up a Boards of Appeal Committee and adopting its Regulations;</p><p><span style="color: #990000;">CONSIDERING the decision of the Administrative Council of 30 June 2016 (CA/43/16 rev. 1 – Part C) concerning the relocation of the Boards of Appeal in a separate building in Munich;</span></p><p>CONSIDERING the decision of the Administrative Council of 16 October 2016 (CA/82/16) to conclude a rental agreement for the new location of the Boards of Appeal in Haar;</p><p>CONSIDERING the Memorandum of Understanding between the President of the Office and the President of the Boards of Appeal on the organisational autonomy of the Boards of Appeal, signed on 29 June 2019;</p><p>WHEREAS the rental contract for the building in Haar was concluded in 2017, for the duration of 15 years, ending in 2032, and an additional contract concluded in 2019, for the duration of 84 months, ending in 2026;</p><p>WHEREAS the Office will introduce the New Ways of working (CA 77/21) in 2022 for a three-year pilot;</p><p><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The President of the Boards of Appeal and the President of the Office jointly propose to the Administrative Council to re-locate the Boards of Appeal from Haar to the building Pschorr-Höfe 7 in Munich, owned by the EPO, as of 2025/2026.</b></span></p><p>Munich, 10 December 2021</p><p>António Campinos Carl Josefsson</p><p>President of the Office President of the Boards of Appeal</p></blockquote><p></p>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-64840444646493706592021-10-29T13:00:00.010+02:002021-10-29T15:33:39.758+02:00G 1/21 - OP by Vico - the full decision is out!<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqKV0hoKKFJvsBZT74QCIqnQPE9UxHaZRyU-oAIUsTLCL8SXXB-z61-rLy2ELzv4PNZK1vKI5dA0QeAyPoOpu6u42VUpN7GEKGI3WchyVbYEgqkkOrkqaWn70M54MzhsHoTQoKYN1l9h_d/s1067/2021.03.17+video+conference+8540228058_4fa1b2868d_o.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1067" data-original-width="1067" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqKV0hoKKFJvsBZT74QCIqnQPE9UxHaZRyU-oAIUsTLCL8SXXB-z61-rLy2ELzv4PNZK1vKI5dA0QeAyPoOpu6u42VUpN7GEKGI3WchyVbYEgqkkOrkqaWn70M54MzhsHoTQoKYN1l9h_d/w400-h400/2021.03.17+video+conference+8540228058_4fa1b2868d_o.png" width="400" /></a></div><i style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;"><i style="font-family: inherit;"><i style="font-family: inherit;">On 16 July 2021, a <span style="color: #0000ee;"><u><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2021/20210716.html" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank">Press Communiqué</a></u></span><a href="https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2021/20210716.html" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank"> </a>was issued by Spokespersons of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office on the decision of the Enlarged Board in G 1/21. The full reasoning of the decision was not yet issued at that time, but only the Order and some comments. E.g, in the press communique, t</i><i style="font-family: inherit;">he Enlarged Board of Appeal "<b>limited the scope of its answer by confining its order to oral proceedings that are held during a period of general emergency impairing the parties' possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises and moreover are conducted specifically before the Boards of Appeal</b>. </i><i style="font-family: inherit;">Accordingly, in its order the Enlarged Board did not address the question whether oral proceedings by videoconference may be held without the consent of the parties in the absence of a period of general emergency. Nor did the order address the question whether oral proceedings by videoconference may be held without the consent of the parties in examination or opposition proceedings before the EPO's departments of first instance." The full reasoning of the decision was expected to shed some light on the effect on the legality and conditions of oral proceedings by videoconference in first instance proceedings and in "normal times", when the pandemic is over.</i></i></i><p></p><p><i style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;"><b>The full decision was published today, 29 October 2021.</b></i><i style="font-family: inherit;"><b> </b><br /></i><i style="font-family: inherit;">In reason 32 of the decision, "I</i><i>he Enlarged Board considers that the limitations currently inherent in the use of video technology <b>can make it suboptimal as a format for oral proceedings</b>, either objectively or in the perception of the participants, <b>but normally not to such a degree that a party's right to be heard or right to fair proceedings is seriously impaired</b>. If in an individual case these rights cannot be respected, it is of course the duty of the deciding body to take appropriate measures to remedy this."<br /></i><i style="font-family: inherit;">In reason 45, the Enlarged Board indicates that "</i><i style="font-weight: bold;">a hearing in person is the optimum format or, to use a term well known in the field of European patent law, it is the gold standard. It definitely fulfils the requirements of Article 113 EPC and Article 6 ECHR. It is also the format that the legislator had in mind when drafting Article 116 EPC. Therefore, in-person hearings should be the default option. Parties can only be denied this option for good reasons.</i><i style="font-family: inherit;"><b>"<br /></b></i><i style="font-family: inherit;">In reason 46, the Enlarged Board indicates that "[...]</i><i> the holding of oral proceedings is seen as serving the interests of the parties. The vast majority of oral proceedings are held upon request by a party. It therefore makes sense that <b>the choice of format for these oral proceedings can be made by the party who requested them and not by the board of appeal</b>, especially as this concerns more than just an organisational matter. As stated earlier, the Enlarged Board holds that at this point in time videoconferences do not provide the same level of communication possibilities as in-person oral proceedings. <b>A party may thus have good reasons to prefer in-person oral proceedings to a videoconference.</b></i><i style="font-family: inherit;">" (see reasons 47-50)</i></p><br /><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">I. During the oral proceedings of 8 February 2021 in case T 1807/15 the Chairman of Board of Appeal 3.5.02 ("the Board") informed the parties that the Board would refer a question under Article 112 EPC to the Enlarged Board of Appeal.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">II. By interlocutory decision of 12 March 2021 the Board referred the following question:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Is the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference compatible with the right to oral proceedings as enshrined in Article 116(1) EPC if not all of the parties to the proceedings have given their consent to the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference?</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">III. With regard to the appeal proceedings in case T 1807/15, the following is noted.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">IV. The appeal was filed by the opponent against the opposition division's decision to maintain European patent No. 1609239 in amended form. The parties were summoned to oral proceedings before the Board on 3 June 2020. The respondent/patent proprietor requested postponement of the oral proceedings because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The oral proceedings were then rescheduled to 8 February 2021. Again the respondent asked for postponement and indicated that the case was not suitable for videoconferencing, in particular because there would be simultaneous interpreting during the proceedings. The appellant agreed with the respondent. Although the parties did not give their consent, the Board maintained the summons to oral proceedings on 8 February 2021 in the form of a videoconference.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">V. The appellant had requested in writing that the decision under appeal be set aside and the patent be revoked. Furthermore, during the oral proceedings the appellant requested as an auxiliary measure that the question whether oral proceedings under Article 116 EPC can be replaced by a videoconference without the consent of the parties be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal. According to the minutes of the oral proceedings, only the auxiliary request was discussed.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VI. In order to avoid any procedural violation, the Board considered it reasonable to seek clarification of the legal situation by referring a point of law to the Enlarged Board. The Enlarged Board understands that, after receiving the answer of the Enlarged Board, the Board will again summon the parties to oral proceedings to discuss the main request, and that the form in which these oral proceedings take place will depend on that answer. This follows from point 2.3 of the Reasons of the referring decision: "[The Board] sees no reason not to use a videoconference as long as the Enlarged Board of Appeal considers the format to be in line with Article 116 EPC."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VII. After the date of the oral proceedings before the Board, at which it was announced that a referral would be made, the appellant withdrew its auxiliary request for a referral. The Board nevertheless issued the written decision with the above-cited question to the Enlarged Board.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">VIII. By order of 17 March 2021, the Chairman of the Enlarged Board of Appeal determined the composition of the panel to decide on the referral under case number G 1/21. On the same date the Enlarged Board invited the parties in appeal case T 1807/15 and the President of the European Patent Office to file submissions on the referred question, and by a communication of 24 March 2021 it invited written statements on the referred question from the public.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">IX. The appellant submitted that, although a videoconference may in certain cases be an acceptable format for oral proceedings, its use should always be dependent on the consent of the parties. The President of the EPO stated in his comments that videoconferences are a form equivalent to in-person oral proceedings that has in recent times proven to be a successful means of addressing the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. The President argued strongly in favour of leaving the choice of the format of oral proceedings to the EPO or the Boards of Appeal, respectively, and not to the parties. The respondent to the appeal proceedings did not file any written submissions on the referral, nor did it attend any of the oral proceedings before the Enlarged Board.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">X. The referral attracted a lot of attention from third parties. Over fifty amicus curiae briefs and third party observations referring to Article 115 EPC were received from various organisations, companies, patent attorney firms and individuals. The majority of the submissions favoured a negative answer to the referred question, although many expressed the view that, in the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, holding oral proceedings by videoconference without the consent of the parties might be justified. It was also argued that measures taken by the EPO and the Boards of Appeal in response to the pandemic should not be prolonged once it ended and should thus not constitute a "new normal". In a minority of submissions, oral proceedings by videoconference were seen as a useful alternative format to in-person oral proceedings. According to some, the choice of this format should not depend on the consent of one or all of the parties.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XI. In its submission dated 27 April 2021, the appellant raised an objection under Article 24(3) EPC against the Chairman and two members of the Enlarged Board for reasons of suspected partiality. The objection was based on the involvement of the Chairman and these members in the preparation of Article 15a of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA). This provision, entitled "Oral proceedings by videoconference" was proposed by the President of the Boards of Appeal, adopted by the Boards of Appeal Committee, and approved by the Administrative Council of 23 March 2021. It entered into force on 1 April 2021. A further member informed the Enlarged Board under Article 24(2) EPC of his involvement in the preparation of Article 15a RPBA and asked the Enlarged Board to decide on his continued participation in the referral case. The objections were found to be admissible and, for the purpose of dealing with them, the panel in G 1/21 was recomposed, with the above-mentioned members being replaced by their alternates.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XII. By interlocutory decision dated 17 May 2021, the Enlarged Board decided pursuant to Article 24(4) EPC that the Chairman of the Enlarged Board and the member who had informed the Enlarged Board under Article 24(2) EPC should not take part in the referral case. The composition of the Enlarged Board was subsequently changed by an order dated 20 May 2021 of the Chairman of the Enlarged Board in case G 1/21.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XIII. By order of 17 March 2021, the parties had been summoned and the President of the EPO had been invited to attend oral proceedings to be held on 28 May 2021. By further letter dated 24 May 2021, the appellant filed four objections against the internal members of the Enlarged Board in its new composition for reasons of suspected partiality and personal interest and filed ten procedural requests, numbered 1 to 11 (there was no request 10).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XIV. By communication dated 27 May 2021 (but sent on 26 May 2021), the Enlarged Board informed the appellant that it had decided to reject the first procedural request to postpone the oral proceedings scheduled for 28 May 2021 and to allow the second procedural request for oral proceedings on the four new objections, at least to the extent that the matter of their admissibility would be discussed during the oral proceedings on 28 May 2021.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XV. During the oral proceedings held on 28 May 2021, the admissibility of the four new objections were discussed with the appellant in a non-public session, as were its procedural requests 3 to 11. The decisions on the admissibility of the objections and on the procedural requests were announced during the public session. The Enlarged Board decided to reject the four new objections as inadmissible. It also rejected procedural requests 3 to 11. The reasons for these decisions were given in the Enlarged Board's second interlocutory decision, which was issued on 28 June 2021.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XVI. During the oral proceedings the appellant complained that it had not been sent the written comments of the President of the EPO in sufficient time to be able to submit its observations on them. It stated that its right under Article 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Enlarged Board of Appeal to file observations on these comments was thereby violated.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XVII. After a discussion of this matter, the Enlarged Board decided to allow the appellant more time to file its observations on the comments of the President of the EPO, and postponed the discussion of the referred question. It was agreed that the time limit for filing these observations would be 25 June 2021 and that the oral proceedings would be postponed until a date in early July 2021.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XVIII. The parties were then summoned to further oral proceedings on 2 July 2021, which the President of the EPO was also invited to attend. The appellant filed its observations on the comments of the President of the EPO on 25 June 2021.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XIX. By further letter dated 30 June 2021, the appellant filed a request addressed to the Chairman of the Enlarged Board to correct the composition of the panel dealing with referral G 1/21. This letter was formulated as a reaction to the Enlarged Board's rejection of its procedural requests 7 and 8. These requests were:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">7. to replace the to be replaced members of the panel, Mr. Josefsson and I. Beckedorf with alternates pursuant to Art. 2(1)(b) of the Business Distribution scheme of the Enlarged Board of Appeal,</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">8. to appoint the substitute for the chairman in accordance with Art. 2(2) of the Business Distribution scheme of the Enlarged Board of Appeal.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XX. The Enlarged Board had rejected these requests in its second interlocutory decision (cf. point XV. above) because it found that the competence to correct the composition of a panel dealing with a referral under Article 112 EPC lay with the Chairman of the Enlarged Board (see Reasons, points 34 to 36).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXI. During the oral proceedings on 2 July 2021, the appellant again addressed the question of the composition of the panel dealing with G 1/21. Although it understood that the panel itself was not competent to change the composition, it argued that as long as the incorrect composition was not corrected, the proceedings should not continue. It requested specifically that the Enlarged Board declare itself not competent to deal with the referral because of its incorrect composition. It also requested postponement of the oral proceedings until the panel was lawfully composed. After both requests had been discussed and the Enlarged Board had deliberated on them, the Chairman announced that the Enlarged Board had decided to reject them. Its reasons for rejecting the requests are given in points 1 to 4 below.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXII. The remaining part of the oral proceedings on 2 July 2021 was dedicated to discussing the referred question with the appellant and the representatives of the President of the EPO. After closure of the debate and deliberation by the Enlarged Board, the Chairman announced that the proceedings would be continued in writing.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXIII. By communication dated 13 July 2021, the Chairman informed the appellant that he had decided to reject its request to change the composition of the panel dealing with G 1/21.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">XXIV. On 16 July 2021 the Enlarged Board issued the order of the present decision.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>Reasons for the Decision</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">A. Procedural issues</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. During the oral proceedings on 2 July 2021, the appellant requested that the Enlarged Board declare itself not competent to deal with the referral because of the panel's incorrect composition. It also requested postponement of the oral proceedings until the composition was corrected by the Chairman of the Enlarged Board.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. The appellant's first request is based on the assumption that the legal consequence of an incorrect composition is that the incorrectly composed panel lacks competence. However, it must be noted that the EPC nowhere provides that a panel composed by the Chairman of the Enlarged Board may declare itself to lack competence by reason of its composition. For that reason alone, the request cannot be granted.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">3. Furthermore, as already held in its second interlocutory decision, issued on 28 June 2021, the Enlarged Board is not competent to change its composition other than by the mechanism of Article 24 EPC. If the composition of the Enlarged Board needed to be corrected, it would fall to the Chairman of the Enlarged Board to make the correction. For this reason the Enlarged Board also refrained in its second interlocutory decision from commenting on the allegation that the panel dealing with G 1/21 was incorrectly composed. The Enlarged Board holds that since it is not competent to change its composition, it is likewise not competent to declare itself to lack competence to deal with the referral because of an alleged problem with its composition.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">4. By requesting postponement of the oral proceedings until the panel's composition was corrected, the appellant asked the Enlarged Board to put the referral proceedings on hold until the Chairman gave a (positive) decision on its request to recompose the present panel. This request required the Enlarged Board to balance the interests at stake. On the one hand, the appellant has an interest in the referral being decided by lawfully appointed judges. On the other hand, in the interests of legal certainty the decision-making process in this referral should not be unnecessarily delayed. The Enlarged Board evaluated the appellant's arguments and concluded that they were not sufficiently compelling to justify putting the proceedings on hold until a decision was taken on the request. It furthermore considered that the request was aimed at a postponement until the panel's composition was changed in such a way that it was correct in the eyes of the appellant. However, it would have been wrong to make the continuation of these proceedings dependent on the appellant being in agreement with the decision on its request.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">B. The proceedings before the Board</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">5. As indicated in point IV., the oral proceedings in appeal T 1807/15 were first scheduled for 3 June 2020 but were postponed at the request of the respondent until the new date of 8 February 2021. On 5 May 2020, the respondent, a company based in Switzerland and represented in the appeal proceedings by a law firm based in the United Kingdom, had requested that the oral proceedings be postponed until after the COVID-19 outbreak ended. In its request it also stated its view that oral proceedings by videoconference were not suitable for the case in hand because there would be simultaneous interpreting and moreover the attorney and his client would be joining from separate locations and so would have difficulty conferring with each other during the oral proceedings.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">6. At the time the decision to postpone was taken, the Boards of Appeal had started to hold oral proceedings by videoconference, but only when the parties agreed (see the communications of the Boards of Appeal published on the website of the EPO as from 6 May 2020). This was also the situation for the remainder of 2020. By the end of 2020 the COVID-19 outbreak had not ended. As a result there were still travel restrictions in Europe, and the restrictions on external persons entering the premises of the EPO were also still in force.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">7. By letter of 8 January 2021, the respondent requested postponement of the oral proceedings scheduled for 8 February 2021, again referring to the COVID-19 outbreak and the travel restrictions. It furthermore expressed the view that the appeal case was not suitable for oral proceedings by videoconference. The appellant expressed its agreement with this view.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">8. In the meantime on 15 December 2020 a communication of the Boards of Appeal had been published on the website of the EPO, under the title "Oral proceedings before the Boards of Appeal continuation of the measures adopted due to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and revised on oral proceedings by VICO" (see https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2020/20201215.html). This communication contained the following sentence: "From 1 January 2021 boards may conduct oral proceedings by VICO even without the agreement of the parties concerned, as has now been made clear in the new Article 15a RPBA adopted by the Boards of Appeal Committee. Since the new provision merely clarifies an existing possibility, boards may adapt their practice as regards dispensing with the need to obtain the agreement of the parties concerned even before the date of its entry into force."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">9. The Board rejected the request for postponement and maintained the date for the oral proceedings. However, it changed the format to a videoconference. During the oral proceedings the appellant filed the following request by e-mail: "Hiermit stellen wir den Hilfs-Antrag, der Grossen Beschwerdekammer die Frage zur Entscheidung vorzulegen, ob eine mündliche Verhandlung nach Art. 116 EPC durch eine Video Konferenz ersetzt werden kann, wenn die Parteien dem nicht zustimmen." (Translation by the Board: "We thus make the auxiliary request that the question be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal for decision as to whether oral proceedings under Article 116 EPC can be replaced by a videoconference without the parties' consent".)</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">10. The appellant's request was discussed during the oral proceedings and the Board then announced that it would refer a question of law to the Enlarged Board. The appellant subsequently withdrew its request on 8 March 2021. By its interlocutory decision dated 12 March 2021 the Board referred the following question: "Is the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference compatible with the right to oral proceedings as enshrined in Article 116(1) EPC if not all of the parties to the proceedings have given their consent to the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference?"</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">C. The referred question</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">C.1 Admissibility</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">11. According to Article 112 EPC, a Board of Appeal, in order to ensure a uniform application of the law or if a point of law of fundamental importance arises, shall refer any question to the Enlarged Board if it considers that a decision is required for the above purpose.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">12. The Enlarged Board considers that these conditions are met in the present case. There are decisions by boards of appeal, albeit few in number, which have taken the view that oral proceedings by videoconference before the Boards of Appeal are oral proceedings within the meaning of Article 116 EPC (see T 1378/16, T 2068/14 and T 2320/16) and giving consent to oral proceedings by videoconference is not equivalent to waiving the right to oral proceedings. The Board questions whether this is so. The referral may thus serve to ensure a uniform application of the law.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">13. The point of law in issue is also of fundamental importance, for two reasons. Firstly, the question whether a practice of the Boards of Appeal is compatible with a provision of the EPC which is related to the right of parties to be heard orally is of fundamental importance in itself. Secondly, oral proceedings take place in most appeal proceedings and the question is thus relevant for a large number of cases. The Enlarged Board is also of the view that an answer to the question is necessary for a decision that the Board has to take, namely whether to summon the parties to the further oral proceedings to discuss the appellant's main request in person or by videoconference.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">C.2 Scope of the referral</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>14. As far as the scope of the referral is concerned, the Enlarged Board takes the view that in two respects the question is formulated more broadly than is necessary for the decision the Board has to take</b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;">.</span><span style="color: #990000;"> Firstly, in appeal case T 1807/15 the issue is <b>whether the Board can</b> summon the parties to oral proceedings by videoconference without their consent, not whether a department of first instance can do so. Secondly, as is clear from the history of the case before the Board, <b>the issue of oral proceedings by videoconference and the role of the agreement or consent of the parties has arisen during and as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.</b> It has arisen because at the relevant time it was not possible, or at least from a public health perspective not desirable, to hold oral proceedings in person, as this would have required the parties to travel to the premises of the Boards of Appeal in Haar and also the members of the Board to be physically present on the premises.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>15. The Board was thus faced with the choice of summoning the parties to oral proceedings by videoconference or postponing the oral proceedings until they could be held in person again. This choice is fundamentally different from the choice between holding oral proceedings in person or as a videoconference.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">16. Therefore, in this regard, the Enlarged Board finds it justified to limit the scope of the referral to oral proceedings before the Boards of Appeal and to take the specific context of the referral, the COVID-19 pandemic, into account. </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">This is in line with earlier decisions G 1/19 (OJ EPO 2021, A77) and G 2/19 (OJ EPO 2020, A87) in which the Enlarged Board took the position that a referred question may remain unanswered to the extent that it exceeds the real need for clarification. See also in this regard Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 9th edition 2019, V.B.2.3.3 "Relevance of the referred question for the underlying case".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>17. On the other hand, the Board limited its referral to the question whether holding oral proceedings by videoconference without the consent of the parties is compatible with Article 116 EPC</b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;">. The Enlarged Board understands from the Board's reasoning that it saw no need to address the matter of its compatibility with Article 113(1) EPC, although the appellant raised concerns with respect to the right to be heard as laid down in that provision. In point 2.3 of the Reasons of its decision, the Board indicated that "...it [saw] no reason not to use a videoconference as long as the Enlarged Board of Appeal considers the format to be in line with Article 116 EPC". And according to point 3.7 of the Reasons, "[i]n this context, the Board would like to note that it has specifically not included the issue of Article 113(1) EPC in the question to be referred, because it considers the issue of compatibility with Article 116(1) EPC to be of primary nature. In the Board's view, the right under Article 113(1) EPC covers the right to be heard at oral proceedings that satisfy the requirements under Article 116 EPC." </span><span style="color: #990000;">The Enlarged Board understands from these passages that if the Enlarged Board concludes that a videoconference is a format for oral proceedings that is not excluded by Article 116 EPC, there will be no issue with the right to be heard. This is borne out by point 4.1.3 of the Reasons, where the Board states: "In the Board's view, running videoconferences using a technology that generally functions properly is compatible with both the right to be heard and the right to a fair trial."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">18. In the submissions of the appellant and in many amicus curiae briefs the view was expressed that oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference are not equivalent to in-person oral proceedings in that they inevitably pose limitations on the interaction between the parties and the board and on the opportunity for the parties to argue their case. In that connection, the specific concern was that the right to be heard and the right to a fair trial are infringed by oral proceedings being held by way of a videoconference.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>19. The Enlarged Board is of the view that in order to clarify the legal framework for holding oral proceedings by videoconference it is appropriate also to consider the compatibility of this format with Article 113 EPC. </b>This is all the more so as the right to be heard is the fundamental principle and the right to oral proceedings is an expression of that principle.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>20. On the basis of the above considerations the Enlarged Board has reformulated the referred question as follows:</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>During a general emergency impairing the parties' possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises, is the conduct of oral proceedings before the boards of appeal in the form of a videoconference compatible with the EPC if not all of the parties have given their consent to the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference?</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">C.3 Interpretation of Article 116 EPC</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">21. The first question to be answered is whether hearing the parties by means of a videoconference can be regarded as holding oral proceedings within the meaning of Article 116 EPC. This requires an interpretation of Article 116(1) EPC, which provides: "Oral proceedings shall take place either at the instance of the European Patent Office if it considers this to be expedient or at the request of any party to the proceedings. However, the European Patent Office may reject a request for further oral proceedings before the same department where the parties and the subject of the proceedings are the same."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">22. According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. The Enlarged Board has consistently applied the provisions of this Convention for interpreting the EPC in the past, and will also do this in the present case.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">23. It appears that Article 116(1) EPC is not primarily concerned with the question of what constitutes oral proceedings. It rather addresses the question of when oral proceedings, as distinct from written proceedings, are to take place and on whose initiative. The term "oral proceedings" itself is not further defined in the text of the Article. As acknowledged by the Board (see point 5.4.1 of the Reasons), the term is in itself very general and allows a broad interpretation. The Enlarged Board agrees that the ordinary meaning of the term is very general. The Board also notes in point 5.4.1 that the EPC does not contain any explicit provision on the form of oral proceedings. The Enlarged Board is not aware either of such a provision.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">24. The Board then goes on to state that to find the "authentic" meaning of the term "oral proceedings" it must be borne in mind that at the time of the preparation and conclusion of the EPC there were no technical options available to provide an alternative to traditional in-person oral proceedings. Therefore, read in context, the term "oral proceedings" inevitably meant in-person oral proceedings. There was thus no need to define the format of oral proceedings, and, in the Board's view, any attempt to construe the term as also encompassing other formats is based on retrospective considerations. The Board also cited Rule 71(2) EPC 1973 and Rule 115 (2) EPC in support of its view that the legislator only had in-person oral proceedings in mind.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">25. The Enlarged Board does not agree with the Board in this respect. The first and most important element in interpreting a legal text is its wording. In the present case the wording is clear: Article 116 EPC relates to proceedings that are oral. According to entry 2.b. of the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd edition, "oral" means "Of disputes, negotiations, agreements, contracts etc.: conducted by the means of the spoken word; transacted by word of mouth; communicated in speech; spoken; verbal", i.e. by the spoken word, by speech, by word of mouth. There is thus no basis in this word for limiting its scope to in-person hearings in a courtroom before the deciding body.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">26. The Enlarged Board has no doubt that those involved in the legislative process leading to the EPC 1973 had in-person oral proceedings in a courtroom in mind. Nor does it dispute that terms such as "appearing" and "before" in provisions relating to oral proceedings were most likely used with this concept in mind. </span><span style="color: #990000;">Thus, for the Enlarged Board it is beyond question that in-person oral proceedings, although not expressly mentioned, are encompassed by the term "oral proceedings" when read in context.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">27. However, <b>the above findings do not lead to the conclusion that the meaning of the general term "oral proceedings" is limited to the specific form </b>that was known at the time the Convention was drawn up.</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> Indeed, if parties to an appeal attend oral proceedings held by videoconference, they can also be said to appear before the board, albeit remotely. Thus, the appellant's representatives rightly accepted during the course of argument that "oral proceedings" within the meaning of Article 116 EPC are not restricted to proceedings using technology that was available in 1973, but they may also involve the use of newer technologies, such as laptops, PowerPoint presentations and digital whiteboards. </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>What is lacking in particular is any indication that the "in-person" aspect, although not mentioned in the Article or anywhere else, was indeed considered essential to the concept of oral proceedings. Nor has it been demonstrated that it was the will of the legislator to limit the scope of oral proceedings to this particular format and no other. Such an intention cannot be deduced from the terminology used in Article 116 EPC, or from the other cited provisions. Furthermore, as has been acknowledged in all contributions in this case, the travaux préparatoires are silent on this issue. This is the case for both the documents concerning the EPC 1973 and those recording the preparatory discussions on the EPC 2000.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">28. In the wider context of the EPC, the Enlarged Board notes that the object and purpose of the Convention is to provide a system for the grant of European patents with the aim of supporting innovation and technological progress. </span><span style="color: #990000;">In the view of the Enlarged Board, it would be at odds with this object and purpose if the intention of the legislator was to exclude future formats for oral proceedings that might be made possible by technological progress. In more specific terms, since the object and purpose of oral proceedings is to give parties an opportunity to plead their case orally, it is improbable that the legislator wished to rule out potential future formats which would allow them to do so.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>29. There is thus no basis to conclude that the term "oral proceedings" is to be understood in a more limited sense than its ordinary meaning, or that oral proceedings held in a particular format that only became available after the conclusion of the legislative process do not fall within the terms of Article 116 EPC.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>30. The Enlarged Board therefore concludes that oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference are oral proceedings within the meaning of Article 116 EPC.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">31. It is further noted that, if videoconference hearings were not oral proceedings according to Article 116 EPC, they would take place in a legal vacuum, meaning that the provisions and practices relating to oral proceedings would not apply either. This in turn would give rise to questions as to legal status of a videoconference, and for example whether parties can be asked to state their final requests or whether the board can close the debate and announce the decision at the end of it. Such questions would moreover arise irrespective of the consent or non-consent of all of the parties, because if videoconferences are not oral proceedings this also applies when the parties have consented to them. In the referring decision, the Board reasoned that a videoconference held with the consent of the parties would be legally unproblematic under Article 116 EPC because parties are entitled to waive their right to oral proceedings. That may be true, but it still leaves open a number of important legal questions as to the nature of these hearings. </span><span style="color: #990000;">The Enlarged Board holds that, because videoconferences are a form of oral proceedings under Article 116 EPC, the rules and practices applicable to oral proceedings also apply to them.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">32. In a number of submissions reference was made to decisions G 2/19 and T 1012/03, both of which deal with the place where oral proceedings are to take place. It was argued that because holding oral proceedings at another place than provided for in the EPC could infringe a party's rights under Article 113 and Article 116 EPC, oral proceedings by videoconference which do not take place at the geographical location specified in the EPC also infringe these rights. However, the Enlarged Board finds that these decisions cannot be relied upon to argue against oral proceedings being held by videoconference. </span><span style="color: #990000;">The question of geographical location does not arise in the case of a videoconference. No party is obliged to appear in a particular place, nor therefore in a place that would be detrimental to its right to be heard. To deduce from these decisions an obligation to hold oral proceedings at a specific location and thus not to hold them as a videoconference is to overlook that videoconferences were not in issue in those cases and that the reasons for each decision addressed quite a different question.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>C.4 Is a videoconference equivalent to in-person oral proceedings and, if not, is it a suitable format for conducting oral proceedings?</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">33. A much-debated question in the comments of the appellant, the President of the EPO and in amicus curiae submissions is whether a videoconference is equivalent to an in-person hearing and whether it is a suitable format for conducting oral proceedings.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">34. In R 3/10 the Enlarged Board gave the following description of the purpose of oral proceedings: ".. to allow each party to make an oral presentation of its arguments, to allow the Board to ask questions, to allow the parties to respond to such questions and to allow the Board and the parties to discuss issues, including controversial and perhaps crucial issues. The value of oral proceedings is that matters may as a result be clarified and the Board may ultimately be satisfied that a party's position is the right one, although it was not so satisfied by the written submissions alone."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">35. The President of the EPO argued that a videoconference enables these essential features of oral proceedings: an opportunity for the parties to present their case orally, to have an interactive exchange of arguments between the competent department in its entirety and the other parties, if any, in real time and, as a consequence, the possibility to immediately respond to inquiries and to act according to any procedural development. He also cited T 2068/14, in which the Board considered that " ... a videoconference ... contains the essence of oral proceedings, namely that the board and the parties/representatives can communicate with each other simultaneously. Thus each party's case can be presented to the board in real time, and the board can put questions to the parties/representatives." This was also the view taken in T 2320/16.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">36. It seems also that the Board has no doubt either that videoconferencing technology is suitable for holding oral proceedings, see the passages of the referring decision cited in para. 17 above.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">37. On the other hand, the appellant and many third parties argued that videoconferences are not equivalent and that they lack essential features of what constitutes oral proceedings. Reference was made in particular to the missing feature of "immediacy" that is present in in-person oral proceedings, the inherent limitation of transmitting communication by digital means, the instability of transmission means, and the obligation on the side of the parties to be equipped with the necessary tools. It was argued that those constraints result in less effective communication and thus for the parties an inferior means by which to present and argue their case. Furthermore, concerns were expressed as to whether the requirement that oral proceedings are public is met in an appropriate manner. Therefore, forcing oral proceedings by videoconference upon a party was seen as a limitation or infringement of the right to be heard in oral proceedings and the right to fair proceedings. This would result in a violation of Article 113 EPC and, in a wider context, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>38. The Enlarged Board's view is that communicating via videoconference cannot, <u>at least for the time being</u>, be put on the same level as communicating in person [underlining added by the blog editor]</b>.</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> Although the Enlarged Board subscribes to the view that videoconferences can ensure the essential features of oral proceedings stated above, communication by this means is less direct and subject to limitations as a result of the constraints of the technology used.</span><span style="color: #990000;"><b> In terms of communication, in-person oral proceedings are for now the optimum format. </b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;">The technology used in videoconferences is aimed at establishing as close an approximation as possible to this direct human interaction</span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>. Video technology has certainly improved in recent times, but cannot yet be said to provide the level of communication which is possible when all participants are physically present in the same room.</b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> It is also true that those participating in oral proceedings by videoconference must familiarise themselves with the technology and learn to cope with technical problems as they arise. This can put a certain strain on both the members of the deciding body and the parties, and even distract them from the issues to be discussed during oral proceedings.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>39. Holding court hearings in person is also preferable from the point of view of the transparency of the justice system and its function in society.</b> In-person hearings held at an appropriate location better reflect the importance of the exchange between a court and the parties seeking justice, before a final decision is taken. These considerations are just as pertinent for the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, whose task it is to hand down final decisions within the European patent system.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>40. However, it does not follow from the above that the right to be heard or the right to fair proceedings cannot be respected when oral proceedings are held by videoconference. </b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;">In this context it must be borne in mind that the proceedings before the EPO are mainly in writing. The written submissions form the basis of the proceedings, and are complemented where necessary or where requested by an opportunity for a party to present and argue its case orally. </span><span style="color: #990000;">Even if the videoconference format has certain shortcomings, it provides parties with an opportunity to present their case orally. In combination with the written part of the proceedings this normally is sufficient to comply with the principles of fairness of proceedings and the right to be heard.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">41. It was frequently asserted that in a videoconference before a board of appeal it is not possible for a party to read the </span><span style="color: #990000;">body language </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">of the board members or otherwise visually gauge how its pleadings are received by the board, and that this format is therefore inherently unsuitable. The Enlarged Board is not persuaded by this argument. It is not the case that people's body language, in particular their facial expressions, is not visible in videoconferences. How clear an impression a party can form of the board members' reception of its oral submissions during in-person oral proceedings or during a videoconference is rather a matter of degree, and is determined by such factors as the set-up of the courtroom or the distance of the members of the board in the in-person format or the quality of the cameras, screens and transmission in videoconferences. </span><span style="color: #990000;">In that respect videoconferences are distinct from telephone conferences in which only sound is transmitted. This means of communication is clearly not suitable as a format for oral proceedings, because the total absence of the visual element significantly reduces the overall quality of the interaction among the participants.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">42. Moreover, the members of the board will normally respond to a party's argument by way of questions or comments, rather than just a nod, a querying look or other such gesture. Thus,</span><span style="color: #990000;"> in the opinion of the Enlarged Board, it cannot be concluded that, because the participants in a videoconference cannot fully witness each other's every possible physical expression, something essential is thereby lost or it is intrinsically unsuitable to hold oral proceedings in this format.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">43. All in all, the Enlarged Board considers that the limitations currently inherent in the use of video technology <b>can make it suboptimal as a format for oral proceedings, either objectively or in the perception of the participants</b>, but <b>normally not to such a degree that a party's right to be heard or right to fair proceedings is seriously impaired.</b> If in an individual case these rights cannot be respected, it is of course the duty of the deciding body to take appropriate measures to remedy this.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">C.5 The role of the parties' consent</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">44. In the preceding paragraphs the Enlarged Board set out the reasons for its conclusion that oral proceedings by videoconference are oral proceedings within the meaning of Article 116 EPC and, although not fully equivalent to oral proceedings held in person, normally do not infringe a party's right to be heard or the right to fair proceedings. This leads to a further question: can oral proceedings by videoconference be imposed on a party? Or put differently, has a party a right to oral proceedings in person? In this respect, too, the appellant, the President of the EPO and the amicus curiae briefs provided diverging comments. The President of the EPO argued that it is up to the deciding body to determine in what form the oral proceedings take place. According to the President of the EPO, the parties are only entitled to ask for oral proceedings to be held but not to request a specific form. This position seems to be linked to the view that oral proceedings held in person and via videoconference are equivalent. This view was also expressed in a number of amicus curiae briefs. On the other hand, the appellant and many amicus curiae briefs argued that parties have a right to oral proceedings in person and thus have to give their consent to a different format. Of those who supported this position some argued that this right is absolute and thus also to be respected in situations of emergency, while a larger number of submissions argued that this right is to be respected under normal circumstances but may be overruled in cases of emergency.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">45. The Enlarged Board holds that the parties have a fundamental right to oral proceedings that provide them with the opportunity to be heard in accordance with Article 113 EPC and Article 6 ECHR. Without doubt, in-person oral proceedings provide such an opportunity.<b> As stated earlier, a hearing in person is the optimum format or, to use a term well known in the field of European patent law, it is the gold standard</b>. It definitely fulfils the requirements of Article 113 EPC and Article 6 ECHR. It is also the format that the legislator had in mind when drafting Article 116 EPC.<b> Therefore, in-person hearings should be the default option. Parties can only be denied this option for good reasons.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">46. It was also argued that the choice of format is an administrative matter which, like other organisational aspects of oral proceedings, can be decided by the instance scheduling the oral proceedings. However, under the EPC it is a party's right to request oral proceedings</span><span style="color: #990000;">. This demonstrates that the holding of oral proceedings is seen as serving the interests of the parties.</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> The vast majority of oral proceedings are held upon request by a party. </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>It therefore makes sense that the choice of format for these oral proceedings can be made by the party who requested them and not by the board of appeal, especially as this concerns more than just an organisational matter</b></span><span style="color: #0e2034;">.</span><span style="color: #990000;"> As stated earlier, the Enlarged Board holds that at this point in time videoconferences do not provide the same level of communication possibilities as in-person oral proceedings. A party may thus have good reasons to prefer in-person oral proceedings to a videoconference.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>47. As for the reasons that could justify denying a party its wish to have the oral proceedings held in person, the Enlarged Board makes the following observations.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">48. Firstly, there must be a suitable, even if not equivalent, alternative. </span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;">As explained above, the Enlarged Board holds the view that a videoconference normally provides the basic conditions for an opportunity to be heard and to present a case. If in a particular case a videoconference is not suitable, the oral proceedings will need to be held in person. In the case underlying the referral, the Board expressed the view that the reasons brought forward why a videoconference would not be suitable for this particular case were not convincing. There was thus, in the Board's assessment, a suitable alternative which could be used to bring the appeal case to a conclusion.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">49. Secondly, there must also be circumstances specific to the case that justify the decision not to hold the oral proceedings in person</span></b><span style="color: #0e2034;">. These circumstances should relate to limitations and impairments affecting the parties' ability to attend oral proceedings in person at the premises of the EPO. In the case of a pandemic, such circumstances could be general travel restrictions or disruptions of travel possibilities, quarantine obligations, access restrictions at the EPO premises, and other health-related measures aimed at preventing the spread of the disease. </span><span style="color: #990000;">This decision<b> should not be influenced by administrative issues such as the availability of conference rooms and interpretation facilities or intended efficiency gains</b>. It is the EPO's responsibility to make available the necessary resources for facilitating the conduct of proceedings provided for in the EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>50. Thirdly, the decision whether good reasons justify a deviation from the preference of a party to hold the oral proceedings in person must be a discretionary decision of the board of appeal summoning them to the oral proceedings.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">51. In the case underlying the referral, the option of in-person oral proceedings was not available at the relevant time because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Excluding oral proceedings by videoconference, as was requested by the parties, would have meant postponing the oral proceedings for an unknown length of time. Also relevant was that the oral proceedings had already been postponed once. Their continued postponement would have led to a further delay in taking a decision on the appeal</span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>. During a pandemic delays in finalising appeals could apply to a great number of pending cases and therefore seriously impair the administration of justice. In these circumstances it was justified to overrule the wish of the parties and to hold oral proceedings by videoconference.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">C.6 Comparison with developments in the Contracting States</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">52. A further aspect of relevance is that many of the EPC Contracting States have recently introduced or expanded the possibility of holding court hearings by videoconference and that these measures are almost always linked to the COVID-19 pandemic.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">53. In some states the use of the videoconference format in a particular case is still dependent on the consent of the party or parties, whereas in others the court may opt for this format irrespective of the wish of the parties. Therefore it cannot be said that a clear line has emerged one way or the other. The position of the Enlarged Board thus cannot be said to be either in agreement with or in conflict with the practice of the Contracting States.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">54. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that, unlike in national jurisdictions, the parties to appeal proceedings before the Boards of Appeal of the EPO and their representatives often come from different countries. During the pandemic the host state of the Boards of Appeal, Germany, has taken measures to restrict travel from abroad. The continuity of the functioning of the Boards of Appeal has therefore been more affected than has been the case in court proceedings in national systems</span><span style="color: #0e2034;">, for which the parties or their representatives normally do not have to cross borders.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">55. In that respect, the European Court of Human Rights, for example, is more comparable to the Boards of Appeal. The first two points of the Court's "Guidelines on Hearings by Videoconference", adopted on 22 December 2020 (www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guidelines_videoconference_hearings_ENG.pdf) state:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">"1. In light of the sanitary conditions prevailing in Europe, and in particular in the Court's host State and in the States where the parties to a case are based, it may be necessary to adapt the usual format for hearings before the Court, conducting the proceedings through videoconference technology.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. This assessment is for the President of the Grand Chamber or of the Chamber to make (Rule 64 of the Rules of Court)."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">These guidelines appear similar to the approach developed by the Enlarged Board in the present decision.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">56. Finally, it would appear that while in some cases Contracting States and international courts have introduced the possibility of imposing videoconference hearings on the parties during the COVID-19 pandemic, there has so far been considerable reticence about prolonging this measure beyond the current emergency situation. <b>In a similar way, the Enlarged Board has limited the scope of its answer in the present referral to a period of general emergency.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>ORDER</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For these reasons it is decided that the question referred to the Enlarged Board is answered as follows:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">During a general emergency impairing the parties' possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises, the conduct of oral proceedings before the boards of appeal in the form of a videoconference is compatible with the EPC even if not all of the parties to the proceedings have given their consent to the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference.</span></div></div></div></div><br /><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span><i>This decision <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/g210001ex3.html" target="_blank">G 1/21</a></i></span><span><i><span> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/g210001ex3.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span><span>) has European Case Law Ide<span>ntifier: </span></span></i></span><i>ECLI:EP:BA:2021:G000121.20210716</i><span><i><span>. </span></i><span style="background-color: white;"><i>The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP04758381&tab=doclist" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span><i style="background-color: white;"> Photo "Video conferencing vector 1" by <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/gperspective/" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank">Greg Williams</a> </i><i style="background-color: white;">obtained </i><i style="background-color: white;">via <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/gperspective/8540228058/in/photolist-e1EUgm-e1zerx-e1EUgS-D5coqS-ChobMM-8r8Njr-8rbVaq-8rbVd1-8rbVs9-8r8qx6-8rbVJJ-8rbyZL-8rbyth-8rmXYp-m4QfcY-m4NrNg-m4Kzkg-m4Limb-m4Pn5h-m4Pm5w-m4MPi4-m4PjPA-m4Pk5g-m4NS8i-m4Ni2a-m4Nqzz-m4KzeV-m4MQQ2-m4MKpT-m4NtoR-m4PbBJ-m4KyYV-m4NgVv-m4MSZH-m4Pgn5-m4MLfa-m4MNm4-m4PHM8-m4NW3T-m4Nn6F-m4N4Lc-m4Q6JW-m4NwAc-m4QLGL-m4NiKz-m4Pkws-m4MYwe-m4PRS6-m4MMk6-m4PCbZ" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank">Flickr</a><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/gperspective/8540228058/in/photolist-e1EUgm-e1zerx-e1EUgS-D5coqS-ChobMM-8r8Njr-8rbVaq-8rbVd1-8rbVs9-8r8qx6-8rbVJJ-8rbyZL-8rbyth-8rmXYp-m4QfcY-m4NrNg-m4Kzkg-m4Limb-m4Pn5h-m4Pm5w-m4MPi4-m4PjPA-m4Pk5g-m4NS8i-m4Ni2a-m4Nqzz-m4KzeV-m4MQQ2-m4MKpT-m4NtoR-m4PbBJ-m4KyYV-m4NgVv-m4MSZH-m4Pgn5-m4MLfa-m4MNm4-m4PHM8-m4NW3T-m4Nn6F-m4N4Lc-m4Q6JW-m4NwAc-m4QLGL-m4NiKz-m4Pkws-m4MYwe-m4PRS6-m4MMk6-m4PCbZ" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank"> </a>under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank">CC BY 2.0 license</a> (no changes made).</i><i><span> </span></i></span></span><div><div><br /></div><div><i>Also see our earlier blogs:</i></div><div><ul style="background-color: white; text-align: left;"><li><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i><a href="https://dp-patentlaw.blogspot.com/2021/07/g-121-oral-proceedings-by.html" target="_blank">G 1/21 - oral proceedings by videoconference also if a party objects: limited to OP before the Board during the pandemic or similar circumstances</a> (FRIDAY 16 JULY 2021</i><i>)</i></span></li><li><a href="https://dp-patentlaw.blogspot.com/2021/05/breaking-news-g-121-exclusion-and.html" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044; font-family: inherit;" target="_blank"><i>BREAKING NEWS: G 1/21 - Exclusion and objection of the chairman of the Enlarged Board, but not of other members</i></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (</span><i style="font-family: inherit;">THURSDAY, 20 MAY 2021)</i></li><li><span style="font-family: inherit;"><i><a href="https://dp-patentlaw.blogspot.com/2021/03/t-180715-referral-op-by-vico-compatible.html" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank">T 1807/15 - Referral G 1/21: OP by ViCo compatible with right to OP acc.Art.116(1) EPC if not all parties agree?</a> (</i><i>WEDNESDAY, 17 MARCH 2021)</i></span></li></ul></div></div>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-34943818633850619872021-10-20T08:54:00.002+02:002021-10-25T08:59:44.512+02:00T 116/18 - Referral to the Enlarged Board on post-published evidence and plausibility of an effect relied on for inventive step (G 2/12)<p><i> Today, <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t180116ex1.html" target="_blank">T 116/18 </a>was published on the Recent Decisions pages of the Boards of Appeal, referring the following questions to the EBA (as G 2/12):</i></p><p><i>The following questions are referred to the Enlarged Board of </i><i>Appeal for decision.</i></p><p><i>If for acknowledgement of inventive step the patent proprietor relies on a technical effect and has submitted evidence, such as experimental data, to prove such an effect, this evidence not having been public before the filing date of the patent in suit and having been filed after that date (post-published evidence):</i></p><p><i>1. Should an exception to the principle of free evaluation of evidence (see e.g. G 3/97, Reasons 5, and G 1/12, Reasons 31) be accepted in that post-published evidence must be disregarded on the ground that the proof of the effect rests exclusively on the post-published evidence?</i></p><p><i>2. If the answer is yes (the post-published evidence must be disregarded if the proof of the effect rests exclusively on this evidence), can the post-published evidence be taken into consideration if, based on the information in the patent application in suit or the common general knowledge, the skilled person at the filing date of the patent application in suit would have considered the effect plausible (ab initio plausibility)?</i></p><p><i>3. If the answer to the first question is yes (the post-published evidence must be disregarded if the proof of the effect rests exclusively on this evidence), can the post-published evidence be taken into consideration if, based on the information in the patent application in suit or the common general knowledge, the skilled person at the filing date of the patent application in suit would have seen no reason to consider the effect implausible (ab initio implausibility)?</i></p><span><a name='more'></a></span><p><b>Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></p><p><br /></p><p>I. This decision concerns the appeal filed by the opponent (appellant) against the decision of the opposition division (decision under appeal) to reject the opposition against European patent No. 2 484 209 (patent in suit).</p><p><br /></p><p>The patent in suit originates from European patent application No. 12002626.5, which is a divisional application of European patent application No. 05719327.8.</p><p><br /></p><p>II. The patent in suit had been opposed pursuant to Article 100(a) EPC for lack of novelty (Article 54 EPC) and lack of inventive step (Article 56 EPC), Article 100(b) EPC for insufficiency of disclosure (Article 83 EPC), and Article 100(c) EPC for added matter (Article 123(2) EPC and Article 76(1) EPC).</p><p><br /></p><p>III. The following documents, submitted before the opposition division, are relevant for the present decision:</p><p><br /></p><p>D4 WO 03/015519 A1</p><p><br /></p><p>D8 WO 2005/048711 A1</p><p><br /></p><p>D8P1 DE 103 53 278.1</p><p><br /></p><p>(first priority application of D8)</p><p><br /></p><p>D8P2 DE 10 2004 006 075.4</p><p><br /></p><p>(second priority application of D8)</p><p><br /></p><p>D9 Experimental report - field trials (18 pages,</p><p><br /></p><p>filed with the notice of opposition)</p><p><br /></p><p>D10 Experimental report (2 pages, filed with the</p><p><br /></p><p>notice of opposition)</p><p><br /></p><p>D21 Additional Test Data (6 pages, filed by the</p><p><br /></p><p>patent proprietor (respondent) with its letter dated 26 October 2016)</p><p><br /></p><p>D22 Additional Test Data (21 pages, filed with the</p><p><br /></p><p>respondent's letter dated 11 September 2017)</p><p><br /></p><p>IV. The opposition division's decision can be summarised as follows.</p><p><br /></p><p>- The grounds for opposition pursuant to Article 100(c) EPC (Article 123(2) and Article 76(1) EPC) did not prejudice the maintenance of the patent in suit as granted.</p><p><br /></p><p>- The question of the conditions under which synergy was achieved was not relevant for sufficiency of disclosure as this effect was not expressed in the claims. This effect was part of the problem to be solved and had to be dealt with under inventive step. Therefore, the ground for opposition pursuant to Article 100(b) EPC did not prejudice the maintenance of the patent in suit as granted.</p><p><br /></p><p>- The novelty objections based on D4 and D8 (prior-art documents pursuant to Article 54(2) and Article 54(3) EPC, respectively) were not convincing because at least two selections had to be made from their respective disclosures to arrive at claim 1 of the patent in suit as granted.</p><p><br /></p><p>- D21 and D22 were admitted into the proceedings. The results in these documents and of test example 2 in the patent in suit proved a synergistic effect from combining thiamethoxam with compounds according to formula Ia of claim 1. The data in D9 and D10 had not been taken into account because, inter alia, the experiments described in them could not be reworked. In view of D4 as the closest prior art, the objective technical problem had to be seen as "the provision of insecticide compositions comprising anthranilamides out of the group disclosed in D4, together with an insecticidally active mixing partner, showing an advantageous enhanced efficacy." (decision under appeal, page 23, penultimate paragraph). The solution to this problem was not obvious because synergism was per se unpredictable.</p><p><br /></p><p>Therefore, the ground for opposition pursuant to Article 100(a) EPC did not prejudice the maintenance of the patent in suit as granted.</p><p><br /></p><p>V. With its statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant submitted the following document:</p><p><br /></p><p>D23 Experimental report (8 pages)</p><p><br /></p><p>The last two pages of the statement of grounds of appeal are headed "Annex 1" and show a calculation of the number of compounds covered by formula Ia in claim 1.</p><p><br /></p><p>VI. As requested, the parties were summoned to oral proceedings. In preparation for the hearing, the board issued a communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA 2020 with a preliminary opinion on certain issues relevant to the decision to be taken. With regard to the disputed requirement of plausibility, the board indicated that a referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal might be necessary.</p><p><br /></p><p>VII. By letter dated 19 April 2021, the appellant withdrew its previously formulated request that the appeal fee be refunded.</p><p><br /></p><p>VIII. By letter dated 22 April 2021, the appellant submitted a copy of a correspondence between epi and the President of the European Patent Office.</p><p><br /></p><p>IX. By letter of 22 June 2021, the respondent filed, inter alia, sets of claims of a second and a third auxiliary request and the following document:</p><p><br /></p><p>D24 Selby, T. S., Lahm, G. P., Stevenson, T. M.,</p><p><br /></p><p>"A retrospective look at anthranilic diamide insecticides: discovery and lead optimization to chlorantraniliprole and cyantraniliprole", Pest Manag. Sci., 73, 2017, pages 658 to 665</p><p><br /></p><p>X. Oral proceedings before the board were held as a video conference on 22 July 2021.</p><p><br /></p><p>At the hearing, the appellant's opening requests were that:</p><p><br /></p><p>- the decision under appeal be set aside and that the patent in suit be revoked in its entirety</p><p><br /></p><p>- D21 and D22 not be taken into account to prove the alleged synergy</p><p><br /></p><p>- D24 not be admitted into the proceedings</p><p><br /></p><p>- the respondent's pending auxiliary requests not be admitted into the proceedings</p><p><br /></p><p>It did not maintain the following previously formulated requests that:</p><p><br /></p><p>- the board order the respondent to file the original data set underpinning the results set out in the patent in suit</p><p><br /></p><p>- the board order the hearing of witnesses capable of testifying as to the accuracy and completeness of the data set out in the patent in suit</p><p><br /></p><p>The respondent's initial requests were that:</p><p><br /></p><p>- the appeal be dismissed, implying that the patent in suit be maintained as granted (main request)</p><p><br /></p><p>- alternatively, that the patent in suit be maintained in amended form based on the sets of claims of the first auxiliary request, filed with the letter dated 26 October 2016, or the second or third auxiliary requests, filed with the letter dated 22 June 2021</p><p><br /></p><p>- if the main request was not allowable, that the case be remitted to the opposition division for further prosecution</p><p><br /></p><p>- figures 1 and 2, shown in the statement of grounds of appeal, as well as the discussion relating to them, not be admitted into the proceedings</p><p><br /></p><p>- D21 and D22 be taken into account to prove the alleged synergy</p><p><br /></p><p>- D23 not be admitted into the proceedings</p><p><br /></p><p>- D24 be admitted into the proceedings</p><p><br /></p><p>During the oral proceedings, both parties additionally requested that questions be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal concerning the disputed requirement of plausibility.</p><p><br /></p><p>During the oral proceedings, the board decided to:</p><p><br /></p><p>- admit D23 into the proceedings</p><p><br /></p><p>- admit figures 1 and 2, shown in the statement of grounds of appeal, as well as the discussion relating to them, into the proceedings</p><p><br /></p><p>- not admit D24 into the proceedings</p><p><br /></p><p>At the end of the oral proceedings, the parties confirmed their opening requests and in addition their requests for referring questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal. The board concluded to continue the proceedings in writing.</p><p><br /></p><p>XI. An observation by a third party was received on 6 October 2021. As it relates to how the referral questions should be answered, the board did not take it into account for this decision.</p><p><br /></p><p>XII. The appellant's appeal case, in so far as it is relevant for the present decision, can be summarised as follows.</p><p><br /></p><p>Admittance of D23</p><p><br /></p><p>- D23 was filed in view of the surprising course of events before the opposition division, i.e. the change in relevance attributed to D9 and D10, and in response to the respondent's documents D21 and D22. After the opposition division's preliminary opinion, which was in favour of the appellant, the respondent filed D22 and expressed criticism only about two months before the oral proceedings. In view of the complexity of the experiments, the remaining time period would have been too short to provide further experimental evidence. D22 was intended, inter alia, to challenge the appellant's results in D9 and D10. The appellant should be given the possibility to react to the late filing of D22. Hence, D23 should be admitted into the proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>Admittance of figures 1 and 2 shown in the statement of grounds of appeal as well as the discussion relating to them</p><p><br /></p><p>- Figures 1 and 2 shown in the statement of grounds of appeal merely amounted to a graphic presentation of the data contained in D9. No new information was added, neither in these figures nor in the discussion relating to them. The respondent had also not identified any such new information.</p><p><br /></p><p>Admittance of D24</p><p><br /></p><p>- The respondent's justification for filing D24 only one month before the oral proceedings before the board was not convincing. In the case at hand, there were no "exceptional circumstances, which have been justified with cogent reasons" as required by Article 13(2) RPBA 2020. Hence, D24 should not be admitted into the proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>Sufficiency of disclosure</p><p><br /></p><p>- The patent in suit did not contain any indication which allowed the skilled person to determine which of the very many claimed combinations, in which ratios, or on which crops and against which pests, might show a synergistic effect. Finding the appropriate conditions amounted to an undue burden for the skilled person. Hence, the invention as stipulated in the claims of the patent in suit as granted was not sufficiently disclosed.</p><p><br /></p><p>Novelty</p><p><br /></p><p>- The subject-matter of claim 1 was not novel over D8; that of claims 1 to 3 was not novel over D4. Novelty could also not be acknowledged because the selections, if there were any, were not purposeful.</p><p><br /></p><p>Inventive step</p><p><br /></p><p>- D4 was the closest prior art. Of the examples contained in the patent in suit, only test examples 2 and 5 related to insecticide compositions according to claim 1. The appellant's data in D23 showed that the combination of thiamethoxam with chlorantraniliprole did not act synergistically at certain weight ratios against the same and a very similar insect species as those used in the patent in suit. The data in D23 were reliable and should be taken into account. The board correctly found that the respondent's defence, that the data of D23 were unreliable because similar concentrations of insecticides resulted in very different death rates, was not convincing. Additional untreated food was simply added to avoid the premature death of insects from starvation. Not adding additional untreated food would have falsified the results. It could also not be held against the appellant that it had used a different spreading agent in D23 from that of the patent in suit since claim 1 was not limited in this respect. Furthermore, with test examples 2 and 5, the patent in suit contained only two isolated data points. They could not render the synergistic effect plausible over the entire breadth of claim 1. Thus, according to established case law of the boards, the post-published evidence, i.e. D21 and D22, had to be disregarded. Even if D21 and its result against Chilo suppressalis under point 4 were taken into account, such a single experiment could not render a synergistic effect plausible against this insect species over the entire breadth of claim 1. This was because formula Ia covered more than 10 million compounds. The objective technical problem could only be seen as the provision of an alternative insecticide composition. The solution to this problem was rendered obvious by D4, which suggested the combination of thiamethoxam and compounds according to formula Ia.</p><p><br /></p><p>XIII. The respondent's appeal case, in so far as it is relevant for the present decision, can be summarised as follows.</p><p><br /></p><p>Admittance of D23</p><p><br /></p><p>- The defectiveness of D9 and D10 should have been clear to the appellant upon filing. In any event, the respondent had criticised the data in D9 and D10 in its letter of 11 September 2017, and there was no reason why D23 could and should not have been filed earlier. The opposition division would have acknowledged an inventive step even without D22. The filing of D23 could therefore not be considered a reaction to the filing of D22. Also in view of the reasoning given in decision T 101/87, D23 should not be admitted into the proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>Admittance of figures 1 and 2 shown in the statement of grounds of appeal as well as the discussion relating to them</p><p><br /></p><p>- Figures 1 and 2 shown in the statement of grounds of appeal as well as the discussion relating to them could and should have been filed before the opposition division. They contained new information which had not been on file. They should not be admitted into the proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>Admittance of D24</p><p><br /></p><p>- The reason for filing D24 was that the board's preliminary opinion had raised, for the first time in the proceedings, issues concerning inventive step which had only been mentioned in the background section of the statement of grounds of appeal. For the respondent, it was completely unclear what purpose this background section should have. D24 should therefore be admitted into the proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>Sufficiency of disclosure</p><p><br /></p><p>- The opposition division correctly concluded that the invention set out in the claims of the patent in suit as granted was sufficiently disclosed.</p><p><br /></p><p>Novelty</p><p><br /></p><p>- The opposition division correctly acknowledged novelty of the claimed subject-matter of the patent in suit as granted over D8 and D4.</p><p><br /></p><p>Inventive step</p><p><br /></p><p>- The subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent in suit as granted differed from the closest prior art D4 in that at least two selections had to be made to arrive at the subject-matter of claim 1. The effect linked to these distinguishing features was the synergistic interaction between thiamethoxam and the compounds of formula Ia. This was evident from test examples 2 and 5 in the patent in suit. There was no scientific reason to doubt this effect. It was therefore up to the appellant to prove that the effect was not achieved over the full breadth of the claim. The appellant's documents D9, D10 and D23 were insufficient to provide such proof. More specifically, the appellant's data in D23 were not reliable and should not be taken into account. In D23, the method of the patent in suit was modified in that additional untreated food was added during the test period. Furthermore, D23 showed that similar concentrations of insecticides resulted in very different death rates. Lastly, D23 used a different spreading agent from the patent in suit.</p><p><br /></p><p>- There was no legal basis for the concept of "plausibility" relied on by the appellant. Even if an ab-initio plausibility criterion were applied, post-published documents D21 and D22 had to be taken into account because the experimental data in the patent in suit had made the synergistic effect plausible. The data in D21 and D22 showed that the synergistic effect was achieved over the whole breadth of claim 1.</p><p><br /></p><p>- More specifically, D21 showed that thiamethoxam and a compound according to formula Ia acted synergistically against Chilo suppressalis. The appellant had neither challenged this result nor provided appropriate counter-evidence. There was no scientific reason why this synergistic effect should not also be achieved with other insecticide combinations according to claim 1. After all, formula Ia only covered compounds which were very similar from a chemical point of view.</p><p><br /></p><p>- Therefore, the objective technical problem had at least to be seen as the provision of an insecticide combination whose insecticides acted synergistically against Chilo suppressalis. The solution to this problem was not obvious because synergism per se was unpredictable.</p><p><br /></p><p>- Even if the objective technical problem was the provision of an alternative, the solution of the patent in suit was not obvious.</p><p><br /></p><p><b>Reasons for the Decision</b></p><p><br /></p><p>The invention</p><p><br /></p><p>1. The claimed subject-matter</p><p><br /></p><p>1.1 The patent in suit as granted comprises two sets of claims for different contracting states, i.e.:</p><p><br /></p><p>- a set of claims for the contracting states IS and LT</p><p><br /></p><p>- a set of claims for the contracting states AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FR, GB, GR, IT, LI, LU, MC, NL and SE</p><p><br /></p><p>1.2 Claim 1 of the set of claims for the contracting states IS and LT reads as follows:</p><p><br /></p><p>"An insecticide composition which comprises thiamethoxam and one or not less than two kinds of compounds being selected from a compound represented by the formula [Ia]:</p><p><br /></p><p>FORMULA/TABLE/GRAPHIC</p><p><br /></p><p>wherein R1 is a halogen atom or a C1-6 haloalkyl group, R2 is a halogen atom, R3 and R5 each are a C1-6 alkyl group, R4 is a hydrogen or halogen atom, and X is N, or a salt thereof."</p><p><br /></p><p>1.3 Claim 1 of the set of claims for the contracting states AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FR, GB, GR, IT, LI, LU, MC, NL and SE comprises the wording of the above claim 1 and the following proviso:</p><p><br /></p><p>"with the provisio [sic] that the following compounds are excluded</p><p><br /></p><p>FORMULA/TABLE/GRAPHIC</p><p><br /></p><p>and</p><p><br /></p><p>FORMULA/TABLE/GRAPHIC"</p><p><br /></p><p>1.4 The respective claims 1 of both sets of claims thus only differ from each other in that claim 1 for the contracting states AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FR, GB, GR, IT, LI, LU, MC, NL and SE additionally contains a disclaimer. This disclaimer excludes compositions which comprise thiamethoxam and at least one of the three specific compounds mentioned which fall within the general definition of formula Ia.</p><p><br /></p><p>In the following, reference is made to 'the set of claims' or, for example, to 'claim 1' if the argument applies equally to both sets of claims or to claim 1 of both sets.</p><p><br /></p><p>2. Background of the invention</p><p><br /></p><p>2.1 The patent in suit (paragraphs [0002] to [0004]) acknowledges, by reference to previously published patent documents, that both thiamethoxam and the compounds according to formula Ia were known for their insecticidal activity before the priority date of the patent in suit. According to the patent in suit (paragraph [0008]), the inventors have found that mixtures of thiamethoxam and compounds according to formula Ia can produce an insecticidal activity which is greater than that which would have been expected based on their respective individual activities. This means that according to the patent in suit, an insecticide composition according to claim 1 can exhibit an over-additive, i.e. synergistic, effect.</p><p><br /></p><p>2.2 To clarify whether a certain combination of insecticides acts synergistically, the patent in suit first determines the activities of the individual insecticides, where the activity is the death rate, i.e. the percentage of dead insects, observed when a certain number of insects is exposed to a certain amount of insecticide for a certain period of time. From these individual activities, an expected activity for the joint use of both insecticides is calculated using Colby's equation. This expected activity value corresponds to a purely additive effect of both insecticides. If the actually determined activity of the combination of both insecticides is above this expected value, the insecticides act synergistically together. If it is below this value, the insecticides of the combination act antagonistically. The use of this approach to assess the presence/absence of synergism between insecticides was undisputed between the parties.</p><p><br /></p><p>2.3 The patent in suit (paragraph [0058]) contains a list of examples of insect pests which can be controlled with the above compositions. Among the insect pests mentioned are Spodoptera litura, Plutella xylostella and Chilo suppressalis (for further details, see below under inventive step).</p><p><br /></p><p>Admittance of D23</p><p><br /></p><p>3. D23 was filed with the appellant's statement of grounds of appeal to show that thiamethoxam and chlorantraniliprole, i.e. a compound according to formula Ia of claim 1 (R**(1) = Br, R**(2) = Cl, R**(3) = Me, R**(4) = Cl, R**(5) = Me), do not act synergistically against Spodoptera littoralis and Plutella xylostella at certain weight ratios. The respondent requested that D23 not be admitted into the proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>4. In respect of the admittance of D23, the history of the case has to be taken into account.</p><p><br /></p><p>4.1 With its notice of opposition, the appellant filed D9 and D10. These two experimental reports were intended to show that the combination of thiamethoxam and chlorantraniliprole does not or at least does not always act synergistically. D9 reports on field trials, and the insects tested included the two tested in the patent in suit, i.e. Spodoptera litura and Plutella xylostella.</p><p><br /></p><p>The respondent criticised the data in D9 in its reply to the notice of opposition and argued that the appellant's data could not be relied upon.</p><p><br /></p><p>Subsequently, the opposition division in the annex to the summons to oral proceedings accepted the appellant's line of reasoning based on D9 and D10 and concluded "that the experimental data of reports D9 and D10 show, that the technical effect (synergism) is not achieved over the whole scope of claim 1" (page 17, penultimate paragraph).</p><p><br /></p><p>The respondent criticised the content of both D9 and D10 again in its subsequent submissions dated 11 September 2017 and 27 September 2017, and with the first of these submissions filed a set of experimental data as D22. These data were intended to show, inter alia, that thiamethoxam acts synergistically with chlorantraniliprole, thus challenging the appellant's findings in D9 and D10.</p><p><br /></p><p>At the oral hearing, the opposition division admitted D22 into the proceedings and, taking it into account, accepted synergism to be a technical effect of the claimed combinations of insecticides.</p><p><br /></p><p>4.2 While it is true that, as argued by the respondent before the board, the respondent had criticised the content of both D9 and D10 in its submissions dated 11 September 2017 and 27 September 2017, the board does not see why - in view of the opposition division's preliminary opinion in favour of the appellant - this should have necessarily prompted the appellant to file a new set of experimental data.</p><p><br /></p><p>Furthermore, the board accepts the appellant's argument that experiments which would be suitable in the current context take a certain period of time. They deal with living insects, have to be repeated a number of times for statistical reasons and require a certain lead time, adding to the overall complexity of such experiments. Thus, even if the respondent's criticism in its submissions filed after the opposition division's preliminary opinion had been such that the alleged defectiveness of the appellant's data in D9 and D10 had been immediately clear, it would have been unreasonable to expect the appellant to submit a new set of experimental data given that after the respondent's submissions of 11 September 2017 and 27 September 2017 there remained only about two months until the oral proceedings before the opposition division on 28 November 2017.</p><p><br /></p><p>In addition, the respondent's submission of 11 September 2017 contained new experimental data D22. It was on the basis of, inter alia, these late-filed additional experimental data that the opposition division changed its mind compared to its previously issued preliminary opinion. Reference is made in this respect to the first paragraph under the heading "Technical effect:" on page 23 of the decision: "The result of test example 2 of the patent in suit and the results of the documents D21 and D22 prove synergism as effect from combining thiamethoxam with compounds falling under formula [Ia] of claim 1."</p><p><br /></p><p>4.3 In view of the above, the appellant's filing of D23, which addresses the same combination of insecticides as the appellant's previous submissions D9 and D10, is to be considered a legitimate and timely reaction to the:</p><p><br /></p><p>- change of the opposition division's assessment of D9 and D10 at the oral hearing and in its written decision compared to that in its preliminary opinion</p><p><br /></p><p>- respondent's filing of D22 only shortly before the oral proceedings before the opposition division</p><p><br /></p><p>5. The respondent argued that D23 should not be admitted in view of the reasoning given in decision T 101/87. However, in the case underlying that decision, the appellant relied exclusively on documents newly filed with its statement of grounds of appeal and a prior use based on them. These documents bore little relation to those filed in the original opposition (T 101/87: points IV, 2 and 6). In the board's judgement, this decision relates to an entirely different situation and has no bearing on the case at issue.</p><p><br /></p><p>6. Due to the reasons given above, the board decided to admit D23 into the appeal proceedings pursuant to Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 (being applicable pursuant to Article 25(1) and (2) RPBA 2020).</p><p><br /></p><p>Admittance of figures 1 and 2 shown in the statement of grounds of appeal as well as the discussion relating to them</p><p><br /></p><p>7. As stated above, experimental report D9 relates to field trials and was filed with the appellant's notice of opposition. The table in D9 contains combinations of different amounts of thiamethoxam and chlorantraniliprole and the results obtained when applied against different insect species. In addition to the individual activities of thiamethoxam and chlorantraniliprole, this table also contains the expected activities calculated using Colby's equation and the activities found during the actual application of the combinations.</p><p><br /></p><p>In figures 1 and 2 in the statement of grounds of appeal, the observed activity for each combination of thiamethoxam and chlorantraniliprole of D9 is plotted against its expected activity. The respondent requested that these figures and the discussion relating to them not be admitted into the proceedings because they could have been filed in the proceedings before the opposition division and because they contained new information which had not been on file.</p><p><br /></p><p>In its communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA 2020, the board had set out why it did not find the respondent's arguments convincing, namely because these two figures merely amounted to a graphic presentation of the data in D9 and because, contrary to the respondent's allegation, no new information appeared to have been introduced in and with these figures or the discussion relating to them. When the respondent was asked to comment at the oral proceedings before the board, it merely referred to its written submissions. The board therefore saw no reason to deviate from its preliminary view and decided to admit figures 1 and 2 shown in the statement of grounds of appeal and the discussion relating to them into the proceedings pursuant to Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 (being applicable pursuant to Article 25(1) and (2) RPBA 2020).</p><p><br /></p><p>Admittance of D24</p><p><br /></p><p>8. D24 is a document published after the priority and filing dates of the patent in suit describing the discovery of the insecticide class of anthranilic diamides (i.e. the class to which the insecticides of formula Ia in claim 1 belong) and the development of two specific members of this class, namely chlorantraniliprole and cyantraniliprole. The appellant requested that D24 not be admitted.</p><p><br /></p><p>8.1 The respondent argued that D24 had been filed in response to the board's communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA 2020. In it, the question of whether a technical effect was achieved over the entire breadth of the claims of the patent in suit as granted had been identified as an issue which possibly had to be discussed with regard to inventive step. In the respondent's view, this was a new issue brought up for the first time in the board's communication, and the filing of D24 was a reaction to this. This was not changed by the fact that this issue had been mentioned in the statement of grounds of appeal. More specifically, this issue was addressed only in the background section of the statement of grounds of appeal, without specifying the link to the actual grounds of appeal. The respondent could not have been expected to identify potential issues mentioned only in this background section. D24 should therefore be admitted into the proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>8.2 D24 was filed by the respondent with the letter of 22 June 2021, i.e. after notification of the summons to oral proceedings (the receipt of the notification had been acknowledged by the respondent by fax on 29 September 2020), which took place after the entry into force of the new Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal. Under these circumstances "[a]ny amendment to a party's appeal case made ... shall, in principle, not be taken into account unless there are exceptional circumstances, which have been justified with cogent reasons by the party concerned." (Articles 25(1) and (3) and 13(2) RPBA 2020). The filing of an entirely new document, such as D24, amounts to an amendment of the respondent's appeal case. As explained in the following, the reasons given by the respondent for submitting D24 only with the letter dated 22 June 2021 are not convincing and for this reason alone cannot satisfy the requirement of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020, in accordance with which there have to be "exceptional circumstances, which have been justified with cogent reasons".</p><p><br /></p><p>As set out above, D24 had been filed to address whether a technical effect was achieved over the entire breadth of the claims of the patent in suit as granted. As correctly noted by the respondent, the breadth of the claims of the patent in suit is addressed in the background section of the statement of grounds of appeal. For instance, under point 9, reference is made to the broad Markush formula Ia and, with reference to Annex 1, it is stated that it comprised at least ten million compounds. However, at the same time, the breadth of this Markush formula is again addressed in subsequent parts of the statement of grounds of appeal. For example, under point 60, reference is made to the number of combinations covered by the Markush claim, and it is explained that because of this the synergistic effect was not plausible for all claimed combinations of insecticides. Contrary to the respondent's assertion, there is thus a clear link between the background section and the subsequent parts in the statement of grounds of appeal, and there can be no doubt that this issue was clearly raised by the appellant. The board's communication reiterating this issue thus does not constitute an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020.</p><p><br /></p><p>8.3 The board therefore decided not to admit D24 into the proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>Main request (patent in suit as granted)</p><p><br /></p><p>9. Sufficiency of disclosure (Article 100(b) EPC)</p><p><br /></p><p>The appellant essentially argued that the patent in suit did not contain any indication which allowed the skilled person to determine which of the very many claimed combinations of compounds, in which ratios, or on which crops and against which pests, might show a synergistic effect. Consequently, the skilled person had to carry out random experiments in the dark and to test and re-test different combinations of known ingredients over and over again until they happened to come across a ratio of specific ingredients which showed synergy. Such a research project clearly amounted to an undue burden.</p><p><br /></p><p>This is not convincing. As correctly set out in the decision under appeal, synergism is not a feature of the claims of the patent in suit. Consequently, whether this effect is achieved over the entire breadth of the claims is not to be assessed under Article 100(b) EPC but Article 56 EPC (G 1/03 (OJ 2004, 413), point 2.5.2 of the Reasons).</p><p><br /></p><p>10. Novelty (Article 54 EPC)</p><p><br /></p><p>The appellant maintained its novelty objections from the proceedings before the opposition division based on D8 (against claim 1) and D4 (against claims 1 to 3).</p><p><br /></p><p>10.1 Novelty objection based on D8</p><p><br /></p><p>10.1.1 D8 was published on 2 June 2005 and thus after the filing date of the patent in suit (21 February 2005). Compared to the European patent application/the European patent (published as EP 1 686 857) emanating from D8, the patent in suit additionally designates IS and LT. Therefore, D8 is:</p><p><br /></p><p>- not prior art for the set of claims for the contracting states IS and LT (see the Decision of the Administrative Council of 28 June 2001 on the transitional provisions under Article 7 of the Act revising the European Patent Convention of 29 November 2000, Article 1, No 1 in connection with Article 54(4) EPC 1973, Article 158(1) and (2) EPC 1973, and Rule 107(1)(d) EPC 1973)</p><p><br /></p><p>- prior art pursuant to Article 54(3) EPC for the set of claims for the contracting states AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FR, GB, GR, IT, LI, LU, MC, NL and SE (see, however, point 10.1.4 below)</p><p><br /></p><p>10.1.2 D8 (claims 1 and 4) discloses an agent containing a synergistically active combination of compounds of formula I and II-1. D8 (page 9, lines 5 to 6) also discloses that six specific compounds according to formula I are particularly preferred. Among these compounds is compound Ig, which is thiamethoxam as referred to in claim 1 of the patent in suit.</p><p><br /></p><p>The appellant argued that there was a very significant overlap between formula II-1 in D8 and formula Ia in claim 1 of the patent in suit and further that thiamethoxam was a member of a very small group of only six compounds preferably used together with the compounds of formula II-1. The subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent in suit was therefore not novel over D8.</p><p><br /></p><p>10.1.3 This is not convincing. As regards thiamethoxam, a first selection from a list of six compounds is necessary to get to claim 1 of the patent in suit. Furthermore, formula II-1 is defined in D8 in claim 4 and on page 13, line 35 to page 14, line 31. However, even in its most preferred and restricted definition (page 14, lines 24 to 31), formula II-1 merely overlaps in scope with formula Ia of claim 1 of the patent in suit so that parts of formula II-1 do not fall under the definition of formula Ia. E.g. formula II-1 allows:</p><p><br /></p><p>- R**(2)/R**(3) to be CH3 and C1-4-alkyl</p><p><br /></p><p>- R**(4) to be CF3, OCF3, F, Cl, Br or I</p><p><br /></p><p>- R**(5) to be CF3 or OCF3</p><p><br /></p><p>- R**(9) to be OCF2H or OCH2CF3</p><p><br /></p><p>These options are not provided for in formula Ia (see the definitions of NHR**(5), R**(3), R**(4) and R**(1), respectively). Thus, a further (i.e. a second) selection is necessary to get to claim 1 of the patent in suit.</p><p><br /></p><p>It is established case law of the boards that such a double selection from a prior-art document generates novel subject-matter unless a pointer exists in the prior-art document to the double selection. In the case at hand, no such pointer is present. D8 does not disclose that thiamethoxam is preferred among the six compounds mentioned on page 9, lines 5 to 6. Furthermore, there is no indication in D8 that the overlap of formula II-1 and Ia (or an even smaller part of the overlap) would be generally preferred.</p><p><br /></p><p>Contrary to the appellant's argument, the reasoning of T 12/90 does not contradict the above conclusion as this decision concerns overlapping Markush formulae only. In this case, however, there are not only the overlapping Markush formulae II-1 and Ia, but there is an additional list of six compounds from which one must be selected.</p><p><br /></p><p>10.1.4 Furthermore, the filing date of D8 is after the priority dates of the patent in suit. The appellant did not contest the validity of the priority claim of the patent in suit, and the board does not see a reason why it should not be valid. This means that subject-matter disclosed in D8 can only be novelty-destroying if it is also contained in one of its two priority applications D8P1 and/or D8P2 (in the appellant's favour, this was assumed to be the case for the passages of D8 referred to above).</p><p><br /></p><p>D8 also gives a list of preferred compounds of formula II-1 on pages 15 to 17. Of these, however, only II-1-1 to II-1-16 are disclosed in D8P1 (table on pages 16 and 17) and D8P2 (table on pages 16 and 17), and only six (II-1-1, II-1-3, II-1-4, II-1-9, II-1-11 and II-1-12) are according to formula Ia in claim 1 of the patent in suit, speaking again to the fact that there is no pointer to the (second) selection. D8 (pages 21 to 27) also discloses preferred combinations of compounds of formula I and II-1. However, only very few combinations are combinations of thiamethoxam and a compound of formula Ia in the patent in suit. Of these very few combinations, only three are disclosed in D8P1 (page 17, line 8 to page 18, line 28) and D8P2 (page 17, line 8 to page 18, line 28):</p><p><br /></p><p>Ig and II-1-9</p><p><br /></p><p>Ig and II-1-11</p><p><br /></p><p>Ig and II-1-12</p><p><br /></p><p>However, these combinations are disclaimed from the subject-matter of claim 1 of the set of claims for the contracting states AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, ES, FR, GB, GR, IT, LI, LU, MC, NL and SE. Furthermore, as set out above (point 10.1.1), D8 is not prior art for the set of claims in the remaining two contracting states IS and LT.</p><p><br /></p><p>10.2 Novelty objection based on D4 (prior art pursuant to Article 54(2) EPC)</p><p><br /></p><p>10.2.1 The line of argument put forward by the appellant based on D4 was very similar to that based on D8.</p><p><br /></p><p>The appellant argued that D4 (claim 1) disclosed a broad Markush formula 1 which overlapped to a great extent with formula Ia in claim 1 of the patent in suit. D4 also disclosed compositions comprising a compound of formula 1 and one additional biologically active compound such as thiamethoxam (page 59, lines 9 to 27). Thus, D4 was novelty-destroying for the subject-matter of claims 1 to 3 of the patent in suit, it argued.</p><p><br /></p><p>10.2.2 Similar to the arguments relating to D8, this is again not convincing. In D4 (page 59, lines 12 ff., in particular line 27; claim 12), thiamethoxam is only disclosed in a long list of possible additional biologically active compounds. D4 does not disclose that thiamethoxam is preferred. Formula 1 is defined in D4 in claim 1. Similar to D8, formula 1 of D4 merely overlaps in scope with formula Ia of claim 1 of the patent in suit so that parts of formula 1 do not fall under the definition of formula Ia. For instance, formula 1 allows:</p><p><br /></p><p>- R**(1) to be F, Cl or Br</p><p><br /></p><p>- R**(2) to be CF3</p><p><br /></p><p>- R**(3) to be OCH2CF3</p><p><br /></p><p>- R**(4a)/R**(4b) to be CH3 and C1-4-alkyl</p><p><br /></p><p>These options are not provided for in formula Ia (see the definitions of R**(3), R**(4), R**(1) and NHR**(5), respectively). There is no indication in D4 that the overlap of formula 1 and Ia (or an even smaller part of the overlap) would be generally preferred. Of the compounds listed in table 1 (pages 37 ff.) and table A (pages 63 ff.) according to formula 1, only a small fraction of them fall under the definition of formula Ia. D4 also discloses more limited lists of 16 preferred compounds according to formula 1 (page 4, line 30 to page 5, line 26; claim 8). However, the last four compounds in these lists do not fall under the definition of formula Ia. Thus, a second selection is again necessary to get to claim 1 of the patent in suit.</p><p><br /></p><p>10.3 In its letter of 19 April 2021, the appellant further argued that the respective selections from D8 and D4, if there were any, had to be purposeful for the acknowledgement of novelty. The appellant noted that the third criterion of the three-part test for assessing novelty of a numerical sub-range selected from a broader range was no longer applied by the majority of boards. However, in the appellant's view, this was wrong. In this context, the appellant, with its subsequent letter of 22 April 2021, submitted a correspondence between epi and the President of the European Patent Office.</p><p><br /></p><p>As correctly set out by the appellant, the "purposeful selection" criterion was developed with respect to a selection of a narrower numerical range from a broader range. The case law is therefore not applicable to the case at hand which is not related to numerical ranges and furthermore concerns a double selection namely (i) from a longer list of compounds and (ii) from a set of compounds defined in the form of a Markush formula. The appellant's argument is thus not convincing.</p><p><br /></p><p>10.4 Thus, the subject-matter of claim 1 is novel over D8, and furthermore the subject-matter of claim 1 and consequently also of its dependent claims 2 and 3 is novel over D4. The decision under appeal is therefore also confirmed on this point.</p><p><br /></p><p>11. Referral - Introduction</p><p><br /></p><p>11.1 After acknowledgement of sufficiency of disclosure and novelty, the next point to be assessed was inventive step. During this assessment, it turned out that questions needed to be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal on whether evidence not public before the filing date of the patent in suit and filed after that date ("post-published evidence") can be taken into consideration in view of the plausibility case law of the boards.</p><p><br /></p><p>11.2 For a referral to be admissible, it is generally considered necessary that the decision on the referral questions be decisive for the outcome of the referral case.</p><p><br /></p><p>As is clear from the above, the appellant's objections as regards sufficiency and novelty were not successful. Whether an inventive step can be acknowledged will therefore be decisive for the outcome of this case.</p><p><br /></p><p>For inventive step, the respondent relied on, inter alia, post-published evidence D21 in support of a synergistic effect. In view of the parties' different positions on the applicability of the plausibility case law, both formulated opposing requests as to whether post-published evidence D21 should be taken into consideration.</p><p><br /></p><p>11.3 The board assessed whether D21 is relevant for inventive step because only if it is does the answer to whether post-published evidence such as D21 can be taken into consideration matters for inventive step and thus the outcome of the case.</p><p><br /></p><p>The board notes that the appellant also relied on post-published evidence for inventive step, namely D23. After the board had decided to admit D23 on procedural grounds (see above), the respondent did not question that D23 could be taken into account. D23 was therefore taken into consideration in the board's assessment of inventive step. However, the board is aware and pointed out during the oral proceedings that D23 is post-published evidence and that it cannot be excluded that after the decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal, the question of whether D23 can be taken into consideration might have to be re-assessed.</p><p><br /></p><p>12. Relevance of post-published evidence D21 for inventive step</p><p><br /></p><p>12.1 As set out above, it was examined whether post-published evidence D21 is relevant for inventive step. The board therefore used the problem-solution approach without (point 12.4) and with D21 (point 12.5) to answer this question.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.2 Both parties agreed that D4 was the closest prior art. The board saw no reason to deviate from this unanimous view.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.3 Based on the assessment above with respect to novelty over D4 and in line with the decision under appeal, the subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent in suit is distinguished over D4 in that both thiamethoxam and the compounds according to formula Ia have to be selected from the respective broader teachings of D4.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.4 Problem-solution approach without D21</p><p><br /></p><p>With regard to a technical effect linked to the distinguishing features, the respondent relied on a synergistic effect resulting from the claimed combination of compounds and referred to test examples 2 and 5 of the patent in suit.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.4.1 Test examples 2 and 5 of the patent in suit are the only examples in which insecticide compositions according to claim 1 are tested against different insect species. Test example 2 shows that the combination of thiamethoxam with compound I-1 (in formula Ia: R**(1) = CF3, R**(2) = Cl, R**(3) = Me, R**(4) = H, R**(5) = i-Pr) acts synergistically against Spodoptera litura when both insecticides are used at a weight ratio of 1:1. Similarly, test example 5 shows that the combination of thiamethoxam with compound I-4 (in formula Ia: R**(1) = Cl, R**(2) = Cl, R**(3) = Me, R**(4) = Cl, R**(5) = i-Pr) acts synergistically against Plutella xylostella when both insecticides are used at a weight ratio of 1:1.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.4.2 Thus, the question to be answered is whether test examples 2 and 5 of the patent in suit provide a valid proof that the claimed subject-matter results in a synergistic effect at least against Spodoptera litura and Plutella xylostella. If this is the case, the objective technical problem could be formulated as the provision of an insecticide composition which acts synergistically against Spodoptera litura and Plutella xylostella.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.4.3 The appellant did not challenge these results of the patent in suit. However, it referred to its tests described in D23. As stated above, D23 serves to show that the combination of thiamethoxam and chlorantraniliprole, i.e. a compound which falls under formula Ia of claim 1 but which is different from those used in test examples 2 and 5, does not act synergistically against Spodoptera littoralis and Plutella xylostella at certain weight ratios.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.4.4 The respondent argued that in view of the differences between D23 and the test examples of the patent in suit, the results in D23 had no bearing on the relevance of these test examples. The board does not agree with this argument.</p><p><br /></p><p>The two relevant examples of D23 are examples 5 and 6. The species used in example 6 of D23 (Plutella xylostella) is the same as that used in test example 5 of the patent in suit. The species used in example 5 of D23 (Spodoptera littoralis) is different from test example 2 of the patent in suit (Spodoptera litura). However, the appellant stated that Spodoptera littoralis was closely related to Spodoptera litura and that therefore the same results had to be expected when the insecticide combinations of example 5 of D23 were used against Spodoptera litura. This was not disputed by the respondent, and the board sees no reason to doubt the appellant's statement.</p><p><br /></p><p>Furthermore, as argued by the appellant, the general procedure used in D23 was essentially analogous to that described in the patent in suit. The insects were exposed to plant parts treated with an insecticide or a combination of insecticides. After a certain exposure time, the activity of the insecticide(s) (i.e. the death rate) was determined.</p><p><br /></p><p>This procedure had to be modified in the experiments with Spodoptera littoralis in that further untreated plant parts were added after the treated plant parts had been completely consumed by the insects. However, this only served to prevent the premature death of the insects through starvation and thus a falsification of the results, which otherwise would have been due not only to the insecticides but also to a lack of food.</p><p><br /></p><p>Lastly, in the test compositions of D23, the appellant used a spreading agent different from the ones used in test examples 2 and 5 of the patent in suit. However, the composition of claim 1 is not limited in this respect and essentially allows any spreading agent to be contained in it.</p><p><br /></p><p>Contrary to the respondent's arguments, the appellant's modifications of the method of the patent in suit cannot therefore call into question the validity of the experiments in D23.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.4.5 In D23, dose-response experiments were first carried out to determine suitable concentration ranges of thiamethoxam and chlorantraniliprole for the actual synergy experiments. As set out above, the actual synergy experiments are described in examples 5 and 6 of D23. In these synergy experiments, the activities of the two insecticides thiamethoxam and chlorantraniliprole were initially determined individually again. It may be that, as argued by the respondent, some of the individual activities determined for thiamethoxam or chlorantraniliprole in the dose-response experiments are different from those determined in examples 5 and 6. However, in the board's view, this cannot call into question the validity of the results described in examples 5 and 6 since (i) experiments with living organisms are naturally subject to fluctuations and deviations between different series of experiments are therefore not unusual and (ii) the activities described for the individual insecticides in examples 5 and 6 follow a clear trend, namely towards lower activity with a decreasing amount of insecticide. Because the respondent's defence relating to this alleged lack of reliability was not convincing, there was no need at the oral proceedings to decide on the appellant's request that it not be admitted into the proceedings. In summary, the board considers the results described in examples 5 and 6 of D23 valid.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.4.6 In example 5 of D23, the effect of the combination of thiamethoxam and chlorantraniliprole against Spodoptera littoralis was determined at 25 different weight ratios in a range from 3840:1 to 15:1 (thiamethoxam:chlor-antraniliprole). In example 6, the effect of the same combination was determined against Plutella xylostella, at 25 different weight ratios, in a range from 16000:1 to 62.5:1.</p><p><br /></p><p>As can be seen from the tables in examples 5 and 6 of D23, in both cases thiamethoxam and chlorantraniliprole do not act synergistically at all weight ratios, on the contrary, they even clearly act antagonistically at some weight ratios. For example, while the expected death rate in experiment 6 at a weight ratio of 100:0.0125 (thiamethoxam:chlor-antraniliprole) was 62%, the observed death rate was only 14%. For the two specific species, it is not possible to make out a clear tendency towards synergy over the tested range of weight ratios.</p><p><br /></p><p>Since claim 1 is not limited to compounds I-1 and I-4 used in test examples 2 and 5 and/or their weight ratios to thiamethoxam, the combinations of insecticides with their weight ratios tested in D23 also fall within the subject matter of claim 1. Therefore, it can be concluded that the synergistic effect described in the patent in suit for Plutella xylostella and Spodoptera litura is not achieved over the entire breadth of claim 1.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.4.7 Thus, given only the experimental data in the patent in suit and in light of D23, the objective technical problem would have to be formulated less ambitiously as the provision of an alternative insecticide composition.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.4.8 D4 discloses the insecticidal activity of both thiamethoxam and compounds according to formula Ia in claim 1. Moreover, the patent in suit itself acknowledges that their insecticidal activities were known before the priority date of the patent in suit (see above). However, arbitrarily combining compounds known to have insecticidal activity to achieve an alternative insecticide composition does not require an inventive step.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.4.9 Thus, without D21, i.e. solely in view of the experimental data in the patent in suit and in light of D23, the main request would not be allowable.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.5 Problem-solution approach with D21</p><p><br /></p><p>Whether this conclusion changes when D21 is taken into consideration is examined below.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.5.1 The respondent referred to D21, example 4. This example deals with a different species from that used in test examples 2 and 5 of the patent in suit or in D23. Example 4 shows that thiamethoxam and compound I-1, i.e. a compound according to formula Ia of claim 1, at a weight ratio of 1:8, act synergistically against the insect species Chilo suppressalis. It was a matter of dispute between the parties whether in view of this the objective technical problem could be formulated as the provision of an insecticide composition that acts synergistically against Chilo suppressalis.</p><p><br /></p><p>The result in example 4 of D21 in itself was not challenged by the appellant, which also did not present any counter-evidence regarding this species in D9, D10 or D23 that could call the result into question.</p><p><br /></p><p>However, the appellant argued that this isolated example of D21 was not a valid proof of a synergistic effect against Chilo suppressalis for all insecticide compositions covered by claim 1. That was because, according to the appellant's conservative calculations in Annex 1, formula Ia covered over 10 million compounds.</p><p><br /></p><p>The board does not agree. In view of the data in D21 and in the absence of any counter-evidence from the appellant, the board sees no reason not to acknowledge this synergistic effect against Chilo suppressalis also for other insecticide compositions covered by claim 1, i.e. insecticide compositions comprising thiamethoxam and a compound of formula Ia different from compound I-1.</p><p><br /></p><p>This position is further supported by the fact that the variability of formula Ia is quite limited in chemical terms. All compounds are based on the same characteristic core structure, namely an anthranilic acid amide part acylated with a (pyridin-2-yl)-1H-pyrazole-5-carboxylic acid. Groups R1 to R5 allow for different substituents, in particular alkyl and haloalkyl groups. According to the appellant's calculations in Annex 1, the number of compounds covered by formula Ia is very high precisely because of these alkyl and haloalkyl groups. However, the compounds of formula Ia and in particular the compounds of formula Ia with different alkyl or haloalkyl groups are, at least in the board's view, not so chemically different that a different behaviour would necessarily be expected in combination with thiamethoxam.</p><p><br /></p><p>Therefore, the synergistic effect observed in example 4 of D21 against the insect species Chilo suppressalis can be acknowledged to be achieved over the entire breadth of claim 1 provided D21 can be taken into account.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.5.2 Given the post-published data in D21 and in line with the respondent's arguments, the objective technical problem would have to be formulated as the provision of an insecticide composition in which the insecticides act synergistically against Chilo suppressalis. As explained during the oral proceedings, the board does not take issue with the formulation of this more specific objective technical problem which also includes a specific insect species. This is because it would be technically nonsensical to require synergism against each and every insect species (for a similar view, albeit with regard to sufficiency, see T 1326/08, point 4.2.2 of the Reasons). The respondent did also not object to the formulation of this objective technical problem.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.5.3 The appellant only ever argued that the objective technical problem lay in providing an alternative insecticide composition. It never addressed obviousness on the basis of the above more ambitious objective technical problem. In fact, the skilled person confronted with the above more ambitious technical problem would not have found any suggestion in the prior art to arrive at the claimed subject-matter. For that reason alone, an inventive step would have to be acknowledged, provided D21 can be taken into account.</p><p><br /></p><p>12.6 In summary, the main request would not be allowable if only the data in the patent in suit and D23 could be taken into account. If the post-published data in D21 could also be taken into account, the main request would be allowable. Therefore, the allowability of the main request crucially depends on the question of whether the post-published data in D21, which are the only proof of a synergistic effect against Chilo suppressalis, can be taken into account.</p><p><br /></p><p>13. Need for the referral questions</p><p><br /></p><p>13.1 As set out below, whether post-published evidence, such as D21, can be taken into account is a fundamental question of law for which diverging lines of case law exist.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.2 For the assessment of inventive step, the problem-solution approach is regularly applied by the departments of the EPO (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 9th edition, 2019 (CLBA), I.D.2). This approach requires, inter alia, that:</p><p><br /></p><p>- the closest prior art be identified (which may not necessarily be the one mentioned in the patent in suit or envisaged by the patent proprietor)</p><p><br /></p><p>- a comparison be made between the subject-matter of the claim at issue and the disclosure of the closest prior art and that the difference(s) between both be identified</p><p><br /></p><p>- the technical effect(s), linked to the difference(s), be determined</p><p><br /></p><p>- the objective technical problem be formulated, i.e. the problem which can be seen to have actually been solved in light of the closest prior art</p><p><br /></p><p>In this analysis, it is often necessary, like in this case, to provide post-published evidence (i.e. evidence that was not public before the filing date of the patent in suit and was filed after that date) as proof that the problem has been solved (i.e. that the alleged technical effect is actually achieved). This applies in particular when the objective technical problem has to be reformulated, e.g. with regard to a closest prior-art document previously unknown to the patent proprietor.</p><p><br /></p><p>Where the proof that a problem has been solved (in this case, the provision of an insecticide composition in which the insecticides act synergistically against Chilo suppressalis) rests on such post-published evidence (in this case, D21), there are, in the board's view, three diverging lines of case law from the boards regarding the circumstances under which the evidence can or cannot be taken into account. The subsequent discussion identifies these different lines of case law.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.3 Before starting this discussion, the board would like to make the following remarks.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.3.1 Whether D21 can be taken into account arose in the case at hand in the context of inventive step because the synergistic effect is part of the problem to be solved. In other cases, the same issue, namely whether post-published evidence can be taken into account, arose under the heading of sufficiency of disclosure because the effect was expressed in the claim at issue. While the fact that an effect is part of the problem to be solved or expressed in the claim at issue dictates which provision of the EPC is applicable (G 1/03 (OJ EPO 2004, 413), point 2.5.2 of the Reasons), it does not - at least not in the board's view - have an impact on the considerations applying to the above issue. Therefore, not only decisions dealing with this issue under Article(s) 100(a) and/or 56 EPC but also those dealing with this issue under Article(s) 100(b) and/or 83 EPC are mentioned below.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.3.2 The following discussion is directed at the question of whether post-published evidence can be taken into account on substantive grounds, depending on the plausibility of the technical effect based on the evidence submitted as proof. This discussion should not be confused with whether post-published evidence can be taken into account on procedural grounds in particular in view of Articles 12 and 13 RPBA. The following discussion is based on the assumption that the post-published evidence in question does form part of the appeal proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.4 Ab initio plausibility</p><p><br /></p><p>In accordance with a first line of case law, post-published evidence can be taken into account only if, given the application as filed and the common general knowledge at the filing date, the skilled person would have had reason to assume the purported technical effect to be achieved. In this line of case law, experimental data or a scientific explanation in the application as filed commonly serve as reasons which justify this assumption. This line of case law applies a standard which is referred to in the following as the "ab initio plausibility" standard. The line of case law applying this standard is denoted in the following as the "ab initio plausibility line of case law".</p><p><br /></p><p>13.4.1 For example, in T 1329/04, the underlying application as filed related to a new polypeptide (denoted growth differentiation factor-9 (GDF-9)), and stated it to be a new member of the transforming growth factor-beta (TGF-beta) superfamily. One alternative in the claim at issue related to GDF-9. In view of the closest prior art, the problem to be solved was defined as isolating a further member of the TGF-beta superfamily. The board in question noted that GDF-9 did not have the structural features generally accepted for members of the TGF-beta superfamily and that the application as filed did not contain any evidence as to whether the mode of action of GDF-9 permitted assignment to the TGF-beta superfamily. Thus, although the application as filed explicitly set out GDF-9 to be a member of the TGF-beta superfamily, the board concluded (point 11 of the Reasons; emphasis added by the current board):</p><p><br /></p><p>"that the application does not sufficiently identify this factor as a member of this family i.e. that there is not enough evidence in the application to make at least plausible that a solution was found to the problem which was purportedly solved."</p><p><br /></p><p>Post-published evidence establishing that GDF-9 was indeed a growth differentiation factor was not taken into account, and the presence of an inventive step was ultimately denied. The board based its conclusion on the following consideration, which was later on applied in several other decisions applying the ab initio plausibility standard (point 10 of the Reasons; emphases in bold and annotation in squared brackets by the current board):</p><p><br /></p><p>"Hence, it is particularly important [in a first-to-file system] that the application allows to conclude that the invention had been made, i.e. that a problem had indeed been solved, not merely put forward at the filing date of the application. Therefore, the issue here is rather how much weight can be given to speculations in the application in the framework of assessing inventive step ..."</p><p><br /></p><p>Thus, it seems to have been of crucial importance for the board in T 1329/04 (and the other decisions applying the ab initio plausibility standard) to be able to ensure that the patent applicant was actually in possession of the invention at the time of filing to prevent purely speculative claiming and thus to safeguard a balance between the actual technical contribution and the patent monopoly defined by the claims.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.4.2 This decision was in line with the earlier decision</p><p><br /></p><p>T 609/02, in which the board in the context of sufficiency of disclosure reasoned (points 5 to 9 of the Reasons; emphasis added by the current board) that:</p><p><br /></p><p>"The patent specification provides no evidence at all relating to the invention in claim 6 ... The appellant provided post-published evidence showing that steroid hormones such as needed to carry out the use according to claim 6 were later structurally identified and that they, indeed, have an effect on AP-1 stimulated transcription. ... On the basis of the disclosures of these post-published documents, it was argued by the appellant that by carrying out the claimed invention, one would necessarily obtain pharmaceutical compositions since it was by following the teachings of the patent in suit that the post-published results had been obtained. Consequently, in the appellant's opinion, sufficiency of disclosure had to be acknowledged. The board cannot share this opinion. Sufficiency of disclosure must be satisfied at the effective date of the patent, ie on the basis of the information in the patent application together with the common general knowledge then available to the skilled person. Acknowledging sufficiency of disclosure on the basis of relevant technical information produced only after this date would lead to granting a patent for a technical teaching which was achieved, and, thus, for an invention which was made, at a date later than the effective date of the patent. The general principle that the extent of monopoly conferred by a patent should correspond to, and be justified by, the technical contribution to the art, has to be kept in mind ... It is required that the patent provides some information in the form of, for example, experimental tests, to the avail that the claimed compound has a direct effect on a metabolic mechanism specifically involved in the disease, this mechanism being either known from the prior art or demonstrated in the patent per se. ... Once this evidence is available from the patent application, then post-published (so-called) expert evidence (if any) may be taken into account, but only to back-up the findings in the patent application in relation to the use of the ingredient as a pharmaceutical, and not to establish sufficiency of disclosure on their own."</p><p><br /></p><p>13.4.3 The ab initio plausibility standard was adopted for example in T 488/16 that reads (point 4.2, 4.5 and 4.19 of the Reasons; emphases added by the current board):</p><p><br /></p><p>"It is established jurisprudence of the boards of appeal that the assessment of inventive step is to be made at the effective date of the patent on the basis of the information in the patent together with the common general knowledge then available to the skilled person. Post-published evidence in support that the claimed subject-matter solves the technical problem the patent in suit purports to solve may be taken into consideration, if it is already plausible from the disclosure of the patent that the problem is indeed solved (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition, I.D.4.6; T 1329/04, point 12 of the Reasons; T 1043/10, point 12 or [sic] the Reasons). Thus, for post-published evidence to be taken into account, it is necessary to establish whether or not the asserted activity has been made sufficiently plausible for dasatinib at the effective date of the patent in suit. Basis for this assessment is the application as filed and the common general knowledge of the person skilled in the art at the filing date."</p><p><br /></p><p>"In the board's judgement, a mere verbal statement that "compounds have been found active" in the absence of any verifiable technical evidence is not sufficient to render it credible that the technical problem the application purports to solve, namely providing PTK inhibitors to treat disorders or diseases associated therewith, is indeed solved ..."</p><p><br /></p><p>"... the board concurs with the opposition division and the respondents that the post-published documents (9) and (10) are the first disclosure showing that ... the purported technical problem has actually been solved. In accordance with established case law, these documents are therefore not taken into consideration in the assessment of inventive step."</p><p><br /></p><p>13.4.4 Other decisions in line with the three mentioned above include T 415/11 (points 45 to 55 of the Reasons), T 1791/11 (points 3.2.5 to 3.2.7 of the Reasons) and T 895/13 (points 15 to 17). In the decisions cited in section 13.4, which all apply the ab initio plausibility standard, plausibility was ultimately denied.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.5 Ab initio implausibility</p><p><br /></p><p>In accordance with a second line of case law, post-published evidence can only be disregarded if the skilled person would have had legitimate reasons to doubt that the purported technical effect would have been achieved on the filing date of the patent in suit. Such doubts may arise, for example, from the fact that either the application as filed or the common general knowledge on the filing date of the patent in suit give an indication that the purported technical effect can in fact not be achieved. In other words, post-published evidence must always be taken into account if the purported technical effect is not implausible. This line of case law applies a standard referred to in the following as the "ab initio implausibility" standard. The line of case law applying this standard is denoted in the following as the "ab initio implausibility line of case law".</p><p><br /></p><p>13.5.1 An example of a decision that applies the ab initio implausibility standard is T 919/15, which concerned the use of herbicide combinations for controlling harmful plants ("weeds") in soybean crops, the combination having an active content of two different herbicides (A) and (B). While the application as filed contained experimental proof of a synergistic interaction for some combinations of herbicides falling under the definitions for (A) and (B), the proof of other combinations was submitted only after the filing date. The opponent argued that the synergistic interaction of herbicides was inherently unpredictable and that the application as filed did not make the synergistic effect plausible for the combinations for which only post-published evidence had been submitted. Therefore, the post-published data had to be disregarded for the assessment of inventive step.</p><p><br /></p><p>The board in question did not agree. It reasoned (point 5.6 of the Reasons; translation provided and emphasis added by the current board):</p><p><br /></p><p>"Thus, in the absence of evidence to the contrary in the common general knowledge for herbicide combinations containing herbicide (A), it cannot simply be assumed that a synergistic interaction would be per se implausible for the combinations not tested in the application as filed. This conclusion is in line with decision T 863/12, in which the plausibility of an effect was also confirmed on the basis of, inter alia, the fact that the common general knowledge did not contain any indications that could question this plausibility ..."</p><p><br /></p><p>13.5.2 A further noteworthy example in this context is decision T 578/06. Here, claim 1 of the main request read as follows (emphasis added by the current board):</p><p><br /></p><p>"[u]se of somatostatin ... in the formulation of a pharmaceutical ... preparation for the treatment of a human patient in receipt of transplanted isolated pancreatic islet cells, wherein the pharmaceutical composition is administered ..., whereby the functional life of the isolated transplanted pancreatic islet cells is extended relative to untreated transplanted isolated pancreatic islet cells."</p><p><br /></p><p>In the appealed decision, the examining division had come to the conclusion that it was not plausible that the effect of extending the functional life of transplanted pancreatic islet cells could be obtained with the claimed subject-matter. The board, in overturning this decision and acknowledging plausibility of the effect, noted the following (points 13 and 15 of the Reasons; emphases added by the current board):</p><p><br /></p><p>"The board notes that the EPC requires no experimental proof for patentability and considers that the disclosure of experimental data or results in the application as filed and/or post-published evidence is not always required to establish that the claimed subject-matter solves the objective technical problem. This is in particular true in the absence of any formulated substantiated doubt as is the case here."</p><p><br /></p><p>"The board re-emphasises in this context however that this case law considers the establishment of plausibility only relevant when examining inventive step if the case at hand allows the substantiation of doubts about the suitability of the claimed invention to solve the technical problem addressed and when it is thus far from straightforward that the claimed invention solves the formulated problem."</p><p><br /></p><p>After plausibility had been acknowledged, the board took the post-published evidence into account (point 17 of the Reasons).</p><p><br /></p><p>13.5.3 Further decisions in line with the two above are T 536/07 (point 11 of the Reasons), T 1437/07 (point 38.1 of the Reasons), T 266/10 (point 37 of the Reasons), T 863/12 (point 7.3.3 of the Reasons), T 184/16 (points 2.4 to 2.7 of the Reasons) and T 2015/20 (point 2.7 of the Reasons). In all the decisions cited in section 13.5 applying the ab initio implausibility standard, plausibility was ultimately acknowledged.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.5.4 The current board acknowledges that some of the decisions discussed above that apply the ab initio implausibility standard contain statements according to which they do not contradict T 1329/04, i.e. a decision considered by the current board to apply the ab initio plausibility standard. This would appear to imply that there is no divergence between the lines of case law applying the ab initio plausibility and the ab initio implausibility standard, respectively. However, close reading reveals that despite these statements, these decisions considered it decisive that there were no indications of doubt or reasons for implausibility on the filing date of the patent in suit (ab initio implausibility standard).</p><p><br /></p><p>Furthermore, irrespective of whether a divergence is considered to exist, in this board's view at least, it is a fundamental question of law whether the ab initio plausibility or ab initio implausibility standard is to be applied.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.5.5 The difference between the two lines of case law referred to above cannot be better illustrated than by the judgment of the UK Supreme Court of 14 November 2018, Generics (UK) (trading as Mylan) v. Warner-Lambert Company Ltd ("the UK Supreme Court decision") and the follow-up on this judgment by C. Floyd, "Plausibility: where from and where to", GRUR, 2021, 185. In the case underlying the UK Supreme Court decision, claim 3 at issue referred to the use of pregabalin for the preparation of a pharmaceutical composition for treating neuropathic pain. A central question to be answered was whether it was plausible at the priority date that the therapeutic effect of treating neuropathic pain could be achieved and whether, in view of this, the post-published evidence could be taken into account.</p><p><br /></p><p>The majority opinion answered this question in the negative. It was held that the experimental data in the application as filed were predictive of efficacy for the treatment of inflammatory pain. But the application as filed did not claim that the experimental data presented made it plausible that pregabalin was effective for the treatment of any kind of neuropathic pain (point 42 of the decision). According to point 52 of the decision, it could:</p><p><br /></p><p>"... not ... be enough to justify a monopoly that it is "possible" a priori that a drug which was effective for inflammatory pain would also be effective for neuropathic pain, in the absence of any reason to suppose that the possibility had some scientific basis or that it was more than speculative. Everything is possible that is not impossible, but "not impossible" is very far from being an acceptable test for sufficiency. Plausibility may be easy to demonstrate, but it calls for more than that."</p><p><br /></p><p>So the majority in the UK Supreme Court decision seems to have applied what this board has termed the ab initio plausibility standard.</p><p><br /></p><p>The minority opinion answered the above question in the positive. According to this opinion, the patent proprietor was not required to demonstrate within its patent a prima facie case of therapeutic efficacy (point 180 of the decision). Furthermore, according to point 181 of the decision (emphasis added by the board), recent decisions of the boards:</p><p><br /></p><p>"... do not require that the patent discloses experimental evidence to demonstrate that plausibility unless there is an allegation, supported by sufficient evidence, that the invention does not work, ..."</p><p><br /></p><p>It was also added (point 195 of the decision, emphasis added by the board) that:</p><p><br /></p><p>"Only if a person skilled in the art would have significant doubts about the workability of the invention would it, in such a case, fail for insufficiency of disclosure."</p><p><br /></p><p>Hence, the minority in the UK Supreme Court decision seems to have applied what the board has termed the ab initio implausibility standard.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.6 No plausibility</p><p><br /></p><p>A third line of case law seems to reject the concept of plausibility altogether. This third line of case law is referred to in the following as applying the "no plausibility" standard. The line of case law applying this standard is denoted in the following as the "no plausibility line of case law".</p><p><br /></p><p>13.6.1 In T 31/18, the underlying application as filed related to pharmaceutical tablets comprising imatinib or pharmaceutically acceptable salts of it. The claim at issue was essentially directed to a tablet comprising imatinib and cross-linked polyvinylpyrrolidone in certain amounts. In view of the closest prior art, the patent proprietor formulated the problem essentially as the provision of imatinib tablets having a disintegration time of 20 minutes or less, and it also filed experimental evidence to prove that this problem had been solved. According to one of the opponents, this experimental evidence was not to be taken into account as it related to an effect which had not been plausibly shown to be achieved by the claimed tablets in the application as filed. The board held (point 2.5.2 of the Reasons) that:</p><p><br /></p><p>"This line of argumentation appears to be incompatible with the assessment of inventive step according to the problem solution approach ... It can indeed not be expected from a patent applicant to include an extensive number of experimental evidences corresponding to all technical features which can possibly be claimed in the application as filed and which can possibly constitute a future distinguishing feature over the closest prior art, since said closest prior art and its technical disclosure may not be known to the applicant at the filing date of the application."</p><p><br /></p><p>The board took the experimental evidence into account but held that it could not support the alleged effect of a low disintegration time vis-à-vis the closest prior art.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.6.2 A similar decision was taken in T 2371/13. The claim at issue essentially concerned the use of a combination of two particular cationic direct dyes. In view of the closest prior art, the patent proprietor formulated the problem essentially as the provision of dye compositions having improved colour homogeneity. It also filed experimental evidence showing that this effect was achieved for the compositions tested. One of the opponents argued that the effect of an improved homogeneity had not been rendered plausible by the application as filed because the latter did not contain any experimental data in this respect. The effect was speculative and at the date of filing, no invention had been made. The board held (point 6.1.2 of the Reasons and catchword of the decision; translation provided by the current board) that:</p><p><br /></p><p>"This line of argument is incompatible with the assessment of inventive step according to the problem-solution approach which requires that the state of the art closest to the invention be identified and that a technical problem in relation to that state of the art be formulated which problem is solved by the claimed subject matter. It is usual to invoke a technical effect for inventive step which is not explicitly mentioned in the application as filed."</p><p><br /></p><p>"A lack of plausibility of an effect based on the absence of evidence in the patent application is not a sufficient reason to disregard comparative tests filed later to prove that effect. Dismissing them for this reason is inconsistent with the problem-solution approach which requires defining a technical problem from the closest prior art document, which is not necessarily the one cited in the patent application - see point 6.1 of the reasons."</p><p><br /></p><p>The board took the patent proprietor's post-published data into account but considered it as not supportive of the effect over the entire breadth of the claim at issue.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.7 Further considerations</p><p><br /></p><p>13.7.1 The three lines of case law discussed above contain two extreme positions, one being a strict application of the ab initio plausibility standard and the other one applying the no plausibility standard. These two extremes illustrate that different results are obtained depending on which plausibility standard is applied. On the one hand, by applying the ab initio plausibility standard strictly, the ultimate result would be that patent applicants receive a patent only for embodiments for which experimental data or other substantiation is contained in the application as filed that makes the effect invoked for inventive step plausible for these embodiments. Hence, any extension of the claimed scope over what has been experimentally shown or otherwise substantiated in the application as filed would lead to refusal of the application. If, on the other hand, no plausibility standard were applied at all, a patent applicant could claim whatever it thinks might possibly be proven later to bring about a purported technical effect. This would give rise to what is often referred to in the case law as "speculative patenting" or "armchair inventions" where a monopoly is conferred to a patent applicant for mere speculation rather than a true invention. The ab initio implausibility standard in terms of its results appears to lie somewhere between these two extreme lines of case law.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.7.2 On the other hand, requiring plausibility or at least the absence of implausibility to access post-published evidence can be particularly problematic in cases where an effect needs to be established vis-à-vis a prior-art document that has not been, and perhaps could not have been, considered by the patent proprietor/applicant. For instance, if a patent proprietor is confronted with a new closest prior document which makes a reformulation of the objective technical problem necessary, in particular under the ab initio plausibility line of case law, the patent proprietor would be barred from providing any evidence in support of the reformulated technical problem. This would mean a basically insurmountable hurdle for patentability once an opponent invokes a new closest prior-art document in opposition proceedings. Furthermore, such an approach would go against decades of case law which has allowed the reformulation of the technical problem in view of new closest prior-art documents and the reliance on post-published evidence in support of the newly formulated problem. In fact, the only hurdle applied in this case law has been that the newly formulated problem must be within the spirit of the invention as originally disclosed. See, for instance, T 1397/08, where it is stated in the catchword (translation provided and emphasis added by the current board; see also T 184/82 (point 5 of the Reasons)) that:</p><p><br /></p><p>"According to the problem-solution approach for assessing inventive step in the field of chemistry, the technical problem can be reformulated, and in certain circumstances must even be reformulated, since for the objective determination of the problem, only the result actually achieved in relation to the closest state of the art counts. Nothing prevents, even at the appeal stage, the modification of the problem initially posed, provided that the spirit of the original statement of the invention is preserved ..."</p><p><br /></p><p>The same follows from decision T 1422/12. In the case underlying that decision, a certain compound, namely crystalline tigecycline, was claimed. The effect relied upon was based on an improved stability with respect to epimerisation. This effect was not even mentioned in the application as filed. The board stated (point 2.3.2 of the Reasons, insertion in squared brackets by the current board) that:</p><p><br /></p><p>"In this connection [i.e. well-established case law], any effects may be taken into account, so long as they concern the same field of use and do not change the character of the invention."</p><p><br /></p><p>On this basis, the board took post-published evidence into account, concluded that the effect of improved stability was credibly shown and acknowledged inventive step.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.7.3 An additional tension exists between the ab initio plausibility and ab initio implausibility standards on the one hand and the principle of free evaluation of evidence on the other hand (see G 3/97 (OJ EPO 1999, 245), point 5 of the Reasons and G 1/12 (OJ EPO 2014, A114), point 31 of the Reasons). It is not immediately clear what could be the legal basis for preventing the patent proprietor from relying on a particular type of evidence of a fact relevant to the outcome of the proceedings. Likewise, it is not clear on what basis a board would be prohibited from taking into account evidence it finds convincing and decisive.</p><p><br /></p><p>13.7.4 In this respect, it should be stressed that, in accordance with Article 56 EPC, an invention must be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art. There can thus be no doubt that inventive step can only be judged in relation to the prior art. The rationale developed in the ab initio plausibility line of case law is, however, that the invention had not been made on the filing date. This finding has been, and can only be, arrived at without considering any prior art. So it may be questionable whether Article 56 EPC is a proper legal basis for plausibility. Indeed, the legal basis for the requirement of plausibility has also been questioned elsewhere. In this respect, the current board would like to refer to the opinion expressed in the UK Supreme Court decision that plausibility "is a court-invented pre-condition to validity" (point 192 of the decision). In R. Jacob, "Plausibility and Policy", Bio-Science Law Review 17(6), 223, the author goes even a step further and states (page 223, first paragraph under "The Statutory Language") that:</p><p><br /></p><p>"If one actually looks at the words of the EPC a purist would say it is straining the meaning of words beyond breaking point to get plausibility out of them - positively Humpty Dumpty-ish. I suppose it is for that reason that none of the judicial reasoning for getting the notion of plausibility out of either the definition of inventive step (obviousness) or sufficiency has much, or indeed anything, to do with the actual words in the statute. And the word plausibility itself is not in the statute - indeed is not, and never has been, in any patent statute anywhere."</p><p><br /></p><p>Also in A. Slade, "Plausibility: a conditio sine qua non of patent law?", I.P.Q. 2020, 3, 180-203, the author considers Articles 56 and 83 EPC not to be a proper legal basis for the application of any plausibility standard. She advocates for Article 52(1) EPC as a legal basis since a speculative use of a known compound must fail the initial requirement of this article of being an invention. In this author's view, only if the requirement of Article 52(1) EPC is met can secondary requirements such as lack of inventive step be examined.</p><p><br /></p><p>14. Conclusion</p><p><br /></p><p>From the above, it is evident that a referral of questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal is needed, both to ensure uniform application of the law and because points of law of fundamental importance have arisen. The three referral questions made in the order of the present decision relate to the three lines of case law discussed above, namely whether any plausibility standard can be applied at all (first referral question) and, if so, whether an ab initio plausibility standard (second referral question) or an ab initio implausibility standard (third referral question) is to be applied. The outcome of the referral is decisive for the case at issue since whether post-published evidence D21 can be taken into account depends on this outcome, and since, furthermore, as has been set out above, if taken into account, D21 is relevant to a final decision on inventive step.</p><p><br /></p><p>15. During the oral proceedings, the board put on screen three preliminary referral questions (for details, see the minutes of the oral proceedings), to which the parties raised the following comments.</p><p><br /></p><p>The appellant suggested that the questions should define the effective date more clearly. For example, in case of a patent claiming priority, it should be indicated whether the relevant date was the priority or the filing date.</p><p><br /></p><p>The appellant also argued that it had to be made clear that the effect on which the respondent relied concerned the full ambit of the claim.</p><p><br /></p><p>The respondent suggested that an additional question should address the burden of proof for (not) achieving the technical effect.</p><p><br /></p><p>To address the appellant's first comment, the board has replaced "effective date" (which covers priority and filing dates) in the referral questions with "filing date". In the case at hand, evidence D21 was filed after the filing date of the patent in suit. Hence, the question whether evidence can be taken into account that the patent proprietor files after the priority date and before the filing date of the patent in suit does not arise in this case.</p><p><br /></p><p>As regards the appellant's second comment, the board notes that a clarification that the effect concerns the full ambit of the claim is not deemed necessary. It is clear to the board that the respondent cannot successfully rely on an effect that only relates to a part of the claimed subject-matter (see e.g. T 939/92, points 2.4 to 2.6 of the Reasons).</p><p><br /></p><p>The issue of the burden of proof for (not) achieving the technical effect raised by the respondent is important but is already encompassed by the current questions. Under the ab initio plausibility line of case law to which the second referral question refers, it is the patent proprietor that has to prove plausibility while in the ab initio implausibility line of case law, to which the third referral question refers, it is the opponent that has to show implausibility.</p><p><br /></p><p><b>Order</b></p><p><br /></p><p>For these reasons it is decided that:</p><p><br /></p><p>The following questions are referred to the Enlarged Board of</p><p>Appeal for decision.</p><p>If for acknowledgement of inventive step the patent proprietor relies on a technical effect and has submitted evidence, such as experimental data, to prove such an effect, this evidence not having been public before the filing date of the patent in suit and having been filed after that date (post-published evidence):</p><p>1. Should an exception to the principle of free evaluation of evidence (see e.g. G 3/97, Reasons 5, and G 1/12, Reasons 31) be accepted in that post-published evidence must be disregarded on the ground that the proof of the effect rests exclusively on the post-published evidence?</p><p>2. If the answer is yes (the post-published evidence must be disregarded if the proof of the effect rests exclusively on this evidence), can the post-published evidence be taken into consideration if, based on the information in the patent application in suit or the common general knowledge, the skilled person at the filing date of the patent application in suit would have considered the effect plausible (ab initio plausibility)?</p><p>3. If the answer to the first question is yes (the post-published evidence must be disregarded if the proof of the effect rests exclusively on this evidence), can the post-published evidence be taken into consideration if, based on the information in the patent application in suit or the common general knowledge, the skilled person at the filing date of the patent application in suit would have seen no reason to consider the effect implausible (ab initio implausibility)?</p>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-47101716034229397082021-07-16T16:06:00.006+02:002021-07-16T16:26:35.737+02:00G 1/21 - oral proceedings by videoconference also if a party objects: limited to OP before the Board during the pandemic or similar circumstances<p><i>Today, a <span style="color: #0000ee;"><u><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2021/20210716.html" target="_blank">Press Communiqué</a></u></span><a href="https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2021/20210716.html" target="_blank"> </a>was issued by Spokespersons of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office on the decision of the Enlarged Board in G 1/21. The press release is cited below in full (emphasis added). The Enlarged Board of Appeal "<b>limited the scope of its answer by confining its order to oral proceedings that are held during a period of general emergency impairing the parties' possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises and moreover are conducted specifically before the Boards of Appeal</b>. </i><i>Accordingly, in its order the Enlarged Board did not address the question whether oral proceedings by videoconference may be held without the consent of the parties in the absence of a period of general emergency. Nor did the order address the question whether oral proceedings by videoconference may be held without the consent of the parties in examination or opposition proceedings before the EPO's departments of first instance." Many interested persons will feel disappointed by the limitation of the scope, as the question remains undecided for oral proceedings in first instance proceedings.</i></p><p><span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><h1 style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 32px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 40px; margin: 38px 0px 50px; padding: 0px;">Press Communiqué of 16 July 2021 on referral G 1/21 to the Enlarged Board of Appeal</h1><p><a name="Content" style="background-color: white; background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px;"></a><span face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 15px;"></span></p><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">16 July 2021</b></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">Today, the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office issued the order of its decision in case </b><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">G 1/21,</b><b style="box-sizing: border-box;"> in which it ruled that oral proceedings before the Boards of Appeal can, during a period of general emergency impairing the parties' possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises, be held by videoconference even without the consent of the parties.</b></p><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Background</span></h3><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The Enlarged Board of Appeal is the highest judicial authority under the European Patent Convention (EPC). Its main task is to ensure the uniform application of the EPC.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">In response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated travel restrictions, the technical prerequisites for conducting oral proceedings by videoconference before the Boards of Appeal were created in 2020. From January 2021, oral proceedings by videoconference before the Boards of Appeal were in some cases conducted without the consent of the parties. Oral proceedings by videoconference were also held without the consent of the parties in examination and opposition proceedings before the EPO's departments of first instance.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">In its interlocutory decision of 12 March 2021 in case <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t151807eu1.html" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">T 1807/15</a>, Technical Board 3.5.02 referred the following question to the Enlarged Board of Appeal under Article 112(1)(a) EPC:</p><blockquote style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; margin: 1em 3em; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i style="box-sizing: border-box;">Is the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference compatible with the right to oral proceedings as enshrined in Article 116(1) EPC if not all of the parties to the proceedings have given their consent to the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference?</i></p></blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Article 116(1) EPC provides:</p><blockquote style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; margin: 1em 3em; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i style="box-sizing: border-box;">Oral proceedings shall take place either at the instance of the European Patent Office if it considers this to be expedient or at the request of any party to the proceedings. However, the European Patent Office may reject a request for further oral proceedings before the same department where the parties and the subject of the proceedings are the same.</i></p></blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">On 23 March 2021, the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation approved new Article 15a RPBA 2020, which entered into force on 1 April 2021. Article 15a RPBA 2020 reads:</p><blockquote style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; margin: 1em 3em; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i style="box-sizing: border-box;">Oral proceedings by videoconference</i></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i style="box-sizing: border-box;">(1) The Board may decide to hold oral proceedings pursuant to Article 116 EPC by videoconference if the Board considers it appropriate to do so, either upon request of a party or of its own motion.<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />(2) Where oral proceedings are scheduled to be held on the premises of the European Patent Office, a party, representative or accompanying person may, upon request, be allowed to attend by videoconference.<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />(3) The Chair in the particular appeal and, with the agreement of that Chair, any other member of the Board in the particular appeal may participate in the oral proceedings by videoconference.</i></p></blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The case reference of the referral before the Enlarged Board of Appeal is <a href="https://register.epo.org/application?lng=en&number=EP04758381&tab=doclist" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">G 1/21</a>. During the proceedings before the Enlarged Board of Appeal, partiality objections under Article 24 EPC were raised against several of its members. By <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/g210001eu1.html" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">interlocutory decision of 17 May 2021</a>, the Enlarged Board of Appeal - composed in accordance with Article 24(4) EPC, i.e. without the participation of the members objected to - decided to replace the Chairman and one legally qualified member, because of their previous involvement in the preparation of Article 15a RPBA 2020, which was at least indirectly under review in the pending referral. The partiality objections against two other members were rejected. Further objections, filed on 24 May 2021, were rejected as inadmissible by <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/g210001eu2.html" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">interlocutory decision of 28 May 2021</a>.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">On 28 May and 2 July 2021, oral proceedings took place before the newly composed Enlarged Board of Appeal.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">On 16 July 2021, the Enlarged Board of Appeal issued the order of its decision in case G 1/21.</p><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;">Key Considerations</h3><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">In G 1/21 the Enlarged Board of Appeal </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">limited the scope of its answer</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> to the more broadly formulated question referred by Technical Board 3.5.02, by </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">confining its order to oral proceedings that are held during a period of general emergency impairing the parties' possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> and </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">moreover are conducted specifically before the Boards of Appeal</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">Accordingly, in its order the Enlarged Board </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">did not address </span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">the question whether oral proceedings by videoconference may be held without the consent of the parties </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">in the absence of a period of general emergency</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">. </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">Nor </span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">did the order address the question whether oral proceedings by videoconference may be held without the consent of the parties </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">in examination or opposition proceedings before the EPO's departments of first instance</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The order issued by the Enlarged Board of Appeal reads as follows:</p><blockquote style="box-sizing: border-box; margin: 1em 3em; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i style="box-sizing: border-box;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">During a general emergency impairing the parties' possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises, the conduct of oral proceedings before the boards of appeal in the form of a videoconference is compatible with the EPC even if not all of the parties to the proceedings have given their consent to the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference.</span></b></i></p></blockquote><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">The reasons for the decision will be issued in writing in due course</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> and will subsequently be publicly available in the decisions database of the Boards of Appeal.</span></p><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Contact</span></h3><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Nikolaus Obrovski<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />Jeannine Hoppe<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />Spokespersons of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" /><a href="mailto:BOA-PRESS@epo.org" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">boa-press@epo.org</a></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i style="box-sizing: border-box;">This press release is a non-binding document for media use</i></p></div><p><i><br /></i></p><p><i>The original BOA press communique can be found <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2021/20210716.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></p><p><i>Another press release from the EPO can be found <a href="https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2021/20210716.html" target="_blank">here</a>, and is cited integrally below (emphasis added):</i></p><h1 style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 32px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 40px; margin: 38px 0px 50px; padding: 0px;">EBoA endorses conduct of oral proceedings by videoconference during pandemic</h1><p><a name="Content" style="background-color: white; background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px;"></a><span face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 15px;"></span></p><div id="body" lang="en" style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p class="alternative" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-weight: bold; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">16 July 2021</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">Today, the Enlarged Board of Appeal, the highest level of independent judicial authority at the European Patent Office (EPO), has decided on referral G 1/21 concerning the compliance of oral proceedings by videoconference (VICO) with the European Patent Convention (EPC). The decision was taken after a public hearing held before the Enlarged Board on 2 July 2021.</b></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">According to the order of the decision, during a general emergency impairing the parties’ possibilities to attend in-person oral proceedings at the EPO premises, the conduct of oral proceedings before the boards of appeal in the form of a VICO is compatible with the EPC even if not all of the parties to the proceedings have given their consent to this form.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;"><span style="border-color: initial; border-image: initial; border-style: initial; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="Oppostion by videoconference" class="floatl" height="257" src="https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2021/20210716/zoom3.jpg?lenya.module=svg&height=257&width=395" style="border: 0px; box-sizing: border-box; float: left; margin: 0px 1em 0px 0px;" title="Oppostion by videoconference" width="395" /></span>In its order the Enlarged Board did not address the question whether oral proceedings by videoconference may be held without the consent of the parties in the absence of a period of general emergency. Nor did the order address the question whether oral proceedings by videoconference may be held without the consent of the parties in examination or opposition proceedings before the EPO’s departments of first instance. </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">The Enlarged Board’s order therefore does not apply directly to oral proceedings by VICO before examining and opposition divisions, nor, by analogy, to the Legal Division or the Receiving Section. It does not apply, either, to any situation where there is no general emergency. In view of this, and given that the pandemic situation in the EPO Contracting States and worldwide still persists, the Office will continue with the conduct of oral proceedings by VICO in accordance with its present practice</span></b><span style="color: #0b2a43;">.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The Enlarged Board has announced that the reasoned decision will be issued as soon as possible. Once available, the Office will carefully analyse the reasoning to assess any potential indirect implications on oral proceedings held by VICO before the EPO’s departments of first instance.</p><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;">Further information:</h3><ul class="noBullets" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; list-style: none; margin: 0px 0px 1.4em; padding: 0px;"><li style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; list-style-position: outside; list-style-type: unset; margin-bottom: 8px; margin-left: 0px !important; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px; margin: 0px 0px 8px; overflow: hidden; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px !important; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><a class="int" href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2021/20210716.html" style="background-image: none; background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer; font-weight: 700; padding-left: 1em; padding-right: 0.6em; position: relative; text-decoration-line: none;" title="BOA Communiqué of 16 July 2021 concerning decision G 1/21 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal">BOA Communiqué of 16 July 2021 concerning decision G 1/21 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal</a></li><li style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; list-style-position: outside; list-style-type: unset; margin-bottom: 8px; margin-left: 0px !important; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px; margin: 0px 0px 8px; overflow: hidden; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px !important; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><a class="int" href="https://www.epo.org/news-events/news/2021/20210712.html" style="background-image: none; background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer; font-weight: 700; padding-left: 1em; padding-right: 0.6em; position: relative; text-decoration-line: none;" title="Opposition by videoconference - a year of progress">Opposition by videoconference – a year of progress</a></li></ul></div><p><i>Also refer to our other blog posts:</i></p><p></p><ul style="text-align: left;"><li><i><a href="https://dp-patentlaw.blogspot.com/2021/03/t-180715-referral-op-by-vico-compatible.html" target="_blank">T 1807/15 - Referral G 1/21: OP by ViCo compatible with right to OP acc.Art.116(1) EPC if not all parties agree?</a> (</i><i>WEDNESDAY, 17 MARCH 2021)</i></li><li><a href="https://dp-patentlaw.blogspot.com/2021/05/breaking-news-g-121-exclusion-and.html" target="_blank"><i>BREAKING NEWS: G 1/21 - Exclusion and objection of the chairman of the Enlarged Board, but not of other members</i></a> (<i>THURSDAY, 20 MAY 2021)</i></li></ul><p></p><p><br /></p>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-33890077709706538632021-06-23T09:10:00.003+02:002021-06-25T13:24:59.187+02:00G 4/19 "Double patenting" - Press Communiqué and decision<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVh7PrAFM4TvS-nKlDfTWqItPXC9x-Ks3UA54BoEnuL5Qi7jNmC9-WnGvcop4YnG2aduEqlob2R93dguLO3ryBkD-GtoiArTxoie0AZTNV-mZgucVR__iZFBUJnM9qRaaQNN1Uhs1ouKcv/s2048/2021.06.23+double+34621632305_94e77f8f68_o.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1152" data-original-width="2048" height="225" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVh7PrAFM4TvS-nKlDfTWqItPXC9x-Ks3UA54BoEnuL5Qi7jNmC9-WnGvcop4YnG2aduEqlob2R93dguLO3ryBkD-GtoiArTxoie0AZTNV-mZgucVR__iZFBUJnM9qRaaQNN1Uhs1ouKcv/w400-h225/2021.06.23+double+34621632305_94e77f8f68_o.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><i><p><i>A </i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>Press Communiqué of 22 June 2021 on decision G 4/19 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal was issued yesterday. The Enlarged Board h</i></span><i style="text-align: center;">eld that a European patent application can be refused by reason of the prohibition on double patenting. The Press </i><i style="text-align: center;">Communiqué is cited below in full (emphasis added); it gives the main conclusion and argument - reference is made to the full decision for the full reasoning and the scope of the prohibition</i><i style="text-align: center;">. The full decision is also replicate below; it is noet yet available on the EPO "Recent decisions" pages, but it is available as pdf in the register </i><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">(<a href="http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/9D699BFBD3CC2C11C12586FC00338610/$FILE/G_4_19_decision_of_the_Enlarged_Board_of_Appeal_of_22_June_2021_en.pdf">pdf</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">). </span></i></p></i><p></p><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><h1 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 32px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 40px; margin: 38px 0px 50px; padding: 0px;">Press Communiqué of 22 June 2021 on decision G 4/19 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal</h1><span style="background-repeat: no-repeat;"><a name="Content" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px;"></a></span><span face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" style="color: #0b2a43; font-size: 15px;"></span><div id="body" lang="en" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">22 June 2021</b></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">The Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office issued decision G 4/19 (Double patenting) today, in which it held that a European patent application can be refused by reason of the prohibition on double patenting.</b></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span></span></p><!--more--><p></p><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;"><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">Background</span></h3><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The Enlarged Board of Appeal is the highest judicial authority under the European Patent Convention (EPC). Its main task is to ensure the uniform application of the EPC.</p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The principle of the prohibition on double patenting excludes two patents being granted to the same applicant for one invention</b></span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">. The examining division applied this principle and refused European patent application </span><a href="https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP10718590&lng=de&tab=main" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">10718590.2</a><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> under Articles 97(2) and 125 EPC on the ground that the applicant already had a patent for the same invention.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">The applicant appealed and Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.01 referred three questions on the prohibition on double patenting to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t140318ex1.html" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">T 318/14</a>, OJ EPO 2020, A104). </span><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The referring board doubted that there was a legal basis for the prohibition in the EPC. In particular, the referring board did not consider Article 125 EPC suitable for that purpose.</b></span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Article 125 EPC provides:</p><blockquote style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; margin: 1em 3em; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i style="box-sizing: border-box;">Reference to general principles</i><i style="box-sizing: border-box;"><br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />In the absence of procedural provisions in this Convention, the European Patent Office shall take into account the principles of procedural law generally recognised in the Contracting States.</i></p></blockquote><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 10px; padding: 0px;">Key considerations</h3><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">The Enlarged Board of Appeal interpreted Article 125 EPC in line with the principles set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the <a href="https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties</a>. </span><span style="color: #990000;">It applied the grammatical and systematic interpretation methods and took the preparatory works of the EPC (travaux préparatoires) into account as a supplementary means of interpretation.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The Enlarged Board of Appeal held that the term "procedural provisions" in Article 125 EPC may extend to provisions requiring a substantive examination of the subject-matter claimed. It stated that the prohibition on double patenting constitutes a principle of procedural law within the meaning of Article 125 EPC and is generally recognised in the Contracting States.</b></span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">The Enlarged Board further held that the prohibition on double patenting is </span><span style="color: #990000;">not limited to applications directed to the same subject-matter which were filed on the same day. It also extends to parent and divisional applications, and to applications claiming the same priority</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">. </span><span style="color: #990000;">The Enlarged Board also confirmed that the prohibition <b>only applies</b> where the application under examination and the patent already granted have <b>common designated Contracting States</b>.</span></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The Enlarged Board of Appeal answered the referred questions as follows:</p><blockquote style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; margin: 1em 3em; padding: 0px;"><p style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i style="box-sizing: border-box;">1. A European patent application can be refused under Articles 97(2) and 125 EPC if it claims the same subject-matter as a European patent which has been granted to the same applicant and does not form part of the state of the art pursuant to Article 54(2) and (3) EPC.</i><i style="box-sizing: border-box;"><br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />2.1 The application can be refused on that legal basis, irrespective of whether it<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />a) was filed on the same date as, or</i><i style="box-sizing: border-box;"><br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />b) is an earlier application or a divisional application (Article 76(1) EPC) in respect of, or<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />c) claims the same priority (Article 88 EPC) as</i><i style="box-sizing: border-box;"><br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />the European patent application leading to the European patent already granted.<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />2.2 In view of the answer to Question 2.1 a separate answer is not required.</i><b style="box-sizing: border-box;"> </b></p></blockquote><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 10px; padding: 0px;">Contact</h3><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Nikolaus Obrovski<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />Jeannine Hoppe<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" />Spokespersons of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office<br style="box-sizing: border-box;" /><a href="mailto:BOA-PRESS@epo.org" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer;">boa-press@epo.org</a></p><p style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i style="box-sizing: border-box;">This press release is a non-binding document for media use.</i></p><h3 style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 400; line-height: 23px; margin: 1.4em 0px 10px; padding: 0px;">Further information</h3><ul class="noBullets" style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; list-style: none; margin: 0px 0px 1.4em; padding: 0px;"><li style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 23px; list-style-position: outside; list-style-type: unset; margin-bottom: 8px; margin-left: 0px !important; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px; margin: 0px 0px 8px; overflow: hidden; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 0px !important; padding-right: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding: 0px; position: relative;"><a class="pdf" href="http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/9D699BFBD3CC2C11C12586FC00338610/$FILE/G_4_19_decision_of_the_Enlarged_Board_of_Appeal_of_22_June_2021_en.pdf" style="background-image: url("../images/icon_sprite.gif"); background-repeat: no-repeat; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; cursor: pointer; font-weight: 700; margin-left: 1.5em; padding-right: 0.6em; position: relative; text-decoration-line: none;" target="_blank">Full text of the decision</a></li></ul></div></div></div></div><div><b>Decision</b></div><div><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div><div><p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">Summary of facts and
submissions<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">I. By its decision
in appeal case T 0318/14 dated<br />
7 February 2019 (OJ EPO 2020, A104) and issued in writing on<br />
20 December 2019, Board of Appeal 3.3.01 referred the<br />
following questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal:<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">“1. Can a European
patent application be refused under<br />
Article 97(2) EPC if it claims the same subject-matter as a<br />
European patent which was granted to the same applicant and<br />
does not form part of the state of the art pursuant to<br />
Article 54(2) and (3) EPC?<br />
2.1 If the answer to the first question is yes, what are the<br />
conditions for such a refusal, and are different conditions<br />
to be applied depending on whether the European patent<br />
application under examination was filed<br />
a) on the same date as, or<br />
b) as a European divisional application (Article 76(1) EPC)<br />
in respect of, or<br />
c) claiming the priority (Article 88 EPC) in respect of a<br />
European patent application on the basis of which a European<br />
patent was granted to the same applicant?<br />
2.2 In particular, in the last of these cases, does an<br />
applicant have a legitimate interest in the grant of a patent<br />
on the (subsequent) European patent application in view of<br />
the fact that the filing date and not the priority date is<br />
the relevant date for calculating the term of the European<br />
patent under Article 63(1) EPC?”<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">II. The appeal
before the referring Board (in the following “the<br />
Board”) was against the decision of the Examining Division<br />
refusing European patent application No. 10718590.2 under<br />
Article 97(2) EPC in conjunction with Article 125 EPC. The</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">Examining Division
found that claim 1 of the sole claim<br />
request on file was directed to subject-matter which was<br />
identical to the subject-matter claimed in European patent<br />
No. 2 251 021, which was granted for the European patent<br />
application from which the application-in-suit claimed<br />
priority. Granting a second patent on this claim was held to<br />
be contrary to the principle of the prohibition on double<br />
patenting (in the following also referred to as just “the<br />
prohibition”), this being an accepted principle in most<br />
patent systems, as stated in the Guidelines. The<br />
applicability of the prohibition was furthermore confirmed by<br />
an </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">obiter </span></i><span lang="EN-US">statement in the
Enlarged Board of Appeal’s<br />
decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06. The Examining Division held that<br />
the prohibition also extended to European applications<br />
claiming an internal priority from another European<br />
application, and that decision T 1423/07 was not applicable<br />
because the applicants were different in that case.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">III. The appellant
applicant argued in its appeal that the<br />
prohibition did not apply in a situation of internal<br />
priority. Decisions G 1/05 and G 1/06 related to divisional<br />
applications, and applied only in that context. Decision<br />
T 1423/07 recognised the existence of a legitimate interest,<br />
namely the longer term of protection available to an<br />
applicant as a result of claiming an internal priority. The<br />
“</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">ne bis in idem</span></i><span lang="EN-US">” principle could
not support the prohibition<br />
either. Article 125 EPC was not a proper legal basis for<br />
prohibiting double patenting, because the issue was one of<br />
substantive law. The preparatory documents of the Convention,<br />
in particular points 665. and 666. of the Minutes of the<br />
Diplomatic Conference establishing the Convention, showed<br />
that at the Diplomatic Conference there was no agreement on<br />
this issue within the meaning of Article 31(2)(a) of the<br />
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (in</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">the following
VCLT). Although there might have been a<br />
majority agreement on a prohibition, it was restricted to<br />
applications having the same filing date. Article 139(3) EPC<br />
could not provide a basis for the prohibition either. It<br />
demonstrated that double patenting was an issue left entirely<br />
to national legislation. A referral to the Enlarged Board was<br />
warranted. During the oral proceedings before the Board, the<br />
appellant requested as its main request the grant of a<br />
patent, and as an auxiliary request a referral to the<br />
Enlarged Board, for which purpose it agreed to the wording of<br />
the questions proposed by the Board.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">IV. To support its
arguments, the appellant referred to several<br />
documents from the collection of the preparatory documents of<br />
the Convention (commonly referred to as the “</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux<br />
préparatoires</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”). They are treated in more detail in the<br />
Reasons of the present decision.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">V. The referring
decision examined those provisions of the<br />
Convention which have so far been considered in the case law<br />
of the boards of appeal to be a possible legal basis for the<br />
prohibition, namely Articles 60(1), 63(1), 76(1) and 125 EPC.<br />
The Board regarded none of them as suitable for this purpose.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">VI. The Board’s
doubts as to the applicability of Article 125 EPC<br />
were based on two main lines of reasoning (Reasons, points<br />
56. to 64.). First, the Board found that the wording and<br />
scope of Article 125 EPC in themselves, i.e. without the<br />
assistance of the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux préparatoires</span></i><span lang="EN-US">, could not be<br />
construed as encompassing the principle of a prohibition on<br />
double patenting. Following the rules of interpretation<br />
stipulated by Articles 31 and 32 VCLT, Article 125 EPC as<br />
interpreted under Article 31 VCLT was neither ambiguous or<br />
obscure, nor manifestly absurd or unreasonable, and therefore</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">was not open to an
interpretation under Article 32 VCLT which<br />
would also take into account the legislative intent derivable<br />
from the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux
préparatoires</span></i><span lang="EN-US">. Secondly, given the lack of<br />
agreement on the issue among all the Contracting States<br />
during the Diplomatic Conference, an interpretation of<br />
Article 125 EPC on the basis of a separate common agreement<br />
of all parties or an instrument accepted by all parties<br />
within the meaning of Article 31(2)(a) or (b) VCLT,<br />
respectively, was not possible either.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">VII. The
preparatory documents relied on by the Board in<br />
connection with this and other points in its Reasons are<br />
treated in detail in the Reasons of the present decision.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">VIII. The
President of the EPO was invited to comment on the<br />
referral, and third parties were given the opportunity to<br />
file submissions under Articles 9 and 10 of the Rules of<br />
Procedure of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (RPEBA). Their<br />
submissions were forwarded to the appellant.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">IX. In his
comments dated 21 September 2020, the President of the<br />
EPO submitted that the legal basis for the prohibition was<br />
Article 125 EPC. The legislative intent to prohibit double<br />
patenting under this article could be clearly derived from<br />
the preparatory materials of the Convention. The existence of<br />
this principle in the majority of the Contracting States<br />
could be inferred from their national legislation<br />
implementing Article 139(3) EPC. It was true that there had<br />
been no agreement by all parties on this issue during the<br />
Diplomatic Conference, but such an agreement was not<br />
necessary. The majority agreement could still be taken into<br />
account as the identifiable legislative intent, and thus as a<br />
supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 VCLT.<br />
Recourse to the preparatory documents under Article 32 VCLT</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">was permissible
for the purpose of confirming the above<br />
interpretation of Articles 125 and 139(3) EPC. Thus the<br />
Office’s long-standing practice of applying the prohibition<br />
was correct, and was also supported by decisions G 1/05 and<br />
G 1/06 of the Enlarged Board.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">X. Amicus curiae
submissions were filed under Article 10 RPEBA<br />
by several professional associations, companies and private<br />
persons. Two submissions were made anonymously. The majority<br />
of them supported the view that there is no proper legal<br />
basis under the Convention for a prohibition on double<br />
patenting or thus for the practice of the Office.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">XI. The appellant
made no further submissions. Nor did it request<br />
oral proceedings before the Enlarged Board. Therefore the<br />
present decision can be issued in written proceedings without<br />
prior oral proceedings.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">Reasons for the
decision<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">A. Admissibility
of the referral<br />
A.1 Interpretation of the referred questions<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">1. The essence of
Question 1 is as follows: is there any legal<br />
basis under the EPC for refusing an application on the ground<br />
of double patenting?<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">2. The Board set
out in detail what it understood by the term<br />
“double patenting” (Reasons, points 17.-23.), and the<br />
Enlarged Board reads this term in the same sense.<br />
Nevertheless, while the basic question being asked may be put<br />
simply, there are good reasons why the Board was justified in<br />
wording Question 1 in a more differentiated manner, bearing<br />
in mind that the term “double patenting” itself may not be<br />
completely clear once isolated from the specific situations<br />
addressed in the referral and in the relatively small body of</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">existing board of
appeal case law. First, a distinction must<br />
be made between the situation falling under<br />
Article 139(3) EPC (simultaneous protection by a national and<br />
a European patent) and double patenting in the narrow sense,<br />
where two or more European applications are involved<br />
(Reasons, points 19. and 21.). Secondly, the distinction<br />
between double protection (claims with overlapping scope) and<br />
double patenting also needs to be kept in mind (Reasons,<br />
point 24.). The Enlarged Board notes that the term double<br />
protection in German (“Doppelschutz”) is also used to denote<br />
the situation governed by Article 139(3) EPC and comparable<br />
situations of parallel protection.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">3. Even if “double
patenting” is immediately understood in its<br />
narrow sense, the term alone may not be sufficient to<br />
indicate to the reader that the issue at stake in the<br />
referral is whether there is a legal basis in the EPC for<br />
prohibiting double patenting. While there is case law which<br />
deals specifically with the question of a legal basis for the<br />
prohibition, there are also decisions which concern rather<br />
the definition of “the same subject-matter” or “the same<br />
applicant” in the context of double patenting. The manner in<br />
which these elements are incorporated into the wording of<br />
Question 1 makes it clear that these points of law are not<br />
the subject of the present referral.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">4. The referral
gives no particular explanation why<br />
Article 97(2) EPC is mentioned in Question 1. The Enlarged<br />
Board takes it that its inclusion serves to distinguish a<br />
refusal of a patent application following examination by the<br />
Examining Division from other possible refusals, such as by<br />
the Receiving Section under Article 90(5) EPC. The main focus<br />
of the referral is on an analysis of the various provisions<br />
of the Convention which have been put forward in the case law</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">as the legal
source of the double patenting prohibition<br />
(Articles 60, 63, 76, 125 EPC), and which as such may<br />
potentially be invoked in conjunction with Article 97(2) EPC<br />
as the legal basis for a refusal. The Board also stated that<br />
the referral does not extend to the question whether and how<br />
the prohibition might be applicable in opposition proceedings<br />
(Reasons, point 31.). Thus the Enlarged Board considers that<br />
the reference to Article 97(2) EPC makes it clear that the<br />
referred question is restricted to (the applicability of the<br />
prohibition during) substantive examination proceedings under<br />
Article 94 EPC before the Examining Division.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">5. Question 1 does
not mention the additional condition that<br />
both the granted and the potential European patent must have<br />
an effect in the same territory. Given the system of<br />
designations (Articles 66 and 79 EPC), and in particular the<br />
possibility to withdraw individual designations<br />
(Article 79(3) EPC), it is the Enlarged Board’s understanding<br />
that in current Office practice an objection of double<br />
patenting is only raised if there are overlapping and still<br />
valid designations in both the granted patent and the<br />
application concerned. As it is clear from the Reasons of the<br />
referring decision that the Board was well aware of this<br />
condition (points 29. and 30.), the Enlarged Board considers<br />
that it is also implied in the question itself.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">6. The essence of
Question 2.1 is as follows: if there is a<br />
legal basis in the EPC for the prohibition on double<br />
patenting, are all three of the possible constellations in<br />
which double patenting may arise to be treated in the same<br />
manner? Common to these constellations is that the granted<br />
patent and the application both have the same effective date<br />
(point 18. of the Reasons).</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">7. Question 2.1 is
to be answered only if the Enlarged Board<br />
finds that there is a legal basis in the EPC for the double<br />
patenting prohibition. The formulation “</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">… what are the<br />
conditions for such a refusal … ?</span></i><span lang="EN-US">” may appear very broad in<br />
scope and intended to cover all possible criteria for<br />
establishing the conditions to be met for the double<br />
patenting prohibition to apply. For example, the referral<br />
invites the Enlarged Board to clarify the conditions for a<br />
“[lack of a] legitimate interest”, which G 1/05 and G 1/06<br />
saw as a possible basis for the prohibition (Reasons,<br />
point 13.4). It also invites the Enlarged Board to clarify<br />
the concept of “the same invention” (Reasons, point 80.). The<br />
</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">amicus curiae </span></i><span lang="EN-US">submissions also
ask for the criteria to be<br />
applied in defining “the same applicant”. It is nevertheless<br />
clear from the Reasons of the referring decision that the<br />
central point of question 2.1 is really an extension of<br />
question 1, namely whether the legal basis for the<br />
prohibition in the EPC, if there is one, is applicable to all<br />
three of the constellations listed, or to only one or two of<br />
them. The Enlarged Board will limit itself to answering<br />
question 2.1 in this sense.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">8. As to question
2.2, it is clear that the Board is primarily<br />
interested in knowing if the reason given in T 1423/07 – a<br />
legitimate interest in a longer term of protection, having<br />
regard to the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">obiter </span></i><span lang="EN-US">statement of the Enlarged Board in<br />
G 1/05 and G 1/06, Reasons, point 13.4 - may establish an<br />
exception to the double patenting prohibition for<br />
applications having different filing dates, but the same<br />
priority date.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">9. Questions 2.1
c) and 2.2 are also apparently restricted to<br />
cases of internal priority, in which both applications are<br />
European applications, with one of them serving as the</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">priority
application for the other. However, as pointed out<br />
in the President’s comments (point 104.), the same question<br />
may be asked in cases where two European applications with<br />
different filing dates claim priority from the same national<br />
application.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">10. Furthermore,
Questions 2.1 b) and c) already appear to be<br />
restricted to the (likelier) case in which the application<br />
filed earlier, (i.e. the application establishing the<br />
priority right, or the earlier application under Article 76<br />
EPC - commonly referred to as the “parent application”) is<br />
also granted first, and the examination of the subsequent<br />
application (i.e. the application claiming priority or the<br />
divisional application) is concluded later. However, any such<br />
restriction would appear to be unintended, and the question<br />
can be applied more generally to any procedurally related<br />
pairs of applications falling under the constellations of<br />
Question 2.1 b) and c), irrespective of which comes to grant<br />
first.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">A.2 Admissibility
criteria under Article 112 EPC<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">11. Article 112(1)
EPC provides:<br />
“In order to ensure uniform application of the law, or if a<br />
point of law of fundamental importance arises:<br />
(a) the Board of Appeal shall … refer any question to the<br />
Enlarged Board of Appeal if it considers that a decision is<br />
required for the above purposes. …<br />
(b) …”<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">12. On this basis,
a referral to the Enlarged Board by a board of<br />
appeal is admissible if there is conflicting case law in the<br />
application of the EPC, or if a point of law of fundamental<br />
importance arises. Notably, a point of law can be one of<br />
fundamental importance even without any conflicting case law.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">The necessity to
ensure the uniform application of the law<br />
may also arise without a high number of conflicting cases<br />
(G 1/11, Reasons, point 1.). Finally, a ruling by the<br />
Enlarged Board on the question must be decisive for the case<br />
before the board (G 1/14, Reasons, point 2.).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">13. Question 1 of
the referral concerns not merely the correct<br />
application of a legal provision, but whether certain<br />
procedures carried out by the Office have a proper legal<br />
basis. That the actions of public authorities cannot be<br />
arbitrary but must be based on the law is considered a<br />
fundamental principle of public law (principle of legality).<br />
Therefore the Enlarged Board also considers the referred<br />
question to be a point of law of fundamental importance, even<br />
without divergent or extensive case law on the issue.<br />
However, as the Board correctly identified, there is even<br />
divergent case law on the question whether any proper legal<br />
basis for a prohibition on double patenting exists at all<br />
(Reasons, points 43. to 46.), and the main part of the<br />
referring decision is dedicated to reviewing and analysing<br />
decisions in which different provisions of the EPC were<br />
identified as the possible legal basis for the prohibition,<br />
or the lack of a legal basis was perceived.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">14. Questions 2.1
and 2.2 only become relevant if Question 1 is<br />
answered in the affirmative. They address issues which may<br />
not immediately appear to be questions of law of fundamental<br />
importance, but rather aspects of the application of the<br />
principle of the prohibition on double patenting. As already<br />
noted in point 7. above, Question 2.1 is formulated in such a<br />
way that it may be read as seeking an answer on all<br />
conceivable criteria for applying the prohibition. However, a<br />
question of such sweeping scope would certainly be<br />
inadmissible, given that the Enlarged Board has, as a matter</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">of principle, no
powers to decide in advance on legal issues<br />
which have not yet arisen in a case before a board of appeal.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">15. In addition,
the referral did not indicate that the Enlarged<br />
Board needs to clarify all the details of the referred<br />
questions. For example, it is not apparent that the<br />
definition of the “same invention” is a contentious issue in<br />
the case underlying the referral, given that the claims<br />
refused by the Examining Division are identical to the claims<br />
of the patent granted earlier (Reasons, point 3.).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">16. For these
reasons, the Enlarged Board reads Question 2.1<br />
narrowly, and as essentially asking whether the possible<br />
legal basis in the EPC is equally applicable to the three<br />
identified constellations, or whether there may be reasons<br />
for treating them differently, for example by establishing an<br />
exception for one of them. Further questions which may arise<br />
in connection with double patenting, such as the question of<br />
the same invention or the same applicant, are not considered<br />
to be covered by the referral.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">17. The Enlarged
Board further notes with regard to the<br />
admissibility of Question 2.1 that the decisions cited in the<br />
context of the more specific Question 2.2. can also be<br />
considered to constitute conflicting case law for the purpose<br />
of answering Question 2.1. Thus, for example, there are<br />
decisions that view the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">obiter dictum </span></i><span lang="EN-US">of G 1/05 and G 1/06 as<br />
being restricted to divisional and parent applications<br />
(T 1423/07, Reasons, point 3.), while others view it as being<br />
more general in its scope, or at least as extending to<br />
applications linked by priority (T 2461/10, Reasons, point<br />
14., confirmed by T 2563/11, Reasons, point 2.5).</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">18. One reason for
a possible exception from the prohibition is<br />
identified in the more specific Question 2.2. For this<br />
question, too, the Board demonstrates that conflicting<br />
decisions exist (T 318/14, Reasons, points 65.-67.). The<br />
question’s formulation appears to imply that the<br />
justification for a prohibition is the principle of (the lack<br />
of) a legitimate interest, following decisions G 1/05 and<br />
G 1/06. Thus the Enlarged Board proceeds on the assumption<br />
that it may only need to give a separate answer to this<br />
question if it concludes that the constellations of Question<br />
2.1 may be treated differently from one another and that a<br />
prohibition on double patenting is indeed to be based on the<br />
principle of a legitimate interest in the proceedings.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">19. The Enlarged Board
is satisfied that a ruling on the referred<br />
questions (read narrowly) is necessary for the Board’s<br />
decision on the appeal. The Enlarged Board also considers the<br />
structuring of the questions to be appropriate. Although the<br />
Board does not specifically say so, it can be inferred from<br />
the referring decision that, in the Board’s own view, the<br />
case before it could potentially be decided at either a<br />
general level or a more specific level, depending on the<br />
answers of the Enlarged Board. This is reflected in the<br />
formulation of the referred questions.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">20. Summing up,
the Enlarged Board is satisfied that the referral<br />
is admissible. More specifically, each of the questions is<br />
admissible, provided that the requested clarification of the<br />
conditions for a refusal is restricted to those which are<br />
inseparable from the question of the legal basis for a<br />
refusal. A reformulation of the questions is not necessary.<br />
The observations made in points 9. and 10. above on the<br />
constellations covered by Question 2.1b) and c) can be taken<br />
into account in the formulation of the answers.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US"><br />
</span><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B. Substantive
issues of the referral: Question 1.<br />
B.1 Article 125 EPC as the suggested legal basis<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">21. The Board
analysed several provisions of the Convention with<br />
respect to their suitability as the proper legal basis for<br />
the prohibition on double patenting. From the referral and<br />
the totality of the case law it is clear that Article 125 EPC<br />
is the most often discussed and, at least </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">prima facie</span></i><span lang="EN-US">, the<br />
most promising one. Article 125 EPC is also given in the EPO<br />
Guidelines for Examination as the legal basis for refusals,<br />
and consequently was also invoked as such by the Examining<br />
Division in the decision under appeal. It is therefore<br />
appropriate to start with this provision.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.1.1
Applicability of Article 125 EPC to the question of double<br />
patenting<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">22. Article 125
EPC is titled “Reference to general principles”<br />
and provides that “[i]n the absence of procedural provisions<br />
in this Convention, the European Patent Office shall take<br />
into account the principles of procedural law generally<br />
recognised in the Contracting States”.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">23. The first
question is whether the scope of Article 125 EPC<br />
or, more precisely, a procedural provision which is absent<br />
from the Convention but which may be established with the<br />
help of a principle of procedural law, may also extend to<br />
substantive issues. In the present case it can be asked if<br />
the missing, and as such hypothetical, provision which would<br />
govern the matter of double patenting could be classified as<br />
a procedural provision. Put differently, the term “procedural<br />
provision” requires interpretation.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">24. The Enlarged
Board’s decision G 1/97 (OJ EPO 2000, 322) on<br />
the interpretation of Article 125 EPC is of no assistance in</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">the present case.
Its finding, namely that Article 125 EPC<br />
does not permit the introduction of new procedures (Reasons,<br />
point 3.), does not provide an answer to the question whether<br />
the examination for double patenting may be covered by this<br />
article. At least, this possibility is not ruled out by<br />
G 1/97: a new procedure need not be introduced, as this<br />
examination can take place as part of the existing procedure<br />
for substantive examination under Article 94 EPC (see also<br />
point 71 of the President’s comments).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">25. In its review
of the relevant decisions, the Board tended to<br />
agree with the approach of those decisions that considered<br />
double patenting to involve both procedural and substantive<br />
issues (Reasons, point 63., referring to T 1423/07), but it<br />
did not explain in detail its reasons for this position. It<br />
also pointed out that early decisions expressly denied the<br />
possibility that Article 125 EPC could regulate matters of<br />
substantive law (Reasons, point 43., with reference to<br />
T 587/98 (OJ EPO 200,497), Reasons, points 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5)<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">26. According to
decision T 1423/07, double patenting also<br />
comprises procedural aspects, a finding which it held to be<br />
supported by the Minutes of the Munich Diplomatic Conference<br />
for the setting up of a European System for the Grant of<br />
Patents (in the following cited as R3), point 665. This<br />
source – in the reading of the deciding board – “</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">confirm[s]<br />
the procedural aspects of double patenting</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”. From this the<br />
deciding board concluded that the refusal of a European<br />
application for double patenting comprised procedural aspects<br />
as well as matters of substantive law, so that Article 125<br />
EPC was applicable. T 1423/07 also concluded that, while some<br />
Contracting States applied the prohibition, it could not be<br />
shown to be generally recognised in the specific context of<br />
the pre-grant stage (Reasons, points 2.2.1 and 2.2.2).</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">27. The Enlarged
Board also considers that a provision falling<br />
under Article 125 EPC may well cover issues which touch upon<br />
substantive matters, such as the scope of claimed subjectmatter. This
interpretation can be based on the Convention<br />
itself, without reference to the preparatory documents. Thus<br />
it is not ruled out that some issues which may be considered<br />
“substantive” are to be decided on the basis of a principle<br />
of procedural law.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">28. It is settled
case law of the Enlarged Board of Appeal that,<br />
even though the VCLT is not formally binding on the boards of<br />
appeal, it provides an appropriate source of international<br />
law for interpreting the Convention. This was also recognised<br />
by the referring decision in its application of Articles 31<br />
and 32 VCLT.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">29. These articles
are in Part III, Section 3, VCLT (titled<br />
“Interpretation of Treaties”) and are worded as follows (with<br />
non-relevant parts omitted):<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">Article 31 VCLT –
General rule of interpretation<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">1. A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance<br />
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the<br />
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and<br />
purpose.<br />
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a<br />
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its<br />
preamble and annexes:<br />
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made<br />
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of<br />
the treaty;</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">(b) any instrument
which was made by one or more parties in<br />
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by<br />
the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.<br />
(3)…<br />
(4)…<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">Article 32 VCLT –
Supplementary means of interpretation<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">Recourse may be
had to supplementary means of interpretation,<br />
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the<br />
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the<br />
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to<br />
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to<br />
article 31:<br />
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or<br />
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or<br />
unreasonable.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">30. In view of
Article 177 EPC, which provides that the three<br />
texts of the Convention, in English, French and German, are<br />
equally authentic, it is furthermore appropriate to point to<br />
Article 33 VCLT, which also belongs to Part III, Section 3:<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">Article 33 VCLT –
Interpretation of treaties authenticated in<br />
two or more languages<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">1. When a treaty
has been authenticated in two or more<br />
languages, the text is equally authoritative in each<br />
language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree<br />
that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.<br />
2. …<br />
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same<br />
meaning in each authentic text.<br />
4. …</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">31. Normally, the
systematic interpretation is the next method to<br />
be applied if, as a result of the grammatical (literal)<br />
interpretation, the ordinary meaning of a term remains<br />
insufficiently clear. The same principle is expressed in<br />
Article 31(1) and (2) VCLT by the statement that the terms of<br />
the treaty are to be interpreted in their context, the<br />
primary context being the text of the treaty itself.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">32. Article 125
EPC is in Chapter I of Part VII of the Convention<br />
(Common Provisions). This chapter is titled “Common<br />
provisions governing procedure”. The term “common” refers to<br />
Parts IV to VI, i.e. the grant, opposition and appeal<br />
procedures. These parts themselves are also devoted to<br />
procedural provisions, and most articles in the common<br />
provisions of Chapter I of Part VII are clearly of a<br />
procedural nature, in the sense that they do not touch on the<br />
substantive provisions of Part II of the Convention, in<br />
particular the provisions of Chapter I of Part II<br />
(Articles 52 to 57 EPC).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">33. Thus it can be
acknowledged that the provisions of Chapter I<br />
of Part VII are procedural in nature. The Enlarged Board is<br />
of the opinion that the minimal difference between the term<br />
“procedural provisions” in Article 125 EPC of Chapter I of<br />
Part VII and the wording “provisions governing procedure” in<br />
the Chapter’s title is not intended to make a material<br />
distinction. </span><span lang="DE">The same applies to
the German wording:<br />
“Vorschriften über das Verfahren” (Article 125 EPC) and<br />
“Vorschriften für das Verfahren” (Chapter I title). </span><span lang="EN-US">In the<br />
French version, the term “disposition[s] de procédure”<br />
appears in both Article 125 EPC and the title of Chapter I.<br />
On this basis, both the wording of Article 125 EPC and its<br />
position in the Convention indicate that it concerns</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">procedural
provisions comparable to the preceding articles in<br />
this chapter.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">34. However,
Chapter I also contains Articles 123(2) and (3) EPC,<br />
which are applied daily in the Office, with the former also<br />
serving as a legal basis for a refusal under<br />
Article 97(2) EPC. Therefore, from a formal point of view,<br />
Articles 123(2) and (3) EPC are procedural provisions. On the<br />
other hand, they cannot be perceived as being purely<br />
procedural, because they require the subject-matter of the<br />
claim to be determined when they are applied in the course of<br />
examination or opposition proceedings. Notably, in G 1/05 and<br />
G 1/06 the Enlarged Board held compliance with<br />
Article 123(2) EPC to be a substantive requirement, to be<br />
examined by the Examining Division (Reasons, point 3.3).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">35. The above
demonstrates that in the system of the EPC, the<br />
term “procedural provision” may well extend to provisions<br />
requiring a substantive examination of the subject-matter<br />
claimed. More particularly, provisions in Chapter I of Part<br />
VII may allow the refusal of a patent application under<br />
Article 97(2) EPC for reasons other than non-compliance with<br />
the substantive patentability requirements of Chapter I of<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">Part II of the
Convention (Articles 52 to 57 EPC).<br />
36. Thus the Enlarged Board concludes that, from a purely<br />
systematic point of view, Article 125 EPC may provide a legal<br />
basis for the regulation of double patenting - whether this<br />
means permitting or prohibiting it - even though a<br />
consideration of substantive issues such as “the same<br />
subject-matter” may be involved as well.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.1.2 Prohibition
of or permission for double patenting as a<br />
generally recognised principle of procedural law in the<br />
practice of the Contracting States<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">37. Since it has
been concluded that Article 125 EPC may serve as<br />
the legal basis for a prohibition on double patenting, the<br />
next question is whether such a principle exists and is<br />
generally recognised in the Contracting States.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">38. The Enlarged
Board is not aware of any reliable source which<br />
would directly confirm this proposition as a fact. The<br />
sources cited in the referring decision (Reasons, point 60.)<br />
or in the comments of the President of the EPO, e.g. the<br />
regularly updated compilations by the EPO of the relevant<br />
provisions of national law (cited as N5 in the referring<br />
decision), only document the practice of the Contracting<br />
States concerning the implementation of Article 139(3) EPC,<br />
but cannot provide direct information about their practice on<br />
double patenting in the narrow sense, i.e. about the<br />
possibility of granting two national patents, analogously to<br />
double patenting in the context of European patents only, as<br />
explained in point 2. above. It appears that the Office can<br />
do no more than infer from the general practice on the<br />
interpretation of Article 139(3) EPC that the double<br />
patenting prohibition is also a generally recognised<br />
principle (points 80. and 81. of the President’s comments).<br />
The above-cited facts are certainly consistent with the<br />
assumption that the prohibition on double patenting in the<br />
narrow sense is also recognised and applied in the majority<br />
of the Contracting States. Still, it remains the case that<br />
there are no data available to the Enlarged Board which would<br />
allow it to safely establish the practice in all or at least<br />
the majority of the Contracting States and therefore to<br />
confirm the applicability of the prohibition under Article<br />
125 EPC on that basis.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.1.3 The
prohibition as an embodiment of the principle of a<br />
legitimate interest in the proceedings (implications of<br />
G 1/05 and G 1/06)<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">39. The President
of the EPO submitted that the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">obiter dictum </span></i><span lang="EN-US">of<br />
the Enlarged Board in G 1/05 and G 1/06 approved the practice<br />
of the Office. The EPO Guidelines for Examination in their<br />
present version (March 2021) also refer to those decisions in<br />
connection with double patenting, see Guidelines, G-IV 5.4.<br />
Although that particular part of the Guidelines is not quoted<br />
in point 93. of the President’s comments, at point 94. G 1/05<br />
and G 1/06 seem to be associated with the proposition that<br />
the necessity of having a legitimate interest in the<br />
proceedings is a generally recognised principle of procedural<br />
law in the Contracting States. However, in those decisions<br />
the Enlarged Board did not explain in what way the<br />
prohibition on double patenting should be derived from the<br />
principle of a legitimate interest. This is understandable,<br />
given that G 1/05 and G1/06 were not directed to this<br />
specific question. The Enlarged Board furthermore did not<br />
seem to be relying on Article 125 EPC when it stated its<br />
acceptance that the “</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">principle of prohibition exists on the<br />
basis of the lack of legitimate interest in the proceedings<br />
leading to a second patent</span></i><span lang="EN-US">” and concluded from this that the<br />
practice of the EPO was not objectionable (G 1/05 and G 1/06,<br />
Reasons, point 3.14). Nor was there even a statement by the<br />
Enlarged Board that it regarded a legitimate interest in the<br />
proceedings to be a generally recognised principle of<br />
procedural law, which might have allowed the inference that<br />
Article 125 EPC should apply. In fact, the only firm<br />
conclusion which may be drawn from the Enlarged Board’s<br />
</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">obiter </span></i><span lang="EN-US">remarks in G 1/05
and G 1/06 is that the lack of a<br />
legitimate interest may provide an explanation for the<br />
prohibition.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">40. Furthermore,
the Enlarged Board’s statement in the Reasons,<br />
point 13.4, that it “accepts” the existence of the<br />
prohibition and that the practice of the Office did not<br />
appear objectionable must be seen in context, in particular<br />
that of point 13.5 of the Reasons. There the Enlarged Board<br />
explained, with reference to the submissions of the President<br />
of the EPO (point VIII(d). in G 1/05 and G 1/06) that<br />
recognising the prohibition could not prevent applicants from<br />
keeping a series of divisional applications pending while<br />
containing the same subject-matter. The conclusion reached by<br />
the Enlarged Board in point 13.5 would have applied </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">a<br />
fortiori </span></i><span lang="EN-US">if the Office had
not applied the prohibition. Thus<br />
the Enlarged Board had no reason to question the Office’s<br />
practice, because confirming it was not required for the<br />
purposes of its own decision. Nor was the practice of the<br />
Office called into question in the case law at that time,<br />
even by decision T 587/98 (</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">supra</span></i><span lang="EN-US">), which was cited by the<br />
referring decision (Reasons, point 43.) as questioning the<br />
applicability of Article 125 EPC to questions of substantive<br />
law. In fact, T 587/98 carefully restricted its findings to<br />
the question of a broader claim wholly encompassing a<br />
narrower claim in cases of divisional applications (Headnote<br />
and Reasons, point 3.7), but it did not go so far as to cast<br />
doubt on the general principle of a prohibition on double<br />
patenting.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">41. Accordingly,
unreservedly approving the double patenting<br />
prohibition on the basis of the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">obiter dictum </span></i><span lang="EN-US">in G 1/05 and<br />
G 1/06 would not be appropriate for the purpose of the<br />
present referral.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">42. In sum, from
the foregoing (points 38. to 41.) alone, the<br />
Enlarged Board is unable to conclude that the prohibition on<br />
double patenting is a principle generally recognised in the</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">Contracting
States. It is therefore necessary to have<br />
recourse to other sources.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2 Recourse to
the preparatory documents of the Convention (the<br />
“</span></b><b><i><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux
préparatoires</span></i></b><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">”)<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">43. The referring
decision discussed whether the provisions of<br />
the VCLT could justify turning to the preparatory documents<br />
of the EPC for guidance. The Board held that under Article 32<br />
in conjunction with Article 31 VCLT it was not possible to do<br />
so for the present case. This appears to have been because it<br />
found that neither condition of Article 32 VCLT was<br />
fulfilled. That is, for the issue of double patenting, an<br />
interpretation of the Convention, here Article 125 EPC, using<br />
the rules of interpretation laid down in Article 31 VCLT did<br />
not (a) leave its meaning ambiguous or obscure, or (b) lead<br />
to an obviously nonsensical (i.e. absurd) or unreasonable<br />
result (Reasons, point 59.). At least, no other conclusion<br />
can be drawn from the Board’s statements there that “</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">[t]he<br />
majority opinion set out in point 665 of document M/PR/I<br />
cannot be relied on … as a supplementary means of<br />
interpretation</span></i><span lang="EN-US">” and that “</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">neither of these alternatives<br />
[conditions (a) and (b) of Article 32 of the Vienna<br />
Convention] applies to the point of law under consideration</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">44. The EBA
concurs with the Board’s findings with respect to<br />
condition (b): as is clear from the whole context of the<br />
underlying case, the EPC may permit or it may prohibit double<br />
patenting. Neither possibility is obviously nonsensical or<br />
unreasonable. Granting two or more patents on the same<br />
invention to the same applicant may appear highly<br />
undesirable, but it is difficult to view it as outright<br />
nonsensical or clearly unreasonable. With regard to the other<br />
option, i.e. the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">status quo </span></i><span lang="EN-US">as set out in the Guidelines
for<br />
Examination, it has never been argued that the practice of<br />
the Office is obviously nonsensical or unreasonable, but</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">simply that it
lacks a proper legal basis. It has never been<br />
argued either that the existing practice is in any way<br />
manifestly unjust. Thus the Enlarged Board agrees that<br />
condition (b) is not applicable.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">45. However, it is
difficult to see why the ordinary means of<br />
interpretation pursuant to Article 31 VCLT do not leave the<br />
meaning of the Convention ambiguous or even obscure with<br />
respect to double patenting. It is clear from the referral<br />
that over thirty years of case law have not been able to<br />
settle the issue. The ambiguity of the Convention with<br />
respect to the question of double patenting is also<br />
implicitly confirmed by those decisions that have dealt with<br />
the questions of the same applicant or the same invention<br />
(see e.g. T 1391/07, Reasons, point 2.5, T 1780/12, Reasons,<br />
points 8.-10., T 879/12, Reasons, point 13., and the further<br />
decisions cited there). The fact that these questions were<br />
examined indicates that the deciding boards could not have<br />
been fully convinced that there is no prohibition on double<br />
patenting under the EPC. Had they been convinced, it would<br />
not have been proper for them to decide on the questions of<br />
the same invention and the same applicant, as these questions<br />
would have been irrelevant.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">46. The Enlarged
Board does not endorse the opinion that the<br />
interpretation of the Convention (in itself) provides a clear<br />
answer. It rather takes the view that Article 125 EPC is<br />
worded in such general terms that, for this reason alone, its<br />
potential scope can be considered to be ambiguous. As<br />
explained in point 36. above, based on a systematic<br />
interpretation, the regulation of double patenting does not<br />
seem to be excluded from the scope of Article 125 EPC. Thus<br />
the Convention is not clear, but rather silent on this issue.<br />
The result of a systematic interpretation may still require</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">confirmation.
Accordingly, it is not at all apparent why<br />
supplementary means of interpretation, and in particular the<br />
preparatory documents of the EPC, cannot or should not be<br />
used in order to determine the position under the Convention<br />
or the meaning of Article 125 EPC with regard to double<br />
patenting. On the contrary, there are good reasons, including<br />
on the basis of Article 32 VCLT, for consulting the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux<br />
préparatoires</span></i><span lang="EN-US">. Indeed, as the cited cases show, in the past<br />
both the boards and the Enlarged Board have turned to the<br />
</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux
préparatoires </span></i><span lang="EN-US">as a matter of course for assistance in<br />
interpreting Article 125 EPC.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.1 Double
patenting in light of the </span></b><b><i><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux préparatoires<br />
</span></i></b><span lang="EN-US">47. In the
following, reference will be made to certain documents<br />
among the preparatory documents of the Convention. The<br />
references used are listed below. They replace the usual full<br />
references for the sake of brevity, and also the numbering N1<br />
to N4 used by the appellant and in the referring decision<br />
because parts of the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux préparatoires </span></i><span lang="EN-US">that were not<br />
included in the extracts filed by the appellant will also be<br />
referred to.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">R1: A collection
of the comments by the participating<br />
governments and other bodies on the draft provisions of the<br />
future Patent Convention, as established by the 6th meeting<br />
of the Inter-Governmental Conference for the setting up of a<br />
European System for the Grant of Patents, held in Luxembourg<br />
from 19 to 30 June 1972 (in short: the 6th Meeting). The<br />
comments are listed as “M9 to M29” in the documentation<br />
maintained by the European Patent Office on the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux<br />
préparatoires</span></i><span lang="EN-US">. R1 also contains the extract filed as N2 in<br />
the referral proceedings.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">R2: The Minutes of
the 6th meeting of the Inter-Governmental<br />
Conference, listed by the EPO as BR/219 e/72. It contains N4.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">R3: The Minutes of
the Diplomatic Conference, titled “Minutes<br />
MDC 1973” in the EPO documentation (English version). It<br />
contains N1.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">R4: The Minutes of
the 10th meeting of Working Party I of the<br />
Inter-Governmental Conference, listed by the EPO as<br />
BR/144 e/71. It contains N3.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">M/34: The Draft
Rules of Procedure of the Diplomatic<br />
Conference. The reference used by the EPO is maintained. It<br />
is to be noted that this Draft was adopted without amendments<br />
and became the final Rules of Procedure, see R3, point 10,<br />
page 13.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">These documents
are also accessible to the public via the<br />
website of the EPO (see </span><span lang="EN-US" style="color: blue; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;">https://www.epo.org/lawpractice/legal-texts/epc/archive/epc-<br />
1973/traveaux/documents.html</span><span lang="EN-US">, at the time of writing).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">48. It appears
undisputed that the last recorded statement on the<br />
present issue of the competent legislator, the Diplomatic<br />
Conference, is the agreement in point 665. of R3. The<br />
significance of this agreement must be evaluated in light of<br />
the legislative work done both at and before the Diplomatic<br />
Conference. Before looking at the preparatory work of the<br />
Convention dating back even earlier, for the purpose of<br />
answering Question 1 it is sufficient to start with the 6th<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">Meeting.<br />
49. By the time of the 6th and final Meeting in June 1972,<br />
Article 125 already had its present wording and numbering,</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">and consequently
was also part of the Draft Convention after<br />
the closure of the Inter-Governmental Conference following<br />
the 6th Meeting. It was clear that the documents adopted by<br />
the Inter-Governmental Conference would form the basis of the<br />
work of the planned Diplomatic Conference (R1, Introduction,<br />
point 4, last paragraph).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.1.1 Minutes of
the 6th Meeting (R2)<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">50. As
acknowledged in the referring decision, a common<br />
understanding was already reached during the discussions on<br />
Article 125 at the 6th meeting that double patenting was not<br />
possible (Reasons, point 56., referring to N4). This common<br />
understanding was recorded in R2 under point 49. The exact<br />
wording is as follows:<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">“</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">Article 125<br />
49. During discussion of this Article the Conference<br />
established that the European Patent Office may not grant<br />
more than one European patent to the same person for the same<br />
invention being the subject of applications filed on the same<br />
date.<br />
The Conference also established that the European Patent<br />
Office is entitled to correct any slips which it may make.</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">Apart from these
two issues (i.e. the double patenting<br />
prohibition and error correction </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">ex officio</span></i><span lang="EN-US">), no further<br />
details are recorded in R2 of the discussions concerning<br />
Article 125.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">51. The
participating governments and bodies were invited to<br />
submit comments on the drafts, including the Draft Convention<br />
(R1, Introduction, points 4 and 6). Comments that were<br />
received before 15 May 1973 were published by the German<br />
Government in preparation for the Diplomatic Conference (R1,</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">Introduction,
point 6). Comments on Article 125 by two<br />
participating governments are known to the Enlarged Board.<br />
</span><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.1.2 M/28,
Comments by the Norwegian Government in R1<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">52. Norway took
part in the Inter-Governmental Conference from<br />
the beginning (R1, Introduction, point 2) and submitted<br />
comments. The complete submission of the Norwegian Government<br />
in M/28 is on pages 341-349 of R1; it was received by the<br />
Secretariat on 5 May 1973. The comment on Article 125 is in<br />
point 11 of M/28 (R1, page 346). The English version is<br />
worded as follows:<br />
“</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">In connection with
Art. 125 the sixth meeting of the InterGovernmental Conference “established
that the European Patent<br />
Office may not grant more than one European patent to the<br />
same person for the same invention being the subject of<br />
applications filed on the same date” (Minutes par. 49).<br />
However, in the Norwegian opinion, it follows from Art. 52(3)<br />
that applications filed on the same day do not at all<br />
constitute novelty hindrance against each other and that an<br />
applicant may thus without detriment to himself file several<br />
applications on the same day. Under the circumstances, a<br />
possible restriction as established at the sixth meeting<br />
should be expressly stated in the Convention.</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.1.3 M/10,
Comments by the UK Government in R1<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">53. The tabular
summary compiled by the Secretariat of the<br />
Diplomatic Conference of the comments contained in R1 (pages<br />
12-14) only mentions Norway as submitting comments in the<br />
context of Article 125 (R1, page 13, right-hand column, at<br />
the bottom). In fact, the comments of the UK Government also<br />
address the issue of double patenting in the same context.<br />
Reference is made to document M/10 (pages 41 to 49 in R1).<br />
These comments of the UK delegation in M/10 were not included</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">under Article 125
in the tabular summary in R1, given that<br />
Article 125 was not mentioned. M/10 was submitted to the<br />
Secretariat earlier than M/28, on 29 March 1973.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">54. M/10, point 2,
is titled “GENERAL” and contains the<br />
following:<br />
“</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">We would prefer
the understandings recorded under paragraph<br />
49 of the minutes of the Conference in June 1972 to be<br />
mentioned also in the records of the Diplomatic Conference.</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”<br />
This point in M/10 apparently refers to point 49 of R2 (see<br />
point 50. above).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.1.4 Minutes of
the Diplomatic Conference (R3), point 665.<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">55. The work of
the Diplomatic Conference was regulated by the<br />
Rules of Procedure (M/34). These were adopted unanimously at<br />
the beginning of the Conference (R3, point 10, page 13). The<br />
Rules specified the organs of the Conference: the Plenary,<br />
various Committees, Working Parties and Rapporteurs (M/34,<br />
Rules 3(2) to 3(4)). The Main Committees had to establish the<br />
draft texts, for submission to the Committee of the Whole<br />
(M/34, Rule 12(5)). The Committee of the Whole had to adopt<br />
the texts for submission to the Plenary (M/34, Rules 3(2) and<br />
36(2)). Main Committee I was tasked with examining Part VII<br />
of the Draft Convention (M/34, Rule 12(2)), including Article<br />
125. All government delegations were entitled to participate<br />
in all three Main Committees and in the Committee of the<br />
Whole (M/34, Rules 12(6) and 14(2)). The decisions of the<br />
various organs required a qualified (two-thirds) or simple<br />
majority of the votes, abstaining delegations being<br />
considered as not voting (M/34, Rules 36 and 37). Decisions<br />
in the Main Committees and Working Parties required a simple</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">majority (except
for reconsideration of proposals under<br />
Rule 34).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">56. Article 125 is
dealt with in the Minutes of the Proceedings<br />
of Main Committee I, points 665. to 669., with points 665. to<br />
668. being dedicated to the issue of double patenting, while<br />
point 669. records the unanimous opinion that the EPO may<br />
correct inadvertent errors. Point 665. is worded as follows<br />
in the English version:<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">“</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">In connection with
Article 125, it was established at the<br />
request of the United Kingdom delegation that there was<br />
majority agreement in the Main Committee on the following:<br />
that it was a generally recognised principle of procedural<br />
law in the Contracting States that a person can be granted<br />
only one European patent for the same invention in respect of<br />
which there are several applications with the same date of<br />
filing.</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">57. On closer
scrutiny, the statement as recorded in the English<br />
version “it was established … that it </span><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">was a </span></b><span lang="EN-US">… </span><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">principle </span></b><span lang="EN-US">… </span><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">in<br />
the Contracting States </span></b><span lang="EN-US">that … only one </span><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">European patent </span></b><span lang="EN-US">[can<br />
be granted] …” (emphasis by the Enlarged Board) appears<br />
somewhat puzzling. A comparison with the German and French<br />
versions (see point 58. below) shows that it may be a<br />
mistranslation. An alternative explanation could be that the<br />
original English text put to the vote first mentioned the<br />
granting of only one (national) patent as the recognised<br />
principle of procedural law, from which it followed that no<br />
more than one European patent should be granted for the same<br />
invention, but that this was then shortened and thus<br />
erroneously redacted for the English version of the minutes.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">58. Either way,
the proper interpretation of this statement is<br />
rather that it “… </span><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">followed from </span></b><span lang="EN-US">the … principles of<br />
procedural law in the Contracting States that only one</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">European patent [can
be granted]…”. This is clear from the</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">corresponding
German version of the minutes (“BerichteMUCDK” in the EPO documentation): “… </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="DE">Aus den allgemein
anerkannten<br />
Grundsätzen des Verfahrensrechts der Vertragsstaaten </span></i><b><i><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldItalicMT, serif" lang="DE">ergibt<br />
sich</span></i></b><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="DE">, dass … </span></i><span lang="DE">”. </span><span lang="EN-US">The French version (“M-PR” in
the EPO<br />
documentation) conveys the same: “</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">… il </span></i><b><i><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">découle </span></i></b><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">des principes<br />
de procédure généralement admis dans les Etats contractants<br />
qu'il … </span></i><span lang="EN-US">”.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">59. It is also
apparent that the UK motion recorded in point 665.<br />
of R3 is the direct consequence of the UK’s comment in M/10.<br />
The Enlarged Board is not aware that this issue is treated<br />
anywhere else in the Minutes of the Diplomatic Conference.<br />
The only fact derivable from the wording of points 665. and<br />
666. (the latter is discussed below) is that the majority<br />
position was established and recorded. This majority<br />
agreement appears to have been established without preceding<br />
debate, as no discussion is recorded or even hinted at. This<br />
may also be concluded from the fact that FICPI’s question and<br />
the UK’s response on the definition of the “same invention”<br />
were recorded in detail (points 667. and 668. of R3). The<br />
referring decision noted that the issue was no longer<br />
mentioned by the Rapporteur of Main Committee I in his report<br />
to the Committee of the Whole (Reasons, point 58.).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.1.5 Minutes of
the Diplomatic Conference (R3), point 666.<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">60. According to
the minutes, the Norwegian delegation made a<br />
statement after the vote on the agreement referred to in<br />
point 665. Point 666. records the statement as follows:<br />
”</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">The Norwegian
delegation stated that it could not agree to<br />
this principle in its present general form since under</span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">Scandinavian law
it was possible in theory to grant two<br />
patents to an applicant for the same invention.</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">61. This statement
is compatible with the fact that the agreement<br />
recorded in point 665. was a majority agreement. Otherwise,<br />
as mentioned above, there is no indication in the minutes or<br />
elsewhere in the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux préparatoires </span></i><span lang="EN-US">that either double<br />
patenting or Article 125 was the subject of any further<br />
debate. Accordingly, this agreement is not only the last<br />
recorded statement of the competent legislator, but can also<br />
be taken as the expression of its final and unchanged<br />
intention on the question of double patenting.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.2
Interpretation of the agreement in point 665.<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">62. The
significance for the issue of double patenting of a<br />
majority agreement being reached and recorded in the minutes<br />
is not difficult to establish. In view of the wording of<br />
Article 125 EPC, and the fact that the agreement was<br />
explicitly linked to this article in the minutes, the<br />
straightforward interpretation of the agreement is that the<br />
(potential) Contracting States agreed that the prohibition on<br />
double patenting was a generally recognised principle of<br />
procedural law in the Contracting States and as such<br />
applicable under Article 125 EPC.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">63. In the opinion
of the Enlarged Board, there can be little<br />
doubt that an agreement established among the delegations was<br />
mentioned in the records for a purpose, and that this had to<br />
be clear to all delegations. The work of a diplomatic<br />
conference for establishing an international treaty is a<br />
serious matter, in which recorded agreements must carry<br />
weight. The purpose of the agreement recorded in point 665.<br />
of R3 is clear: it was to provide an interpretation of<br />
Article 125 EPC and have the provision applied in accordance</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">with this
interpretation. As is evident from the literature<br />
(and from the preparatory documents of the Vienna Convention<br />
itself), the practice of consulting the preparatory materials<br />
in order to determine the legislative intent behind treaty<br />
provisions was already long established in international law,<br />
even if this practice was not always accepted without<br />
reservation.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.3 Reservations
expressed in the referring decision<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">64. The Board
noted that the issue of double patenting arose<br />
during the discussions on Article 125 of the Convention, and<br />
that up to the Diplomatic Conference it was common ground<br />
that double patenting should not be possible. Nevertheless,<br />
the Board finally held that it could not be established<br />
beyond doubt that the prohibition on double patenting could<br />
indeed fall under Article 125 EPC or that an agreement to<br />
this effect was reached. It concluded: “The documents of the<br />
Munich Diplomatic Conference, however, fail to demonstrate<br />
that there was still agreement on the principle …” (Reasons,<br />
point 58.). The Board’s doubts appear to have been based on<br />
various factors emerging from the minutes: that a declaration<br />
at the Diplomatic Conference was originally planned (Reasons,<br />
point 57., referring to N3 and N4) but did not materialise,<br />
that the agreement was not reported to the Committee of the<br />
Whole, and that only a majority, not a unanimous, agreement<br />
was reached (Reasons, point 58., referring to N1, i.e. points<br />
665. and 666. of R3).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">65. The Enlarged
Board does not share the Board’s reservations.<br />
The various factors which it mentioned in connection with the<br />
agreement of point 665., and which were also put forward by<br />
the appellant, do not cast doubt on the validity of the<br />
agreement or its applicability for the interpretation of the<br />
Convention. On the contrary, the agreement as recorded was</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">sufficient for its
purpose, it did not require additional<br />
follow-up, and there is no indication that it lost support.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.3.1 Lack of
unanimous agreement among the contracting parties<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">66. The referring
decision came to the conclusion that the events<br />
recorded in points 665. and 666. of R3 could not demonstrate<br />
the existence of a common understanding or agreement among<br />
all Contracting States for the purposes of Article 31 VCLT,<br />
and could not be used either for establishing the prohibition<br />
in place of an express provision in the Convention through<br />
the application of Article 32 VCLT (Reasons, point 59.). This<br />
view may be correct if it is based on the premise that the<br />
events recorded in points 665. and 666. were evidence of only<br />
an attempt, and as such an unsuccessful act, to bring about a<br />
common understanding. However, in light of document M/10, it<br />
is clear that the “establishment of the majority agreement”<br />
was not merely an attempt, but a successful motion from the<br />
UK delegation, the primary purpose of which was to ensure the<br />
“mentioning in the records” of the previously established<br />
agreement on the principle of the prohibition.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">67. The fact that
the agreement did not find unanimous support<br />
does not preclude it from being taken into account as a means<br />
of interpreting the Convention. The agreed texts of the<br />
Convention were also established by majority vote, and even<br />
the adoption of the Convention as a whole only required a<br />
two-thirds majority of the Plenary (M/34, Rules 36(1) and<br />
(2)). Each State participating in the Conference was also<br />
entitled not to sign the Convention, or to sign it with<br />
certain reservations (Article 167 EPC 1973). However, Article<br />
125 could not be the subject of a reservation. From this it<br />
is clear that the adoption of the Convention by a Contracting<br />
State did not mean that, at the stage of the negotiations<br />
during the Diplomatic Conference, each and every Contracting</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">State already had
to agree specifically to each and every<br />
Article and Rule. The common agreement of all parties<br />
concerning the scope of the Convention as a whole was only<br />
achieved and attested by their signatures, followed by the<br />
appropriate ratification (Articles 165(1) and (2) EPC 1973,<br />
Articles 11, 12 and 14 VCLT), or by accession<br />
(Article 166 EPC 1973, Articles 11 and 15 VCLT).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.3.2 Intended
declaration referred to in R4<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">68. It was argued
by the appellant and also mentioned in the<br />
referring decision (Reasons, point 57.) that earlier<br />
documents suggested that there was to be a declaration on<br />
double patenting, instead of an express provision in the<br />
Convention. As recorded in point 119. of R4, it was decided<br />
that such a declaration should be contained in the minutes of<br />
the Diplomatic Conference. This point of R4 is also cited in<br />
the referring decision (Reasons, point 55.). The appellant<br />
argued that the agreement referred to in point 665. of R3 was<br />
not the intended declaration because it added the condition<br />
of the same filing date. The referring decision did not<br />
endorse this argument, but does appear to have agreed with<br />
the appellant that the agreement of point 665. could not be<br />
considered to be the aforementioned declaration (Reasons,<br />
points 57. and 58.), possibly because of the lack of<br />
unanimity and the absence of any follow-up.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">69. In the
Enlarged Board’s judgement, apart from the fact that<br />
R3 does not use the word “declaration” but “agreement” in<br />
point 665, there is no apparent reason why that agreement<br />
should not be taken as the intended interpretative<br />
declaration. The UK Government’s comments in M/10 make it<br />
clear that the motion of the UK delegation had the same<br />
objective as the foreseen declaration and that it effectively<br />
achieved the same result. The UK proposed that the</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">“understandings
[established at the 6th meeting should] be<br />
mentioned also in the records of the Diplomatic Conference”.<br />
Clearly, that happened, and once the agreement of point 665.<br />
was recorded, any further declaration was unnecessary.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.3.3 Omission
of the agreement by the rapporteur of the Main<br />
Committee I<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">70. The foregoing
conclusion also accords with the fact that the<br />
issue was no longer mentioned by the rapporteur of the Main<br />
Committee I in his report to the Committee of the Whole. The<br />
double patenting issue was discussed on several levels and<br />
occasions and the text of Article 125 remained unchanged.<br />
Establishing the agreement of the majority did not require<br />
any amendment to the text of the Convention, nor could it be<br />
seen as a resolution or recommendation, the adoption of which<br />
would have been in the competence of the Plenary (M/34,<br />
Rule 3(2)).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">71. The absence of
any mention in the rapporteur’s report to the<br />
Committee of the Whole confirms that the issue was not<br />
controversial and did not entail any serious discussion, as<br />
explained in point 59. above. Reference is made to the<br />
following account on page 183 of R3, in Chapter C, I.<br />
Preliminary Remark: “</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">[t]he present rapporteur considered it<br />
his duty to give the Committee of the Whole as comprehensive<br />
a survey as possible of the discussions of Main Committee I<br />
and the decisions which resulted therefrom. With this in mind<br />
items of discussion which were of lesser importance or which<br />
were more of a drafting nature have been deliberately ignored<br />
even where they led to amendments to the text</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”. For example,<br />
the unanimous opinion on the error correction in point 669 of<br />
R3 was not mentioned either by the rapporteur. Indeed, his<br />
report concentrates on the truly contentious issues. Given<br />
that the agreement of point 665. did not change the wording<br />
of Article 125, there was even less reason to mention it.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.3.4 Lack of proof
of a final agreement<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">72. The Enlarged
Board sees no circumstance indicating a lack of<br />
a final agreement or any change of opinion. It is not<br />
plausible that a change of opinion on double patenting could<br />
have occurred without any record in the minutes. In<br />
connection with the agreement the only dissent recorded is<br />
the statement of the Norwegian delegation in point 666. in R3<br />
(see point 60. above) explaining only after the majority<br />
agreement was established why it could not support the UK’s<br />
proposal. The Rules of Procedure expressly provided the<br />
possibility for delegations to explain their votes, even<br />
after a vote was held (M/34, Rule 39). It follows that<br />
Norway’s dissent does not imply that the issue was still<br />
open. Re-opening the debate, while possible, would have been<br />
difficult: if a delegation still wished to assert the view<br />
that the principle of the prohibition or its application by<br />
way of Article 125 was wrong, it would have had to make a<br />
proposal for reconsideration, which in turn would have<br />
required a two-thirds majority (M/34, Rule 34).<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">73. Moreover, if
the understanding with regard to the prohibition<br />
on double patenting previously established at the 6th Meeting<br />
and confirmed in point 665. of R3 had lost support, it would<br />
have deserved a mention by the rapporteur of the Main<br />
Committee I as well. The delegations in the Committee of the<br />
Whole would have had to be aware of such a situation when<br />
submitting the texts to the Plenary, likewise the delegations<br />
in the Plenary when voting for the Convention as a whole,<br />
including Article 125 in unamended form. The President of the<br />
EPO argues similarly (at point 40.) when he states that a<br />
subsequent change of view at such a late stage would have<br />
been reflected in the minutes.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.2.4 Agreement in
point 665. of R3 as a supplementary means of<br />
interpretation under Article 32 VCLT<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">74. Article 32
VCLT mentions both the preparatory work of a<br />
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion as<br />
supplementary means of interpretation. The agreement recorded<br />
in point 665. of R3 must be seen as an integral part of the<br />
legislative process, and not as intended to be a separate<br />
agreement or separate instrument of the parties possibly<br />
falling under Article 31(2)(a) or (b) VCLT and requiring the<br />
consent of all parties. If the texts of the Convention could<br />
be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote, and draft articles<br />
could be established by simple majority, it would not have<br />
made sense to expect explanatory statements to be adopted<br />
unanimously. Given that the Plenary of the Diplomatic<br />
Conference agreed to task Main Committee I with the<br />
preparation of the draft wording of Article 125 on behalf of<br />
the Plenary (the Committee of the Whole also being an organ<br />
of the Plenary, cf. M/34, Rule 3(2)), it was only logical<br />
that any interpretation of Article 125 should also be<br />
discussed in Main Committee I. Against this background, the<br />
agreement recorded in point 665. of R3 was established in<br />
accordance with the rules on decision-making which the<br />
Diplomatic Conference laid down for itself, and to that<br />
extent it is no less suitable as a means for determining the<br />
common intention of the Contracting States than any of the<br />
express provisions in the Convention.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">75. It is true
that the agreement recorded in point 665. of R3 is<br />
neither an agreement under Article 31(2)(a) VCLT nor an<br />
instrument under Article 31(2)(b) VCLT, as also noted in the<br />
comments of the President of the EPO (at point 42.).<br />
Nevertheless, it is a suitable and admissible means for<br />
determining the intention of the contracting parties<br />
concerning the scope and meaning of Article 125 EPC, and of</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">the Convention
more generally. Since an interpretation in<br />
accordance with Article 31 VCLT alone or in conjunction with<br />
the case law cannot dispel the ambiguity surrounding the<br />
question of double patenting, the meaning of the Convention<br />
is to be determined by establishing the intention of the<br />
parties. Pursuant to Article 32(a) VCLT, this may be done by<br />
recourse to the preparatory work of the treaty and the<br />
circumstances of its conclusion.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">76. Summing up,
the proposition that the majority agreement on<br />
double patenting as recorded in point 665. of R3 cannot be<br />
taken into account in interpreting the Convention is not<br />
tenable. The preparatory documents demonstrate with<br />
overwhelming certainty that there was a real and effective<br />
agreement that the European Patent Office should prohibit<br />
double patenting by taking into account principles of<br />
procedural law generally recognised in the Contracting<br />
States, i.e. by a direct application of Article 125 EPC.<br />
Furthermore, there must have been a common understanding<br />
among the potential signatories to the Convention that this<br />
majority agreement was made on behalf of the Plenary of the<br />
Diplomatic Conference and recorded with the purpose of<br />
defining the scope of Article 125, and that therefore the<br />
principle expressed in the agreement formed part of the<br />
Convention.<br />
</span><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.3 Other
suggestions for a legal basis<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">77. In view of
these findings, it is not necessary to examine the<br />
other provisions proposed as the proper legal basis for the<br />
prohibition on double patenting, i.e. Articles 60(1), 63(1)<br />
and 76(1) EPC. Nor is it necessary to determine the<br />
conditions for a legitimate interest in the proceedings or to<br />
examine if there is a need to fill a lacuna in the<br />
Convention. The analysis above shows that the prohibition is</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">to be derived from
the legislative intention underlying the<br />
Convention and that no lacuna exists.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">B.4 Consequence of
the established legislative intent for<br />
Article 125 EPC<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">78. Article 125
EPC expressly empowers and, indeed, possibly even<br />
instructs or obliges the European Patent Office to take into<br />
account (“berücksichtigt”, “prend en consideration”)<br />
generally recognised principles of procedural law, where the<br />
Convention is silent. Therefore, since the competent<br />
legislator, here the Diplomatic Conference, established that<br />
the prohibition on double patenting was a generally<br />
recognised principle as a question of fact, and in addition<br />
made it clear that this was a principle falling under Article<br />
125 EPC as a matter of interpretation of the law, the Office<br />
was thereby not only empowered to apply this principle but<br />
effectively also duty-bound to do so.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">79. At the time of
signing of the Convention, the statement of<br />
the delegations in point 665. of R3 had to be taken as proof<br />
that the principle of the prohibition on double patenting was<br />
a generally recognised principle in the Contracting States,<br />
and therefore the Office was correct to apply it from the<br />
start. No information has been brought to the Enlarged<br />
Board’s attention, nor has it been argued, that this<br />
situation might have changed, for example through the<br />
accession of new Contracting States, or as a result of more<br />
recent legislation in the Contracting States. Accordingly,<br />
there is no reason to conclude that the principle is no<br />
longer to be applied by the EPO.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">80. Overlapping
designations under Article 79 EPC are an<br />
additional precondition for the prohibition to apply. Neither<br />
the key statement in point 665. of R3 nor the previous<br />
agreement in point 49 of R2 provide an explanation of why the</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">EPO must take this
into account. However, there was no need<br />
for the records of the discussions at the Diplomatic<br />
Conference to make express mention in this context of the<br />
precondition of overlapping territorial effect because this<br />
principle was stated to originate in the Contracting States<br />
and is an inherent feature of national patents. On the other<br />
hand, the statements of Working Party I in the second and<br />
fourth paragraphs of point 118. of R4 (cited in point 90.<br />
below) show that the legislator was aware that double<br />
patenting only arises in the event of overlapping<br />
designations. Moreover, if the Office did not take this<br />
additional precondition into account, i.e. if it refused to<br />
grant a second European patent regardless of the status of<br />
the respective designations, the effect of such a strict<br />
prohibition would go beyond the scope of the original<br />
national principle and thus deprive it of its legal basis.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">81. For all these
reasons, Question 1 is to be answered in the<br />
affirmative.<br />
</span><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">C. Questions 2.1
and 2.2<br />
C.1.1 Question 2.1<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">82. The above
findings of the Enlarged Board confirm that on the<br />
question of double patenting under the EPC in the narrow<br />
sense the intent of the legislator is derivable from the<br />
preparatory documents of the Convention. According to this<br />
legislative intention, the prohibition is applicable “</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">for the<br />
same invention in respect of which there are several<br />
applications with the same date of filing</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”. In view of the<br />
general wording used, it is probable that different<br />
conditions for the constellations set out in Question 2.1<br />
were not envisaged.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">83. The appellant
argued that the agreement was restricted to<br />
applications with the same filing date, and for this reason<br />
the constellation of Question 2.1(c) was not covered.<br />
However, as the preparatory documents show, the final<br />
agreement referred to in point 665. of R3 was a confirmation<br />
of the earlier agreement at the 6th Meeting (point 49 of R2).<br />
The referring decision pointed out that the earlier agreement<br />
also contained the condition of the same filing date, but<br />
that this was likely to have been an inadvertent inaccuracy<br />
(Reasons, point 56.). It is reasonable to assume that this<br />
inaccuracy was taken over when the agreement in point 665. of<br />
R3 was established and recorded. As noted in point 80. above,<br />
the additional requirement that has been consistently applied<br />
by the Office, namely that the prohibition only applies where<br />
the application under examination and the already granted<br />
patent have common designated states, was not contained in<br />
the agreement of point 665. of R3 either.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">84. Furthermore,
the agreement in point 665. of R3 is not to be<br />
read as a legal provision in the usual sense, but rather as<br />
what it was intended to be, namely the expression of a<br />
general principle. Therefore, it cannot be expected to have<br />
been formulated with the precision of a legal provision.<br />
Against this background, the Enlarged Board considers that<br />
the requirement of the same date as stated in point 665. of<br />
R3 is to be understood as the same “effective date”, in line<br />
with the explanation in point 18. of the Reasons of the<br />
referring decision, such that applications with a common<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">priority are also
covered by the prohibition.<br />
</span><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">C.1.2 Conclusions
from the Minutes of the 10th Meeting of Working<br />
Party I (R4)<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">85. That the
prohibition on double patenting applies to all three<br />
of the constellations set out in referred Question 2.1 is<br />
confirmed by the parts of the preparatory work that preceded</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">the final
conclusion expressed in point 665. of R3. The<br />
Enlarged Board sees no reason to conclude, nor was any put<br />
forward in the referring decision, that those parts of the<br />
</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux
préparatoires </span></i><span lang="EN-US">which treat the various aspects of this<br />
question, i.e. the applicability of the prohibition in the<br />
different constellations of Question 2.1, are not a reliable<br />
source for exploring the legislative intent, or that the<br />
positions expressed there were later replaced by contrary<br />
ones. Nor is there any indication in the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux<br />
préparatoires </span></i><span lang="EN-US">or elsewhere that, despite mentioning no<br />
particular conditions, the final explicit statement of the<br />
legislator, i.e. the agreement recorded in point 665. of R3,<br />
was for some other reason intended not to be generally<br />
applicable. Indeed, the Board expressed the view (Reasons,<br />
point 55.) that the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux </span></i><span lang="EN-US">do not seem to support any<br />
exception for European applications having different filing<br />
dates but a common priority, because, as attested by R4 (see<br />
points 117-120), the double patenting prohibition was also<br />
discussed for such applications, and not only for divisional<br />
applications. Other decisions cited in the referring<br />
decision, e.g. T 2461/10 (supra, Reasons, point 14.), came to<br />
the same conclusion.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">86. The Enlarged
Board concurs with these findings of the<br />
referring decision and T 2461/10. Points 117. and 118. of R4<br />
provide a clear indication that the legislator’s intention to<br />
exclude protection for the same subject-matter covered not<br />
only parent-divisional pairs of applications but also<br />
applications with a common priority, because each point<br />
contains an identical statement to this effect (see also the<br />
referring decision, Reasons, point 55., where these<br />
statements are cited). Formally, point 117. is directed to<br />
divisional applications (Article 137a of the then Draft<br />
Convention), but its first paragraph already makes clear that</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">the considerations
are to be extended to parallel<br />
applications (i.e. constellation a) of Question 2.1) as well.<br />
Point 118. explicitly addresses applications with a common<br />
priority, thus demonstrating that the prohibition is also<br />
applicable to those.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">87. Reference is
also made to the comments of the President of<br />
the EPO, point 27., and to decision T 2563/11 (supra,<br />
Reasons, points 2.4 and 2.5), where the deciding board noted<br />
that point 120 of R4 provided a more detailed explanation of<br />
why, in the context of divisional applications, a provision<br />
prohibiting claims directed to the same subject-matter had<br />
been deleted, and why this provided support for the<br />
prohibition being of a more general nature. The same<br />
conclusion was drawn by the Board in the referring decision,<br />
Reasons, point 69., in connection with its analysis of<br />
Article 76(1) EPC. A comparison of the original and the<br />
amended wording of Article 137a (European divisional<br />
applications) illustrates this point.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">Article 137a(2) as
approved at the 9th meeting of Working<br />
Party I (in October 1971) was worded as follows:<br />
“</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">(1)…<br />
(2) The claims of the earlier application and any divisional<br />
application shall exclude the matter for which protection is<br />
sought by any of the other applications. Where possible, the<br />
description and drawings of each application shall relate<br />
only to the matter for which protection is sought by that<br />
application. However, when it is necessary for an application<br />
to describe the matter for which protection is sought by<br />
another application, it shall include a cross-reference to<br />
that other application.</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”<br />
(source: BR/134 e/71, cf. Introduction, point 2, explaining<br />
that this draft was the outcome of the 9th meeting of Working</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">Party I and that
it would be discussed at the 10th meeting;<br />
also cited in the referring decision, Reasons, point 54.)<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">Following the
deletions made at the 10th Meeting, Article<br />
137a(2) had this wording:<br />
“(2) </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">Where possible,
the description and drawings of the<br />
earlier and any divisional application shall relate only to<br />
the matter for which protection is sought by the respective<br />
application. However, when it is necessary for an application<br />
to describe the matter for which protection is sought by<br />
another application, it shall include a cross-reference to<br />
that other application.</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”<br />
(source: BR/139 e/71, cf. R4, point 4)<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">88. Considered in
isolation, the deletions from the wording of<br />
Article 137a of the Draft Convention may not point to a<br />
general prohibition on double patenting, but could on the<br />
contrary appear to endorse the possibility of claiming<br />
identical subject-matter. However, the correct explanation is<br />
to be found in the aforementioned point 120. of R4, and in<br />
this regard, rather than the English text (quoted by the<br />
President of the EPO in point 27. of his comments), it is<br />
more instructive to look at the German version (BR/144 d/71):<br />
“</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">Um einem
Umkehrschluss aus Artikel 137 a Absatz 2<br />
vorzubeugen, der dahin gehen könnte, dass - ausser bei<br />
Teilanmeldungen - die Patentansprüche späterer Anmeldungen<br />
denselben Gegenstand enthalten dürfen wie die Ansprüche<br />
früherer Anmeldungen, beschloss die Arbeitsgruppe, Satz 1<br />
dieser Bestimmung zu streichen.</span></i><span lang="EN-US">“ Thus the German version<br />
makes it clearer that the deletion was meant to prevent any<br />
inverse conclusion that only divisional applications had to<br />
be directed to different subject-matter, whereas other<br />
applications of the same applicant were permitted to claim<br />
the same invention. The French version (BR/144 f/71) conveys</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><span lang="EN-US">the same sense as
the German. Thus point 120. of R4 is<br />
consistent with the conclusion of the Enlarged Board’s above<br />
reasoning that the prohibition on double patenting is general<br />
and applies to all the constellations of Question 2.1.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">89. Thus the
Enlarged Board considers that the </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">travaux<br />
préparatoires </span></i><span lang="EN-US">do not point to any special circumstance or<br />
condition inherent in the identified constellations which<br />
would lead to the conclusion that any of the three<br />
constellations should be treated differently from the others<br />
with respect to the prohibition on double patenting. This<br />
gives the answer to Question 2.1.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">90. The appellant
also argued that the last sentence in the<br />
fourth paragraph of point 118. of R4 suggests that in cases<br />
of internal priority the legislator accepted an extended term<br />
of protection in respect of states designated in both the<br />
priority and the subsequent application. The following is<br />
stated there: “</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">The Working Party came to the conclusion that<br />
even when an applicant claimed the priority of an earlier<br />
European patent application, he should not be able to obtain<br />
the same patent twice for the same invention in the same<br />
designated States. It was not necessary, however, to provide<br />
a rule to this effect in the Convention. Under the present<br />
version of the Paris Convention, there would have to be an<br />
extended term for those States which were designated twice</span></i><span lang="EN-US">”.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span lang="EN-US">91. However, this
statement has to be read together with the<br />
condition described at the end of the second paragraph of<br />
point 118. of R4, namely the assumption that the earlier<br />
application would have been withdrawn in the meantime: </span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">“The<br />
majority of the delegations considered that Article 73 of the<br />
Convention [Priority right, essentially corresponding to<br />
Article 87 EPC 1973 and Article 87 EPC 2000] did not in</span></i><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
</span><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">principle prevent
an applicant from claiming the priority of<br />
an earlier European patent application, while Article 8 of<br />
the PCT in fact makes provision for this in respect of<br />
international applications. It did appear doubtful whether a<br />
State which had been designated in the earlier application<br />
could be designated again in the later European application,<br />
as this could lead to the term of the patent being extended<br />
by the time between the filing of the two applications </span></i><b><i><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">in the<br />
case of the earlier application being withdrawn during that<br />
time</span></i></b><i><span face="CourierNewPS-ItalicMT, serif" lang="EN-US">” </span></i><span lang="EN-US">(emphasis by the Enlarged Board). In the third<br />
paragraph of point 118. the Working Party established that<br />
the problem of an extended term was likely to disappear due<br />
to expected amendments to the Paris Convention (mentioned as<br />
the “Paris Union”). As a result, the extended term referred<br />
to can be understood as a combination of the term of<br />
protection under Article 64(1) EPC with that of provisional<br />
protection under Article 67(1) EPC (at that time Articles 18<br />
and 19, which essentially corresponded to the articles of the<br />
EPC 1973 and the present articles). In light of this, the<br />
statement of the Working Party relied on by the appellant<br />
does not concern the situation of double patenting in the<br />
narrow sense, nor does it contradict the Working Party’s<br />
preceding explicit statement that a second patent cannot be<br />
granted for the same invention even in the case of internal<br />
priority.<br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">C.2 Question 2.2<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">92. In light of
the above findings, it is clear that the<br />
legislator’s intention with respect to the prohibition on<br />
double patenting also extends to applications having a common<br />
priority. As stated above, the answer to Question 2.1 is that<br />
the prohibition applies to all three constellations<br />
identified. It follows that Question 2.2 does not require a<br />
separate answer.</span><span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-language: NL;"><br />
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span face="CourierNewPS-BoldMT, serif" lang="EN-US">Order<br />
For these reasons, it is decided that the questions<br />
referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal are answered as<br />
follows:<br />
</span></b><span lang="EN-US">1. A European
patent application can be refused under<br />
Articles 97(2) and 125 EPC if it claims the same subject<br />matter as a European
patent which has been granted to the<br />
same applicant and does not form part of the state of the art<br />
pursuant to Article 54(2) and (3) EPC.<br />
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<!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">2.1 The
application can be refused on that legal basis,<br />
irrespective of whether it<br />
a) was filed on the same date as, or<br />
b) is an earlier application or a divisional application<br />
(Article 76(1) EPC) in respect of, or<br />
c) claims the same priority (Article 88 EPC) as the European<br />
patent application leading to the European patent already<br />
granted.<br />
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<!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0cm;"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: inherit;">2.2 In view of the
answer to Question 2.1 a separate answer is<br />
not required.</span></p></div><br /><span><i>This decision G 4/19</i></span><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/9D699BFBD3CC2C11C12586FC00338610/$FILE/G_4_19_decision_of_the_Enlarged_Board_of_Appeal_of_22_June_2021_en.pdf">pdf</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span></span></i></span><i>[not yet known]</i><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span>The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/application?number=EP10718590&lng=de&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> Photo</span><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span>170330-double-exposure-tulips-fence.jpg<span style="font-family: inherit;"> by </span><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/zionfiction/" target="_blank">r. nial bradshawm</a></span></i><i><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/zionfiction/" target="_blank">obtained</a> v</i><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">ia <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/zionfiction/34621632305/in/photolist-UKoV5V-7kui9p-6rBpiW-4ch5EM-diYXMh-GR47SB-pbWw2y-2fsYjxD-2kRzGPG-2gGvFXV-5T6cZW-DJpWTL-DY6NQv-NqP6XD-mT4KWQ-2kpzur6-2jLQ5WM-c4nePy-bHKzFt-tqaej-rzycKX-23EtAr4-5cLk7z-89EuUm-H6aub9-BRgzrP-as9uDg-iZxYjB-5HxLZm-qkobfu-4E23DF-5HpBSS-2ks9Pd6-qBSnLA-ceLre9-s2FZyg-6DrCJa-pEWwcC-4seswc-4PhF84-yA7gAy-9D8BRG-5HBBLu-8fmXsr-btgN37-kJU3Kp-3c7gzY-6hSyhW-4yVn5-ri7ege" target="_blank">Flickr</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/zionfiction/34621632305/in/photolist-UKoV5V-7kui9p-6rBpiW-4ch5EM-diYXMh-GR47SB-pbWw2y-2fsYjxD-2kRzGPG-2gGvFXV-5T6cZW-DJpWTL-DY6NQv-NqP6XD-mT4KWQ-2kpzur6-2jLQ5WM-c4nePy-bHKzFt-tqaej-rzycKX-23EtAr4-5cLk7z-89EuUm-H6aub9-BRgzrP-as9uDg-iZxYjB-5HxLZm-qkobfu-4E23DF-5HpBSS-2ks9Pd6-qBSnLA-ceLre9-s2FZyg-6DrCJa-pEWwcC-4seswc-4PhF84-yA7gAy-9D8BRG-5HBBLu-8fmXsr-btgN37-kJU3Kp-3c7gzY-6hSyhW-4yVn5-ri7ege" target="_blank"> </a>under </span><a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">CC BY 2.0 license</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (no changes made).</span></i>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-89850542321154338092021-06-15T09:21:00.000+02:002021-06-15T09:21:32.884+02:00D 11/19 - Pilot project EQE 2019 on a computer: legality & equal treatment challenged in appeal<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPQSq8GlSeLCJKGyT01gjOFAaKlUkULUzSq4XvqVE7sG__zgRo3Sqxp8rQ5yAmNQ5VSz4eej81Eybh7T4YiChRNSmzWb-ebvVPi7Um_JCC0_cHhbOfW09VvPX4uEBFjQkctnbQtv9zwfBu/s2048/2021.06.15+paper-computer+4251082322_dd5c5fca19_o.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1539" data-original-width="2048" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgPQSq8GlSeLCJKGyT01gjOFAaKlUkULUzSq4XvqVE7sG__zgRo3Sqxp8rQ5yAmNQ5VSz4eej81Eybh7T4YiChRNSmzWb-ebvVPi7Um_JCC0_cHhbOfW09VvPX4uEBFjQkctnbQtv9zwfBu/w400-h300/2021.06.15+paper-computer+4251082322_dd5c5fca19_o.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><p><i>In this EQE appeal against a decision awarding 41 marks for paper B 2019, "requests were made to revoke the decision and to have to quantify the extent to which the advantage of the participants in the "pilot project" of the EQE 2019 was reflected in a better result, and based on this knowledge, in particular to reevaluate task B of the complainant, so that the complainant's entire 2019 EQE is deemed to have been passed". "As an alternative, it is requested to revoke the decision and to arrange for the examination committee to quantify the extent to which the advantage of the participants in the "pilot project" of the EQE 2019 was reflected in a better result, and based on this knowledge, in particular, task B of the complainant is reassigned rate so that the complainant's entire 2019 EQE is deemed to have been passed". Various further requests were filed. The Disciplinary Board summarized this part of the complaint as "The complainant [finally] complains about a violation of the principle of equal treatment and an impairment of the impartiality of the examiners in connection with the implementation of the pilot test on the occasion of the European qualifying examination 2019, in which 15 selected applicants were allowed to write the work on task B with the help of a computer. He specifically asserts practical simplifications in the preparation of the work using a computer, which resulted in a considerable time advantage and better examination conditions. In view of the small number of 15 participants, anonymity and impartiality in the correction were not guaranteed. Overall, the regular applicants in the European qualifying examination 2019 were clearly at a disadvantage,"</i></p><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b style="background-color: transparent;">Sachverhalt und Anträge</b></div></div></div><div><div><br /></div><div>I. Der Beschwerdeführer wendet sich gegen die mit der Entscheidung der Prüfungskommission vom 1. Juli 2019 getroffene Feststellung des Nichtbestehens der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung, und zwar bezüglich der dieser Entscheidung zugrunde liegenden Benotung der Aufgabe B mit 39 Punkten.</div><div><br /></div><div>II. Mit Schreiben vom 23. Juli 2019 legte der Beschwerdeführer hiergegen form- und fristgerecht Beschwerde ein. Der Beschwerdeführer stellte folgende Anträge:</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Es wird beantragt, die Entscheidung aufzuheben und hinsichtlich der Punktebewertung der Aufgabe B dahingehend abzuändern, dass die Aufgabe B in der Entscheidung mit wenigstens 45 Punkten bewertet wird und somit die gesamte europäische Eignungsprüfung als bestanden zu bewerten ist. ?"</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Ebenfalls wird beantragt die beiden Korrekturen hinsichtlich der Aufgabe B im Original oder als Kopie des Originals komplett, d.h. mit der jeweiligen detaillierten Bepunktung zu übersenden. ?"</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Es wird zudem beantragt detaillierte Informationen über das "pilot project" und die für das "pilot project" ausgewählten 15 Kandidaten, wie z.B. Punktzahlen der 15 Kandidaten in jeder der Aufgaben A, B, C und D, deren Nationalitäten, Alter, Geschlecht, Wohnsitze, Anzahl an Versuchen der Prüfung bzw. der Aufgaben A, B, C und D, sowie die Auswahlkriterien, einen genauen Ablauf der Prüfung, Informationen über die Räumlichkeiten, in der die Prüfung abgelegt wurde (z.B. Platzangebot eines Kandidaten, Größe des Raumes, etc), sowie die Ergebnisse des "pilot projects" zu übersenden bzw. offenzulegen. ?"</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Weiter wird die Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr beantragt."</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Hilfsweise wird beantragt, dass die betreffende Lösung der Aufgabe B, mit der Anordnung diese mit wenigstens 45 Punkten zu bewerten, zur erneuten Bewertung zurück an die entsprechende Stelle bzw. die Prüfungskommission oder an den Prüfungsausschuss verwiesen wird."</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Ferner wird hilfsweise eine mündliche Verhandlung beantragt."</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Für den Fall, dass sich nach der Beschwerde bzw. dem Beschwerdeverfahren, einer eventuellen Rückverweisung und/oder einer etwaigen mündlichen Verhandlung für die Prüfungsaufgabe B insgesamt weniger als 45 Punkte ergeben, wird hiermit zudem hilfsweise beantragt, dass die komplette Prüfungsaufgabe B der europäischen Eignungsprüfung (EEP) 2019 nochmals geschrieben bzw. kostenfrei wiederholt wird."</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Für den Fall, dass der Beschwerde stattgegeben und die Aufgabe B mit wenigstens 45 Punkten bewertet wird, wird zudem beantragt, dass die bereits entrichtete Anmeldungs- und Prüfungsgebühr für die EEP 2020 vollständig zurückgezahlt wird."</div><div><br /></div><div>III. Mit Schreiben vom 11. September 2019 legte die Prüfungskommission die Beschwerde der Beschwerdekammer in Disziplinarangelegenheiten (im Folgenden: Beschwerdekammer) vor. Sie merkte an, dass die Beurteilung der mit der Beschwerde vorgebrachten Argumente ergeben habe, dass 2 Punkte zu wenig vergeben worden seien, so dass die Arbeit des Beschwerdeführers mit 41 Punkten zu bewerten sei. Damit könnte aber nicht dem Antrag auf Bewertung mit wenigstens 45 Punkten stattgegeben werden.</div><div><br /></div><div>IV. Dem Präsidenten des Europäischen Patentamts (EPA) und dem Präsidenten des Rats des Instituts der zugelassenen Vertreter (epi) wurde gemäß Artikel 24 (4) VEP i.V.m. Artikel 12 VDV Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme gegeben. Es sind keine schriftlichen Stellungnahmen zu der Beschwerde eingegangen.</div><div><br /></div><div>V. Mit Schreiben datiert vom 7. Oktober 2019 rügte der Beschwerdeführer eine Verletzung des rechtlichen Gehörs im Rahmen der Abhilfe und stellte die folgenden Anträge "zusätzlich zu den bereits bestehenden Anträgen":</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Es wird beantragt die Korrektur und/oder die Korrekturen bzgl. der (nicht gegebenen) Abhilfe hinsichtlich der Aufgabe B, welcher die Entscheidung der Prüfungskommission vom 11.09.2019 zugrunde liegt, im Original oder als Kopie des Originals komplett, d.h. mit der jeweiligen detaillierten Bepunktung und den entsprechenden vollständigen, detaillierten Argumenten zu übersenden. ?"</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Weiterhin wird nochmals beantragt bzw. darauf hingewiesen, wie bereits schon in der Beschwerdeschrift vom 23.07.2019 beantragt, die beiden (Erst-) Korrekturen hinsichtlich der Aufgabe B komplett im Original oder als Kopie des Originals komplett, d.h. mit der jeweiligen detaillierten Bepunktung zu übersenden. Auch in diesem Fall sind, wie oben erwähnt, die jeweiligen detaillierten Argumente beizufügen. ..."</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Zudem wird nochmals beantragt bzw. darauf hingewiesen, wie bereits ebenfalls schon in der Beschwerdeschrift vom 23.07.2019 beantragt, detaillierte Informationen über das "pilot project" 2019 und die für das "pilot project" ausgewählten 15 Kandidaten, wie z.B. die erreichten Punktzahlen der 15 Kandidaten in jeder der Aufgaben A, B, C und D, deren Nationalitäten, Alter, Geschlecht, Wohnsitze, Anzahl an Versuchen der Prüfung bzw. der Aufgaben A, B, C und D, sowie die Auswahlkriterien, einen genauen Ablauf der Prüfung, Informationen über die Räumlichkeiten, in der die Prüfung abgelegt wurde (z.B. Platzangebot eines Kandidaten, Größe des Raumes, etc), sowie die Ergebnisse des "pilot projects" dem Beschwerdeführer zu übersenden bzw. offenzulegen. ..."</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Da der vorliegende Sachverhalt auch für weitere "normale" Kandidaten relevant ist, insbesondere die Thematik um das "pilot project", wird hiermit im Sinne einer größtmöglichen Transparenz zudem beantragt, dass für den Fall einer Anberaumung einer mündlichen Verhandlung die mündliche Verhandlung schriftlich, visuell und akustisch durch den Beschwerdeführer komplett aufgezeichnet werden darf und diese Aufzeichnungen später auch durch den Beschwerdeführer veröffentlicht werden dürfen. Zusätzlich wird beantragt, ein vollständiges schriftliches Protokoll der mündlichen Verhandlung anfertigen zu lassen, welches dem Beschwerdeführer später komplett übersendet wird, und welches der Beschwerdeführer ebenfalls vollständig veröffentlichen darf."</div><div><br /></div><div>- "? wird zusätzlich beantragt die Entscheidung der Prüfungskommission vom 11.09.2019 bezüglich der Abhilfe aufzuheben, und die Prüfungskommission anzuweisen über die Abhilfe neu zu entscheiden mit der Maßgabe der Beschwerde abzuhelfen bzw. die Aufgabe B mit wenigstens 45 Punkten zu bewerten. Ebenfalls wird zusätzlich beantragt die neue Entscheidung über die Abhilfe bzw. die der neuen Entscheidung zugrunde liegende Korrektur und/oder Korrekturen der Aufgabe B mit der entsprechenden detaillierten Bepunktung sowie den vollständigen Argumenten dem Beschwerdeführer zu übersenden."</div><div><br /></div><div>- "Zusätzlich wird im Sinne einer größtmöglichen Transparenz bzgl. des "pilot project" 2019 beantragt, die Erwägungen und detaillierten begründeten Entscheidungsgründe der Entscheidungsträger bzgl. der Durchführung des Projekts, dessen Ziele, Aufgaben, Ergebnisse und den detaillierten Durchführungsablauf sowie die rechtlichen Grundlagen für die Durchführung des Projekts dem Beschwerdeführer zu übersenden."</div><div><br /></div><div>Abschließend ersuchte der Beschwerdeführer die Beschwerdekammer, "die Entscheidung der Prüfungskommission vom 01.07.2019 bzw. vom 11.09.2019 (Abhilfe) aufzuheben bzw. dahingehend abzuändern, dass die Prüfungsaufgabe B mit wenigstens 45 Punkten zu bewerten ist, und somit die gesamte europäische Eignungsprüfung als bestanden zu bewerten ist."</div><div><br /></div><div>VI. Mit Schreiben vom 25. November 2019 trug der Beschwerdeführer weitere Argumente vor. Er beantragte "zusätzlich zu den bereits in der Beschwerdeschrift vom 23.07.2019 und der Eingabe vom 07.10.2019 vorgetragenen Anträgen":</div><div><br /></div><div>"Es wird beantragt detailliert darzulegen, wie die Korrektur, insbesondere die Korrektur bzgl. der Antworten der 15 ausgewählten Kandidaten durchgeführt wurde. Es ist dabei insbesondere anzugeben, welche Korrektoren diese Antworten korrigiert haben. Auch ist insbesondere anzugeben, wie genau die Antworten der Kandidaten an die Korrektoren verteilt wurden. ?"</div><div><br /></div><div>Abschließend ersuchte der Beschwerdeführer die Beschwerdekammer, "die Entscheidung der Prüfungskommission vom 01.07.2019 bzw. vom 11.09.2019 (Abhilfe) aufzuheben bzw. dahingehend abzuändern, dass die Prüfungsaufgabe B mit wenigstens 45 Punkten zu bewerten ist, und somit die gesamte europäische Eignungsprüfung als bestanden zu bewerten ist."</div><div><br /></div><div><div>VII. Am 17. Februar 2020 erging eine Mitteilung der Beschwerdekammer gemäß Artikel 14 VOBKD. Da der Beschwerdeführer einer Ladung mit verkürzter Frist nicht zustimmte, wurde die mündliche Verhandlung am 6. Juli 2020 angesetzt.</div><div><br /></div><div>VIII. Mit Schreiben vom 2. Juli 2020 nahm Herr X, Direktor des Direktorats 5.1.3 "Patentakademie und EQE", zu schriftlich gestellten Fragen der Beschwerdekammer betreffend den Pilotversuch anlässlich der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 Stellung.</div><div><br /></div><div>IX. Mit Eingabe vom 2. Juli 2020 trug der Beschwerdeführer weitere Argumente zum Pilotversuch anlässlich der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 vor. Er beantragte "zusätzlich zu den bereits bestehenden Anträgen", </div></div></div><div><br /></div><div>[...]</div><div><br /></div><div><div>XIII. Das Vorbringen des Beschwerdeführers betrifft im Wesentlichen drei Punkte:</div><div><br /></div><div>a) Der Beschwerdeführer beanstandet zunächst eine fehlerhafte Anwendung der Bewertungsvorlage durch die Prüfer. Nach dem Bewertungsschema hätten verschiedene Teile seiner Arbeit mit einer höheren Punktezahl bewertet werden müssen.</div><div><br /></div><div>b) Der vom Beschwerdeführer abweichend vom erwarteten Bereich gewählte Schmelztemperaturbereich habe mehrfach zu Punkteabzügen geführt (nämlich bei der Bewertung der Änderungen der Ansprüche, der Darlegung der Grundlagen der Änderungen sowie der Neuheit). Es liege insoweit eine unzulässige "Doppelbestrafung" von bloßen Folgefehlern vor.</div><div><br /></div><div>c) Der Beschwerdeführer beanstandet schließlich eine Verletzung des Gleichbehandlungsgebots sowie eine Beeinträchtigung der Unvoreingenommenheit der Prüfer im Zusammenhang mit der Durchführung des Pilotversuchs anlässlich der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019, bei dem 15 ausgewählten Bewerbern erlaubt wurde, die Arbeit zur Aufgabe B mit Hilfe eines Computers zu verfassen. Er macht namentlich praktische Erleichterungen bei der Anfertigung der Arbeiten unter Verwendung eines Computers geltend, die in einem erheblichen Zeitvorteil und besseren Prüfungsbedingungen resultierten. In Anbetracht der geringen Zahl von 15 Teilnehmern sei auch die Anonymität sowie die Unvoreingenommenheit bei der Korrektur nicht gewährleistet gewesen. Insgesamt seien die regulären Bewerber in der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 deutlich im Nachteil gewesen, aber dennoch gleich beurteilt worden.</div></div><div><br /></div><b>Entscheidungsgründe</b><br /><div><br /></div><div>[...]</div><div><br /></div><div>6.3 Die Beanstandungen des Beschwerdeführers, die Bewertungsvorlage sei durch die Prüfer nicht korrekt angewandt worden, laufen nach dem Gesagten auf eine Überprüfung der zugrunde liegenden Werturteile hinaus, die außerhalb der Kompetenz der Beschwerdekammer liegt. Gleiches gilt für Beanstandungen, denen zufolge Teile der Prüfungsarbeit des Beschwerdeführers mehr Punkte verdient hätten. Diese Beanstandungen werden daher als unzulässig zurückgewiesen.</div><div><br /></div><div>[...]</div><div><br /></div><div>7.4 Die vorstehenden Erwägungsgründe machen deutlich, dass es dem Beschwerdeführer anhand des ihm übersandten Bewertungsbogens mit der Punktewertung der beiden Prüfer und der weiteren veröffentlichten Unterlagen (namentlich dem Prüferbericht) durchaus möglich war, die angefochtene Entscheidung der Prüfungskommission auf eine mögliche "Doppelbestrafung" hin zu prüfen. Einer Vorlage allfällig vorhandener Notizen der Prüfer zur Korrektur seiner Arbeit bedurfte es daher nicht (dazu Punkt 4.). Für die Feststellung eines eindeutigen Fehlers sind geringfügige Abweichungen von der Bewertungsvorlage nicht ausreichend, die sich im Beurteilungsspielraum der Prüfer bewegen. Denn solche Einzelheiten der Notengebung der Prüfer sind nicht justiziabel, so dass auch kein schützenswertes Interesse an deren Offenlegung bestehen kann. Schwere und eindeutige Fehler sind andrerseits auch ohne Einzelheiten zur Notengebung der Prüfer feststellbar, wenn Bewerber die erforderliche Objektivität bei der persönlichen Einschätzung ihrer Arbeit an den Tag legen. Die Beschwerdekammer konnte daher dem Beschwerdeführer nicht darin folgen, dass die Aufschlüsselung der Punktevergabe in den Bewertungsbögen nicht hinreichend detailliert sei, um dem Beschwerdeführer den erforderlichen Nachweis eines schweren und eindeutigen Fehlers zu ermöglichen.</div><div><br /></div><div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">8. Verletzung des Gebots der Gleichbehandlung</span></b></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">8.1 Der Beschwerdeführer berief sich auf eine Verletzung des Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatzes sowie eine Beeinträchtigung der Unvoreingenommenheit der Prüfer im Zusammenhang mit der Durchführung eines Pilotversuchs anlässlich der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019</span>. Es hätten nicht für alle Bewerber die gleichen Bedingungen bei der Prüfung gegolten. Der Beschwerdeführer machte namentlich praktische Erleichterungen bei der Anfertigung der Arbeiten unter Verwendung eines Computers geltend, die sich in einem erheblichen Zeitvorteil und besseren Prüfungsbedingungen niedergeschlagen hätten. In Anbetracht der geringen Zahl von 15 Teilnehmern sei auch nicht die Unvoreingenommenheit der Prüfer bei der Korrektur gewährleistet gewesen. Insgesamt seien die regulären Bewerber deutlich im Nachteil gewesen, aber dennoch nach den gleichen Kriterien wie die Teilnehmer am Pilotversuch beurteilt worden. Im Einzelnen machte der Beschwerdeführer eine Verletzung der Artikel 1 (3) und 20 VEP geltend. Schließlich beanstandete der Beschwerdeführer das Fehlen einer Rechtsgrundlage für den Pilotversuch.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">8.2 In tatsächlicher Hinsicht stellt die Beschwerdekammer zunächst Folgendes fest:</span></div><div><br /></div><div>8.2.1 Im Rahmen der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 wurde ein Pilotversuch durchgeführt. Unter den Bewerbern, die in München alle Aufgaben A bis D der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 ablegten, wurden 15 Kandidaten nach dem Zufallsprinzip ausgewählt und Ende Januar 2019 angefragt, ob sie am Pilotversuch anlässlich der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung vom 26. bis 28. Februar 2019 teilnehmen wollten. <span style="color: #990000;">Den Teilnehmern wurde für die Europäische Eignungsprüfung ein Laptop mit einem einfachen Text-Editor zur Verfügung gestellt, mit dem sie die Aufgaben bearbeiten konnten (Mitteilung des Prüfungssekretariats vom 25. Januar 2019). Es war ihnen allerdings freigestellt, ihre Antworten statt in elektronischer Form handschriftlich abzufassen (siehe Schreiben vom 2. Juli 2020 von Herrn X). Den Teilnehmern stand auch ein PDF-Viewer zur Verfügung, mit dem die Prüfungsaufgaben gelesen und der Text der Aufgabe durchsucht und kopiert (aber nicht markiert) werden konnte (siehe Handbuch für den erweiterten Pilotversuch 2020, Version 4.0, Oktober 2019)</span>.</div><div><br /></div><div>8.2.2 Da der Beschwerdeführer alle vier Aufgaben der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 in München ablegte, wäre er als Teilnehmer des Pilotversuchs in Frage gekommen. <span style="color: #990000;">Allerdings konnte er sich nicht als Teilnehmer bewerben und wurde auch nicht als Teilnehmer ausgelost. <b>Anders als die Teilnehmer am Pilotversuch erhielt der Beschwerdeführer also in der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 keinen Laptop zur Verfügung gestellt und hatte auch nicht die Wahlmöglichkeit, alle Prüfungsaufgaben mit Hilfe eines Computers oder handschriftlich zu bearbeiten.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>8.2.3 Was die Ergebnisse des Pilotversuchs 2019 anbelangt, gibt das Schreiben vom 2. Juli 2020 von Herrn X kaum Aufschluss. Es finden sich keine konkreten Angaben, etwa zum Anteil handschriftlicher Arbeiten oder zu den erzielten Noten. Die Daten zeigten angeblich keine signifikanten Unterschiede in der Benotung gegenüber Bewerbern, die alle Prüfungsteile unter regulären Bedingungen absolviert hätten.</div><div><br /></div><div>Das Auskunftsbegehren der Beschwerdekammer bleibt damit im Wesentlichen unbeantwortet. Der Versuch, diese faktische Verweigerung einer Auskunft mit Artikel 3 (5) VEP zu rechtfertigen, ist wohl einer falsch verstandenen Amtsverschwiegenheit (Artikel 23 VEP) geschuldet. Artikel 15 VDV sei in Erinnerung gerufen.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">Wiewohl der Hinweis im Schreiben vom 2. Juli 2020 auf die statistisch wenig aussagekräftige Anzahl der Teilnehmer am Pilotversuch nachvollziehbar ist, so widerspricht dieses Argument doch dem erklärten Ziel eines Pilotversuchs, belastbare Daten zu erhalten, auf deren Grundlage eine fundierte Entscheidung über die Modernisierung der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung getroffen werden kann. Darüber hinaus stellt das Argument die Behauptung in Frage, dass keine signifikanten Abweichungen in der Benotung festgestellt wurden. Letztendlich ist dies auch kein tragfähiger Grund, der Beschwerdekammer vorhandene Daten nicht zur Verfügung zu stellen.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">Die für die (wegen der Pandemie entfallene) Europäische Eignungsprüfung 2020 ursprünglich geplante Ausweitung des Pilotversuchs legt nach Auffassung der Beschwerdekammer jedenfalls nahe, dass die Vorzüge einer unter Verwendung eines Computers abgelegten Europäischen Eignungsprüfung etwaige "Herausforderungen" überwogen.</span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>8.3 In rechtlicher Hinsicht ist Folgendes zu prüfen:</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>- Durfte der Beschwerdeführer den Verstoß gegen das Gebot der Gleichbehandlung mit der Beschwerde gegen die Prüfungsentscheidung geltend machen oder hätte er diesen Rechtsfehler zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt beanstanden müssen?</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>- Besteht eine gesetzliche Grundlage für die Durchführung eines Pilotversuchs?</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>- Ist das Gebot der Gleichbehandlung durch den Pilotversuch verletzt?</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>- Beansprucht der Beschwerdeführer eine Gleichbehandlung im Unrecht?</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>- Wie ist ein Vorteil/Nachteil zu quantifizieren und im Verhältnis zur individuellen Leistung zu setzen?</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>8.3.1 Zeitpunkt der Beanstandung</div><div><br /></div><div>a) Beanstandungen über den Ablauf der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung sind gemäß Regel 19 (3) ABVEP spätestens 30 Minuten nach dem Schlusssignal am letzten Prüfungstag gegenüber der leitenden Aufsichtsperson schriftlich unter Darlegung der Tatsachen vorzubringen. Diese Vorschrift stellt sicher, dass die Prüfungskommission die Umstände feststellen kann, die Anlass zur Beanstandung gaben, bevor sie gemäß Regel 19 (4) ABVEP eine Entscheidung trifft oder die vorgebrachten Tatsachen in der Entscheidung über das Prüfungsergebnis gemäß Artikel 6 (5) VEP behandelt. Unterlässt es ein Bewerber, eine Beanstandung gemäß Regel 19 (3) ABVEP vorzubringen, bleibt sie unberücksichtigt, so dass auch eine spätere Befassung der Beschwerdekammer in Disziplinarangelegenheiten mit einer solchen Beanstandung im Rahmen einer Beschwerde gegen die Entscheidung über das Prüfungsergebnis ausgeschlossen ist (D 3/10, Punkt 14 der Entscheidungsgründe).</div><div><br /></div><div>b) Aufgrund des Sachzusammenhangs und des Ermittlungszwecks von Regel 19 (3) ABVEP unterliegen nach Auffassung der Beschwerdekammer indessen nur solche Abweichungen vom regulären Ablauf der Prüfung der Obliegenheit zur Beanstandung, die von Teilnehmern im Verlauf der Prüfung festgestellt und im unmittelbaren Anschluss daran von der Prüfungskommission überprüft werden können. Der Pilotversuch anlässlich der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 wurde allerdings räumlich getrennt durchgeführt. Er beeinträchtigte folglich nicht den regulären Ablauf der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 in München und war für die übrigen Teilnehmer der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 - von der Ankündigung am 25. Januar 2019 abgesehen - nicht feststellbar. <span style="color: #990000;">Der Pilotversuch ist auch qualitativ nicht mit den in Regel 19 VEP angesprochenen Beeinträchtigungen des Ablaufs einer Prüfung vergleichbar. Für die Teilnehmer am Pilotversuch waren spezielle Bedingungen angeordnet. Die Beanstandung des Beschwerdeführers betrifft also keine Abweichung von regulären Anweisungen während der Durchführung der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019, die einer zeitnahen Feststellung der Umstände zur Beweissicherung bedürfen, sondern besondere Prüfungsbedingungen für die Teilnehmer am Pilotversuch. Daher kommt Regel 19 (3) ABVEP nach Auffassung der Beschwerdekammer vorliegend nicht zum Tragen.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>c) Davon abgesehen hat der Beschwerdeführer erst nachträglich vom Pilotversuch Kenntnis erlangt. Ein Vorbringen zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt als mit seiner Beschwerde war daher gar nicht möglich und nach Treu und Glauben auch nicht zu erwarten. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Im Rahmen der Abhilfe nach Artikel 24 (3) VEP hätte die Prüfungskommission durchaus die Möglichkeit und Pflicht gehabt, ihre Entscheidung über das Prüfungsergebnis gemäß Artikel 6 (5) VEP im Lichte des Vorbringens des Beschwerdeführers zu prüfen.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>8.3.2 Gesetzliche Grundlage für den Pilotversuch</div><div><br /></div><div>a) In seinem Schreiben vom 2. Juli 2020 berief sich Herr X auf Artikel 9 (2) b) VEP. Diese Bestimmung überträgt dem Prüfungssekretariat die Aufgabe, die Europäische Eignungsprüfung vorzubereiten und zu organisieren. Diese Vollzugskompetenz erlaubt dem Prüfungssekretariat und verpflichtet dieses sogar, in seinem Zuständigkeitsbereich generelle Anordnungen zur Durchführung der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung zu treffen (zu den Anweisungen an die Bewerber für den Ablauf der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung siehe nachstehend). <span style="color: #990000;">Solche Anordnungen für die praktische Durchführung der Prüfung können offene oder unbestimmte Normen der VEP und ABVEP konkretisieren und Ermessensspielräume ausfüllen. Die Anweisungen dürfen aber nicht über die VEP und ABVEP hinausgehen oder von diesen abweichen (vgl. Artikel 1 (6) VEP). Das Prüfungssekretariat kann sich auf dem Weg von Anordnungen zudem keine weitergehenden Befugnisse einräumen, als sie nach der VEP und der ABVEP besitzt.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>Bei der Konkretisierung der Vorgaben der VEP oder ABVEP steht dem Prüfungssekretariat ein gewisses Ermessen zu, insoweit es die Befugnis haben muss, unter mehreren denkbaren Anordnungen diejenige auszuwählen, die sachgerecht ist. Das Ermessen ist aber pflichtgebunden. Denn das Prüfungssekretariat ist gehalten, im Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit eine einheitliche und sachgerechte Rechtsanwendung sicherzustellen. <span style="color: #990000;">Sofern die Durchführung eines Pilotversuchs nicht ohnehin die Ermächtigung zur Organisation der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung überschreitet, weil ein solcher Pilotversuch gerade außerhalb der regulären Bedingungen stattfindet, so lässt Artikel 9 (2) b) VEP dafür höchstens insoweit Raum, als die einheitliche und sachgerechte Rechtsanwendung gewährleistet ist. Problematisch erweist sich dabei die Einheitlichkeit, die sich vorliegend mit der Beanstandung der Verletzung des Gleichbehandlungsgebots überschneitet, da der Pilotversuch anlässlich der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 lediglich mit 15 Bewerbern durchgeführt wurde. <b>Die Beschwerdekammer kann daher offenlassen, ob Artikel 9 (2) b) VEP als Rechtsgrundlage für einen Pilotversuch genügt, und sich auf die Frage der beanstandeten Verletzung des Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatzes beschränken.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>b) Gemäß Punkt 9 a) der Anweisungen an die Bewerber für den Ablauf der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung, ABl. EPA 2019, Zusatzpublikation 2, 36, nachstehend: Anweisungen), <span style="color: #990000;">ist den Bewerbern nicht gestattet, elektronische Geräte - mit Ausnahme einer analogen Armbanduhr ohne Zusatzfunktionen - zur Vorprüfung oder Hauptprüfung mitzubringen, es sei denn, deren Verwendung ist vom Prüfungssekretariat vorab genehmigt worden. Die Beschwerdekammer hat erwogen, ob sich der Pilotversuch auf eine Genehmigung im Sinne des zweiten Halbsatzes von Punkt 9 a) der Anweisungen stützen ließe.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>Die Voraussetzungen, unter denen das Prüfungssekretariat die Verwendung elektronischer Geräte genehmigen kann, sind unbestimmt. Dem Wortlaut zufolge verfügt das Prüfungssekretariat somit über ein nahezu freies Ermessen, selbst wenn die Genehmigung als Ausnahme vom Verbot der Mitnahme solcher Geräte formuliert ist. Die Erteilung einer Genehmigung (Englisch: "permission"; Französisch "autorisation") ist außerdem nicht ausdrücklich an einen Antrag geknüpft. Sofern ein Antragserfordernis nicht dem Begriff der Genehmigung inhärent angesehen wird, stützt eine weite Interpretation von Punkt 9 a) der Anweisungen sowohl die Erteilung einer individuellen Genehmigung als auch eine Genehmigung für eine Vielzahl von Personen ohne Antrag. <span style="color: #990000;">Der Wortlaut schließt in diesem Fall auch die Genehmigung der Verwendung von Computern als besondere Anordnung im Rahmen eines Pilotversuchs mit ein.</span></div><div><br /></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">Allerdings können die Anweisungen, die sich auf Artikel 9 (2) b) VEP stützen (siehe Präambel der Anweisungen), nicht über diese Kompetenznorm hinausgehen. Punkt 9 a) der Anweisungen kann folglich neben Artikel 9 (2) b) VEP keine eigenständige Rechtsgrundlage für den Pilotversuch anlässlich der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 bilden. Die Schranke bei Festlegung der Anweisungen ist wie bei Artikel 9 (2) b) VEP die Sicherstellung einer einheitlichen und sachgerechten Organisation. Punkt 9 a) der Anweisungen darf daher nicht in einer Weise angewandt werden, die das Gebot der Gleichbehandlung verletzt, was im Folgenden zu prüfen ist.</span></b></div><div><br /></div><div>c) Abgesehen von der Überschneidung mit der entscheidenden Frage, ob der Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz verletzt wurde, sieht die Beschwerdekammer auch deswegen keinen Grund, sich abschließend zur gesetzlichen Grundlage des Pilotversuchs zu äußern, weil sie mit der Beschwerde eines Teilnehmers der unter "regulären" Bedingungen durchgeführten Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 befasst ist. <span style="color: #990000;">Das mögliche Fehlen einer Rechtsgrundlage wirkt sich indes nur auf den durchgeführten Pilotversuch aus, da dieser gegebenenfalls als rechtsfehlerhaft anzusehen wäre. Dies hätte wiederum ausschließlich Konsequenzen für Entscheidungen der Prüfungskommission nach Artikel 6 (5) VEP, die aufgrund der Teilnahme am Pilotprojekt getroffen wurden. Diese Entscheidungen sind aber nicht Gegenstand des vorliegenden Verfahrens. <b>Die Beschwerdekammer ist daher nicht befugt, sich mit der Rechtsgültigkeit des Pilotprojekts und den Konsequenzen für die Teilnehmer am Pilotprojekt zu befassen.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>8.3.3 Verletzung des Grundsatzes der Gleichbehandlung</div><div><br /></div><div>a) Die Beschwerdekammer in Disziplinarangelegenheiten überprüft gemäß ihrer ständigen Praxis die Einhaltung des Gebots der Gleichbehandlung von Bewerbern der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung als höherrangiges Recht (D 2/95; D 14/95; D 10/97; D 5/99; D 19/04). Dieses Gebot verlangt, dass bei steter Orientierung am Gerechtigkeitsgedanken Gleiches gleich und Ungleiches seiner Eigenart entsprechend verschieden zu behandeln ist (D 19/04, Punkt 5.1 der Entscheidungsgründe). Vergleichbare Sachverhalte dürfen demnach nicht unterschiedlich behandelt werden, es sei denn, dass die Differenzierung objektiv gerechtfertigt, d.h. in einer gegebenen Situation nach Art und Ausmaß sachlich begründet ist. <span style="color: #990000;">Ein zu beanstandender Rechtsfehler liegt allerdings dann vor, wenn die Prüfungsbedingungen so gewählt sind, dass sie einen Teil der Bewerber benachteiligen, ohne dass hierfür ein sachlicher Grund erkennbar wäre (D 3/95, Punkt 3 der Entscheidungsgründe; D 10/97, Punkt 4.1 der Entscheidungsgründe).</span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">b) Es steht außer Zweifel, dass anlässlich der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 für die 15 Teilnehmer am Pilotversuch in München Prüfungsbedingungen angeordnet waren, die von den mit Wirkung vom 1. Januar 2019 beschlossenen Anweisungen, wie sie für alle übrigen Prüfungsteilnehmer galten, abwichen. Im Kern geht es um die Möglichkeit, einen bereitgestellten Laptop mit einem einfachen Text-Editor zur Bearbeitung der Prüfungsaufgaben zu verwenden. Dieses Hilfsmittel stand den Versuchsteilnehmern zusätzlich zu den Unterlagen auf Papier zur Verfügung, über die auch alle anderen Prüfungsteilnehmer verfügten (Punkt 23 der Anweisungen). Ihnen war weiterhin erlaubt, die Antworten handschriftlich abzufassen. <b>Sie konnten daher entsprechend ihrer Vorliebe und Fähigkeiten den Laptop oder EEP-Papier für ihre Prüfungsarbeiten nutzen. Diese Möglichkeit hatten die anderen Teilnehmer nicht.</b></span><b> </b>Daher geht der Hinweis im Schreiben vom 2. Juli 2020 von Herrn X, dass Artikel 1 (3) VEP beim Pilotversuch beachtet worden sei, an der Sache vorbei. Beinahe abwegig ist auch die Aussage, dass das Verbot der Mitnahme elektronischer Geräte (Punkt 6 und 9 a) der Anweisungen) auch für die Teilnehmer am Pilotversuch galt. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Für eine Ungleichbehandlung ist entscheidend, dass nicht alle Teilnehmer der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 - abweichend vom Punkt 23 der Anweisungen - ein Laptop als zusätzliches technisches Hilfsmittel zur Verfügung gestellt erhielten, und nicht allen Teilnehmern gestattet war, ihre Arbeiten wahlweise handschriftlich oder - abweichend vom Punkt 24 der Anweisungen - unter Verwendung des zur Verfügung gestellten Laptops in elektronischer Form abzufassen</b></span>. Die von den Anweisungen abweichenden Prüfungsbedingungen liegen mit anderen Worten in zusätzlichen Hilfsmitteln und Bearbeitungsmöglichkeiten, die den zufällig ausgelosten Teilnehmern am Pilotversuch vorbehalten waren. Der Beschwerdekammer liegen keinerlei Anhaltspunkte vor, dass es unterschiedslos allen Teilnehmern an der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 offenstand, für sich vergleichbare Abweichungen von den geltenden Anweisungen - insbesondere auch die Bereitstellung eines Laptops durch das Prüfungssekretariat - in Anspruch zu nehmen wie sie für die Versuchsteilnehmer bestanden. Im Gegenteil steht außer Zweifel, dass die Versuchsteilnehmer ausgelost wurden, womit eine Bewerbung ausgeschlossen war. Weiter war den "regulären" Teilnehmern die Mitnahme eines privaten Laptops gemäß Punkt 6 und 9 a) der Anweisungen untersagt. <span style="color: #990000;">Die Mitnahme und Verwendung eines solchen Geräts wäre fraglos als betrügerisches Verhalten geahndet worden (Regel 20 (1) ABVEP). Wiederum ist dem Schreiben von Herrn X nichts zu entnehmen, das den Schluss zuließe, den "regulären" Teilnehmern wäre gestützt auf Punkt 9 a), zweiter Halbsatz der Anweisungen die Mitnahme eines Laptops genehmigt worden. Stattdessen wurden Versuchsteilnehmer laut Herrn X sogar zusätzlich bevorzugt, indem ihnen gestützt auf Punkt 9 a), zweiter Halbsatz der Anweisungen gestattet wurde, ihre eigene Tastatur mitzunehmen. <b>Eine Ungleichbehandlung steht daher zweifelsfrei fest.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">c) Diese Ungleichbehandlung zweier Teilnehmerkreise der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 stellt nur dann keinen Rechtsfehler dar, wenn sie objektiv gerechtfertigt war. </span></b>In seinem Schreiben vom 2. Juli 2020 hat Herr X allerdings keine sachlichen Gründe wie etwa die Kompensierung körperlicher Einschränkungen gemäß Regel 17 (3) ABVEP oder medizinische Gründe angeführt, die die unterschiedliche Behandlung der beiden Teilnehmergruppen hätte rechtfertigen oder zumindest als vertretbar erscheinen lassen können. Die Teilnehmer am Pilotprojekt wurden - wie dargelegt - nach dem Zufallsprinzip ermittelt, was objektive Kriterien ausschließt. <span style="color: #990000;">Die künftige Modernisierung der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung vermag die unterschiedliche Behandlung auch nicht zu rechtfertigen, selbst wenn sie ein gewichtiges allgemeines Anliegen darstellt. Wie der Beschwerdeführer nämlich zu Recht vortrug, hätte dieser Pilotversuch außerhalb einer regulären Europäischen Eignungsprüfung - z.B. unter Beteiligung von Prüfern des EPA - durchgeführt werden können.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>Herr X argumentierte, die Versuchsteilnehmer seien ein Risiko eingegangen, da sie ein neues System getestet hätten. Das angebliche Risiko widerspricht zunächst der Tatsache, dass den Versuchsteilnehmern freistand, die Arbeiten handschriftlich anzufertigen. Im Falle einer technischen Panne wären sie also nicht schlechter gestellt gewesen als die "regulären" Prüfungsteilnehmer. Im Übrigen hätten sie auch die Teilnahme am Pilotversuch ablehnen können. Ein begründetes Risiko hätte das Prüfungssekretariat nach Treu und Glauben ohnehin dazu veranlassen müssen, den Pilotversuch außerhalb einer regulären Europäischen Eignungsprüfung durchzuführen. Nicht zuletzt muss dieses Argument auch deswegen scheitern, weil eine Ungleichbehandlung nicht mit einem hypothetischen Nachteil aufgewogen und gerechtfertigt werden kann, sondern in der Eigenart der beiden Teilnehmerkreise begründet sein muss.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Freilich kommt die Nutzung eines Laptops als zusätzliches Hilfsmittel nicht allen Bewerbern gleichermaßen entgegen. </b>Die einen schreiben beispielsweise schneller von Hand, die anderen schneller auf dem Laptop. Insofern sind Vor- oder Nachteile dieses zusätzlichen Hilfsmittels zumindest teilweise mit persönlichen Vorlieben und Fähigkeiten der Bewerber verknüpft. Auf ein geringes Ausmaß der Ungleichbehandlung kann deswegen aber nicht pauschal geschlossen werden.</span> Entscheidend ist nicht, ob und wie gut einzelne Versuchsteilnehmer von dem zusätzlichen Hilfsmittel Gebrauch gemacht haben, auch wenn davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass sich nur solche Bewerber zur Verfügung gestellt haben, denen die Verwendung eines Laptops entgegenkam. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Vielmehr kommt es darauf an, ob der Unterschied bei den Prüfungsbedingungen die Ausgangslage für einen Teil der Bewerber in erheblichem Maß verändert hat und ob dafür sachliche Gründe gegeben waren. </b></span>Was die Bereitstellung eines Laptops anbelangt, kann nicht von einem in Art und Ausmaß lediglich marginalen Unterschied in der Ausgangslage der Prüfungsteilnehmer ausgegangen werden. Anders mag dies in Bezug auf die vom Beschwerdeführer beanstandeten vermutungsweise besseren räumlichen Bedingungen (Platzangebot, Anzahl der Personen) für Teilnehmer am Pilotprojekt zu beurteilen sein. Unterschiedliche Prüfungsräume und Teilnehmerzahlen sind bei der Durchführung der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung an mehreren Prüfungsorten unvermeidbar. Die exemplarische Gegenüberstellung der Prüfungsorte Bern und München lässt vergleichbare Unterschiede hinsichtlich der räumlichen Bedingungen und Teilnehmerzahlen erwarten wie sie der Beschwerdeführer als ungerechtfertigten Vor- bzw. Nachteil im Zusammenhang mit dem Pilotversuch beanstandet. Diese Differenzen lassen sich bei der Organisation einer Präsenzprüfung für das Gebiet der 38 Vertragsstaaten des EPÜ kaum austarieren. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Das ist auch unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Gleichbehandlung nicht erforderlich, da dem Aufwand zum Ausgleich ein unverhältnismäßig geringerer Nutzen gegenübersteht: Der Anteil solcher Differenzen am individuellen Prüfungsergebnis ist gering. Daher sind solche Unterschiede hinzunehmen.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>d) Die Beschwerdekammer konnte weder dem Schreiben vom 2. Juli 2020 von Herrn X noch dem Prüferbericht einen Hinweis entnehmen, dass die zusätzlichen Hilfsmittel und Bearbeitungsmöglichkeiten der Versuchsteilnehmer bei der Bewertung der Arbeiten aller Bewerber berücksichtigt worden wären. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Der Beschwerdeführer wurde insofern durch die Bewertung seiner Arbeiten nach den gleichen Kriterien wie die bei den Versuchsteilnehmern angewandten Kriterien ungleich behandelt. Eine Ungleichbehandlung ohne sachlich vertretbaren Grund ist daher zu bejahen. Dass der Beschwerdeführer dennoch die übrigen Prüfungsaufgaben bestanden hat, tut dieser Feststellung keinen Abbruch. Mangels Informationen zu den Ergebnissen des Pilotversuchs lässt sich nämlich nicht ausschließen, dass der Unterschied bei der Prüfungsaufgabe B ausschlaggebend war.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>8.3.4 Anspruch auf Gleichbehandlung im Unrecht</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">a) Die Ungleichbehandlung äußert sich vorliegend in einer Abweichung von den Anweisungen beim Pilotversuch.</span> Den Versuchsteilnehmern wurden unter Verletzung des Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatzes zusätzliche Hilfsmittel und Bearbeitungsmöglichkeiten zugestanden. Die übrigen Teilnehmer einschließlich des Beschwerdeführers haben die Europäische Eignungsprüfung 2019 unter Einhaltung der Anweisungen und damit unter regulären Bedingungen abgelegt. Der Beschwerdeführer will als Konsequenz der Verletzung des Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatzes die abweichenden Bedingungen der Versuchsteilnehmer bei der Bewertung seiner Prüfungsaufgabe B berücksichtigt wissen. Er macht mit anderen Worten die unzulässige Begünstigung der Versuchsteilnehmer geltend und nimmt diese für sich in Anspruch. D<span style="color: #990000;">ie Beschwerdekammer hat deshalb erwogen, ob die Beschwerde auf die Geltendmachung einer Gleichbehandlung im Unrecht hinausläuft, auf die im Allgemeinen kein Anrecht besteht, weil dies dem Interesse der Gesetzmäßigkeit behördlichen Handelns widerspricht.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>b) Nach Auffassung der Beschwerdekammer geht es vorliegend indes nicht um eine Gleichbehandlung im Unrecht. Der Pilotversuch stellt kein Ereignis dar, das mit der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 zeitlich und sachlich unzusammenhängend und daher rechtlich getrennt zu behandeln wäre. Folglich lässt sich die Ungleichbehandlung als Rechtsfehler nicht allein am Pilotprojekt festmachen, sondern betrifft die Europäische Eignungsprüfung 2019 insgesamt. "Bevorzugte" und "benachteiligte" Bewerber der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 bilden mit anderen Worten eine Einheit, die unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Gleichbehandlung rechtlich zu betrachten ist. Darin liegt auch der Unterschied zu den Sachverhaltskonstellationen, die unter dem Stichwort "Gleichbehandlung im Unrecht" erörtert werden. Denn dort geht es um das Ersuchen, einen zeitlich vorangegangenen, in anderem Zusammenhang erfolgten Rechtsfehler unter späteren vergleichbaren Umständen zu wiederholen. <span style="color: #990000;">Eine solche Wiederholung von Rechtsfehlern unter Umständen, die nicht in sich geschlossen sind, steht im Widerspruch zum Prinzip der Gesetzmäßigkeit der Verwaltung, was der Grund dafür ist, dass ein Anspruch auf Gleichbehandlung im Unrecht in solchen Situationen für gewöhnlich verneint wird.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>c) Die Beschwerdekammer kommt aufgrund der vorstehenden Erwägungen zum Schluss, dass die Ungleichbehandlung der Teilnehmer bei Durchführung der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 einen Rechtsfehler darstellt, der dieser Europäischen Eignungsprüfung insgesamt anhaftet. Die angefochtene Entscheidung ist daher als rechtsfehlerhaft aufzuheben.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>8.3.5 Quantifizierung des Vorteils/Nachteils und Zusammenhang zur individuellen Leistung</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>a) Schwierig erweist sich die Frage, wie die Ungleichbehandlung auszugleichen ist. </b></span>Denkbar wäre, dem Bewerber die kostenlose Wiederholung der Prüfungsaufgabe B zuzugestehen. Freilich kann dies nicht die Prüfungsaufgabe B der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019 sein, wie der Beschwerdeführer argumentierte. Die Lösung ist ihm bekannt, weshalb deren Wiederholung dem Beschwerdeführer einen vollkommen ungerechtfertigten Vorteil gäbe. Es könnten dem Beschwerdeführer bei der Wiederholung der Prüfungsaufgabe höchstens vergleichbare Hilfsmittel und Bearbeitungsmöglichkeiten zugestanden werden wie den Teilnehmern am Pilotversuch anlässlich der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2019. Allerdings dürfte dies keine erneute Ungleichbehandlung anderer Bewerber zur Folge haben, die zusammen mit dem Beschwerdeführer die Prüfungsaufgabe B absolvieren. Angesichts dieser Einschränkungen hat die Beschwerdekammer auch erwogen, ob ein Ausgleich im Rahmen einer Neubewertung der Prüfungsaufgabe B des Beschwerdeführers denkbar wäre. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Da jedoch der Beschwerdekammer keine detaillierten Angaben zu den Ergebnissen des Pilotversuchs gemacht wurden, muss sie sich auf grundsätzliche Hinweise beschränken und es der Prüfungskommission überlassen, nach Zurückverweisung der Angelegenheit einen nach Art und Ausmaß in der gegebenen Situation angemessenen Ausgleich zu finden und die Benotung gegebenenfalls gemäß Artikel 6 (5) Satz 2 VEP entsprechend zu korrigieren. Der Beschwerdeführer kann gegebenenfalls im Rahmen einer erneuten Beschwerde die von der Prüfungskommission getroffenen Anordnungen überprüfen lassen.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>b) Im Falle einer Neubewertung der Prüfungsaufgabe B des Beschwerdeführers wäre zunächst der in der Ungleichbehandlung begründete Vorteil oder Nachteil objektiv zu quantifizieren.</b></span> Es kommt dabei entgegen der Ansicht des Beschwerdeführers nicht darauf an, ob der Beschwerdeführer schneller mit einem Laptop schreiben kann als von Hand. <span style="color: #990000;">Maßgebend sind vielmehr die Erleichterungen bei der Bearbeitung der Prüfungsaufgabe B, die für alle Bewerber aufgrund der zusätzlichen Hilfsmittel und Bearbeitungsmöglichkeiten (einschließlich der Such- und Kopierfunktionen im Text der elektronisch verfügbaren Prüfungsaufgaben) zu erwarten waren. Soweit die Auswertung des Pilotversuchs darüber keinen Aufschluss gibt (etwa in Form der Feststellung, dass Versuchsteilnehmer durchschnittlich mehr Teilaspekte des Prüfungsteils B bearbeiten konnten, als andere Prüfungsteilnehmer), ist die Quantifizierung anhand eines Hilfskriteriums vorzunehmen</span>. Im Vordergrund steht ein (hypothetischer) Zeitgewinn. Freilich sind keine exakten Ergebnisse, sondern ist nur eine Annäherung zu erwarten.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>c) In einem zweiten Schritt ist ein ermittelter Vorteil in Relation zur Beurteilungsvorlage und zur Leistung des Beschwerdeführers zu setzen. Dabei werden sich hypothetische Überlegungen nicht vermeiden lassen (insoweit ist in der vorliegenden Situation Punkt 4.3 der Entscheidung D 10/97 zu relativieren). </b></span>N<span style="color: #990000;">ach Auffassung der Beschwerdekammer ist eine Korrelation von Vorteilen in der Ausgangslage mit der Leistungsbeurteilung nicht durch das anwendbare Recht ausgeschlossen. </span>So kann das Prüfungssekretariat nach Regel 17 (3) ABVEP Bewerbern zum Ausgleich körperlicher Einschränkungen zusätzliche Zeit für das Verfassen der Arbeiten gewähren und damit einen Nachteil aufgrund hypothetischer Betrachtungen angemessen kompensieren. Ziel ist eine vergleichbare Leistung zu ermöglichen, wie sie Bewerbern ohne diese Einschränkung möglich ist.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">Wie nach Regel 17 (3) ABVEP ist auch die (nachträgliche) Korrelation von Vorteil und Leistung objektiv zu bestimmen. </span>So könnte vorliegend ein etwaiger Zeitvorteil dem Zeitrahmen gegenübergestellt werden, der für die Bearbeitung der einzelnen Teilaspekte der Prüfungsaufgabe B innerhalb der Dauer von dreieinhalb Stunden vorgesehen ist (Regel 24 (1) ABVEP in Verbindung mit dem Beschluss des Aufsichtsrats vom 17. November 2016, ABl. EPA 2017, Zusatzpublikation 2, 43). <span style="color: #990000;"><b>Dies würde gegebenenfalls zu einer pauschalen Änderung der Benotung führen (vgl. hierzu D 10/97, Punkte 2 und 3.2 der Entscheidungsgründe). Nach Auffassung der Beschwerdekammer steht dem nicht entgegen, dass die erzielten Punkte die Bewertung einer einzelnen Arbeit ausdrücken (Regel 6 (1) ABVEP).</b></span> Anders etwa als bei der Bewertung der Prüfungsaufgabe C der Europäischen Eignungsprüfung 2007 (siehe beispielhaft die Entscheidung D 9/07, Punkt 6 der Entscheidungsgründe) geht es vorliegend nicht um eine nachträgliche Neubewertung inhaltlich unterschiedlicher Antworten, die eine objektive Beurteilung erfordern und einer solchen auch zugänglich sind. Denn die Auswirkungen vorenthaltener Hilfsmittel sind in einer Arbeit nicht feststellbar, weil sie dort keinen Niederschlag gefunden haben können. <span style="color: #990000;">Die vorliegenden Umstände sind daher eher mit einer Situation vergleichbar, in der ein Teil der Bewerber 10 statt 11 Fragen erhält (siehe hierzu D 10/97, Punkte 2 und 3.2 der Entscheidungsgründe). Die infolge unvollständiger Unterlagen fehlenden Antworten lassen sich auch nicht beurteilen. Es bleibt mithin nur ein pauschaler Ausgleich innerhalb der nach Regel 6 (1) und (3) ABVEP vorgegebenen Punkteskala (zu Folgefragen bei Bewerbern, die alle 11 Fragen erhalten und beantworten, siehe D 10/97, Punkt 4 der Entscheidungsgründe).</span></div><div><br /></div><div>Ein etwaiger, mit der Benutzung zusätzlicher Hilfsmittel verbundener Zeitvorteil könnte auch in Beziehung zu der vom jeweiligen Bewerber während der regulären Zeit erzielten Punktezahl gesetzt werden. Ein solcher Ansatz gäbe der individuell erbrachten Leistung mehr Gewicht. Allerdings ist eine solche Betrachtung wiederum pauschalierend, insoweit dabei das Verhältnis von Zeit und Leistung als linear unterstellt wird. Die oben festgestellte Ungleichbehandlung wird sich auch nach diesem Ansatz nicht vollständig ausgleichen lassen. Dies ist auch nicht erforderlich, solange verbleibende Unterschiede nach Art und Ausmaß geringfügig und in der besonderen Situation vertretbar sind.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>d) Aufgrund der vorabgehenden Erwägungen erachtet es die Beschwerdekammer für angebracht, die Angelegenheit zur erneuten Beurteilung im Sinne von Artikel 6 (5) VEP an die Prüfungskommission zurückzuverweisen. Die Anträge 6a), 6b), 6c), 7a) und 13 des Beschwerdeführers (s.o. Punkt X.) sind damit gegenstandslos. Die Anträge 6, 7, 8 und 9 sind zurückzuweisen, da sie das Ergebnis der Neubeurteilung vorwegnehmen und unbegründete und damit unzulässige Begehren auf Festsetzung einer bestimmten Note (s.o. Punkt 1.6) enthalten.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>9. Verletzung der Anonymität und Unvoreingenommenheit</div><div><br /></div><div>Was die Beanstandung einer Verletzung der Anonymität und Unvoreingenommenheit der Prüfer anbelangt, erachtet die Beschwerdekammer die Anonymität im Sinne von Artikel 21 (1) VEP als gewährleistet. Allerdings waren die Arbeiten der 15 Teilnehmer am Pilotversuch für die Prüfer anhand ihrer Form zu erkennen. Ob dadurch bereits die Unvoreingenommenheit der Prüfer in Frage gestellt war, kann allerdings dahingestellt bleiben. Die Beschwerdekammer kann keine weitergehenden Folgen erkennen, als sie nicht ohnehin aus der Bejahung einer Ungleichbehandlung resultieren.</div><div><br /></div><div>10. Zuerkennung zusätzlicher Punkte oder Festlegung einer bestimmten Note</div><div><br /></div><div>10.1 Die Anträge 1 bis 5 enthalten unbegründete und damit unzulässige Begehren auf Festsetzung einer bestimmten Note (s.o. Punkt 1.6) und sind daher zurückzuweisen.</div><div><br /></div><div>10.2 In ihrem Schreiben vom 11. September 2019 merkte die Prüfungskommission an, dass die Beurteilung der mit der Beschwerde vorgebrachten Argumente ergeben habe, dass 2 Punkte zu wenig vergeben worden seien, so dass die Arbeit des Beschwerdeführers mit 41 Punkten zu bewerten sei. Die Beschwerdekammer schließt sich der rechtlichen Beurteilung einer vergleichbaren Äußerung in der Entscheidung D 8/19 an und erachtet die Prüfungskommission im Rahmen der Zurückverweisung nach dem Grundsatz des Vertrauensschutzes an die Bewertung der Arbeit des Beschwerdeführers mit 41 Punkten als Ausgangspunkt für die erneute Überprüfung gebunden.</div><div><br /></div><div>11. Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr</div><div><br /></div><div>Da der vorliegenden Beschwerde stattzugeben ist, soweit die angefochtene Entscheidung aufzuheben und die Angelegenheit zur erneuten Entscheidung an die Prüfungskommission zurückzuverweisen ist, entspricht es der Billigkeit, die Rückzahlung der ganzen Beschwerdegebühr gemäß Artikel 24 letzter Satz VEP im vorliegenden Fall anzuordnen.</div><div><br /></div><div><b>Entscheidungsformel</b></div><div><br /></div><div>Aus diesen Gründen wird entschieden:</div><div><br /></div><div>1. Die angefochtene Entscheidung der Prüfungskommission wird aufgehoben.</div><div><br /></div><div>2. Die Angelegenheit wird zur erneuten Entscheidung an die Prüfungskommission zurückverwiesen.</div><div><br /></div><div>3. Die Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr wird angeordnet.</div><div><br /></div><br /><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/d190011du1.html" target="_blank">D 11/19 () of 26.4.2021</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (pdf</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span></span></i></span><i>ECLI:EP:BA:2021:D001119.20210426</i><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span></i></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">Photo</span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;"> "</span><span style="background-color: white;">Sometimes you need paper - </span><span style="background-color: white;">Computers are great, tablet computers are good too, but sometimes a pad of paper is the best way to collect your information</span><span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">" by </span><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/tsakshaug/" target="_blank">Ted Sakshaug</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></span></i><i>obtained </i><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">via <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/tsakshaug/4251082322/in/photolist-7tDUEN-2jD6WK2-2j9Agks-7rD4r-2jSFXPB-xVNhv-UxtJon-avZUVo-6quej-2iu4y3b-dbkCCd-bJsTcF-6P5r5E-2kEWyV9-fghGJ-dNuZMF-4HfejV-7UWHnT-8Nztdg-6bB8S4-8Uf9oH-caR8tq-2i9w9ck-cdaEDL-2j4icVg-2gsdXkM-2jMCPTr-cjhDRh-au2jhs-dPcqJ1-61pcSS-5Xbgm2-fURPFT-7MELrn-9QFc5i-FL7Jg-7VUTom-Hs2RHF-8VVEYo-b1YNz-7w9eEL-2kRvZsg-a4bqvj-2jFhtK1-4tyYiV-5wD6B8-A81S6E-q9MMQ-2kiZKqD-btPhUs" target="_blank">Flickr</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/tsakshaug/4251082322/in/photolist-7tDUEN-2jD6WK2-2j9Agks-7rD4r-2jSFXPB-xVNhv-UxtJon-avZUVo-6quej-2iu4y3b-dbkCCd-bJsTcF-6P5r5E-2kEWyV9-fghGJ-dNuZMF-4HfejV-7UWHnT-8Nztdg-6bB8S4-8Uf9oH-caR8tq-2i9w9ck-cdaEDL-2j4icVg-2gsdXkM-2jMCPTr-cjhDRh-au2jhs-dPcqJ1-61pcSS-5Xbgm2-fURPFT-7MELrn-9QFc5i-FL7Jg-7VUTom-Hs2RHF-8VVEYo-b1YNz-7w9eEL-2kRvZsg-a4bqvj-2jFhtK1-4tyYiV-5wD6B8-A81S6E-q9MMQ-2kiZKqD-btPhUs" target="_blank"> </a>under </span><a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">CC BY 2.0 license</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (no changes made).</span></i></div>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-22591977110876470742021-05-20T21:07:00.009+02:002021-06-02T08:47:23.368+02:00BREAKING NEWS: G 1/21 - Exclusion and objection of the chairman of the Enlarged Board, but not of other members<p><i>Interesting developments in G 1/21! On the same day as on which the President of the EPO further extended the </i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>pilot project for oral proceedings by videoconference before opposition divisions, as set out in the decision of the President of the European Patent Office dated 10 November 2020 concerning the modification and extension of the pilot project for oral proceedings by videoconference before opposition divisions (OJ EPO 2020, A121), to run until 31 January 2022 (see <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/official-journal/president-notices/archive/20210520.html" target="_blank">here</a>), was a decision published online with respect to exclusion and objection of the chairman and other members of the Enlarged Board in case G 1/21 (decision dated 17 May 2021). Curious to what was decided and why: see below! <br />Update 28.05.2021: on 24.05.2021, the opponent's representative filed a response to the Communication with the decision, raising further reasoned objections and requests; the oral proceedings on 28.05.2021 started with a non-public discussion of those issues - see at the bottom of the page. The objections were rejected, but the oral proceedings to the merits of the case were further postponed, as the submissions from the President were only notified to the appellant two days before the oral proceedings.<br /></i></span><i style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: #990000;">Update 02.06.2021: oral proceedings are to be held on 2 July 2021 by videoconference</span>.)</i></p><br /><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>A. FACTS AND SUBMISSIONS</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. At the end of the oral proceedings of 8 February 2021 in case T 1807/15 before the Board of Appeal 3.5.02 (the Board), the Boards Chairman informed the parties that the Board would refer a question under Article 112 EPC to the Enlarged Board of Appeal.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">With its interlocutory written decision of 12 March 2021 </span><span style="color: #990000;">the Board referred the following question:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">Is the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference compatible with the right to oral proceedings as enshrined in Article 116(1) EPC if not all of the parties to the proceedings have given their consent to the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference?</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. By Order of 17 March 2021 the Chairman of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (Enlarged Board) determined the composition of the panel to decide on the referral. On 17 March 2021 the parties to the appeal proceedings in case T 1807/15 and the President of the European Patent Office (EPO) were invited to file submissions on the referred question by 27 April 2021. By a communication of 24 March 2021 the public was invited to file written statements on the referred question within the same timeframe.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>3. More than 40 amicus curiae briefs were filed, the President of the EPO provided his comments and also the appellant-opponent (further: appellant) filed a submission. In this submission, dated 27 April 2021, the appellant raised an objection under Article 24(3) EPC against the Chairman and two members (X and Y) of the Enlarged Board for reason of suspected partiality. The objection was based on the involvement of the Chairman in the preparation and enactment of Article 15a of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA), which entered into force on 1 April 2021. For the members X and Y the objection was based on their membership of the Presidium of the Boards of Appeal.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">4. Article 15a RPBA reads:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(1) The Board may decide to hold oral proceedings pursuant to Article 116 EPC by videoconference if the Board considers it appropriate to do so, either upon request by a party or of its own motion.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(2) Where oral proceedings are scheduled to be held on the premises of the European Patent Office, a party, representative of accompanying person may, upon request, be allowed to attend by videoconference.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">(3) The Chair in the particular appeal and, with the agreement of the Chair, any other member of the Board in the particular appeal may participate in the oral proceedings by videoconference.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">5. The appellant also referred to <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2020/20201215.html" target="_blank">a communication from the Boards of Appeal, dated 15 December 2020</a>, which included the following wording: "From 1 January 2021 boards may conduct oral proceedings by VICO even without the agreement of the parties concerned, as has now been made clear in the new Article 15a RPBA adopted by the Boards of Appeal Committee. Since the new provision merely clarifies an existing possibility, boards may adapt their practice as regards dispensing with the need to obtain the agreement of the parties concerned even before the date of its entry into force." The appellant assumed that such a communication was based on the instructions of the President of the Boards of Appeal or, at least, was issued with his consent.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The appellant argues that the text of the proposal of the new Article 15a RPBA, the comments in decision document BOAC 16/20 (proposing the adoption of the new Article 15a RPBA to the Board of Appeal Committee) and the above communication demonstrated the position of the Chairman of the Enlarged Board that oral proceedings can also be held by videoconference without the agreement of the parties.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">6. According to the appellant this provision deals with the same issue as the referral, namely the question whether oral proceedings can be held by videoconference without the agreement/consent of all the parties. The referral sought an answer to the question whether holding videoconferences without the consent of the parties is compatible with Article 116 EPC, whereas this question already seemed to have been answered positively in Article 15a RPBA. Therefore the appellant is of the opinion that the Chairman of the Enlarged Board who was involved in the preparation and enactment of this provision and the members X and Y who were consulted on a proposal for this provision should not decide on the referred question. A reasonable, objective and informed person considering this circumstance would conclude that he has good reasons to doubt the impartiality of these members. A similar line of argument has also been developed in several amicus curiae briefs.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">7. A further member of the panel dealing with G 1/21 (Z) informed the Enlarged Board that he was also involved in the preparation of Article 15a RPBA and that his involvement could be qualified as relating to circumstances underlying the objections made by the appellant. He therefore asked the Enlarged Board in a composition under Article 24(4) EPC to decide on his continued participation in the referral case G 1/21.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>8. The Enlarged Board in its original composition found the objection to be admissible and decided to honour the request of the other member. Thereupon the Chairman of the Enlarged Board recomposed the panel dealing with G 1/21:</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">- The Chairman was replaced by Mr. F. Blumer,</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">- X and Y were replaced by Mr. P. Gryczka and Mr. G. Pricolo respectively,</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">- Z was replaced by Mr. T. Bokor.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">9. The Enlarged Board in its composition according to Article 24(4) EPC invited the replaced members to make comments on the objection or on their request. All members concerned provided brief comments.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>B. REASONS</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">1. LEGAL PRINCIPLES DEVELOPED BY THE CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL AND THE ENLARGED BOARD OF APPEAL CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 24 EPC</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">10. The following principles have been developed by the Enlarged Board and the Boards of Appeal for the application of Article 24 EPC (see also Case Law, 9th edition, 2019, Chapter III.J.1. General principles). </span><b><span style="color: #990000;">These principles will also be applied by the Enlarged Board in its current composition:</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">a. the right to object to a judge for reasons of suspicion of partiality is meant to prevent judges from being influenced in their decision-making "be it deliberately or inadvertently" by extraneous considerations, prejudices and predilections, i.e. by considerations other than the arguments they consider factually and legally relevant for the case under consideration;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">b. justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done and the composition of a deciding panel should inspire confidence in the impartiality of the court;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">c. the requirement of impartiality in proceedings before the Enlarged Board and the other boards of appeal must in view of their judicial functions at final instance within the European patent granting system be strictly observed;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">d. the right of parties to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal is a fundamental legal right, as also recognized by Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Human Rights Convention). Therefore the Boards of Appeal shall also apply the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and national courts regarding the fundamental principles laid down in Article 6 of the Human Right Convention;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">e. suspicion of partiality of a judge has to be determined by two tests: firstly, a subjective test requiring proof of actual partiality of the judge concerned, and secondly an objective test, whether the circumstances of the case give rise to an objectively justified fear of partiality;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">f. with respect to the subjective test it is presumed that a duly and lawfully appointed judge is personally impartial, unless there is proof of the contrary;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">g. with respect to the objective test the following question has to be answered: would a reasonable, objective and informed person on the basis of the correct facts reasonably be concerned that the judge had not or would not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case. It thus has to be established that a reasonable onlooker considering the circumstances of the case would conclude that the party might have good reasons to doubt the impartiality of the judge objected to. This criterion excludes subjective suspicions on the part of the party who makes the objection;</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">h. parties are entitled to have their case decided by a duly and lawfully appointed judge or judges. Appointed judges can therefore not withdraw from a case at will, and their replacement has to be decided upon by the court in light of the provisions of Article 24 EPC.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">2. THE OBJECTION AGAINST THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ENLARGED BOARD OF APPEAL</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. The facts</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">11. The Chairman of the Enlarged Board also holds the function of President of the Boards of Appeal (President BOA), Rule 12a(1) EPC. One of the roles of the President BOA is defined in Rule 12c(2) EPC, which reads: "On a proposal from the President of the Boards of Appeal and after the President of the European Patent Office has been given the opportunity to comment, the Committee set up under paragraph 1 shall adopt the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal and of the Enlarged Board of Appeal."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">12. It follows from the submission of the appellant in his objection and the comments from the Chairman of the Enlarged Board that t</span><span style="color: #990000;">he following facts seem to be uncontested.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">The Chairman of the Enlarged Board proposed in his function as President BOA an amendment to the RPBA to the Boards of Appeal Committee (BOAC) for adoption,</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> see document BOAC/16/20. Point 20 of the explanatory remarks of BOAC/16/20 contained the following wording: "It is suggested that proposed new Article 15a RPBA enters into force on 1 April 2021, subject to its approval by the Administrative Council under Article 23(4), second sentence, EPC, and applies to all oral proceedings scheduled to take place on or after that date. As outlined above, proposed new Article 15a RPBA clarifies the practice of the Boards of Appeal since May 2020 of conducting oral proceedings by videoconference. Therefore, the Boards of Appeal may adapt their practice before the date of entry into force. The existing discretionary power of the Boards of Appeal to hold oral proceedings by videoconference remains unaffected. </span><span style="color: #990000;">Accordingly, Boards may summon parties to oral proceedings by videoconference for a date before 1 April 2021 and may convert oral proceedings scheduled to take place on the premises before that date to oral proceedings by videoconference, even without requiring the parties' agreement to this format."</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">The thrust of Point 20 was also communicated to the users on the Boards of Appeal web section of the EPO website on 15 December 2020 (see the citation under point 5 above).</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">New Article 15a RPBA was adopted by the BOAC by written procedure on 11 December 2020, approved by the Administrative Council during its E-meeting of 23 March 2021 and entered into force on 1 April 2021.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">13. The Chairman of the Enlarged Board in his comments to the objection also stated that he:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- organised and chaired several meetings during 2020 with user representatives on the holding of oral proceedings by videoconference</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- approved the publication of several communications on oral proceedings by videoconference from May 2020 onwards, including the communication of 15 December 2020</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- proposed to the Administrative Council to approve the amendment inserting a new Article 15a in the RPBA (document CA/5/21)</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">- refrained from presenting CA/5/21 or discussing the proposed amendment of the RPBA during the meeting of the Administrative Council on 23 March 2021 where the proposal for Article 15a was discussed. Instead the Head of Department of the Boards of Appeal Legal Research Service conducted the presentation and discussion.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">Finally, the Chairman indicated that he did not make any comments, be it internally or publicly, on the referral G 1/21.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. The objection</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">14. The appellant alleges that the above facts establish that "it appears to a reasonable, objective and informed person that the BoA President had no reservations, that the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference is compatible with the right to oral proceedings as enshrined in Article 116(1) EPC, even if not all of the parties to the proceedings have given their consent".. As the referral in G 1/21 raises precisely the question of the compatibility of this practice with Article 116 EPC, a reasonable, objective and informed person would conclude that he has good reasons to doubt the impartiality of the President BOA as Chairman of the Enlarged Board in the present proceedings.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">3. Evaluation of the objection</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>15. The Enlarged Board notes that the referred question in G 1/21 and Article 15a RPBA indeed deal with the same topic, namely the legality of holding oral proceedings by videoconference without consent of all the parties. Where the referral seeks an answer to the question whether this practice is compatible with 116 EPC, Article 15a RPBA seems to be based on the view that it is compatible with Article 116 EPC.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">16. The fact that a judge has expressed an opinion on a legal issue that is to be decided upon in a case is not in itself and not always a ground for suspicion of partiality (see also G 3/08 and G 2/08). </span><span style="color: #990000;">The argument that the President BOA had no reservation on the compatibility of oral proceedings in the form of videoconference without consent of the parties with Article 116 EPC<b> is therefore in itself not sufficient as a basis for suspicion of partiality</b>.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>17. In the current case, however, the issue is not so much about the expression of an opinion on a legal issue. </b>The issue at hand is that the Chairman of the Enlarged Board has in his capacity as President BOA been involved in the passage of legislation, which, depending upon the answer given to the referred question, might be found to be in conflict with Article 116 EPC.</span><span style="color: #0e2034;"> </span><span style="color: #990000;">Furthermore, he has informed the public that also prior to the entry into force of Article 15a RPBA, oral proceedings before Boards of Appeal could be held in the form of a videoconference without the consent of the parties, thereby directing the practice of the Boards of Appeal in a certain way</span><span style="color: #0e2034;">.</span><span style="color: #990000;"><b> In other words, he has performed legislative and managerial acts based on the view that oral proceedings by videoconference without consent of all the parties are compatible with Article 116 EPC. </b>If the Enlarged Board gave a negative answer to the referred question, this would mean that the above mentioned acts would lack a legal basis and would contravene the EPC. <b>It is these acts that in the view of the Enlarged Board would lead a reasonable, objective and informed person to conclude that he or she has good reasons to doubt the impartiality of Chairman in this case. The concern that the Chairman might have a bias towards answering the referred question in the positive in order to avoid the outcome that his own acts were not in compliance with Article 116 EPC, is therefore objectively justified.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">18. This conclusion is in line with decisions of the ECHR in comparable cases, see for example the cases of McGonnell v. the United Kingdom (8 February 2000 - 28488/95) and Procola v. Luxemburg (28 September 1995 - 14570/89). In McGonnell v. the United Kingdom the ECHR considered in Point 55:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">The participation of the Bailiff in the present case shows certain similarities with the position of the members of the Conseil d'Etat in the Procola case. First, in neither case was any doubt expressed in the domestic proceedings as to the role of the impugned organ. Secondly, and more particularly, in both cases a member, or members, of the deciding tribunal had been actively and formally involved in the preparatory stages of the regulation at issue. As the Court has noted above, the Bailiffs non-judicial constitutional functions cannot be accepted as merely ceremonial. With particular respect to his presiding, as Deputy Bailiff, over the States of Deliberation in 1990, the Court considers that any direct involvement in the passage of legislation, or of executive rules, is likely to be sufficient to cast doubt on the judicial impartiality of a person subsequently called on to determine a dispute over whether reasons exist to permit a variation from the wording of the legislation or rules at issue.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>19. In the current case, the Chairman was involved in all stages of the preparation of the legislation, which is at least indirectly under review in G 1/21. His involvement was direct and decisive, as follows from the above mentioned facts.</b> He initiated the proposal, presented it for adoption and approval by the competent organs, he steered the practice of the Boards of Appeal in this direction and communicated this practice to the public. <b>The reasoning of the ECHR that a direct involvement in the passage of legislation is likely to be sufficient to cast doubt on partiality, therefore seems to apply a fortiori to the present case.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>20. In conclusion, the Enlarged Board finds that the objection against the participation of the Chairman in the present case for reason of suspected partiality is justified and the Chairman thus has to be replaced.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><b><span style="color: #990000;">3. THE OBJECTION AGAINST X AND Y WHO ARE ALSO MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE BOA</span></b></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><i><span style="color: #0e2034;">[Comment from the editor: it can be deduced from the a</span><span style="background-color: transparent;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">micus curiae briefs - see file wrapper -, the third party observations and the party's submission who X and Y are].</span></span></i></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034;">1. The objection</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">21. This objection is based on the fact that the Presidium of the Boards of Appeal was consulted by the President BOA on the proposal for new Article 15a RPBA. The two members objected to were also members of the Presidium at the time of the consultation. </span><span style="color: #0e2034;">The appellant states in its submission of 27 April 2021, page 15, last paragraph, that the fact that the proposal for Article 15a RPBA has first been presented for consultation to the Presidium and afterwards to the BOAC and the Administrative Council for adoption and approval, is evidence that the majority of the Presidium appeared to be in favour of the proposal. According to the appellant it appears that the members concerned thus also have a bias in favour of considering oral proceedings by videoconference without consent of the parties.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. Evaluation of the objection</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">22. The EBA does not find this argument convincing. It is admitted that one of the roles of the Presidium is indeed to advise the President BOA on proposals for amending the RPBA, see Rule 12b(3)(c) EPC, but the fate of such proposals is not dependent on a positive advice of the Presidium. The Enlarged Board is not aware of a formally worded written advice of the (majority of) the Presidium on the proposal. It appears that the proposal has been discussed during a meeting of the Presidium and comments have been made on various aspects of the proposal. There appears not to have been a vote on a negative or positive opinion. Whether the objected members have contributed to this discussion and if so, what comments they made, is not known. <b>The Enlarged Board is of the view that their membership of the Presidium and their participation in a consultative meeting where the proposal for the legislation at issue was discussed, is not enough to objectively justify the concern that the members in question are biased. Their role in an advisory body cannot be qualified as a direct involvement in the passage of legislation as discussed above for the Chairman.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">23. The Enlarged Board is also not aware of any other circumstance which would prevent X and Y from taking part in case G 1/21.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">24. The Enlarged Board is therefore of the view that the objection against X and Y is not justified and they can continue their participation in G 1/21.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>4. THE REQUEST OF Z UNDER ARTICLE 24(2) EPC TO DECIDE ON HIS CONTINUED PARTICIPATION AS A MEMBER OF THE PANEL DECIDING ON REFERRAL G 1/21</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">25. Z informed the Enlarged Board that, as a member of a working party, he was involved in the preparation of what later became the legislative proposal for amending the RPBA. He mentioned that this involvement was of a mere general and informal nature.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">26. From internal documents from the Boards of Appeal it appears that Z was indeed a member, and task coordinator, of the "Working group on VICO provision in RPBA" set up by the President BOA. Part of the mandate of the working group reads: "The group shall: Make a proposal for a new provision in the RPBA 2020 regulating oral proceedings to be held by videoconference (VICO). The provision may regulate, for example, that oral proceedings via VICO in any format are oral proceedings within the meaning of Article 116 EPC ".</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">In his capacity as member and task coordinator Z was thus involved in the drafting of a proposal for a provision that later became Article 15a RPBA. He was also involved in presenting drafts for the proposal during discussions in the Presidium and with user representatives during the consultation phase.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">27. Unlike the Chairman, Z did not play a formal role in the decision making process leading to the adoption and approval of Article 15a RPBA. However, his active involvement in the preparation of the proposal was visible to other actors in the process and those with an interest in the way oral proceedings are conducted before the BOA.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The Enlarged Board finds that it would not inspire confidence in the impartiality of the Enlarged Board if Z would also be part of the panel that decides on the compatibility</b> of oral proceedings by videoconference without consent of the parties with Article 116 EPC. <b>There may exist in the public eye an objectively justified concern that he, like the Chairman, might be biased towards answering the referred question positively, because answering the question negatively would imply that he has been actively involved in the preparation of a proposal that is not compatible with Article 116 EPC.</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #990000;">28. In conclusion, the Enlarged Board finds that Z should not take part in the present referral case G 1/21.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><b>C. ORDER</b></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">For these reasons it is decided that:</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">1. The Chairman is replaced by Mr. F. Blumer.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">2. The objection under Article 24(3) EPC against X and Y is rejected.</span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;"><br /></span></div><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="color: #0e2034;">3. Z is replaced by Mr. T. Bokor.</span></div></div></div></div><br /><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/g210001eu1.html" target="_blank">G 0001/21 (Exclusion and objection) of 17.5.2021</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/g210001eu1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide</span><span><span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span>ECLI:EP:BA:2021:G000121.20210517</span></span></i></span><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span>The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP04758381&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></i><div><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></i></div><div><i>The referral was addressed in <a href="https://dp-patentlaw.blogspot.com/2021/03/t-180715-referral-op-by-vico-compatible.html" target="_blank">this </a>earlier blog.</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i>Note that Oral proceedings in G 1/21 will be held, by videoconference, on Friday 28 May 2021. Members of the public can register to watch the livestream of these oral proceedings until 27 May 2021 via <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2021/20210514.html" target="_blank">this </a>webpage.</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i>---</i></div><div><i>Update 28.05.2021:</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i>On 24 May 2021, <b><span style="color: #990000;">the opponent's representative filed <a href="javascript:NewPDFWindow('application?documentId=E59U2OKU4391DSU&number=EP04758381&lng=en&npl=false', 'E59U2OKU4391DSU_EP04758381_en')" target="_blank">a response</a> </span></b>to the Communication of the Registry of the Enlarged </i><i>Board of Appeal, dated May 21, 2021, comprising the decision cited above. </i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div><i>In the response, further reasoned objections and requests were filed as to (cited from the letter):</i></div><div><div><br /></div><div>"<span style="color: #990000;"><b>Objections</b></span></div><div>In view of Article 24(3), second sentence, EPC we provide in the following objections under</div><div>Art. 24(3) EPC before we come to procedural request.</div><div><ul style="text-align: left;"><li><b>Objection 1</b><br />In accordance with Article 24(3) EPC regular members of panel G. Eliason, and A. Ritzka are objected to as suspected of partiality for the reasons specified below (section IV.1).<br /> </li><li><b>Objection 2</b><br />In accordance with Article 24(3) EPC regular members of panel F. Blumer, T. Bokor, W. Van der Eijk, G. Eliason, and A. Ritzka may not take part in the present case as they have a personal interest (Art. 24(1) EPC) or alternatively suspected of partiality for the reasons specified below (section IV.2).<br /> </li><li><b>Objection 3</b><br />In accordance with Article 24(3) EPC the regular members of the present panel according to the Order of 20 May 2021 who already belonged to the panel of the EBoA according to the Order of 17 March 2021; W. Van der Eijk, G. Eliasson, and A. Ritzka are objected to as suspected of partiality for the reasons specified below (section IV.3).<br /><b> </b></li><li><b>Objection 4</b><br />In accordance with Article 24(3) EPC regular members of panel F. Blumer, T. Bokor, W. Van der Eijk, G. Eliason, and A. Ritzka are objected to as suspected of partiality for the reasons specified below (section IV.4)."</li></ul></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">Requests</span></b>: (emphasis adedd) "</div><div><ol style="text-align: left;"><li><b><span style="color: #990000;"><u>to postpone oral proceedings scheduled for May 28, 2021, </u></span></b></li><li><span style="color: #990000;"><b>oral proceedings to be held in the proceedings under Art. 24(4) EPC, regarding the above-mentioned objections 1 to 4 as to suspicion of partiality,</b></span></li><li><span style="color: #990000;">to provide the parties with the brief submission of I. Beckedorf, mentioned in the interlocutory decision,</span></li><li><span style="color: #990000;">to provide the parties with the brief submission of G. Eliason, mentioned in the interlocutory decision,</span></li><li><span style="color: #990000;">to provide the parties with the brief submission of A. Ritzka, mentioned in the interlocutory decision,</span></li><li><span style="color: #990000;">to provide information about the members of the "Working group on VICO provision in RPEA",</span></li><li><span style="color: #990000;">to replace the to be replaced members of the panel, Mr. Josefsson and I. Beckedorf with alternates pursuant to Art. 2(1)(b) of the Business Distribution scheme of the Enlarged Board of Appeal,</span></li><li><span style="color: #990000;">to appoint the substitute for the chairman in accordance with Art. 2(2) of the Business Distribution scheme of the Enlarged Board of Appeal,</span></li><li><span style="color: #990000;">to summon for oral proceedings in the proceedings under Art. 24(4) EPC, <b>only after the submissions/information requested under items 3. to 6. have been provided to the parties of the proceedings</b>, and</span></li><li><span style="color: #990000;">to invite the public to file further amicus curiae concerning the composition of the panel."</span></li></ol></div><div><i>The objections and requests were extensively substantiated.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic;">The letter can be found in the register as "24.05.2021<span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>Incoming letter in referral procedure" (<a href="javascript:NewPDFWindow('application?documentId=E59U2OKU4391DSU&number=EP04758381&lng=en&npl=false', 'E59U2OKU4391DSU_EP04758381_en')" target="_blank">here</a>).</div><div style="font-style: italic;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic;">In response to the letter, <a href="javascript:NewPDFWindow('application?documentId=E594BQZ71807DSU&number=EP04758381&lng=en&npl=false', 'E594BQZ71807DSU_EP04758381_en')" target="_blank">a communication from the Enlarged Board of Appeal</a> was issued, providing (emphasis added):</div></div><div style="font-style: italic;"><br /></div><div><div>1. With a letter dated 24 May 2021 the appellant-opponent raised 4 objections against members of the Enlarged Board of Appeal under Article 24 EPC and formulated several procedural requests, inter alia to postpone the oral proceedings scheduled for 28 May 2021 and to be heard in an oral proceeding on their objections.</div><div><br /></div><div>2. The Enlarged Board has considered these requests and has decided to reject the request to postpone the oral proceedings scheduled for 28 May 2021.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>3. The Enlarged Board intends to proceed as follows:</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>- the scheduled oral proceedings will firstly be dedicated to hearing the appellant-opponent on the topic of admissibility of their objections in a non-public hearing</b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>- in case one or more of the objections are found to be admissible the oral proceedings will be closed and the Enlarged Board will deal with the objections in a new composition</b></span></div><div><b><span style="color: #990000;">- in case the objections are found not to be admissible the oral proceedings may continue in a public format to hear the appellant-opponent and the President of the European Patent Office on the referral</span>.</b></div><div><br /></div><div>4. As to the request to postpone the oral proceedings scheduled for 28 May 2021 the Enlarged Board has considered that it is not in the interest of the parties nor of the public to be left in uncertainty longer than necessary about the composition of the panel that will decide in G1/21. Therefore at least the admissibility of the objections against members of the present composition should be discussed and decided upon as soon as possible. The oral proceedings already scheduled for 28 May provide a good and timely opportunity to do this. Depending on the outcome of the non-public hearing, the oral proceedings may continue with a discussion of the referral itself. The members of the Enlarged Board consider themselves sufficiently prepared to hear the parties and the President of the Office. After the debate the Enlarged Board will decide how to proceed further.</div><div style="font-style: italic;"><br /></div><div style="font-style: italic;">On Friday 28 May 2021, the oral proceedings, with live streaming, started shortly after 9:00 CET. The oral proceedings were conducted as indicated in item 3 of the communication. Public streaming stopped after about 15 minutes. The Enlarged Board was conducting the non-public discussion with the party until about 13:00, when public streaming was resumed. </div><div style="font-style: italic;">The appellant then submitted that the received the communication from the Enlarged Board forwarding the comments from the President and all 50 (!) amicus curiae only two days before the oral proceedings, so did not have sufficient time to prepare comments thereto, and requested a postponement [not mentioned, but note R 7/09, cited in Case Law Book (9th edition, 2019) V.B.4.3.19, relating to the non-forwarding of a statement of grounds, as: "The fact that the statement of grounds became available to the public and, thus, also to the petitioner by way of electronic file inspection, had no bearing on the right of parties to be individually and specifically informed by the Office"]. </div><div style="font-style: italic;"><span style="color: #990000;">After some discussion and some more interruptions for deliberation, the appellant indicated that he would accept a 1-month period for studying issues and prepare written submissions, the Enlarged Board announced that they would set a submission deadline in about a month and postpone to early July ("rule is 2 months, but summer is approaching."). To be continued!</span></div><div style="font-style: italic;"><br /></div><div><i style="font-style: italic; text-align: center;">Update 02.06.2021: oral proceedings are to be held on 2 July 2021 by videoconference. See <a href="https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=E6AXUZWZ8071DSU&number=EP04758381&lng=en&proc=EP-PCT" target="_blank">order of the Enlarged Board</a> dated 31.05.2021 and a </i><i><a href="https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=E6AX1Q5K7020DSU&number=EP04758381&lng=en&npl=false" target="_blank">Communication from Registry of the Enlarged Board of Appeal</a> dated 01.06.2021.</i></div><div style="font-style: italic;"><br /></div></div><div style="font-style: italic;"><br /></div>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-53845630256602918692021-05-20T11:57:00.003+02:002021-05-20T12:13:54.897+02:00 T 1294/16 - A matter of principle<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicdwqlDtIJNOycv4O9FrajKrz676ogcGOM02TxhAFmY37in8p4sQdzaqje2vD3XlceHXLI3qobmHqbOym8U_Bwzdh15vvhQ0RjdHig30dxsjsny4Q4hyLz7NatYSxHHfHHQk4A8Q8DRcI/s1920/mosaic-3394375_1920_19-MAY-21.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1280" data-original-width="1920" height="301" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicdwqlDtIJNOycv4O9FrajKrz676ogcGOM02TxhAFmY37in8p4sQdzaqje2vD3XlceHXLI3qobmHqbOym8U_Bwzdh15vvhQ0RjdHig30dxsjsny4Q4hyLz7NatYSxHHfHHQk4A8Q8DRcI/w453-h301/mosaic-3394375_1920_19-MAY-21.jpg" width="453" /></a></div><p></p>A few interesting topics in this decision of the Board of Appeal, wherein an appeal was filed <span class="fontstyle0">against the decision of the Examining Division to refuse the application.</span><div><ol style="text-align: left;"><li><span class="fontstyle0">If there is a prior art document D2 that has the same purpose or objective as the claimed invention, is it then possible that another document D1 that has a different purpose is chosen as the closest prior art </span><span class="fontstyle0">for assessing inventive step?</span><br style="font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-size-adjust: auto;" /></li><li><span class="fontstyle0">Is it a substantial procedural violation if the decision of the Examining Division is based on D1 as closest prior art, when - allegedly - </span>
<span class="fontstyle0">in the oral proceedings before the Examining Division, only D2 was considered as the closest prior art?</span> Is it "implicit" that both D1 and D2
<span class="fontstyle0">had been considered as closest prior art, and is this "implicit discussion" </span><span class="fontstyle0">sufficient to satisfy the appellant's right to be heard?</span> <br style="font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-size-adjust: auto;" /></li><li>Can a difference (relative) to D1 in the mathematical formula claimed be an argument for inventive step?</li><li>In view of RPBA 2020 Article 13(1) and (2), may the Board still admit requests that were filed after <span class="fontstyle0">notification of the summons to oral proceedings, and during oral proceedings?</span></li></ol></div><div><br /></div><span><a name='more'></a></span><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><div>The Board expressed the following considerations:<br /><ol style="text-align: left;"><li>A document with a different purpose can be selected as a starting point in an inventive step analysis (see, e.g., T 1742/12, points 9 and 10). Under Article 56 EPC 1973, the only relevant question is whether the skilled person, having regard to the state of the art, would find the claimed invention to be obvious. This does not exclude the skilled person starting their considerations from any piece of prior art they might be aware of. Thus, the choice of the starting point is not restricted, and the fact that a document has a different purpose than the invention does not mean that it cannot lead to a finding of obviousness.</li><li>According to the Board, since the summons to oral proceedings before the Examing Division contained objections starting from both D1 and D2, it appears that it was at least implicit during these oral proceedings, i.e. it should have been known to the applicant, that both D1 and D2 were considered as closest prior art. However, even if such an "implicit discussion" would not be sufficient to satisfy the appellant's right to be heard, in the present oral hearing the Board explicitly considered both D1 and D2 as possible closest prior art documents, so that a potential violation of the appellant's right to be heard by the Examining Division would have no impact on the present decision.</li><li>Although the claimed mathematical formula itself is different from the one in D1, the mathematical result is the same. As such, the claimed formula is only a mathematical equivalent of that in D1 causing no ascertainable technical effect and is therefore immaterial for the inventive-step assessment in the present case.</li><li><span class="fontstyle0">The present Board finds Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 to be ambiguous. More specifically, it considers the term "in principle" in <i>"[...] </i></span><i>
<span class="fontstyle0">any amendment to a party's appeal case made after notification of a summons to oral proceedings shall, i<u>n principle</u>, not be taken into account, <u>unless there are exceptional circumstances</u></span> [...]"</i> to lead to various interpretations regarding, among others, whether the Board still has <span class="fontstyle0">a residue of discretion to admit a request even in the absence of exceptional circumstances. </span><span class="fontstyle0">The Board therefore concludes that the term "in principle" in Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 should be ignored.<br /></span>The Board then went into considerable detail as to how <span class="fontstyle0">to determine in general whether the circumstances are "exceptional" and concluded that "e</span><span class="fontstyle0">xceptionality" is not necessarily linked to events being exceptional in the sense of deviating from the expected, </span><span class="fontstyle0">but can also be caused by<br />considerations related to the legal framework, such as the </span><span class="fontstyle0">suitability of an amendment to resolve an issue raised by the Board.<br /></span><span class="fontstyle0">The present Board found that "if admittance of a (late-filed) submission is not detrimental to procedural economy this Board considers it appropriate to accept that "exceptional circumstances" within the meaning of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 are present, and justified to admit the submission, provided that this does not adversely affect any other party". Since this was an examination appeal, "<span class="fontstyle0">no other party is adversely affected, and procedural economy was not affected as the Board was able to deal with the amendment without undue delay during the oral proceedings" and "the e</span><span class="fontstyle0">xceptionality of this situation resides in that considerations related<br />to procedural economy are not present and thus the interests of the party in overcoming objections by amendment may prevail without running counter to the principles of the convergent approach".<br /></span>Although this decision is directed to the admittance of late-filed requests in examination, it suggests that also in opposition appeal the Board may admit late-filed requests if the Board can deal with the amendments without undue delay during the oral proceedings, although the question arises to what extent it may <span class="fontstyle0">adversely affect any other party present at the proceedings. </span></span></li></ol><br /></div><p style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;">In recent other Board decisions, the Board did not admit an auxiliary request of the applicant (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t141317du1.html" target="_blank">T 1317/14</a>, ex parte; Board’s objection could be derived already from the Board’s communication under Article 15(1) RPBA, hence no exceptional circumstances); <a href="https://dp-patentlaw.blogspot.com/2020/09/t-221415-ordinary-not-exceptional.html" target="_blank">(T 2214/15</a>, ex parte; amendments made to overcome objections raised in the summons and leading to further objections do not represent an exceptional circumstance justifying admittance of new claim requests); (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t180995du1.html" target="_blank">T 995/18</a>, inter partes; divergence of Board's opinion during oral proceedings from its preliminary opinion is not exceptional circumstance if underlying arguments had already been made in written submissions, requests not admitted; but, claim request admitted if dependent claims/alternatives in a claim are deleted).</p><p><b style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px;"><br /></b></p><p><b style="box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px;">Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">I. The appeal is against the decision of the Examining Division to refuse the application for lack of inventive step of all requests. The refusal cites documents</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">D1: TSAI D-M ET AL: "The evaluation of normalized cross correlations for defect detection", PATTERN RECOGNITION LETTERS, ELSEVIER, AMSTERDAM, NL, vol. 24, no. 15, November 2003, pages 2525-2535</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">D2: TSAI D-M ET AL: "Fast normalized cross correlation for defect detection", PATTERN RECOGNITION LETTERS, ELSEVIER, AMSTERDAM, NL, vol. 24, no. 15, November 2003, pages 2625-2631</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">D3: R. Gonzales and R. Woods: "Digital Image Processing", 31 December 2002, Prentice Hall, pages 701-704</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">D4: John Russ: "Acquiring Images" In: "The Image Processing Handbook", 1 July 2002, CRC Press</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">D5: SMITH M A CHEN T ET AL: "Handbook of Image and Video Processing, Image and Video Indexing and Retrieval; A Unified Framework for Video Summarization, Browsing, and Retrieval", 21 June 2005, ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS, AMSTERDAM, NL, PAGES 993-1029, and</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">D6: "Introduction (Image Processing Toolbox)", 27 January 2004, Retrieved from URL:https://web.archive.org/web/20040127003214/http:/www-rohan.sdsu.edu/doc/matlab/toolbox/images/intro8.html#17818,</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">though only D1, D2, D3 and D6 are relied on in the reasons.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">II. With the grounds of appeal, the appellant requested that the decision of the Examining Division be set aside and that a patent be granted on the basis of the main request or one of two auxiliary requests, all three requests filed with the grounds of appeal. For all requests, claim 1 was unchanged in respect of the corresponding version upon which the decision was based. The appellant also put forward that the decision was based on different reasons than those discussed at the oral proceedings before the Examining Division, in that the inventive step reasoning was based on D1 as closest prior art, whereas at the oral proceedings it was only D2 that was relied on as closest prior art.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">III. The Board invited the appellant to oral proceedings. In the communication accompanying the summons the Board informed the appellant of its opinion that the requests were not allowable for lack of inventive step. In this context the Board cited document</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">D7: Smolarski, Dennis C. Data Structures Essentials, Research & Education Association, 1990, Chapter 3, ARRAYS AND RECORDS.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">IV. The Board also set forth (point 5.4) that, on the basis of the minutes of the oral proceedings in examination, it was at least implicit during the oral proceedings, and should have been known to the applicant, that both D1 and D2 were considered as "closest prior art".</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">V. Before the oral proceedings, with a letter dated 10 February 2021, the appellant filed two new auxiliary requests in replacement of the previous ones. The appellant also asked the Board to refer a question to the Enlarged Board, i.e. whether an implicit consideration of a document as the closest prior art was sufficient to fulfil the right to be heard (Article 113(1) EPC 1973). During the oral proceedings the appellant filed a third auxiliary request.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">VI. The appellant's requests are therefore as follows:</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">- that the decision under appeal be set aside</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">- that a European patent be granted on the basis of the claims of the main request filed with the grounds of appeal dated 31 March 2016, or the first or second auxiliary request, both filed with a letter dated 10 February 2021, or on the basis of the claim of the third auxiliary request filed during the oral proceedings of 10 March 2021</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">- that the Board refer the question of "implicit discussion" of documents in oral proceedings to the Enlarged Board of Appeal if the Board intended to maintain the opinion set out in its preliminary opinion at point 5.4.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">VII. Claim 1 of the main request defines</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">An image processing device (1) for specifying a region in an input image based on a correlation value with a model image; the image processing device (1) comprising:</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">an input image acquiring means (2) adapted to acquire the input image made up of a plurality of pixels defined by three color variables in which each color is independent from each other;</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">a determination target region setting means adapted to set a determination target region (OBJ) in the input image, the determination target region (OBJ) having a size equal to the model image acquired in advance;</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">a first data array transformation means adapted to arrange at least two of the three color variables of each pixel contained in the determination target region (OBJ) in a single first data array (40) according to a predetermined rule;</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">a correlation value calculating means adapted to calculate the correlation value between the single first data array (40) and a single second data array (44) in which at least two of the three color variables of each pixel configuring the model image are arranged according to the predetermined rule; wherein</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">the determination target region setting means are adapted to sequentially move the determination target region (OBJ) in a search region (SEARCH) of the input image, and to repeatedly execute, for every movement of the determination target region (OBJ), the processes in the first data array transformation means and the correlation value calculating means; and</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">a determining means adapted to specify the determination target region (OBJ) having high correlation value with the model image based on a comparison between the correlation value calculated for every movement of the determination target region and a predetermined threshold value, and to output the total number of specified determination target regions (OBJ) and/or each position of the specified determination target regions (OBJ) when the movement of the determination target region is completed.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">VIII. Claim 1 of the first auxiliary request differs therefrom in that the transformation means are defined to use a predetermined rule as follows:</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">a first data array transformation means adapted to arrange the color variables of each pixel contained in the determination target region (OBJ) in a single first data array (40) by a predetermined rule of</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">(i) arranging, in juxtaposition, the matrix containing the red gray value color variables, the matrix containing the green gray value color variables, and the matrix containing the blue gray value color variables in order along the same direction so as to configure the single first data array (60) which is two-dimensional, or</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">(ii) continuously arranging the red gray value color variables, the green gray value color variables, and the blue gray value color variables in a respective one-dimensional array, and arranging the three one-dimensional arrays (72R, 72G, 72B) in order in the same direction so as to configure the single first data array (70) which is one-dimensional;</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">IX. Claim 1 of the second auxiliary request defines</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">An image sensor (100) comprising:</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">a display section (3) ;</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">an imaging section including three CCDs for acquiring an input image;</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">an image processing device ...</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">the image processing device differing from that of claim 1 of the first auxiliary request only in that the second alternative for the predetermined rule has been stricken out.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">X. Claim 1 of the third auxiliary request, as claim 1 of the second auxiliary request, defines a sensor but further specifies the computation of the normalized correlation value according to equation (1) (page 23 of the description), which is copied into the claim.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">XI. At the end of the oral proceedings, the chairman announced the decision of the board.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">Reasons for the Decision</b></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The application and the prior art</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">1. The application relates to the detection of patterns on products in manufacturing context (paragraph 2).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">1.1 Starting from the known technique of using normalized cross correlation (NCC) to detect known patterns in grayscale images (paragraphs 3, 4), the application aims at providing a robust NCC method for color images, improving on known prior art (paragraphs 5 to 8).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">1.2 For this purpose, the 3-color image is transformed into a 2D or 1D matrix by rearranging the values according to predetermined rules. The NCC is then computed on this matrix (paragraph 9 and, further in detail, paragraphs 68 to 73 and 103 to 110, in particular equations (1) and (4)).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2. The prior art documents relevant for this decision are briefly summarised here.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2.1 Document D1 teaches a method of defect detection. Its contribution to the art is the extension of the NCC for use on a 3-color image (abstract; page 2526, right column, 2nd paragraph; Section 2).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2.2 Document D2 is from the same authors as D1. It teaches a method of defect detection with NCC on a grayscale image (abstract). This document also explains that NCC is commonly used for pattern detection by template matching (page 2626, left column).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2.3 Document D3 is an excerpt from a textbook on object recognition explaining the usage of cross-correlation for template matching (section "Matching by correlation").</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2.4 Document D6 is a section of the MATLAB documentation explaining the RGB format.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2.5 D4 teaches the different color acquisition arrangements, including single CCD and 3-CCD (Figure 12 and enclosing section "Color cameras"; Figures 41 to 45 and enclosing section "Digital camera limitations").</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2.6 Document D7 is a textbook excerpt on arrays and records and their storage in memory.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Main request: inventive step</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Starting point (closest prior art)</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">3. The Examining Division considered that claim 1 of the main request lacked an inventive step starting from document D1.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">4. The appellant (page 4 of the grounds of appeal) disagrees with the choice of D1 as "closest prior art" and submits that D2 should instead be the "closest prior art", because D2 has, or at least mentions, the same purpose, i.e. a search for a model in an image, whereas D1 is only about defect detection. In support, the appellant quotes the "Case Law of the Boards of Appeal" (I.D.3.1, seventh edition; same section in the ninth edition) stating:</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>The boards have repeatedly pointed out that the closest prior art for assessing inventive step is normally a prior art document disclosing subject-matter conceived for the same purpose or aiming at the same objective as the claimed invention and having the most relevant technical features in common.</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">5. <b>This Board endorses the opinion that a document with a different purpose can be selected as a starting point in an inventive step analysis (see, e.g., T 1742/12, points 9 and 10). Under Article 56 EPC 1973, the only relevant question is whether the skilled person, having regard to the state of the art, would find the claimed invention to be obvious. This does not exclude the skilled person starting their considerations from any piece of prior art they might be aware of. Thus, the choice of the starting point is not restricted.</b> The Board notes that the above passage quoted by the applicant is a rule which states which document is "normally" (not "always") to be chosen as closest prior art. This rule is employed for efficiency reasons, but it cannot be taken to exclude the selection of different prior art as a starting point and thus as "closest prior art" (see T 0694/15, point 13; T 0405/14, point 19; T 0816/16, point 3.7.1).</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">6. Considering the situation as put forward by the appellant,<b> the fact that a document has a different purpose than the invention does not mean that it cannot lead to a finding of obviousness. There can be obvious reasons for using the teachings of the document for the claimed purpose</b>, e.g. when the skilled person reading it knows that the teaching can be used, as it is or analogously, for that purpose.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Preliminary assessment of differences</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">7. In the present case, the finding in respect of obviousness does not differ if one starts from D1 or D2.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">7.1 Starting from D1, the skilled person would immediately recognize, on the basis of their common knowledge (as acknowledged in D2; see point 2.2 above), that the NCC proposed can also be used for pattern detection with template matching and would use it accordingly (at least in order to evaluate its effectiveness).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">7.2 Starting from D2, the skilled person would replace the grayscale NCC with a color one, for reasons of improved accuracy, as explained in D1 ("alleviates false alarms", page 2526, right column, second paragraph).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">7.3 So, either way, the skilled person arrives at a pattern detection method based on template matching using the color NCC formula (equation 2 of D1).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8. The Board further agrees with the Examining Division (point 17.1.4, second paragraph) that a pattern detection method based on template matching in its standard form implies the features of shifting, re-computing the correlation value and selecting a match at the highest correlation point, as shown by D2 and D3 (see points 2.2 and 2.3 above).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">9. The appellant submits that D1 and D2 taken together, (even when considering D6) would not disclose the transformation step itself, and its repetition for every shift (pages 7 and 8 of the grounds).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">10. The Board is of the opinion that the repetition is intrinsic to the default implementation of the template matching procedure, which requires that at each position in the large image the corresponding subimage (D2, page 2626, left column) is fetched and matched with the template. The repetition of this fetching process requires the repetition of all necessary steps to transform the subimage in a form that can be matched with the template, thus including a transforming step if necessary.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">11. Hence the only question that remains to be answered in respect of the transformation and matching steps taken together is whether, when implementing equation 2 of D1, the transformation step as claimed would be obvious.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">11.1 The wording of this feature is: a first data array transformation means adapted to arrange at least two of the three color variables of each pixel contained in the determination target region in a single first data array according to a predetermined rule.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">11.2 As the predetermined rule is not specified at all, this wording says nothing more than that the color values of the pixels are arranged in a single data array, which is what fetching the subimage also does by copying the pixels from the original color image to a single array, i.e. the subimage. Hence this feature is implied by the template matching procedure as discussed above.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">12. The appellant contested that the fetching of the subimage could be equated to the claimed transformation step. The skilled person understood this step as defining a transformation of the form of the data matrix e.g. at the mathematical or software (programming) level, not simply the copying of the data from the image region into a subimage, i.e. to another memory, during execution.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">13. The Board disagrees with this argument because the claim does not specify any such reshaping, it merely requires transformation means to arrange the data of a target region in a single data array (all of it, when three color variables are considered), i.e. the subimage to be matched with the template.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">14. Thus claim 1 of this request lacks inventive step starting from D1 in view of the common knowledge in the art, or from D2 in view of D1 and the common knowledge in the art, Article 56 EPC 1973.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Auxiliary requests: admittance</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>(Article 13(1) and (2) RPBA 2020)</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>15. Article 13(1) RPBA 2020 states that any amendment to a party's appeal case after it has filed its grounds of appeal or reply may be admitted only at the discretion of the board. Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 further provides that any amendment to a party's appeal case made after notification of a summons to oral proceedings shall, in principle, not be taken into account, unless there are exceptional circumstances, which have been justified by cogent reasons by the party concerned.</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">16. The amendments to the first two requests with respect to the auxiliary requests as filed with the grounds of appeal consisted in the addition of the following specification of the form of single data array resulting from the first alternative predetermined rule: which is two-dimensional.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">16.1 The appellant explained that the amendments were a reaction to the Board citing document D7. It clarified that the first transformation rule lead to data being transformed into a two-dimensional matrix, and not a linear array for storage into memory, which was the teaching of D7.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">16.2 The Board accepts that this is the case but notes that it had introduced D7 only as evidence that an argument by the Examining Division was based on common general knowledge (see the summons, point 17). This is a development that the appellant should have foreseen and which does not change the objection in substance.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">17. The third auxiliary request was filed during the oral proceedings before the Board. The appellant stated that the filing was caused by the explanations provided by the Board during the oral proceedings as to why no technical effect could be acknowledged, in particular the distinction made between mathematics, software and hardware. The amendment aimed to make clear the difference with D1 in terms of the mathematical equation used and the usage of just two loops for computation instead of three.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">17.1 However, the Board's finding of a lack of inventive step is a confirmation of the same finding of the Examining Division. Furthermore, it was already set out in the summons to oral proceedings that the mathematical result was the same and that no technical effect could be identified in view of the lack of software and hardware specification. <b>That the Board is not persuaded by the argumentation of the appellant is a foreseeable possibility.</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>17.2 The amendments to the third auxiliary request limit the claims in such a way that an argument important to the appellant finds basis in the claim. The appellant's interest to make a claim fit its arguments is not, in the Board's view, sufficient to justify the late filing of amendments.</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">17.3 As explained in points 16.2, 17.1 and 17.2 the Board holds that the reasons provided by the appellant have not established "exceptional circumstances" in the meaning of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 for filing the three auxiliary requests at late stages in the proceedings.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">18. <b>It needs to be decided whether, in view of the very stringent wording of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020, the Board may admit the new requests nonetheless.</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">18.1 <b>The Board finds Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 to be ambiguous.</b> It does not merely state that submissions filed after notification of a summons to oral proceedings shall not be taken into account, unless there are exceptional circumstances (that are justified with cogent reasons), but that this should apply only "in principle". "In principle not" is frequently construed as "only under extraordinary, i.e. exceptional, circumstances". This means that, under a literal reading, Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 could be paraphrased to read in pertinent part:</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">Any amendment to a party's appeal case made... after notification of a summons to oral proceedings shall[deleted: , in principle, not ]be taken into account only under exceptional circumstances, unless there are exceptional circumstances, which have been justified with cogent reasons by the party concerned.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">It is not clear whether the term "in principle" is</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">(i) effectively redundant over the express requirement of exceptional circumstances,</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">(ii) whether it is in opposition with that express requirement, as the literal reading of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 might suggest, thus making this provision contradictory in itself and, as a consequence, not applicable, or</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">(iii) whether the term means something different and what this could be. In this latter respect, it is unclear inter alia whether the term "in principle" is meant to provide a residue of discretion for the Board to admit a request even in the absence of exceptional circumstances (or where no cogent reasons were supplied for their justification).</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">The Board is of the view that the second ("literal") option would invalidate Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 and thus cannot reflect the lawmakers' intention. Taking either the first or the third option means that no further conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the qualification of "in principle". <b>The Board concludes that the term "in principle" should be ignored.</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">18.2 <b>The Board also notes that neither the Article nor the explanatory remarks contained in CA/3/19 give an explanation of how to determine in general whether the circumstances are "exceptional". </b>However, the example provided in the explanatory remarks to Article 13(2) RPBA 2020, according to which the Board raising a new objection can be seen to constitute such exceptional circumstances, suggests that, in view of procedural fairness vis-à-vis the concerned party, considerations similar to those in Article 13(1) as to "the suitability of the amendment to resolve the issues ... which were raised by the Board" should (exceptionally) prevail over considerations of procedural economy, although the Board raising a new objection is in a situation that may not necessarily be qualified as exceptional in the (dictionary) sense of unusual or uncommon. <b>The exceptionality is hence not necessarily linked to events being exceptional in the sense of deviating from the expected, but can also be caused by considerations related to the legal framework, notably the principles underlying the rules of procedure.</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">18.3 Articles 12 and 13 RPBA 2020 implement what the explanatory remarks refer to as "convergent approach", according to which it should be the more difficult for parties to have their submissions considered the later in the appeal proceedings they are made. The major motivation for this principle is the procedural economy of the appeal proceedings. <b>If admittance of a (late-filed) submission is not detrimental to procedural economy this Board considers it appropriate to accept that "exceptional circumstances" within the meaning of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 are present, and justified to admit the submission, provided that this does not adversely affect any other party. The exceptionality of this situation resides in that considerations related to procedural economy are not present and thus the interests of the party in overcoming objections by amendment may prevail without running counter to the principles of the convergent approach.</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">18.4 Moreover, <b>the Board sees that there are circumstances which are beyond the submitting party's control, namely the Board's judgment as to whether it can, without undue delay, deal with the proposed submission, but also any other party's agreement to have the submission taken into account. In particular, if the Board, of its own motion, finds the circumstances exceptional in view of the purpose of the convergent approach, then cogent legal reasons need not be brought forward by the party.</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">19. The Board considers the principles set out in the preceding paragraph to be complied with in respect of all three auxiliary requests. <b>These being ex parte proceedings, no other party is adversely affected, and procedural economy was not affected as the Board was able to deal with the amendment without undue delay during the oral proceedings. That is because the submissions were only further specifications aiming to make sure that all of the appellant's arguments already brought forward are taken into account (see points 16.1, 17, 17.2 in view of the appellant's arguments as summarised in points 12 and 23). The Board therefore finds the auxiliary requests to be filed under "exceptional circumstances" within the meaning of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 and takes them into account.</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">With this conclusion, the Board is in agreement with the decision T 2135/18 (reasons 2).</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>20. The Board would like to make it clear that it would have come to the same conclusion by exercising its discretion under Article 13(1) RPBA 2020 in view of the general approach applying to the admittance of late-filed submissions which can be briefly summarised by the expression "the later, the stricter". The considerations under point 19 above would then apply mutatis mutandis.</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">First auxiliary request: inventive step</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">21. This request differs from the main request in that it defines two alternative rules of arranging the color values in a single data array.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">22. This arranging does not change the result of the color NCC, which remains identical to that of D1, as the order of the elements is irrelevant for the result of the computation (compare equation 2 of D1 with equations 1 and 4 in the application). This was not contested by the appellant. There is therefore no technical effect in terms of the results of the detection procedure.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">23. The appellant argued that the arrangement simplified the addressing of the data values, because it required the use of just one or two indexes, instead of three. It was sufficient to use one or two loops to go through the data instead of three, which made the method faster. This also made the programming more convenient for the programmer.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">23.1 If one took the objective technical problem of speeding up the computations, it would have to be seen that D1 did not address this problem. D2 did, but solved it in a different manner, using sum-tables (D2, abstract).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">23.2 D7 was also not concerned with this problem, but even if D7 were to be considered by the skilled person, it would not lead to the claimed arrangements. Although D7 taught that one can vary the indexes in different order to create the linear memory array, this was just a memory arrangement, the matrix itself would still be three-dimensional, using three indices. Furthermore, when considering the NCC formula from D1, the obvious way would be to go through the position indexes first, following the way this was defined in D1.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">24. Moreover, there was no requirement under Article 56 EPC of a technical effect. Even if a technical effect was not acknowledged, the claim should be recognized as compliant with Article 56 EPC (1973) because it was not obvious. Starting from D1 or D2 there was no pointer to the specific data arrangements claimed.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">25. In response to this second point, the Board recalls that it is of constant jurisprudence that only features contributing to the solution of a technical problem by providing a technical effect can contribute towards a finding of inventive step (T 0641/00 Two identities/COMVIK, point 6). This is because the EPC provides for protection of inventions, which require a technical solution to a technical problem (Rule 27(1)(c) EPC 1973). It is the (claimed) invention, i.e. the technical solution, that needs to involve an inventive step (Articles 52 EPC and 56 EPC 1973) for a patent to be granted.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">26. In response to the first set of arguments (point 23. above), the Board first remarks that, whichever way the data is arranged, the number of operations (data read-outs, additions, multiplications) cannot change, because the computation of the NCC requires all data to be read and the same products to be computed and added.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">26.1 So, if there is any speed-up, it must come from a faster data read-out, caused by the allegedly simpler structure. This, however, cannot be assessed without information on the software and hardware architecture. Such information is not provided, neither in the claim, nor in the description. A simpler indexing structure does not necessarily translate to a faster read-out. This depends on a number of factors, including the data structures allowed by the programming language, the memory management, the compiler design etc. If, for instance, the programming language is optimized for treating RGB images in the standard 3-plane format (see D6), then forcing a rearrangement of the data matrix will actually reduce performance. There is no information in the description allowing to assess this.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">26.2 The Board does not dispute that a technical effect might be obtained under some circumstances. But this is not sufficient for acknowledging an inventive step, because those circumstances are not claimed (nor are they in fact made clear by the description), which means that the effect is not obtained over the full breadth of the claim, which in turn leads to the conclusion that at least a subset of the claimed matter is not to be seen as a technical solution to a technical problem and hence cannot be acknowledged as an invention involving an inventive step (see also T 0939/92, points 2.4 to 2.6).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">27. Regarding the argument as to the convenience for the programmer, i.e. easing the programming effort, this, in principle, cannot be considered to define an invention at all (T 1539/09, Catchword). Arguendo, even if that could be the case, the technical effect cannot be objectively assessed here, because on the one hand the programming language is not specified, and because on the other hand the answer is a matter of subjective preference: while writing code with only two loops may be more convenient, the indexes will no longer intuitively directly represent the standard RGB format, making code reading less convenient.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">28. Thus the claimed data transformation means does not solve any technical problem at all, and hence cannot contribute to a finding of inventive step. As in the case of the main request, claim 1 of this request lacks inventive step starting from D1 in view of the common knowledge in the art or from D2 in view of D1 and the common knowledge in the art.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Second auxiliary request: inventive step</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">29. Claim 1 of this request defines an image sensor, comprising an image processing device as per the previous request, where the transformation rule is defined as being according to the first rule only. The added features are those of using a display, and of using a 3CCD sensor.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">30. A display is implicit in D1.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">31. In view of document D4 (passages as cited above), it is clear that the 3CCD configuration is common knowledge, and its advantages (better image quality) are known. Thus the skilled person would use it for template matching if needed.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">32. In support of inventive step, the appellant argues synergy between the 3CCD acquisition set-up and the transformation step. Thus was explained in paragraph 99 (description as filed), wherein it is stated:</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">... since the data array is generated by combining the red gray image, the green gray image, and the blue gray image configuring one image, transformation to the data array is facilitated by using the picture signal from each CCD if the imaging section including three CCDs for acquiring the gray value for each color is used.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">33. The Board is not convinced of the presence of synergy. Neither the claim nor the description specify any specific hardware arrangements that would provide for an effect of the usage of the 3 CCD sensor going beyond improved image quality. Paragraph 99 only describes a desired effect, without describing how this is actually achieved. The claim is not specific either as to how the signals from the CCDs are used. In fact, the straightforward interpretation thereof is that the CCDs are used to obtain a standard RGB image, as e.g. in D6, having no further influence on the following processing.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">34. Claim 1 of this request lacks inventive step starting from D1 in view of the common knowledge in the art, or from D2 in view of D1 and the common knowledge in the art.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Third auxiliary request: inventive step</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">35. The Board has already considered the argument as to the number of loops, so this cannot help the appellant's case. The mathematical formula itself is different to the one in D1, but this is immaterial for the inventive-step assessment in the present context.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;"><b>Differences in mathematics can lead to a finding of inventive step only if they contribute to defining a technical solution in a field of technology not excluded under Articles 52(2) and (3) EPC.</b> This is not the case here, the proposed formula is only a mathematical equivalent of that in D1 causing no ascertainable technical effect, as discussed in the framework of the previous requests.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">36. Claim 1 of this request lacks inventive step starting from D1 in view of the common general knowledge in the art, or from D2 in view of D1 and the common general knowledge in the art.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">Alleged procedural violation</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">37. The appellant submits that in the oral proceedings before the Examining Division only D2 was considered as the "closest prior art" in the framework of the "problem and solution approach", whereas the decision is based on document D1 as "closest prior art". The applicant was not heard on the grounds that led to the refusal, in breach of Article 113(1) EPC 1973.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">38. The minutes of those oral proceedings mention that the "preliminary opinion of 23-11-2015" was discussed (1st page, paragraph 4), especially its "section 1.3.2" (paragraph 10), and state (1st page, last sentence, to 2nd page, 1st paragraph) that the "Art 52 objection of the preliminary opinion under point 1.3.2 was withdrawn" and that "the Art 52 objections raised in section 1.5 [...] were maintained". There is no point 1.5 in the preliminary opinion of 23 November 2015. The summons to oral proceedings dated 5 June 2015 contain objections starting from both D1 and D2 (in combination with D1) in points 1.4 and 1.5. The discussion during the oral proceedings then focused on the teachings of D1 (2nd page, top: "fills the gaps of D1"; further down "The contiguous data is not explicitly disclosed in D1").</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">39. Thus, on the basis of the examination file itself, <b>it appears that it was at least implicit during the oral proceedings, i.e. it should have been known to the applicant that both D1 and D2 were considered as "closest prior art".</b></span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">40. The appellant disagreed. It was clear during the oral proceedings before the Examination Division that the starting point was D2. The arguments were different if one started from D1 or D2. The case could then have been argued differently.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">41. The Board is not in a position to verify this allegation. It would have been for the members of the Examining Division to do so had the applicant contested the minutes of the oral proceedings before the division. Thus, the Board cannot find that a (substantial) procedural violation took place.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The request for referral to the Enlarged Board</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">42. The appellant argued that the Examining Division had based its decision on D1 as closest prior art that had not as such been discussed during the oral proceedings. In its preliminary opinion (see points 5.3 and 5.4), the Board expressed its doubts, stating, with reference to passages from the minutes, that it seemed to be "at least implicit" that both D1 and D2 had been considered as closest prior art by the Examining Division. </span><span style="color: #990000;">The appellant takes issue with the idea that an only "implicit discussion" could be sufficient to satisfy the appellant's right to be heard under Article 113(1) EPC 1973 and asks the Board to submit that question to the Enlarged Board.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #990000;">43. <b>The board takes the view that a potential violation of the appellant's right to be heard by the Examining Division would have no impact on the present decision, as the appellant did not contest that the right to be heard on the matter was respected by the Board.</b> The appellant acknowledged to have had ample opportunity to present its case before this Board. In particular, it was discussed what is the appropriate starting point ("closest prior art") for the assessment of inventive step, the Board explicitly considered both D1 and D2 as possible "closest prior art" documents, and the appellant was given several opportunities to file amendments at a very late stage of the proceedings.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">44. Hence, the answer to the question the appellant asks the Board to refer would have no consequences on the present case, so that a decision is not required (Article 112(1)(a) EPC 1973).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">Order</b></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">For these reasons it is decided that:</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">The appeal is dismissed.</p><div> </div><div><p>This decision <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t161294eu1.html" target="_blank">T 1294/16</a> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t161294eu1.pdf" target="_blank">PDF</a>) has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2021:T129416.20210310. The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP06022645&tab=doclist" target="_blank">here</a>. <a href="https://pixabay.com/photos/mosaic-tiles-pattern-texture-3394375/">Photo</a> obtained via Pixabay by <a href="https://pixabay.com/users/michaelgaida-652234/" target="_blank">Michael Gaida</a> under CC0 license (no changes made)<span face=""arial" , sans-serif" style="background-color: white; font-size: 13px;">.</span></p></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-10114406178171018322021-05-11T17:54:00.001+02:002021-05-11T17:54:00.171+02:00T 2255/15 - Can the Board of Appeal disregard third party observations that were only filed during the appeal proceedings?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgDLsRbNNSMB2PhD57rfs5CAq2OdMW0OPIExjUQb3KTUjCTFq-LjE68mF3v_PDezNRuJh-NE2dsAI1iCZnmdIV0rugrIO3CN8qdjUgvsCGUBz2ZBbnc3C_ecdV-JXWQlaFzyb-cLVV_Aa6x/s1600/2021.05.11+too+late+-+5247157613_80ae842d26_o.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1067" data-original-width="1600" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgDLsRbNNSMB2PhD57rfs5CAq2OdMW0OPIExjUQb3KTUjCTFq-LjE68mF3v_PDezNRuJh-NE2dsAI1iCZnmdIV0rugrIO3CN8qdjUgvsCGUBz2ZBbnc3C_ecdV-JXWQlaFzyb-cLVV_Aa6x/w400-h266/2021.05.11+too+late+-+5247157613_80ae842d26_o.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><p><i>In the present case, the </i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>appeals lodged by the opponent and the patent proprietor lie from the interlocutory decision of the opposition division that the European patent No 1 369 037 in amended form</i></span><i style="text-align: center;">. Third party observations were submitted in an early stage of the appeal proceedings, as well as in later stages, objecting to novelty and to inventive step w.r.t. newly field documents (existing grounds, but new facts, arguments and evidence). </i><i style="text-align: center;">The patent proprietor requested that th</i><span style="text-align: center;"><i>e third-party observations, with all the documents and annexes referred to in the observations, not be admitted into the proceedings as they were late-filed. However, the RPBA seems to only impose constraints on late-file submissions by parties, as does Art. 114(2) EPC, and not by third parties. How did the Board handle these third party observations: were they admitted and, if so, to what extent?</i></span></p><div style="background-color: white; color: #0e2034; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><a name='more'></a></div><div style="background-color: white; margin-bottom: 1em; padding: 0px;"><div class="WordSection1"><div class="Heading30" style="background-color: transparent; color: #0e2034; line-height: 16.8pt; margin: 0cm 52pt 0.0001pt 1pt;"><span style="background-color: transparent;"><b>Summary of Facts and Submissions</b></span></div></div></div><div><br /></div><div>I. The appeals lodged by the opponent and the patent proprietor lie from the interlocutory decision of the opposition division that European patent No 1 369 037 in amended form according to the fourth auxiliary request comprising the set of claims filed on 12 May 2015 met the requirements of the EPC.</div><div><br /></div><div>II. The patent as granted contained ten claims, independent claims 1, 2, 6 and 8 of which read as follows:</div><div><br /></div><div>"1. Disinfectant in the form of a working mixture which comprises</div><div><br /></div><div>(a) 0.05 to 1% by weight of 1-(2-ethylhexyl) glycerol ether and</div><div><br /></div><div>(b) 0.2 to 5% by weight of one or more aromatic alcohols selected from the group consisting of aryloxyalkanols and arylalkanols.".</div><div><br /></div><div>"2. Disinfectant in the form of a working mixture or of a concentrate, characterized in that it comprises</div><div><br /></div><div>(a) 1-(2-ethylhexyl) glycerol ether and</div><div><br /></div><div>(b) one or more aromatic alcohols selected from the group consisting of aryloxyalkanols and arylalkanols,</div><div><br /></div><div>the weight ratio x of component (a) to component (b) being 0.15 or less.".</div><div><br /></div><div>"6. Disinfectant in the form of a working mixture which comprises</div><div><br /></div><div>(a) 0.05 to 0.02% by weight of 1-(2-ethylhexyl) glycerol ether and</div><div><br /></div><div>(b) 1.0 to 2.0% by weight of phenoxyethanol."</div><div><br /></div><div>"8. Process for controlling mycobacteria in which a disinfectant which comprises (a) one or more 1- or 2-(C3- to C24-alkyl) glycerol ethers and (b) one or more aromatic alcohols is allowed to act on the surface to be disinfected selected from a medical instrument or a laboratory apparatus."</div><div><br /></div><div>III. The following documents are referred to in the present decision:</div><div><br /></div><div>[...] </div><div><br /></div><div>IV. The opposition division came to, inter alia, the following conclusions:</div><div><br /></div><div>- The subject-matter of claims 1 and 2 according to the main request (patent as granted) was not novel in view of the disclosure of each of D1, D2 and D4.</div><div><br /></div><div>- The subject-matter of claims 1 and 2 according to the first auxiliary request then on file was not novel in view of the disclosure of each of D2 and D4.</div><div><br /></div><div>- The subject-matter of claim 1 according to each of the second and third auxiliary requests then on file was not novel in view of the disclosure of D4.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">- The claims according to the fourth auxiliary request then on file met the requirements of Articles 83, 84, and 123(2) and (3) EPC.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">- The subject-matter of the claims according to the fourth request then on file was novel in view of each of D1, D2 and D4 and involved an inventive step in view of D1 or D2 as the closest prior art (Article 56 EPC).</span></div><div><br /></div><div>V. In its statement setting out the grounds of appeal, the opponent contested the reasoning of the opposition division and submitted that claim 1 of the fourth auxiliary request then on file was not clear and contained added subject-matter and that its subject-matter was not novel and did not involve an inventive step.</div><div><br /></div><div>VI. In its statement setting out the grounds of appeal, the patent proprietor submitted that the subject-matter of the claims according to any of the main request (granted claims) and auxiliary requests 1 to 3 ("Set A", "Set B" and "Set C" corresponding to the claims of the first to third auxiliary requests submitted with the letter dated 12 May 2015) was novel and involved an inventive step.</div><div><br /></div><div>VII. The patent proprietor and opponent are both appellant and respondent in these appeal proceedings and are referred to in the following as "patent proprietor" and "opponent", respectively.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>VIII. Third-party observations with documents A006, A007, A012, A014 and A015 were submitted on 16 February 2016, 14 November 2018 and 31 May 2019. Novelty objections were submitted based on A006, D3a and A012. The inventive step of the claimed subject-matter was objected to in view of A006 and D3a. Reference was made to A013.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>IX. During the appeal proceedings, the opponent submitted A010 and A011. It objected that the subject-matter of claim 1 and/or claim 2 of the main request and the auxiliary requests corresponding to sets A to C was not novel in view of D1, D2, D4, A006 or A012.</div><div><br /></div><div>X. During the appeal proceedings, the patent proprietor submitted A008 and counter-arguments with regard to the objections of added subject-matter and lack of clarity, novelty and inventive step. It contested the admittance of A006. It submitted auxiliary requests A' to F', A008a, A009 and A009a.</div><div><br /></div><div>XI. The board issued a communication pursuant to Rule 100(2) EPC summarising the parties' submissions and requesting that the patent proprietor clarify its requests.</div><div><br /></div><div>XII. With a further letter dated 10 November 2020, the patent proprietor clarified its requests and submitted sets of claims G-J and G'-I'.</div><div><br /></div><div>XIII. Oral proceedings before the board were held on 25 February 2021 by videoconference.</div><div><br /></div><div>XIV. The opponent requested that:</div><div><br /></div><div>- the decision under appeal be set aside and that the patent be revoked in its entirety</div><div><br /></div><div>- claim sets A' to F' not be admitted into the proceedings</div><div><br /></div><div>- if the board should find the subject-matter of the claims of any of the main request and auxiliary requests 1 and 3 novel, the case be remitted to the opposition division</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">XV. The patent proprietor requested that:</span></div><div><br /></div><div>- the decision of the opposition division to maintain European patent EP 1369037 Bl in amended form based on auxiliary request D be set aside and that the patent be maintained as granted</div><div><br /></div><div>- alternatively, that the patent be maintained in amended form on the basis of any of claim sets A-J or A'-I' in the following order: A, A', B, B', C, C', D, D', E, E', F, F',G, G', H, H', I, I', J</div><div><br /></div><div>- should the board consider that the subject-matter of the claims of any of claim sets A-C, E-J and G'-I' be novel but not inventive, or should the board consider that claim sets A' to F' do not overcome the objections under Article 84 EPC, the case be remitted to the department of first instance for examination of inventive step or clarity, respectively</div><div><br /></div><div>- the objections of lack of novelty based on the example of D1 and the objections under Article 84 EPC not be admitted into the proceedings</div><div><br /></div><div>- should the objections under Article 84 EPC be admitted into the proceedings and should the board consider claim sets A to F to be unclear, claim sets A' to F' be admitted into the proceedings</div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">- the third-party observations filed on 15 February 2016, 14 November 2018 and 31 May 2019, with all the documents and annexes referred to in the observations, not be admitted into the proceedings</span></div><div><br /></div><div>- A008, A008a and A009 be admitted into the proceedings</div><div><br /></div><div>- A010 and A011 not be admitted into the proceedings</div><div><br /></div><div>XVI. The opponent's case, where relevant to the present decision, may be summarised as follows.</div><div><br /></div><div>Main request</div><div><br /></div><div>- Novelty in view of D1</div><div><br /></div><div>- Example 1 was prejudicial to the novelty of claim 1 of the main request. Furthermore, the combination of paragraphs [0060], [0073] and [0078] of D1 anticipated the subject-matter of claim 2 of the main request.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Novelty in view of D2</div><div><br /></div><div>- The subject-matter of claim 2 of the main request lacked novelty in view of example 14. The weight ratio of 1-(2-ethylhexyl) glycerol to phenoxypropanol in this composition was 0.154 and had to be rounded to 0.15.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Novelty in view of D4</div><div><br /></div><div>- The composition of chapter III, 2.d) on page 150, of D4 anticipated the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request.</div><div><br /></div><div>Auxiliary request 1</div><div><br /></div><div>- Admittance of the objection of lack of clarity</div><div><br /></div><div>- The objection of lack of clarity of claim 1 was not a new objection but a new argument. The objection should be admitted into the proceedings.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Novelty</div><div><br /></div><div>- The reasons given for the main request applied to the claims of auxiliary request 1. Thus, example 2 of D2 was also prejudicial to the novelty of the subject-matter of claim 2 of auxiliary request 1.</div><div><br /></div><div>Auxiliary request 3</div><div><br /></div><div>- Added subject-matter</div><div><br /></div><div>- The indefinite article "an" in claim 2 of auxiliary request 3 implied that further non- listed aryloxyalkanols and arylalkanols could be present in the disinfectant of the claim, contrary to what was required in claims 4 and 5 as filed.</div><div><br /></div><div>- The term "or" in claim 2 of auxiliary request 3 implied that if one of the listed compounds was selected, no other listed compound could be present in the disinfectant of the claim, again contrary to what was required in claims 4 and 5 as filed.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Claim 2 added subject-matter beyond the content of the application as filed.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Novelty</div><div><br /></div><div>- The reasons given for the main request applied to the claims of auxiliary request 3.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Remittal</div><div><br /></div><div>- The case should be remitted to the opposition division if novelty was acknowledged. The inventive step of the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 was not assessed by the opposition division considering D4 as the closest prior art. This justified remitting the case to the opposition division.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Inventive step considering D1 as the closest prior art</div><div><br /></div><div>- The distinguishing feature of claims 1 and 2 in view of the example of D1, using 2-methyl-4-phenylbutan-2-ol, was the specific aromatic alcohol defined in the claims.</div><div><br /></div><div>- The activity against Mycobacterium terrae shown in the example of the patent was not to be considered in the formulation of the objective technical problem. First, the effect of controlling mycobacteria was not relevant for cosmetics and only considered to be a bonus effect. Second, if it were accepted that the effect was relevant, the effect was not achieved over the whole scope of claim 1 or 2 of auxiliary request 3.</div><div><br /></div><div>- The objective technical problem was the provision of an alternative disinfectant composition.</div><div><br /></div><div>- The solution would have been obvious in view of D1 alone or in view of D1 in combination with D4.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Inventive step considering D2 as the closest prior art</div><div><br /></div><div>- The subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 differed from the composition of table V of D2 in the presence of 1-(2-ethylhexyl) glycerol.</div><div><br /></div><div>- The objective technical problem was the provision of an alternative disinfectant composition.</div><div><br /></div><div>- The solution would have been obvious in view of D2 in combination with D4.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">XVII. The patent proprietor's case, where relevant to the present decision, may be summarised as follows.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">Admittance of the third-party observations</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">- The third-party observations were late-filed and should not be admitted into the proceedings.</span></div><div><br /></div><div>Main request</div><div><br /></div><div>- Admittance of the novelty objection in view of D1</div><div><br /></div><div>- The objection based on the example of D1 was raised by the opposition division during the oral proceedings. This objection was to be rejected for being late-filed.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Novelty in view of D1</div><div><br /></div><div>- A double selection was necessary to arrive at the subject-matter of claim 2: a selection of "Octoxyglycerin" in paragraph [0073] and a selection of the weight ratio of the glycerine ether to the aryl-substituted alcohol, i.e. 1/10 from the different range limits to be made in paragraph [0078]. Furthermore, the aryl-substituted alcohol mentioned in paragraph [0060] was not mandatorily an aryloxyalkanol or an arylalkanol.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Novelty in view of D2</div><div><br /></div><div>- The weight ratio of compound (a) to compound (b) (i.e. the weight of 1-(2-ethylhexyl) glycerol to the aromatic alcohol) referred to in claim 2 of the main request was not directly and ambiguously disclosed in D2.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Novelty in view of D4</div><div><br /></div><div>- The composition of chapter III, 2.d) on page 150, of D4 did not directly and unambiguously disclose the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request. The "Glycerinether" used in combination with phenoxyethanol in this composition was not necessarily 1-(2-ethylhexyl) glycerol, i.e. the compound required by claim 1 of the main request.</div><div><br /></div><div>Auxiliary request 1</div><div><br /></div><div>- Admittance of the objection of lack of clarity</div><div><br /></div><div>- The objection of lack of clarity of claim 1 was not raised during the first-instance proceedings and could not be derived from the objection of lack of clarity of claim 5 of the fourth auxiliary request then on file raised before the opposition division. The objection of lack of clarity of claim 1 should have been raised before the opposition division and should not be admitted into the appeal proceedings.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Novelty</div><div><br /></div><div>- The reasons given for the main request applied to the claims of auxiliary request 1.</div><div><br /></div><div>Auxiliary request 3</div><div><br /></div><div>- Added subject-matter</div><div><br /></div><div>- Claim 2 of auxiliary request 3 was based on the combination of claims 2, 4 and 5 of the application as filed, except that the terms "oligoalkanol aryl ethers" (found in claim 2 as filed) and "phenoxypropanol" (found in claim 4 as filed) were deleted.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Claim 2 as filed used the "comprising" language and referred to the wording "one or more aromatic alcohols". It meant that the combination of claim 2 as filed with either claim 4 or 5 as filed allowed the presence of further aryloxyalkanols or arylalkanols in addition to those mentioned in the two claims. The same as in claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 owing to the presence of the indefinite article "an".</div><div><br /></div><div>- The term "or" used in claim 2 of auxiliary request 3 could not be exclusive since the claim referred for component (b) to "one or more aromatic alcohols".</div><div><br /></div><div>- Novelty</div><div><br /></div><div>- 2-methyl-4-phenylbutan-2-ol in the composition of example 1 of D1 was not an arylalkanol as defined in claim 1 of auxiliary request 3.</div><div><br /></div><div>- The composition of example 14 of D2 comprised, inter alia, phenoxypropanol. This compound was not an aryloxyalkanol encompassed by claim 2 of auxiliary request 3.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Remittal</div><div><br /></div><div>- The fact that the opposition division did not assess the inventive step of claim 1 in view of D4 did not justify remittal of the case to the opposition division.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Admittance of the objection of lack of inventive step based on D4 as the closest prior art</div><div><br /></div><div>- This objection was raised for the first time during the appeal proceedings. It should have been raised at a previous stage of the appeal proceedings.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Inventive step considering D1 as the closest prior art</div><div><br /></div><div>- The distinguishing feature of claims 1 and 2 in view of the example of D1, using 2-methyl-4-phenylbutan-2-ol, was the specific aromatic alcohol defined in the claims.</div><div><br /></div><div>- The examples in the patent showed that the composition according to claim 1 or claim 2 exhibited an activity against Mycobacterium terrae.</div><div><br /></div><div>- The objective technical problem was the provision of a disinfectant composition for controlling, inter alia, mycobacteria.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Neither D1 nor D4 referred to any activity against mycobacteria, and it could not be deduced that any disinfectant would be suitable for controlling mycobacteria.</div><div><br /></div><div>- Inventive step considering D2 as the closest prior art</div><div><br /></div><div>- The subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 differed from the composition of table V of D2 in the presence of 1-(2-ethylhexyl) glycerol and its amount (0.05 wt.% is the lowest amount in claim 1).</div><div><br /></div><div>- In the same way as for D1, the objective technical problem was the provision of a disinfectant composition for controlling, inter alia, mycobacteria.</div><div><br /></div><div>- D4 would not have rendered obvious the composition of claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 for controlling mycobacteria.</div><div><br /></div><div><b>Reasons for the Decision</b></div><div><br /></div><div><i><span style="color: #990000;">Admittance of the objections and documents submitted with the third-party observations filed under Article 115 EPC</span></i></div><div><br /></div><div>1. Third-party observations were filed on 15 February 2016, 14 November 2018 and 31 May 2019.</div><div><br /></div><div>1.1 The patent proprietor requested that the third-party observations dated 15 February 2016, 14 November 2018 and 31 May 2019 and documents A006, A007, A012, A014 and A015 and annexes 1-2 submitted along with them not be admitted into the proceedings.</div><div><br /></div><div>1.2 In the communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA, the board already expressed its preliminary view on the following points regarding admittance of the third-party observations. The opponent did not contest the board's preliminary view in this respect.</div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">1.3 With the third-party observations of 15 February 2016, documents A006 and A007 and annexes 1-2 were filed. It was argued that document A006 anticipated the subject-matter of granted claims 1 and 4 and that, in view of its relevance, the document should be admitted into the proceedings. Reference was made to annexes 1 and 2. Annexes 1 and 2 demonstrated that the same antimicrobial effect was obtained for different microorganisms with compositions comprising 1-(2-ethylhexyl)glycerol ether and phenoxyethanol at ratios of 0.11, 0.15 and 0.20, i.e. compositions according to the invention and comparative compositions. Furthermore, inventive step of the granted claims and the independent claims of the fourth auxiliary request held allowable by the opposition division (claim set D) was challenged with the disclosure of A006 and A007.</span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">In its observations of 14 November 2018, the third party raised a further objection of lack of novelty in view of D3a and a further objection of lack of inventive step in view of D3a or A014 as the closest prior art. It submitted further arguments for the objection of lack of inventive step in view of A006 as the closest prior art.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">A further objection of lack of novelty based on A012 was submitted with the third-party observations of 31 May 2019.</span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">1.4 In its submissions of 15 February 2016 and 14 November 2018, <b>the third party argued that A006 with annexes 1 and 2 were prima facie relevant and should be admitted into the proceedings.</b> <b>Furthermore, the third-party observations were filed at an early stage of the appeal proceedings.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>1.5 <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The board observes that in accordance with the case law of the boards, observations by third parties pursuant to Article 115 EPC can also be filed during an appeal proceedings</b></span> (T 390/90, G 9/91, OJ 1993, 408, T 1756/11). This interpretation is consistent with the wording of Article 115 EPC, which sets no time limit in this respect (T 390/90, OJ 1994, 808). <span style="color: #990000;"><b>However, in accordance with the case law, Article 115 EPC must not be interpreted in such a way as to grant third parties rights which extend beyond those of the parties to proceedings</b></span> (T 951/91, OJ 1995, 202; see also Schachenmann, Article 115 EPC, in Singer-Stauder, The European Patent Convention, Vol 2, 3rd ed.). <span style="color: #990000;">Since <b>Article 114(2) EPC </b>confers to the bodies of the EPO the discretionary power to disregard submissions not filed in due time, <b>this provision must also apply to observations by third parties</b>. Since the<b> Rules of Procedures of the Boards of Appeals</b> specify some criteria for exercising <b>this discretion in appeal proceedings with respect to the submissions of the parties to the proceedings, in the board's view, these criteria must also apply to third-party observations.</b> Hence, the criteria laid down in <b>Article 12(2) RPBA 2020 and 12(4) RPBA 2007 are to be taken into consideration in deciding whether and to what extent the submissions at issue must be considered.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>As set out above, the following objections were raised in the third-party observations:</div><div><br /></div><div>- lack of novelty of the subject-matter of claims 1 and 4 as granted in view of A006 and D3a</div><div><br /></div><div>- lack of novelty of the subject-matter of claim 1 of claim set D over A012</div><div><br /></div><div>- lack of inventive step of the subject-matter of claims 2 and 6 as granted and the claims of all claim sets submitted by the patent proprietor over A006 in combination with A007</div><div><br /></div><div>- lack of inventive step of the subject-matter of claims 1 and 4 as granted and claim 1 of claim sets A' to F' over A014 as the closest prior art in combination with A015</div><div><br /></div><div>- lack of inventive step of the subject-matter of claim 1 as granted and claim 1 of claim sets A' to C' over D3a</div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b><br /></b></span></div><div><span style="color: #990000;"><b>None of these objections had been raised before in the opposition or appeal proceedings. </b></span>Document A006 is a document discussed in the context of novelty of the granted claims. It is also discussed, in combination with annexes 1-2, in the context of inventive step of the claims of auxiliary request 7 (claim set D). Annexes 1 and 2 were filed to show activity of compositions according to the invention and compositions not according to the invention. <span style="color: #990000;"><b>The submission of A006 and annexes 1-2 does not constitute a direct and timely response to facts, objections, arguments or evidence on which the decision under appeal is based. The third-party observations of 15 February 2016 do not provide any argument why the impugned decision would not be correct and which would justify the submission of A006 and annexes 1-2</b></span>. The same reasoning applies with regard to the attack of lack of inventive step over A006 in combination with A007; A014 and the attack of lack of inventive step based on this document as the closest prior art; the attack of lack of novelty based on D3a; and the attack of lack of novelty based on document A012.</div><div><br /></div><div>Thus, the objections contained in the third-party observations filed on 15 February 2016, 14 November 2018 and 31 May 2019 (i.e. based on documents D3a, A006, A007, A012, A014 and A015) <span style="color: #990000;"><b>could and should have been made in opposition proceedings.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>Furthermore,<span style="color: #990000;"> the purpose of appeal proceedings is to <b>review the opposition division's decision rather than to start a second opposition proceedings (Article 12(2) RPBA 2020)</b>. However, admitting the new objections into the proceedings would have meant exactly that, namely <b>it would have offered the third party and thus also the opponent a second go at opposition proceedings.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div><span style="color: #990000;">Therefore, the objections based on documents D3a, A006, A007, A012, A014 and A015 raised in the third-party observations filed on 15 February 2016, 14 November 2018 and 31 May 2019, as well as the submissions made by the opponent on the basis of these objections, were <b>not admitted into the proceedings according to Articles 12(4) RPBA 2007 and 12(2) RPBA 2020.</b></span></div><div><br /></div><div>Main request claims as granted</div><div><br /></div><div>2. Admittance of the novelty objection in view of D1</div><div><br /></div><div>2.1 An objection of lack of novelty in view of the only example on page 11 of D1 was raised by the opposition division during oral proceedings (see the minutes, page 1, "Main Request (patent as granted)"). The impugned decision discusses this objection (point 17 of the decision), and it was held that the example of D1 was prejudicial to the novelty of claim 1 of the main request.</div><div><br /></div><div>2.2 The patent proprietor requested that this objection not be admitted.</div><div><br /></div><div>2.3 In the communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA, the board already expressed its preliminary view on the admittance of the novelty objection in view of D1.</div><div><br /></div><div>In line with this communication, the board observes that, according to the minutes of the opposition division, "The parties did not make further submissions to what had been put forward in written" (page 1, "Main Request (patent as granted)"). This implicitly means that the parties, i.e. the opponent and the patent proprietor, were asked whether they wanted to comment on, inter alia, the objection based on the example of D1. Thus, the patent proprietor had during oral proceedings before the opposition division the opportunity to present arguments against the admittance and relevance of the attack based on the example of D1 but did not make any submission in this regard. Neither did the patent proprietor use the opportunity to request a break to react to this attack or an adjournment of the oral proceedings. Thus, the patent proprietor had been given sufficient opportunity to present its comments on the only example of D1 before any decision was issued. The evidence based on this example, and on which the decision was based, had been identified and communicated to the patent proprietor in a proper way.</div><div><br /></div><div>Thus, the board did not see any reasons why the objection of lack of novelty in view of the only example of D1 raised during oral proceedings before the opposition division should not have formed a basis for the appealed decision (Article 12(2) RPBA 2020). As this was not disputed by the proprietor during the oral proceedings, the board decided to admit the objection into the proceedings.</div><div><br /></div><div>3. Novelty</div><div><br /></div><div>[...]</div><div><br /></div><div><div>4. In view of the above lack of novelty of the subject-matter of claims 1 and 2, the main request is not allowable.</div><div><br /></div><div>Auxiliary request 1 - Claims 1-7 of "Set A" filed on 12 May 2015</div></div><div><br /></div><div>[...]</div><div><br /></div><div>8. Auxiliary request 1 is thus not allowable.</div><div><br /></div><div>Auxiliary request 3 - Claims 1-7 of "Set B" filed on 12 May 2015</div><div><br /></div><div><div>11.6 The board thus concludes that the subject-matter of the claims of auxiliary request 3 is novel in view of any of D1, D2 and D4.</div><div><br /></div><div>12. Remittal</div><div><br /></div><div>12.1 The opponent requested that the case be remitted to the opposition division if novelty was acknowledged.</div><div><br /></div><div>12.2 In accordance with Article 11 RPBA 2020, the board must not remit a case unless special reasons present themselves for doing so. As a rule, fundamental deficiencies apparent in the proceedings before the first-instance department constitute such special reasons.</div><div><br /></div><div>In the case at hand, the board is not aware of any fundamental procedural deficiencies before the opposition division justifying remittal.</div><div><br /></div><div>12.3 The opponent submitted that the opposition division did not assess the inventive step of the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 in view of D4 as the closest prior art. Thus, the case should be remitted.</div><div><br /></div><div>The attack starting from D4 as the closest prior art was filed for the first time during the oral proceedings before the board and thus is an entirely new attack. If by filing such a new attack, a party could force the board to remit the case, it would be at the party's disposition to shift the case back to the first instance at whatever stage of the appeal proceedings and to thereby start, at any point in the appeal proceedings, a new opposition before the opposition division. This would not only run counter to the principle of procedural economy but to the very nature of appeal proceedings, which is to review the appealed decision (Article 12(2) RPBA 2020) rather than to allow for the start of a second opposition proceedings.</div><div><br /></div><div>Consequently, the board decided that the case was not to be remitted to the opposition division for further prosecution.</div><div><br /></div><div>13. Inventive step</div><div><br /></div></div><div><div>14. The board thus comes to the conclusion that auxiliary request 3 is allowable.</div><div><br /></div><div>15. Admittance of A010 and A011</div><div><br /></div><div>Documents A010 and A011 invoked by the opponent are press publications of the patent proprietor that disclose that the claimed compositions were used as "preservatives for cosmetics and toiletries". During the oral proceedings, the opponent did not rely on these documents. There was thus no need to decide on their admittance.</div><div><br /></div><div><b>Order</b></div><div><br /></div><div>For these reasons it is decided that:</div><div><br /></div><div>1. The decision under appeal is set aside.</div><div><br /></div><div>2. The case is remitted to the opposition division with the order to maintain the patent on the basis of the claims of auxiliary request 3 "Set B" aa submitted with letter of 12 May 2015 and a description to be adapted thereto.</div></div><br /><br /><span><i>This decision </i></span><span><i><span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t152255eu1.html" target="_blank">T 2255/15 () of 25.2.2021</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t152255eu1.pdf" target="_blank">pdf</a></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">) has European Case Law Ide<span style="font-family: inherit;">ntifier: </span></span></i></span><i>ECLI:EP:BA:2021:T225515.20210225</i><span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">. </span>The file wrapper can be found here.</i></span><i><span style="font-family: inherit;"> Photo</span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;"> "#52 Too late" by <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/marcsamsom/" target="_blank">Marc Samsom</a> </span></i><i>obtained </i><i><span style="font-family: inherit;">via <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/marcsamsom/5247157613/in/photolist-8ZF49H-23G7nA8-2kHvpYU-25iXtin-2kBZt8v-eH2X1-Vg8yYF-QEjvTk-sBcH7s-PV1vr5-JkzHWA-r3cNg1-9QpJed-2inRnzM-4rd6Eq-r3dEaw-wkYV2o-2eBw1bC-Vfru2L-jJxUwE-2hJgnd8-86KvwX-JoBXqg-jCR8bu-2jr7xVa-BC3ysj-KNNvRJ-p6LyGq-5rykzs-KNNvzb-XgCnD3-3Etcmv-Qa68eP-aeceap-5ysb4L-2k3WVo4-5RaENA-4ZJBf4-WqcRt1-6Vi2SH-2kB8CxF-WAFDhY-bSi2HK-2j8g3k9-cDF9ms-cxYKuS-2kfK9BM-2kTPN4S-DeAXXx-HrDnFg" target="_blank">Flickr</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/marcsamsom/5247157613/in/photolist-8ZF49H-23G7nA8-2kHvpYU-25iXtin-2kBZt8v-eH2X1-Vg8yYF-QEjvTk-sBcH7s-PV1vr5-JkzHWA-r3cNg1-9QpJed-2inRnzM-4rd6Eq-r3dEaw-wkYV2o-2eBw1bC-Vfru2L-jJxUwE-2hJgnd8-86KvwX-JoBXqg-jCR8bu-2jr7xVa-BC3ysj-KNNvRJ-p6LyGq-5rykzs-KNNvzb-XgCnD3-3Etcmv-Qa68eP-aeceap-5ysb4L-2k3WVo4-5RaENA-4ZJBf4-WqcRt1-6Vi2SH-2kB8CxF-WAFDhY-bSi2HK-2j8g3k9-cDF9ms-cxYKuS-2kfK9BM-2kTPN4S-DeAXXx-HrDnFg" target="_blank"> </a>under </span><a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">CC BY 2.0 license</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> (no changes made).</span></i>Roel van Woudenberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15823355175016282250noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-60643826417178713062021-04-13T11:30:00.004+02:002021-04-13T11:30:26.140+02:00T 488/18 - Withdrawn request for Oral Proceedings need not be made by orignal party for reimbursement<p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white;"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhv5MwnQSLt06NXi_MH_dY1rqTyaE_2aKyvAC1daEAiD4XSbWjy6QvNJPP5jLXdapD97796KBTqpJNHsX5j4uD00FV4WSlJ70DK9J2GZgsPY2onXDSNtNGUyuVl-B6hcCjlmjz1Bwu8qFzh/s1920/2021.04.13+ask-2341784_1920.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1280" data-original-width="1920" height="266" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhv5MwnQSLt06NXi_MH_dY1rqTyaE_2aKyvAC1daEAiD4XSbWjy6QvNJPP5jLXdapD97796KBTqpJNHsX5j4uD00FV4WSlJ70DK9J2GZgsPY2onXDSNtNGUyuVl-B6hcCjlmjz1Bwu8qFzh/w400-h266/2021.04.13+ask-2341784_1920.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Who exactly should ask for the refund?</td></tr></tbody></table></span></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;"><br /></span></span></p><p><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">During this opposition an </span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">insolvency was started for the assests of the opponent. A preliminary insolvency administrator was appointed, who then became a party to the proceedings in opposition by way of a statutory change of party and took the place of the former opponent and respondent. An attempt was made to interrupt the proceedings under </span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2020/e/r142.html" style="font-family: inherit;">Rule 142(1)(b) EPC</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> or under </span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2020/e/r84.html" style="font-family: inherit;">Rule 84(2), first sentence, EPC</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> but these were rejected. </span></p><p><span style="font-family: inherit;">When the only request for oral proceedings was withdrawn from the now opponent, the question presented </span>whether<span style="font-family: inherit;"> this suffices for a 25% </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43; font-family: inherit;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43; font-family: inherit;">reimbursed of the appeal fee under <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2020/e/r103.html">Rule 103(4)(c) EPC</a>. In a another Board decision (</span><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t150777eu1.html">T 777/15</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43; font-family: inherit;">), this was denied. The board provides a deep analysis for this point, and comes to the different conclusion that a reimbursement is possible. The following head note was provided:</span></p><p><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"></span></span></p><blockquote><p><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">There may also be a possibility of repayment of the appeal fee under Rule 103(4)(c) EPC if a request for oral proceedings has not been withdrawn by the appellant but by another party to the proceedings who has not filed an appeal (see points 8.3 - 8.9 of the grounds for the decision). (English MT translation by <a href="http://deepl.com/">Deepl</a>.)</span></span></p><p><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Eine Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit der Beschwerdegebühr gemäß Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ kann es auch dann geben, wenn ein Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung nicht vom Beschwerdeführer zurückgenommen wurde, sondern von einem anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten, der keine Beschwerde eingelegt hat (siehe Nrn. 8.3 - 8.9 der Entscheidungsgründe).</span></span></p><p></p></blockquote><p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span></span></span></p><a name='more'></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;">The decision is in German. Below is an MT translation of relavant parts. Below that the German original. </span></span><p></p><p>(...)</p><p> Reasons for decision (Machine Translation)</p><p><br /></p><p>1. decision by written procedure</p><p>The complainant did not file a request for oral proceedings.</p><p><span style="color: #cc0000;">The request for oral proceedings made in the alternative in the response of the then respondent was withdrawn by the unambiguous written statement of July 9, 2020.</span></p><p>Since there was no longer a request for oral proceedings and the Board also did not consider oral proceedings to be relevant, the date for oral proceedings before the Board was cancelled. The present decision is issued by written procedure without oral proceedings in accordance with Article 12(8) UPC 2020, respecting the procedural rights of the parties under Articles 113 and 116 EPC. In particular, the principle of the right to be heard under Article 113(1) EPC is fully respected, since the parties have presented their arguments on the merits of the case and the board has based its decision on these arguments. The appeal is ready for decision on the basis of the contested decision to be reviewed and the written submissions of the parties.</p><p><br /></p><p>2. position of the parties</p><p><br /></p><p>2.1 Insolvency Administrator as a Party by virtue of his Office</p><p><br /></p><p>In insolvency proceedings relating to the assets of the company G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG (Case No. 145 IN 481/18), which was the then opposing party and respondent in the present appeal proceedings, a preliminary insolvency administrator was initially appointed by order of the Wuppertal Local Court dated August 8, 2018 by name and ordered that dispositions by the debtor of items of its assets are now only effective with its consent (see Section 21 (2) of the German Insolvency Code (InsO)). This provisional insolvency administrator also consented to a renewed authorization of the previous professional representative of the then respondent, who had resigned his mandate, by signing the individual power of attorney filed with the EPO by letter dated October 24, 2018. By a further order of the Wuppertal Local Court dated November 1, 2018, which was submitted to the Board for the first time by letter dated October 30, 2020, insolvency proceedings were opened against the assets of the company G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG insolvency proceedings were opened and the preliminary insolvency administrator was appointed as insolvency administrator. <span style="color: #cc0000;">Under German insolvency law, the appointed insolvency administrator is a party by virtue of the insolvency opening decision. The appointed insolvency administrator therefore became a party to the proceedings in the present proceedings by way of a statutory change of party and took the place of the former opponent and respondent.</span> As a result, the appeal proceedings were opened with the insolvency administrator of the company G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG as a party by virtue of office and thus as a respondent to the appeal (see also T 1533/07, No. 2 of the reasons for the decision). The professional representative, who had been authorized by the individual power of attorney submitted by letter dated October 24, 2018 and also signed by the preliminary insolvency administrator, was not deprived of the mandate by the insolvency administrator as a party by virtue of office, but the professional representative himself resigned from the representation by letter dated September 21, 2020. It can therefore be assumed that the insolvency administrator, who was aware of the authorization of the professional representative, had no objections to a continuation of the representation on the part of the professional representative. The Board therefore sees no reason to question the professional representative's authority to represent the company until his resignation from the representation.</p><p><br /></p><p>2.2 Request for transfer of party status as opponent</p><p><br /></p><p><span style="color: #cc0000;">By letter dated September 23, 2019, it was submitted that the company poschmann kunststofftechnik GmbH & Co. KG had taken the place of the company G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG in these appeal proceedings,</span> as it had in the meantime taken over all essential parts of the business operations of G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG and is now continuing the business.</p><p><br /></p><p>According to the case law of the Boards of Appeal, <span style="color: #cc0000;">party status as opponent may be transferred if a relevant part of the opponent's business has been transferred</span> (G 2/04, OJ EPO 2005, 549), although the opposition may only be transferred or assigned to a third party as belonging to the opponent's business together with that part of that business to which the opposition relates (G 4/88, OJ EPO 1989, 480). A transfer of opponent status may also be requested in opposition appeal proceedings. <span style="color: #cc0000;">However, a new opponent does not acquire party status as opponent and as party to the opposition appeal proceedings until appropriate evidence is provided</span> (see, e.g., T 1137/97, No. 4 of the grounds for the decision).</p><p><br /></p><p>Although the Board already referred to the required evidence for the requested transfer of the party position as opponent to poschmann kunststofftechnik GmbH & Co. KG, <span style="color: #cc0000;">no corresponding evidence has been submitted to date. However, as long as the corresponding evidence of the transfer of rights has not been provided, the insolvency administrator of the company G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG, as a party by virtue of his office, remains the respondent in these appeal proceedings.</span></p><p><br /></p><p>3) Application for interruption or continuation of the appeal proceedings due to the insolvency proceedings</p><p><br /></p><p><span style="color: #cc0000;">The application for interruption of the appeal proceedings was not granted for the following reasons:</span></p><p><br /></p><p>3.1 Interruption of the proceedings under <span style="color: #cc0000;">Rule 142(1)(b) EPC is not possible in the present case, since the wording of this provision refers to the applicant or patentee, but not to the opponent</span>. Thus, the requirements of Rule 142(1)(b) EPC are not met in the present case.</p><p><br /></p><p>3.2 Similarly, <span style="color: #cc0000;">an interruption of the proceedings by analogous application of Rule 84(2), first sentence, EPC could not be considered, since, for the following reasons, there is no case of loss of capacity of the former opponent referred to in this provision.</span></p><p><br /></p><p>Opposition proceedings may be continued ex officio if the opponent dies or loses his legal capacity (Rule 84(2), first sentence, EPC). In the interest of expeditious proceedings, this rule allows the opposition proceedings to be continued even without the participation of the heirs or the legal representative of the opponent. The determination of the heirs and the acceptance of the inheritance or the appointment of a legal representative may, but need not, be awaited (cf. also Singer/Stauder, European Patent Convention, 8th edition, Article 101, paragraph 109 ff.).</p><p><br /></p><p>In the present case, by order of August 8, 2018, the Local Court of Wuppertal appointed a temporary insolvency administrator by name in the insolvency proceedings relating to the assets of the then opponent and respondent to the appeal ("debtor"), which is a legal entity, and ordered that dispositions by the debtor of objects of its assets are only effective with its consent (see also Sec. 21 (2) InsO). According to the court order, this did not impose a general ban on administration and disposal on the insolvency debtor. Rather, disposals by the debtor of its present and future assets continue to be possible for the duration of the insolvency proceedings, but the consent of the preliminary insolvency administrator is required for them to be effective. The then respondent therefore retained the sole power of administration and disposal over its corporate assets, which also included the opposition position (see also G 4/88, supra).</p><p><br /></p><p>Also with the opening of the insolvency proceedings on the assets of the company G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG in the further order of the Local Court of Wuppertal of November 1, 2018 and <span style="color: #cc0000;">the appointment by name of the preliminary insolvency administrator as insolvency administrator, who consequently became a party by virtue of office, the former respondent did not lose its legal capacity. Under German insolvency law, the debtor does not lose its legal capacity even if it loses the power to administer and dispose of the insolvency estate </span>(see Schulte, Patentgesetz mit EPÜ, 10th edition, Introduction, paragraph 217).</p><p><br /></p><p>3.3 For the reasons stated above, the board had no reason to interrupt the appeal proceedings. Therefore, the question of a continuation of the appeal proceedings is also irrelevant.</p><p><br /></p><p>(...)</p><p><br /></p><p>8. refund of 25% appeal fee - Rule 103(4)(c) EPC.</p><p><br /></p><p>The recast Rule 103 EPC, which entered into force on 1 April 2020, applies to the present appeal since it was already pending on the date of entry into force (see Article 2 of Decision of the Administrative Council CA/D 14/19 of 12 December 2019 (OJ EPO 2020, A5)).</p><p><br /></p><p>8.1 <span style="color: #cc0000;">Rule 103(4)(c) EPC provides for reimbursement of the appeal fee at the rate of 25% if "any request for oral proceedings is withdrawn within one month of notification of a communication issued by the Board of Appeal in preparation for oral proceedings and no oral proceedings are held".</span></p><p><br /></p><p>8.2 In the present case, the then respondent filed a request for oral proceedings in the alternative in its response. It withdrew this request within one month after the notification of the notice of the Board issued for the preparation of the oral hearing pursuant to Article 15 (1) of the 2020 UPC. As a result, the scheduled date for oral proceedings was cancelled. The Appellant did not file any request for oral proceedings during the entire appeal proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>8.3 <span style="color: #cc0000;">The question therefore arises whether there can be a possibility of repayment of the appeal fee under Rule 103(4)(c) EPC if a request for oral proceedings was not withdrawn by the appellant but by another party to the proceedings who did not file an appeal.</span></p><p><br /></p><p>8.4 According to the established case law of the Enlarged Board of Appeal and the Boards of Appeal, although the European Patent Organisation is not a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (hereinafter: Vienna Convention), <span style="color: #cc0000;">the European Patent Convention (EPC) must be interpreted in accordance with the principles set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention </span>(see G 1/18, OJ EPO 2020, A26, REASON FOR OPINION, No. III, first paragraph with numerous references to further case law). Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that a treaty "shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its provisions in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." In application of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, the preparatory works ("travaux préparatoires") and the circumstances of the conclusion of the EPC serve only as supplementary sources confirming the result of the interpretation, or they are consulted when no meaningful meaning can be determined by applying the general rule of interpretation (see, e.g., G 2/12, OJ EPO 2016, 27, No. V. (4) of the reasons for decision; G 1/18, supra, REASON FOR OPINION, No. III, last paragraph).</p><p><br /></p><p>8.5 Literal interpretation of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC</p><p><br /></p><p>According to the wording of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC, "any request for oral proceedings" (English version: "any request for oral proceedings" and French version: "une requête en procédure orale") must be withdrawn within the one-month period in order for there to be the possibility of a 25% refund of the appeal fee. However, it cannot be deduced from the wording of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC whose request for oral proceedings must be withdrawn in order for there to be this possibility of repayment. <span style="color: #cc0000;">The wording "any request" ("une requête") only indicates that the withdrawal of a request for oral proceedings must be present for this repayment possibility. However, it cannot be concluded from this wording that it must be a request made by a specific party to the proceedings.</span></p><p><br /></p><p>In unilateral appeal proceedings this is unproblematic, since there is only the appellant as the only party to the proceedings and consequently only this one party to the proceedings can file and later withdraw a request for oral proceedings under Article 116(1), first sentence, EPC.</p><p><br /></p><p>The situation is different, however, in multilateral appeal proceedings. Here, under the first sentence of Article 116(1) EPC, any party to the proceedings may file a request for oral proceedings, irrespective of whether it has filed an appeal, and may subsequently withdraw it. <span style="color: #cc0000;">However, it cannot be inferred from the wording of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC that in multi-party appeal proceedings it is relevant whether the withdrawn request for oral proceedings was filed by an appellant or by one of the other parties to the proceedings.</span> In particular, it cannot be concluded from the use of the phrase "any request" ("une requête") that the question of repayment depends on whether the withdrawn request for oral proceedings was made by an appellant or by another party to the proceedings. Also the wording of the further requirement in Rule 103(4)(c) EPC</p><p><br /></p><p>(" ... and no oral proceedings take place") does not provide any information in this respect, because whether oral proceedings take place in the appeal proceedings does not depend on the fact that a request for oral proceedings was (also) filed by the appellant.</p><p><br /></p><p>In summary, the Board finds that Rule 103(4)(c) EPC, according to its wording, only requires that "any request" for oral proceedings be withdrawn. There is no indication in the wording of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC that the possibility of repayment is conditional on a request for oral proceedings having been withdrawn by the appellant. <span style="color: #cc0000;">Therefore, on a literal interpretation of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC, the possibility of repayment of the 25% appeal fee to an appellant in multilateral appeal proceedings does not depend on whether the appellant has filed and withdrawn a request for oral proceedings. </span>Therefore, on a literal interpretation of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC, this possibility of repayment exists even if the withdrawal of a request for oral proceedings was not declared by the appellant but by another party to the proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>8.6 Systematic interpretation</p><p><br /></p><p><span style="color: #cc0000;">According to the principles of the Vienna Convention, systematic interpretation is the second pillar in the interpretation of a legal provision and its terms </span>(see G 2/12, supra, No. VII. 2. (1) of the reasons for decision with numerous references to other decisions/opinions of the Enlarged Board of Appeal; G 1/18, supra, REASON FOR OPINION, No. IV. 2., first paragraph). When applying this second method of interpretation, the meaning of the relevant wording must be determined in the context of the relevant provision itself. In addition, the provision must be interpreted taking into account "its position and function within a coherent group of related legal rules" (see e.g. G 2/12, supra, No. VII. 2. (1) of the grounds for the decision).</p><p><br /></p><p>Rule 103 EPC is the only provision in the EPC concerning the refund of the appeal fee. Rule 103(1)(a) EPC deals with the possible refund of the appeal fee because of a substantial procedural defect if the appeal is allowed or allowed, and therefore deals with a very different legal situation from Rule 103(4)(c) EPC. Otherwise, Rule 103 EPC provides for full or partial refund of the appeal fee if "the appeal" (English version: "the appeal" and French version: "le recours") is withdrawn under certain conditions (Rule 103(1)(b), (2), (3)(a)-(c) and (4)(a) and (b) EPC). Here the wording does not focus on the fact that "any" appeal is withdrawn, but "the appeal" must be withdrawn for there to be the possibility of repayment. Therefore, there is a direct connection between a particular appeal being withdrawn and the appeal fee paid for that appeal. Moreover, this fact concerns only the appellant, since only the appellant can withdraw the appeal, and not the other parties to the proceedings who have not filed an appeal. Moreover, this possibility of repayment depends solely on the fact that the withdrawal of the appeal is made under certain temporal conditions at certain stages of the appeal proceedings. However, there is no further condition comparable to the requirement in Rule 103(4)(c) EPC that no oral proceedings take place. Reimbursement of the appeal fee to the appellant who has withdrawn his appeal is made in multi-party appeal proceedings even if further appeals against the same decision are (and remain) pending and the appeal proceedings are continued, in which case the appellant who has withdrawn his appeal remains a party to the proceedings. Thus, the refund of the appeal fee upon withdrawal of the appeal does not depend on the appeal proceedings being terminated without a final decision. It can therefore be determined immediately upon withdrawal of the appeal whether the requirements of one of the possibilities for refund of the appeal fee regulated for this purpose in Rule 103 EPC are fulfilled and not only, as in the case of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC, at the conclusion of the appeal proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>A systematic interpretation of Rule 103 EPC as a whole shows that <span style="color: #cc0000;">the legal situation envisaged by the legislator in Rule 103(4)(c) EPC for a repayment possibility of the appeal fee is not comparable with the other repayment possibilities regulated in Rule 103 EPC. Different formulations are used, so that the systematic interpretation of Rule 103 EPC does not conflict with the literal interpretation of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC given above.</span></p><p><br /></p><p>8.7 Teleological interpretation</p><p><br /></p><p><span style="color: #cc0000;">According to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Agreement, the interpretation of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC also depends on the object and purpose of this provision.</span></p><p><br /></p><p><span style="color: #cc0000;">The repayment option under Rule 103(4)(c) EPC is, already according to its wording and the demarcation from the other cases of repayment of the appeal fee provided for in Rule 103 EPC, recognizably intended to create an incentive for such requests to be withdrawn in appeal cases in which a request for oral proceedings has been filed, so that ultimately a decision on the merits is given without oral proceedings having taken place.</span></p><p><br /></p><p>On the one hand, the omission of oral proceedings leads to a relevant reduction in the workload of the Board of Appeal in the appeal case in question and, in some cases, also to an omission of interpretation costs. On the other hand, this Board of Appeal may be able to use the freed-up capacity to schedule oral proceedings in another appeal case. In addition, a hearing room freed up by the discontinuation of oral proceedings may also be used by another Board of Appeal for oral proceedings. In addition, the decision in the appeal case in question may possibly already be issued before the date set for the oral proceedings, i.e. the appeal proceedings can be brought to a conclusion more quickly and legal certainty can thus be created for the parties and the public at an earlier stage.</p><p><br /></p><p>The obviously primary objective of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC set out above, i.e. the omission of oral proceedings, is always achieved in unilateral proceedings if the appellant does not maintain his request for oral proceedings, unless the Board of Appeal nevertheless considers it appropriate to hold oral proceedings under Article 116(1), first sentence, EPC.</p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p>In multilateral proceedings, it must be borne in mind that this objective is not always achieved if the appellant withdraws its request for oral proceedings. Apart from the question of the relevance of the oral proceedings from the Board's point of view, the omission of the oral proceedings then depends on whether the other parties to the proceedings have also filed a request for oral proceedings and, if so, whether they also withdraw their request or whether their request has been filed as an auxiliary request and no longer needs to be considered in the light of the final decision to be taken by the Board.</p><p><br /></p><p>On the other hand, oral proceedings in multilateral proceedings may also be omitted if only one party to the proceedings who has not filed an appeal withdraws its request for oral proceedings. In this case, however, it also depends on whether the other parties to the proceedings, including the appellant, have also filed a request for oral proceedings and, if so, whether they also withdraw their request or whether their request has been filed as an auxiliary request and no longer needs to be considered in light of the final decision to be rendered by the Board.</p><p><br /></p><p>Thus, in multilateral proceedings, the withdrawal of a request for oral proceedings, regardless of which party to the proceedings, may result in no oral proceedings being held. However, whether or not oral proceedings then take place in the event of such a withdrawal also depends on the previous or further conduct of the other parties to the proceedings. <span style="color: #cc0000;">If, for example, an appellant has not filed a request for oral proceedings in the entire appeal proceedings, then this conduct will mean that oral proceedings are no longer required if the respondent withdraws its request for oral proceedings, unless the appellant then files a request for oral proceedings itself or the Board of Appeal nevertheless considers it appropriate to hold oral proceedings under Article 116(1), first sentence, EPC. The possibility of repayment of 25% of the appeal fee under Rule 103(4)(c) EPC should therefore be an incentive for the appellants either to withdraw their request for oral proceedings or to contribute by their conduct to the fact that no oral proceedings will be held if another party to the proceedings withdraws its request for oral proceedings. </span>Therefore, if oral proceedings do not take place after a request for oral proceedings has been withdrawn in due time, thus achieving the aim and purpose of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC, the pro rata appeal fee should be refunded to the appellant even if it is not he but another party to the proceedings who has withdrawn.</p><p><br /></p><p>8.8 Travaux préparatoires</p><p><br /></p><p><span style="color: #cc0000;">This result of the interpretation of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC according to the principles established in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention is further supported by the materials which, according to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, may be used as supplementary means of interpretation in support of a meaning arising under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.</span></p><p><br /></p><p>The reasons for the amendment proposal concerning Rule 103 EPC to provide for the pro rata reimbursement of the appeal fee also in the case of a withdrawal of a request for oral proceedings are given in the explanatory notes to this amendment proposal (see document CA/80/19 of October 4, 2019).</p><p><br /></p><p>No. 52 of this CA document reads, "In particular, it is proposed to introduce some additional possibilities of partial repayment in case of withdrawal of the appeal and to extend the repayment also to the withdrawal of the request for oral hearing. This should have a positive impact on the procedural efficiency and workload of the Boards of Appeal and thus on their cost recovery. [...] "</p><p><br /></p><p>The rationale for this new possibility of partial reimbursement of the appeal fee in the event of withdrawal of the request for oral proceedings can be found in Section VII.B (a) (iv) of document CA/80/19, entitled "Withdrawal of the request for oral proceedings (reimbursement: 25%)".</p><p><br /></p><p>No. 82 reads, "If a request for oral proceedings is withdrawn in time before the oral proceedings, the Board of Appeal concerned may be able to use the freed-up capacity to schedule oral proceedings in another appeal case. Moreover, interpreters could then be cancelled in time to reduce [sic] or entirely avoid interpretation costs."</p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p>From this it can be seen that the timely withdrawal of a request for oral proceedings can have a positive effect on procedural efficiency, the workload of the Boards of Appeal and the financial burden on the European Patent Office.</p><p><br /></p><p>It then goes on to say:</p><p><br /></p><p>"The most appropriate time at which the appellant - as well as the other parties to the appeal proceedings - should be incentivized to notify their intention to withdraw the request for oral proceedings would be upon service of the notice under amended Article 15(1) UPC. A period of one month should be sufficient for a party to the proceedings to decide whether or not to withdraw its request for oral proceedings." (No. 84; emphasis added by the Board)</p><p><br /></p><p>and</p><p><br /></p><p>"Therefore, it is proposed that the appeal fee be refunded at the rate of 25% if, despite a previous request for oral proceedings, the decision is ultimately rendered without an oral hearing having taken place. This will be the case if the Board does not consider oral proceedings to be relevant and, in unilateral proceedings, the applicant/appellant withdraws its request for oral proceedings or, in multilateral proceedings, all parties withdraw their requests for oral proceedings." (No. 85; emphasis added by the Board).</p><p><br /></p><p>These two paragraphs, in addition to addressing the issue of the best possible time in the appeal proceedings to withdraw a request for oral proceedings, also address the incentive by which the appellant, as well as the other parties to the proceedings, should be induced to do so. And this incentive is seen in the repayment of the appeal fee in the amount of 25%. However, this repayment is to be made only if the decision is ultimately rendered without oral proceedings. The Board concludes from this reasoning that the incentive to withdraw the previous request for oral proceedings is also intended to apply to the respondent, even if this incentive consists in a repayment of the appeal fee in the amount of 25% to the appellant.</p><p><br /></p><p>No. 85 addresses the case when in multilateral proceedings all parties withdraw their requests for oral proceedings. No. 86 addresses other scenarios in multilateral proceedings and states, "If in multilateral proceedings only one party withdraws its request for oral proceedings and the oral proceedings are held anyway, no refund should be made. While the Board may have to spend less time and effort in such a case because it can be assumed that the party who has withdrawn its request will rely solely on its written submissions, this reduced workload does not seem sufficient to justify a partial refund of the appeal fee." (emphasis added by the Board)</p><p><br /></p><p><span style="color: #cc0000;">These explanations confirm the interpretation by the Board as set out above that there may be the possibility of repayment under Rule 103(4)(c) EPC in multilateral proceedings if a party to the proceedings - and not necessarily the appellant - withdraws its request for oral proceedings, provided that there is a lapse of oral proceedings, which is apparently also regarded in these explanations as the primary objective of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC.</span></p><p><br /></p><p>8.9 In view of the Board's interpretation of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC as set out above, there may be a possibility of repayment of the appeal fee under Rule 103(4)(c) EPC even if a request for oral proceedings has not been withdrawn by the appellant but by another party to the proceedings who has not filed an appeal. Therefore, the withdrawal of the request for oral proceedings declared by the respondent in the present case satisfies the requirement of withdrawal of "any request for oral proceedings" under Rule 103(4)(c) EPC.</p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p>8. 10 <span style="color: #cc0000;">In decision T 777/15 with comparable facts, the possibility of reimbursement of the appeal fee to one of the appellants under Rule 103(4)(c) EPC was denied on the following grounds: The Board interprets Rule 103(4)(c) EPC as providing an incentive for a party who had initially requested oral proceedings before the Board to reconsider such a request at a later stage of the appeal proceedings and, in the event that the party abandons such a request, to provide a reward in the form of a partial refund of that party's appeal fee. Accordingly, Appellant Opponent 5, an appealing party that did not request oral argument in the proceedings before the Board, does not benefit from the withdrawal of the request for oral argument by another party. (See T 777/15, no. 4.1 of the reasons for the decision; translation by this Chamber).</span></p><p><br /></p><p>However, the Board cannot agree with this narrow interpretation of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC for the reasons set out above (Nos. 8.4 - 8.8 above).</p><p><br /></p><p>8.11 The one-month time limit under Rule 103(4)(c) EPC was also observed in the present case. The communication under Article 15(1) UPC 2020 of 16 June 2020 issued by the Board of Appeal in preparation for the oral proceedings is deemed to have been notified under Rule 126(2) EPC on the tenth day after posting, i.e. on 26 June 2020. The one-month period referred to in Rule 103(4)(c) EPC thus ended on Monday, 27 July 2020 (Rule 131(2), (4) and Rule 134(1) EPC). The request for oral proceedings submitted in the alternative in the response was withdrawn on 10 July 2020 and thus within one month from the date of notification of the communication issued by the Board of Appeal in preparation for oral proceedings.</p><p><br /></p><p>8.12 Since no oral proceedings were held in the present case either, all requirements of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC for a refund of the appeal fee in the amount of 25% are fulfilled.</p><p><br /></p><p>Decision formula</p><p><br /></p><p>For these reasons it is decided:</p><p><br /></p><p>(1) The contested decision is annulled.</p><p><br /></p><p>(2) The matter is referred back to the first instance for further decision.</p><p><br /></p><p>3. the appeal fee shall be refunded in the amount of 25%.</p><p>---</p><p>(Original German text)</p><p>(...)</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">Entscheidungsgründe</b></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">1. Entscheidung im schriftlichen Verfahren</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Die Beschwerdeführerin hat keinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung gestellt.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Der in der Beschwerdeerwiderung der damaligen Beschwerdegegnerin hilfsweise gestellte Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung wurde durch die eindeutige schriftliche Erklärung vom 9. Juli 2020 zurückgenommen.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Da kein Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung mehr vorlag und die Kammer eine mündliche Verhandlung auch nicht für sachdienlich hielt, wurde der Termin zur mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer aufgehoben. Die vorliegende Entscheidung ergeht im schriftlichen Verfahren ohne mündliche Verhandlung gemäß Artikel 12 (8) VOBK 2020 unter Wahrung der Verfahrensrechte der Beteiligten nach Artikel 113 und 116 EPÜ. Insbesondere ist der Grundsatz des rechtlichen Gehörs nach Artikel 113 (1) EPÜ uneingeschränkt beachtet, da die Beteiligten zur Sache vorgetragen haben und die Kammer diesen Vortrag ihrer Entscheidung zugrunde gelegt hat. Die Beschwerdesache ist auf der Grundlage der zu überprüfenden angefochtenen Entscheidung und des schriftlichen Vorbringens der Beteiligten entscheidungsreif.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2. Beteiligtenstellung</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2.1 Insolvenzverwalter als Partei kraft Amtes</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">In einem Insolvenzverfahren über das Vermögen der Firma G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG (Az. 145 IN 481/18), die die damalige Einsprechende und Beschwerdegegnerin im vorliegenden Beschwerdeverfahren war, wurde zunächst mit Beschluss des Amtsgerichts Wuppertal vom 8. August 2018 ein vorläufiger Insolvenzverwalter namentlich bestellt und angeordnet, dass Verfügungen der Schuldnerin über Gegenstände ihres Vermögens nur noch mit seiner Zustimmung wirksam sind (vgl. § 21 (2) der deutschen Insolvenzordnung (InsO)). Dieser vorläufige Insolvenzverwalter hat auch einer erneuten Bevollmächtigung des bisherigen zugelassenen Vertreters der damaligen Beschwerdegegnerin, der sein Mandat niedergelegt hatte, durch seine Unterschrift auf der mit Schreiben vom 24. Oktober 2018 beim EPA eingereichten Einzelvollmacht zugestimmt. Mit einem weiteren Beschluss des Amtsgerichts Wuppertal vom 1. November 2018, der der Kammer erstmalig mit Schreiben vom 30. Oktober 2020 vorgelegt wurde, wurde über das Vermögen der Firma G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG das Insolvenzverfahren eröffnet und der vorläufige Insolvenzverwalter wurde zum Insolvenzverwalter bestellt. Nach deutschem Insolvenzrecht ist der bestellte Insolvenzverwalter infolge des Insolvenzeröffnungsbeschlusses Partei kraft Amtes. Der bestellte Insolvenzverwalter ist daher im Wege gesetzlichen Parteiwechsels Verfahrensbeteiligter im vorliegenden Verfahren geworden und an die Stelle der früheren Einsprechenden und Beschwerdegegnerin getreten. Damit war das Beschwerdeverfahren mit dem Insolvenzverwalter der Firma G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG als Partei kraft Amtes und damit als Beschwerdegegner fortzuführen (vgl. auch T 1533/07, Nr. 2 der Entscheidungsgründe). Dem zugelassenen Vertreter, der mit der mit Schreiben vom 24. Oktober 2018 eingereichten und auch vom vorläufigen Insolvenzverwalter unterzeichneten Einzelvollmacht bevollmächtigt worden war, wurde das Mandat vom Insolvenzverwalter als Partei kraft Amtes nicht entzogen, sondern der zugelassene Vertreter hat selbst mit Schreiben vom 21. September 2020 die Vertretung niedergelegt. Es ist daher davon auszugehen, dass der Insolvenzverwalter, der Kenntnis von der Bevollmächtigung des zugelassenen Vertreters hatte, keine Einwände gegen eine Fortsetzung der Vertretung seitens des zugelassenen Vertreters hatte. Die Kammer sieht deshalb keinen Grund, die Vertretungsbefugnis des zugelassenen Vertreters bis zu seiner Niederlegung der Vertretung in Frage zu stellen.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2.2 Antrag auf Übertragung der Parteistellung als Einsprechender</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Mit Schreiben vom 23. September 2019 wurde vorgetragen, dass die Firma poschmann kunststofftechnik GmbH & Co. KG in diesem Beschwerdeverfahren an die Stelle der Firma G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG getreten sei, da sie zwischenzeitlich alle wesentlichen Teile des Geschäftsbetriebs der Firma G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG übernommen habe und nun die Geschäfte fortführe.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Nach der Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern kann die Parteistellung als Einsprechender übertragen werden, wenn ein einschlägiger Teil des Geschäftsbetriebs des Einsprechenden übertragen wurde (G 2/04, ABl. EPA 2005, 549), wobei der Einspruch allerdings nur als zum Geschäftsbetrieb des Einsprechenden gehörend zusammen mit jenem Bereich dieses Geschäftsbetriebs an einen Dritten übertragen oder abgetreten werden kann, auf den sich der Einspruch bezieht (G 4/88, ABl. EPA 1989, 480). Eine Übertragung der Einsprechendenstellung kann auch im Einspruchsbeschwerdeverfahren beantragt werden. Jedoch erlangt ein neuer Einsprechender die Parteistellung als Einsprechender und als Partei des Einspruchsbeschwerdeverfahrens erst dann, wenn entsprechende Nachweise vorgelegt werden (siehe z.B. T 1137/97, Nr. 4 der Entscheidungsgründe).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Obgleich die Kammer bereits in ihrer Mitteilung vom 29. November 2019 auf den erforderlichen Nachweis für die beantragte Übertragung der Beteiligtenstellung als Einsprechende auf die Firma poschmann kunststofftechnik GmbH & Co. KG hingewiesen hat, wurden bisher keine entsprechenden Beweismittel vorgelegt. Solange der entsprechende Nachweis des Rechtsübergangs jedoch nicht erbracht ist, bleibt der Insolvenzverwalter der Firma G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG als Partei kraft Amtes in diesem Beschwerdeverfahren der Beschwerdegegner.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">3. Antrag auf Unterbrechung bzw. auf Fortsetzung des Beschwerdeverfahrens wegen des Insolvenzverfahrens</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Dem Antrag auf Unterbrechung des Beschwerdeverfahrens wurde aus folgenden Gründen nicht stattgegeben:</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">3.1 Eine Unterbrechung des Verfahrens gemäß Regel 142 (1) b) EPÜ ist im vorliegenden Fall nicht möglich, da sich der Wortlaut dieser Vorschrift auf den Anmelder oder Patentinhaber, jedoch nicht auf den Einsprechenden bezieht. Somit sind die Voraussetzungen der Regel 142 (1) b) EPÜ im vorliegenden Fall nicht erfüllt.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">3.2 Ebenso wenig kam eine Unterbrechung des Verfahrens in analoger Anwendung der Regel 84 (2) Satz 1 EPÜ in Betracht, da aus den folgenden Gründen kein Fall des in dieser Vorschrift genannten Verlusts der Geschäftsfähigkeit der früheren Beschwerdegegnerin vorliegt.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Das Einspruchsverfahren kann von Amts wegen fortgesetzt werden, wenn der Einsprechende stirbt oder seine Geschäftsfähigkeit verliert (Regel 84 (2) Satz 1 EPÜ). Diese Regelung ermöglicht im Interesse eines zügigen Verfahrens die Fortsetzung des Einspruchsverfahrens auch ohne die Beteiligung der Erben oder des gesetzlichen Vertreters des Einsprechenden. Die Ermittlung der Erben und die Annahme der Erbschaft bzw. die Bestellung eines gesetzlichen Vertreters kann, muss aber nicht abgewartet werden (vgl. dazu auch Singer/Stauder, Europäisches Patentübereinkommen, 8. Auflage, Artikel 101, Rdnr. 109 ff.)</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Im vorliegenden Fall hat das Amtsgericht Wuppertal mit Beschluss vom 8. August 2018 in dem Insolvenzverfahren über das Vermögen der damaligen Einsprechenden und Beschwerdegegnerin ("Schuldnerin"), die eine juristische Person ist, einen vorläufigen Insolvenzverwalter namentlich bestellt und angeordnet, dass Verfügungen der Schuldnerin über Gegenstände ihres Vermögens nur noch mit seiner Zustimmung wirksam sind (vgl. auch § 21 (2) InsO). Damit wurde der Insolvenzschuldnerin laut Gerichtsbeschluss kein allgemeines Verwaltungs- und Verfügungsverbot auferlegt. Vielmehr sind Verfügungen der Schuldnerin über ihr gegenwärtiges und zukünftiges Vermögen über die Dauer des Insolvenzverfahrens weiterhin möglich, jedoch bedarf es für ihre Wirksamkeit der Zustimmung des vorläufigen Insolvenzverwalters. Die damalige Beschwerdegegnerin hat daher die alleinige Verwaltungs- und Verfügungsbefugnis über ihr Unternehmensvermögen, zu dem auch die Einsprechendenstellung gehört (siehe auch G 4/88, supra), behalten.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Auch mit der Eröffnung des Insolvenzverfahren über das Vermögen der Firma G. Ohliger GmbH & Co. KG in dem weiteren Beschluss des Amtsgerichts Wuppertal vom 1. November 2018 und der namentlichen Bestellung des vorläufigen Insolvenzverwalters zum Insolvenzverwalter, der infolgedessen Partei kraft Amtes wurde, hat die frühere Beschwerdegegnerin ihre Geschäftsfähigkeit nicht verloren. Nach deutschem Insolvenzrecht verliert die Schuldnerin selbst bei einem Verlust der Verwaltungs- und Verfügungsbefugnis über die Insolvenzmasse nicht ihre Rechts- und Geschäftsfähigkeit (vgl. Schulte, Patentgesetz mit EPÜ, 10. Auflage, Einleitung, Rdnr. 217).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">3.3 Aus den oben dargelegten Gründen bestand für die Kammer keine Veranlassung, das Beschwerdeverfahren zu unterbrechen. Somit ist auch die Frage einer Fortsetzung des Beschwerdeverfahrens gegenstandslos.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">4. Zulässigkeit der Beschwerde</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">4.1 In der Beschwerdeerwiderung wurde beantragt, die Beschwerde als unzulässig zu verwerfen, da die Beschwerdebegründung nicht die Erfordernisse des Artikels 108 EPÜ in Verbindung mit Regel 99 (2) EPÜ erfülle.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Dazu wurde im Wesentlichen argumentiert, dass es der Beschwerdebegründung sowohl an jeglichen Ausführungen zur Schutzfähigkeit (Artikel 54 und 56 EPÜ) der neu geltend gemachten Ansprüche als auch zu den Einwänden gemäß Artikel 84 und 123 EPÜ fehle, weshalb die Beschwerde wegen fehlender Beschwerdebegründung im Sinne des Artikels 108 EPÜ in Verbindung mit Regel 99 (2) EPÜ nicht zulässig sei.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">4.2 Die Beschwerdeführerin hat keine Argumente zur Zulässigkeit ihrer Beschwerde vorgebracht.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">4.3 Die Beschwerde ist aus folgenden Gründen ausreichend begründet und erfüllt daher die Voraussetzungen des Artikels 108 Satz 3 EPÜ in Verbindung mit der Regel 99 (2) EPÜ.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">4.3.1 Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern ist eine Begründung im Sinne von Artikel 108 Satz 3 EPÜ als ausreichend anzusehen, wenn sie sich mit den tragenden Gründen der angefochtenen Entscheidung auseinandersetzt und die Gründe angibt, warum die Entscheidung der ersten Instanz nicht Bestand haben kann (siehe z.B. T 220/83, ABl. EPA 1986, 249, Nr. 4 der Entscheidungsgründe). Die Prüfung der Anforderungen des Artikels 108 Satz 3 EPÜ und der Regel 99 (2) EPÜ hat auf der Grundlage des Inhalts sowohl der Beschwerdebegründung als auch der angefochtenen Entscheidung zu erfolgen (siehe z.B. T 213/85, ABl. EPA 1987, 482, Nr. 3 der Entscheidungsgründe). Ob eine Beschwerdebegründung im Einzelfall den Mindestanforderungen des Artikels 108 EPÜ entspricht, kann nur aus dem jeweiligen Zusammenhang heraus entschieden werden (siehe auch T 162/97, Nr. 1.1.2 der Entscheidungsgründe).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">4.3.2 Die Einspruchsabteilung basierte ihre Entscheidung, das Patent gemäß Artikel 101 (3) b) EPÜ zu widerrufen, einzig auf der Feststellung, dass der Anspruch 1 aller damals vorliegenden Anträge die Erfordernisse des Artikels 123 (2) EPÜ nicht erfülle, denn ihrer Ansicht nach sei das Merkmal "...und dass sowohl die Auftriebskörper (3) als auch der Faden oder Draht (6) vollständig innerhalb des Sondenrohrs (2) angeordnet sind" (im Folgenden als "Merkmal M8" bezeichnet) so nicht ursprünglich offenbart, da es weder Passagen noch Ausführungsbeispiele in der ursprünglichen Anmeldung gebe, wonach das Zugseil vollständig innerhalb des Sondenrohrs angeordnet sei.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">4.3.3 In der Beschwerdebegründung wurde ausgeführt, dass das in der angefochtenen Entscheidung unter Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ beanstandete Merkmal im Anspruch 1 aller neu eingereichten Anträge gestrichen worden sei und der geänderte Anspruch gemäß aller neu eingereichten Anträge daher zulässig sei. Damit setzt sich die Beschwerdebegründung mit dem einzigen tragenden Grund der angefochtenen Entscheidung auseinander und stellt somit den für eine ausreichende Begründung erforderlichen Kausalzusammenhang mit der angefochtenen Entscheidung her (siehe Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern des Europäischen Patentamts, 9. Auflage 2019, V.A.2.6.3 b)). Nach gefestigter Rechtsprechung kann eine Beschwerdebegründung auch dann als ausreichend angesehen werden, wenn ein neuer Tatbestand vorgebracht wird, der der Entscheidung die rechtliche Grundlage entzieht, insbesondere durch die Einreichung neuer Anspruchssätze (siehe dazu auch Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, V.A.2.6.5 c)). Für die Zulässigkeit der vorliegenden Beschwerde ist es daher nicht unbedingt erforderlich, dass die Beschwerdeführerin die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung in ihrer Beschwerdebegründung als fehlerhaft angegriffen hat. Wenn, wie vorliegend, geänderte Ansprüche eingereicht werden, so kann eine Beschwerde auch zulässig sein, wenn in der Beschwerdebegründung ausreichende Gründe angegeben werden, warum die Änderungen geeignet sind, die von der Einspruchsabteilung gerügten Mängel auszuräumen (siehe auch T 1668/14). Die Beschwerdeführerin hat in ihrer Beschwerdebegründung angegeben, dass der einzige von der Einspruchsabteilung gerügte Mangel der unzulässigen Erweiterung nach Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ durch die Streichung des betreffenden Merkmals in den Ansprüchen ihrer mit der Beschwerdebegründung eingereichten Anträge ausgeräumt worden sei.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">4.3.4 Da der Verstoß gegen Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ der einzige tragende Grund in der angefochtenen Entscheidung für den Widerruf des Patents ist, ist es im vorliegenden Fall für die Zulässigkeit der Beschwerde nicht erforderlich, dass die Beschwerdebegründung auch Ausführungen zur Klarheit, Neuheit und erfinderischen Tätigkeit enthält.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">4.4 Da auch die übrigen Voraussetzungen des EPÜ für eine zulässige Beschwerde erfüllt sind, ist der Antrag des Beschwerdegegners, die Beschwerde als unzulässig zu verwerfen, nicht gewährbar.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">(...)</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8. Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr in Höhe von 25% - Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Die am 1. April 2020 in Kraft getretene neu gefasste Regel 103 EPÜ gilt für die vorliegende Beschwerde, da sie am Tag des Inkrafttretens bereits anhängig war (siehe Artikel 2 des Beschlusses des Verwaltungsrats CA/D 14/19 vom 12. Dezember 2019 (ABl. EPA 2020, A5)).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.1 Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ sieht die Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr in Höhe von 25 % vor, wenn "ein etwaiger Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung innerhalb eines Monats ab Zustellung einer von der Beschwerdekammer zur Vorbereitung der mündlichen Verhandlung erlassenen Mitteilung zurückgenommen wird und keine mündliche Verhandlung stattfindet".</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.2 Im vorliegenden Fall stellte die damalige Beschwerdegegnerin in ihrer Beschwerdeerwiderung hilfsweise einen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung. Diesen Antrag nahm sie innerhalb eines Monats nach der Zustellung der zur Vorbereitung der mündlichen Verhandlung erlassenen Mitteilung der Kammer nach Artikel 15 (1) VOBK 2020 zurück. Daraufhin wurde der anberaumte Termin zur mündlichen Verhandlung aufgehoben. Die Beschwerdeführerin hat während des gesamten Beschwerdeverfahrens keinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung gestellt.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.3 Es stellt sich daher die Frage, ob es eine Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit der Beschwerdegebühr gemäß Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ geben kann, wenn ein Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung nicht vom Beschwerdeführer zurückgenommen wurde, sondern von einem anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten, der keine Beschwerde eingelegt hat.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.4 Nach der ständigen Rechtsprechung der Großen Beschwerdekammer und der Beschwerdekammern ist das Europäische Patentübereinkommen (EPÜ), obwohl die Europäische Patentorganisation nicht Vertragspartei des Wiener Übereinkommens über das Recht der Verträge vom 23. Mai 1969 (nachfolgend: Wiener Übereinkommen) ist, gemäß den in den Artikeln 31 und 32 des Wiener Übereinkommens aufgestellten Grundsätzen auszulegen (siehe G 1/18, ABl. EPA 2020, A26, BEGRÜNDUNG DER STELLUNGNAHME, Nr. III, erster Absatz mit zahlreichen Verweisen auf weitere Rechtsprechung). Nach Artikel 31 (1) des Wiener Übereinkommens ist ein Vertrag "nach Treu und Glauben in Übereinstimmung mit der gewöhnlichen, seinen Bestimmungen in ihrem Zusammenhang zukommenden Bedeutung und im Lichte seines Zieles und Zweckes auszulegen." In Anwendung des Artikels 32 des Wiener Übereinkommens dienen die vorbereitenden Arbeiten ("Travaux préparatoires") und die Umstände des Abschlusses des EPÜ lediglich als ergänzende Quellen, die das Ergebnis der Auslegung bestätigen, oder sie werden herangezogen, wenn bei Anwendung der allgemeinen Auslegungsregel keine sinnvolle Bedeutung zu bestimmen ist (siehe z.B. G 2/12, ABl. EPA 2016, 27, Nr. V. (4) der Entscheidungsgründe; G 1/18, supra, BEGRÜNDUNG DER STELLUNGNAHME, Nr. III, letzter Absatz).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.5 Wörtliche Auslegung der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Nach dem Wortlaut der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ muss "ein etwaiger Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung" (englische Fassung: "any request for oral proceedings" und französische Fassung: "une requête en procédure orale") innerhalb der Einmonatsfrist zurückgenommen werden, damit es die Möglichkeit einer Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr in Höhe von 25 % geben kann. Aus dem Wortlaut der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ lässt sich jedoch nicht ableiten, wessen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung zurückgenommen werden muss, damit es diese Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit geben kann. Der Formulierung "ein etwaiger Antrag" ("any request"; "une requête") ist nur zu entnehmen, dass die Rücknahme eines Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung für diese Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit vorliegen muss. Aus diesem Wortlaut kann jedoch nicht geschlossen werden, dass es sich dabei um einen Antrag handeln muss, der von einem bestimmten Verfahrensbeteiligten gestellt wurde.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Im einseitigen Beschwerdeverfahren ist dies unproblematisch, da es nur den Beschwerdeführer als einzigen Verfahrensbeteiligten gibt und infolgedessen auch nur dieser eine Verfahrensbeteiligte einen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung nach Artikel 116 (1) Satz 1 EPÜ stellen und später zurücknehmen kann.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Anders sieht es hingegen im mehrseitigen Beschwerdeverfahren aus. Hier kann gemäß Artikel 116 (1) Satz 1 EPÜ jeder Verfahrensbeteiligte, unabhängig davon, ob er Beschwerde eingelegt hat, einen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung stellen und gegebenenfalls später zurücknehmen. Dem Wortlaut der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ ist jedoch nicht zu entnehmen, dass es in einem mehrseitigen Beschwerdeverfahren darauf ankommt, ob der zurückgenommene Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung von einem Beschwerdeführer oder von einem der übrigen Verfahrensbeteiligten gestellt wurde. Insbesondere kann aus der Verwendung der Formulierung "ein etwaiger Antrag" ("any request"; "une requête") nicht geschlossen werden, dass die Frage der Rückzahlung davon abhängt, ob der zurückgenommene Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung von einem Beschwerdeführer oder einem anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten gestellt wurde. Auch der Wortlaut der weiteren Voraussetzung in Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">(" ... und keine mündliche Verhandlung stattfindet") gibt diesbezüglich keinen Aufschluss, denn, ob eine mündliche Verhandlung im Beschwerdeverfahren stattfindet, hängt nicht davon ab, dass ein Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung (auch) vom Beschwerdeführer gestellt wurde.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Zusammenfassend stellt die Kammer fest, dass die Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ ihrem Wortlaut nach lediglich fordert, dass "ein etwaiger Antrag" auf mündliche Verhandlung zurückgenommen wird. Es gibt keinen Anhaltspunkt im Wortlaut der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ, dass die Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit an die Voraussetzung geknüpft ist, dass ein Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung vom Beschwerdeführer zurückgenommen wurde. Deshalb kommt es bei einer wörtlichen Auslegung der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ für die Möglichkeit einer Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr in Höhe von 25 % an einen Beschwerdeführer im mehrseitigen Beschwerdeverfahren nicht darauf an, ob dieser Beschwerdeführer einen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung gestellt und zurückgenommen hat. Bei einer wörtlichen Auslegung der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ besteht diese Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit daher auch dann, wenn die Rücknahme eines Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung nicht vom Beschwerdeführer erklärt wurde, sondern von einem anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.6 Systematische Auslegung</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Laut den Grundsätzen des Wiener Übereinkommens ist die systematische Auslegung die zweite Säule bei der Auslegung einer Rechtsvorschrift und ihrer Begriffe (siehe G 2/12, supra, Nr. VII. 2. (1) der Entscheidungsgründe mit zahlreichen Verweisen auf andere Entscheidungen/ Stellungnahmen der Großen Beschwerdekammer; G 1/18, supra, BEGRÜNDUNG DER STELLUNGNAHME, Nr. IV. 2., erster Absatz). Bei der Anwendung dieser zweiten Auslegungsweise ist die Bedeutung des betreffenden Wortlauts im Kontext der entsprechenden Vorschrift selbst zu ermitteln. Zudem muss die Vorschrift unter Berücksichtigung "ihrer Stellung und Funktion innerhalb einer kohärenten Gruppe mit ihr zusammenhängender Rechtsnormen ausgelegt werden" (siehe z.B. G 2/12, supra, Nr. VII. 2. (1) der Entscheidungsgründe).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Regel 103 EPÜ ist die einzige Vorschrift im EPÜ über die Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr. In der Regel 103 (1) a) EPÜ geht es um die mögliche Rückerstattung der Beschwerdegebühr wegen eines wesentlichen Verfahrensmangels, wenn der Beschwerde abgeholfen oder ihr stattgegeben wird, und deshalb um einen ganz anderen rechtlichen Sachverhalt als in der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ. Ansonsten sieht die Regel 103 EPÜ die vollständige oder teilweise Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr vor, wenn "die Beschwerde" (englische Fassung: "the appeal" und französische Fassung: "le recours") unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen zurückgenommen wird (Regel 103 (1) b), (2),</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">(3) a) - c) und (4) a) und b) EPÜ). Hier stellt der Wortlaut nicht darauf ab, dass "eine etwaige" Beschwerde zurückgenommen wird, sondern es muss "die Beschwerde" zurückgenommen werden, damit es die Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit gibt. Deshalb gibt es einen direkten Zusammenhang zwischen einer bestimmten Beschwerde, die zurückgenommen wird, und der Beschwerdegebühr, die für diese Beschwerde bezahlt wurde. Zudem betrifft dieser Tatbestand nur den Beschwerdeführer, da nur dieser die Beschwerde zurücknehmen kann, und nicht die anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten, die keine Beschwerde eingelegt haben. Außerdem ist diese Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit allein davon abhängig, dass die Rücknahme der Beschwerde unter bestimmten zeitlichen Bedingungen in bestimmten Phasen des Beschwerdeverfahrens erfolgt. Es gibt jedoch keine weitere Voraussetzung, die vergleichbar ist mit der in der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ enthaltenen Voraussetzung, dass keine mündliche Verhandlung stattfindet. Die Rückerstattung der Beschwerdegebühr an den Beschwerdeführer, der seine Beschwerde zurückgenommen hat, erfolgt im mehrseitigen Beschwerdeverfahren auch dann, wenn weitere Beschwerden gegen dieselbe Entscheidung anhängig sind (und bleiben) und das Beschwerdeverfahren fortgesetzt wird, wobei dann der Beschwerdeführer, der seine Beschwerde zurückgenommen hat, Verfahrensbeteiligter bleibt. Die Rückerstattung der Beschwerdegebühr bei der Rücknahme der Beschwerde ist also nicht davon abhängig, dass das Beschwerdeverfahren ohne Endentscheidung beendet wird. Es kann daher sofort bei der Rücknahme der Beschwerde festgestellt werden, ob die Voraussetzungen einer der in Regel 103 EPÜ dafür geregelten Rückzahlungsmöglichkeiten der Beschwerdegebühr erfüllt sind und nicht erst, wie im Falle der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ, bei Abschluss des Beschwerdeverfahrens.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Bei einer systematischen Auslegung der Regel 103 EPÜ insgesamt erweist sich, dass der vom Gesetzgeber in der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ vorgesehene rechtliche Sachverhalt für eine Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit der Beschwerdegebühr nicht mit den anderen in Regel 103 EPÜ geregelten Rückzahlungsmöglichkeiten vergleichbar ist. Es werden verschiedene Formulierungen verwendet, so dass die systematische Auslegung der Regel 103 EPÜ der oben vorgenommenen wörtlichen Auslegung der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ nicht entgegensteht.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.7 Teleologische Auslegung</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Nach Artikel 31 (1) des Wiener Übereinkommens kommt es bei der Auslegung der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ auch auf das Ziel und den Zweck dieser Vorschrift an.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Die Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit nach Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ soll schon nach ihrer Formulierung und der Abgrenzung gegenüber den anderen in der Regel 103 EPÜ vorgesehenen Fällen der Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr in Beschwerdefällen, in denen ein Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung vorliegt, erkennbar einen Anreiz schaffen, dass solche Anträge zurückgenommen werden, damit letztlich eine Entscheidung in der Sache ergeht, ohne dass eine mündliche Verhandlung stattgefunden hat.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Zum einen führt der Wegfall einer mündlichen Verhandlung zu einer relevanten Arbeitsentlastung der Beschwerdekammer in dem betreffenden Beschwerdefall und in manchen Fällen auch zu einem Wegfall von Dolmetscherkosten. Zum anderen kann diese Beschwerdekammer die frei gewordene Kapazität unter Umständen für die Anberaumung einer mündlichen Verhandlung in einem anderen Beschwerdefall nutzen. Außerdem kann ein durch den Wegfall einer mündlichen Verhandlung freigewordener Verhandlungssaal ggf. auch von einer anderen Beschwerdekammer für eine mündliche Verhandlung genutzt werden. Darüber hinaus kann die Entscheidung in der betreffenden Beschwerdesache unter Umständen bereits vor dem für die mündliche Verhandlung anberaumten Termin ergehen, d.h. das Beschwerdeverfahren kann rascher zum Abschluss gebracht werden und es kann somit für die Beteiligten und die Öffentlichkeit zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt Rechtssicherheit geschaffen werden.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Das oben dargelegte offensichtlich vorrangige Ziel der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ, d.h. der Wegfall einer mündlichen Verhandlung, wird im einseitigen Verfahren immer dann erreicht, wenn der Beschwerdeführer seinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung nicht aufrechterhält, es sei denn, die Beschwerdekammer erachtet die Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung dennoch nach Artikel 116 (1) Satz 1 EPÜ für sachdienlich.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Im mehrseitigen Verfahren ist zu bedenken, dass dieses Ziel nicht immer dann erreicht wird, wenn der Beschwerdeführer seinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung zurücknimmt. Abgesehen von der Frage der Sachdienlichkeit der mündlichen Verhandlung aus der Sicht der Kammer, hängt der Wegfall der mündlichen Verhandlung dann davon ab, ob die anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten auch einen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung gestellt haben und wenn ja, ob sie ihren Antrag ebenfalls zurücknehmen oder ob ihr Antrag als Hilfsantrag gestellt wurde und im Lichte der zu treffenden Endentscheidung der Kammer nicht mehr berücksichtigt werden muss.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Andererseits kann die mündliche Verhandlung im mehrseitigen Verfahren auch dann wegfallen, wenn nur ein Verfahrensbeteiligter, der nicht Beschwerde eingereicht hat, seinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung zurücknimmt. In diesem Fall hängt es jedoch auch davon ab, ob die anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten einschließlich des Beschwerdeführers ebenfalls einen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung gestellt haben und wenn ja, ob sie ihren Antrag ebenfalls zurücknehmen oder ob ihr Antrag als Hilfsantrag gestellt wurde und im Lichte der zu treffenden Endentscheidung der Kammer nicht mehr berücksichtigt werden muss.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Im mehrseitigen Verfahren kann also die Rücknahme eines Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung, gleichgültig von welchem Verfahrensbeteiligten, dazu führen, dass keine mündliche Verhandlung stattfindet. Ob die mündliche Verhandlung bei einer solchen Rücknahme dann stattfindet oder nicht, hängt allerdings auch von dem bisherigen bzw. weiteren Verhalten der anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten ab. Wenn z.B. ein Beschwerdeführer im gesamten Beschwerdeverfahren keinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung gestellt hat, dann führt dieses Verhalten dazu, dass eine mündliche Verhandlung nicht mehr erforderlich ist, wenn der Beschwerdegegner seinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung zurücknimmt, es sei denn, der Beschwerdeführer stellt dann selbst einen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung oder die Beschwerdekammer erachtet die Durchführung der mündlichen Verhandlung dennoch nach Artikel 116 (1) Satz 1 EPÜ für sachdienlich. Die Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit von 25 % der Beschwerdegebühr gemäß Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ dürfte daher für die Beschwerdeführer ein Anreiz sein, entweder ihren Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung zurückzunehmen oder durch ihr Verhalten dazu beizutragen, dass keine mündliche Verhandlung stattfindet, wenn ein anderer Verfahrensbeteiligter seinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung zurücknimmt. Daher sollte, wenn eine mündliche Verhandlung nach der rechtzeitigen Rücknahme eines Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung nicht stattfindet und damit das Ziel und der Zweck der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ erreicht werden, die anteilige Beschwerdegebühr an den Beschwerdeführer auch dann zurückgezahlt werden, wenn nicht er, sondern ein anderer Verfahrensbeteiligter die Rücknahme erklärt hat.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.8 Travaux préparatoires</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Dieses Ergebnis der Auslegung der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ gemäß den in Artikel 31 (1) des Wiener Übereinkommens aufgestellten Grundsätzen wird weiter gestützt durch die Materialien, die gemäß Artikel 32 des Wiener Übereinkommens zur Stützung einer gemäß Artikel 31 des Wiener Übereinkommens sich ergebenden Bedeutung als ergänzende Auslegungsmittel herangezogen werden dürfen.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Die Gründe für den Änderungsvorschlag betreffend Regel 103 EPÜ, die anteilige Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr auch bei einer Rücknahme eines Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung vorzusehen, finden sich in den Erläuterungen zu diesem Änderungsvorschlag (siehe Dokument CA/80/19 vom 4. Oktober 2019).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Nr. 52 dieses CA-Dokuments lautet: "Insbesondere wird vorgeschlagen, einige zusätzliche Möglichkeiten der teilweisen Rückzahlung bei Rücknahme der Beschwerde einzuführen und die Rückzahlung auch auf die Rücknahme des Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung auszudehnen. Dies dürfte sich positiv auf die Verfahrenseffizienz und die Arbeitslast der Beschwerdekammern und somit auf ihre Kostendeckung auswirken. [...] "</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Die Begründung für diese neue Möglichkeit einer teilweisen Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr im Falle einer Rücknahme des Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung findet sich im Abschnitt VII.B a) (iv) des Dokuments CA/80/19 mit der Überschrift "Rücknahme des Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung (Rückzahlung: 25%)".</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Nr. 82 lautet: "Wird ein Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung rechtzeitig vor der mündlichen Verhandlung zurückgenommen, kann die betreffende Beschwerdekammer die frei gewordene Kapazität unter Umständen für die Anberaumung einer mündlichen Verhandlung in einem anderen Beschwerdefall nutzen. Außerdem könnten dann die Dolmetscher so rechtzeitig abbestellt werden, dass sich die Dolmetschkosten [sic] verringern oder gänzlich vermeiden lassen."</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Daraus ist zu entnehmen, dass sich die rechtzeitige Rücknahme eines Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung positiv auf die Verfahrenseffizienz, die Arbeitslast der Beschwerdekammern und die finanziellen Belastungen für das Europäische Patentamt auswirken kann.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Es heißt dann weiter:</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">"Der geeignetste Zeitpunkt, zu dem der Beschwerdeführer - ebenso wie die übrigen Beteiligten am Beschwerdeverfahren - durch einen entsprechenden Anreiz dazu veranlasst werden sollten, ihre Absicht zur Rücknahme des Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung mitzuteilen, wäre bei Zustellung der Mitteilung nach dem geänderten Artikel 15 (1) VOBK. Eine Frist von einem Monat sollte einem Verfahrensbeteiligten ausreichen, um zu entscheiden, ob er seinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung zurücknehmen will oder nicht." (Nr. 84; Hervorhebung durch die Kammer)</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">und</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">"Daher wird vorgeschlagen, die Beschwerdegebühr in Höhe von 25 % zurückzuzahlen, wenn trotz eines vorangegangenen Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung die Entscheidung letzten Endes ergeht, ohne dass eine mündliche Verhandlung stattgefunden hat. Dies wird der Fall sein, wenn die Kammer eine mündliche Verhandlung nicht für sachdienlich hält und im einseitigen Verfahren der Anmelder/Beschwerdeführer seinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung zurücknimmt bzw. im mehrseitigen Verfahren alle Beteiligten ihre Anträge auf mündliche Verhandlung zurücknehmen." (Nr. 85; Hervorhebung durch die Kammer)</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">In diesen beiden Absätzen wird, neben der Frage des bestmöglichen Zeitpunkts im Beschwerdeverfahren für eine Rücknahme eines Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung, auch der Anreiz angesprochen, durch den der Beschwerdeführer, aber auch die übrigen Verfahrensbeteiligten veranlasst werden sollen, dies zu tun. Und dieser Anreiz wird in der Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr in Höhe von 25 % gesehen. Allerdings soll diese Rückzahlung nur dann erfolgen, wenn die Entscheidung letztlich ohne mündliche Verhandlung ergeht. Die Kammer schließt aus dieser Begründung, dass der Anreiz, den vorangegangenen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung zurückzunehmen, auch für den Beschwerdegegner gelten soll, selbst wenn dieser Anreiz in einer Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr in Höhe von 25 % an den Beschwerdeführer besteht.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">In Nr. 85 wird der Fall angesprochen, wenn im mehrseitigen Verfahren alle Beteiligten ihre Anträge auf mündliche Verhandlung zurücknehmen. Nr. 86 befasst sich mit weiteren Szenarien im mehrseitigen Verfahren und lautet: "Wenn im mehrseitigen Verfahren nur ein Beteiligter seinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung zurücknimmt und die mündliche Verhandlung trotzdem stattfindet, sollte keine Rückzahlung erfolgen. Zwar muss die Kammer in einem solchen Fall möglicherweise weniger Zeit und Arbeit aufwenden, weil davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass der Beteiligte, der seinen Antrag zurückgenommen hat, sich allein auf sein schriftliches Vorbringen stützt, doch scheint diese geringere Arbeitslast nicht ausreichend, um eine teilweise Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr zu rechtfertigen." (Hervorhebung durch die Kammer)</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Diese Erläuterungen bestätigen die oben dargelegte Auslegung durch die Kammer, dass es im mehrseitigen Verfahren die Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit nach Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ geben kann, wenn ein Verfahrensbeteiligter - und nicht zwingend der Beschwerdeführer - seinen Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung zurücknimmt, sofern es zu einem Wegfall der mündlichen Verhandlung kommt, was offensichtlich auch in diesen Erläuterungen als das vorrangige Ziel der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ angesehen wird.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.9 Angesichts der oben dargelegten Auslegung der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ durch die Kammer kann es eine Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit der Beschwerdegebühr gemäß Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ auch dann geben, wenn ein Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung nicht vom Beschwerdeführer zurückgenommen wurde, sondern von einem anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten, der keine Beschwerde eingelegt hat. Daher erfüllt die vom Beschwerdegegner erklärte Rücknahme des Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung im vorliegenden Fall das Erfordernis der Rücknahme "eines etwaigen Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung" nach Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.10 In der Entscheidung T 777/15 mit einem vergleichbaren Sachverhalt wurde die Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit der Beschwerdegebühr an eine der Beschwerdeführerinnen gemäß Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ mit folgender Begründung verneint: Die Kammer legt die Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ so aus, dass sie einem Beteiligten, der zunächst eine mündliche Verhandlung vor der Kammer beantragt hatte, einen Anreiz bietet, einen solchen Antrag in einem späteren Stadium des Beschwerdeverfahrens zu überdenken, und für den Fall, dass der Beteiligte diesen Antrag aufgibt, eine Belohnung in Form einer teilweisen Rückerstattung der Beschwerdegebühr dieses Beteiligten vorsieht. Dementsprechend kommt der beschwerdeführenden Einsprechenden 5, eine beschwerdeführende Beteiligte, die im Verfahren vor der Kammer keine mündliche Verhandlung beantragt hat, die Rücknahme des Antrags auf mündliche Verhandlung durch einen anderen Beteiligten nicht zugute. (Siehe T 777/15, Nr. 4.1 der Entscheidungsgründe; Übersetzung von dieser Kammer).</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Dieser engen Auslegung der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ kann sich die Kammer jedoch aus den oben dargelegten Gründen (Nrn. 8.4 - 8.8 oben) nicht anschließen.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.11 Es wurde vorliegend auch die Einmonatsfrist nach Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ eingehalten. Die von der Beschwerdekammer zur Vorbereitung der mündlichen Verhandlung erlassene Mitteilung nach Artikel 15 (1) VOBK 2020 vom 16. Juni 2020 gilt nach Regel 126 (2) EPÜ mit dem zehnten Tag nach der Abgabe zur Post als zugestellt, d.h. am 26. Juni 2020. Damit endete die in Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ genannte einmonatige Frist am Montag, den 27. Juli 2020 (Regel 131 (2), (4) und Regel 134 (1) EPÜ). Der in der Beschwerdeerwiderung hilfsweise gestellte Antrag auf mündliche Verhandlung wurde am 10. Juli 2020 zurückgenommen und damit innerhalb eines Monats ab Zustellung der von der Beschwerdekammer zur Vorbereitung der mündlichen Verhandlung erlassenen Mitteilung.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">8.12 Da im vorliegenden Fall auch keine mündliche Verhandlung stattfand, sind sämtliche Voraussetzungen der Regel 103 (4) c) EPÜ für eine Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr in Höhe von 25% erfüllt.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">Entscheidungsformel</b></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">Aus diesen Gründen wird entschieden:</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">1. Die angefochtene Entscheidung wird aufgehoben.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2. Die Angelegenheit wird an die erste Instanz zur weiteren Entscheidung zurückverwiesen.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">3. Die Beschwerdegebühr ist in Höhe von 25% zurückzuzahlen.</p><p><i><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: xx-small;"><span style="background-color: white;">This decision <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t180488du1.html">T0488/18</a> </span><span style="background-color: white;">(<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t180488du1.pdf" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank">pdf</a>) has European Case Law Identifier: </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;">ECLI:EP:BA:2021:T048818.20210325</span><span style="background-color: white;">. The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP11186605&tab=doclist" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank">here</a>.</span><span style="background-color: white;"> Photo by </span>Dean Moriarty (<a href="https://pixabay.com/users/terimakasih0-624267/">Terimakasih0</a>) <span style="background-color: white;">obtained </span><span style="background-color: white;">via <a href="https://pixabay.com/photos/ask-sign-design-creative-2341784/" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;">PixaBay</a> under the </span><a href="https://pixabay.com/service/license/" style="background: rgb(255, 255, 255); color: #636363; cursor: pointer; margin: 0px; outline: none !important;">Pixabay License</a><span style="background-color: white;"> (no changes made). </span>Translations by <a href="http://www.DeepL.com/Translator">www.DeepL.com/Translator</a>. </span></i></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p>Sander van Rijnswouhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08074604101159694993noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8990057754240336385.post-48026714322257806812021-04-07T09:41:00.001+02:002021-04-07T09:41:43.198+02:00T 2393/17 - mere assertion of lack of information not enough for insufficiency <p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgF8uW2_1i2vnAwkndpf6WkNMZX1mTXcPycP3UPUCiDJp4u6Q-tf1ho4RtCFxBDHvG0PqvnuF3AUyjuhTOIE530R_bofszOyQd3g5l7HkynEwgUBnXxVuyexfYwQDoa0tLFDoqHB0jKSYM0/s1920/2021.04.07+tableware-555203_1920.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1365" data-original-width="1920" height="285" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgF8uW2_1i2vnAwkndpf6WkNMZX1mTXcPycP3UPUCiDJp4u6Q-tf1ho4RtCFxBDHvG0PqvnuF3AUyjuhTOIE530R_bofszOyQd3g5l7HkynEwgUBnXxVuyexfYwQDoa0tLFDoqHB0jKSYM0/w400-h285/2021.04.07+tableware-555203_1920.jpg" width="400" /></a></div><br /><i><br /></i><p></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i>Claim 1 for a dishwasher in this opposition appeal comprises the feature that </i></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px; text-align: left;">either said bottom wall (14) or said cover (12) incorporating a first and a second half-conduit (28, 30) tapering at respective ends facing each other, so that they form an air gap device, </p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i>The opponent objected that the patent does not sufficiently disclose such incorporated half-conduits. The boards does not agree, and finds that it is not enough to state insufficiency but that one has to address why this particular feature would not be possible for the skilled person to produce. </i></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><i><span></span></i></p><a name='more'></a><span style="box-sizing: border-box;">(...)</span><p></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">Reasons for the Decision</b></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">1. The appeal is admissible.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">2. Background of the invention</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #cc0000;">The patent relates to a water supply commonly known as "air break" in dishwashers (paragraph 0001) that typically comprises a flattened hollow body of plastic material</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">, and adapted to perform various functions of providing a vent for vapour formed in the washing chamber, an air gap for the water supply, or a collector of water for use in forming regeneration brine for the water softener (paragraph 0002). The air gap more particularly provides an interruption of the conduit guiding the supply of fresh water to allow the above functions. In paragraph 0010 the aim to optimise the air gap device, in particular avoiding the need for deflectors or the like is expressed. The core of the solution consists in providing two tubular facing ends of the first and second half-conduits attached to either the bottom or cover of the device and aligned along the same straight line.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">3. Sufficiency - Art 100 b) EPC</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #cc0000;">3.1 The appellant considers the patent does not sufficiently disclose how to realise a first and a second tubular half-conduit being incorporated in the bottom wall or cover.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">3.2 </span><span style="color: #cc0000;">The Board disagrees.</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> According to paragraph 0013, the claimed water supply device is made of plastic material using the well known injection moulding process. </span><span style="color: #cc0000;">Manufacturing the first and second half-conduits</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> tubular and tapering at their respective ends to face each other such that they are made integrally with the bottom wall -or cover- as explained in paragraph 0016 </span><span style="color: #cc0000;">realises the requirement of claim 1 </span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">that the bottom wall -or cover- incorporates the above half conduits. In the </span><span style="color: #cc0000;">Board's view this can be performed by the skilled person's putting into practise routine injection moulding steps of plastic material</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;">, that is injecting molten plastic into two half-moulds having cavities reproducing the tubular shape of the half conduits on the flat surface of the bottom -or cover- wall.</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><span style="color: #0b2a43;">3.3 </span><span style="color: #cc0000;">By simply stating that the description of the patent does not contain information on how the tubular half conduits are manufactured so as to be incorporated in one of the walls, the appellant has not substantiated by verifiable facts his claim that forming a tubular shape integrally with a flat surface of the bottom -or cover- wall might be impossible to obtain by injection moulding of plastic material</span><span style="color: #0b2a43;"> (See <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/caselaw/2019/e/clr_ii_c_9.htm">CLBA, 9th edition 2019, II.C.9</a>).</span></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">3.4 The Board thus confirms the opposition division's positive assessment of sufficiency of disclosure, Article 100(b) EPC.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">4. Novelty over D3 or D7</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">(...)</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">5. Inventive step starting from D7 or D3</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">(...)</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">7. In the light of the above, the Board confirms the opposition division's decision to reject the opposition, Article 101(2) EPC.</p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;"><b style="box-sizing: border-box;">Order</b></p><p style="background-color: white; box-sizing: border-box; color: #0b2a43; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 23px; margin: 0px 0px 1.5em; padding: 0px;">For these reasons it is decided that:</p><p><span face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43; font-size: 15px;">The appeal is dismissed</span> </p><p><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: x-small;"><span style="background-color: white;"><i>This decision <a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t172393eu1.html">T 2393/17</a></i></span><span style="background-color: white;"><i><a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t151807eu1.html" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank"> </a>(<a href="https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf/t172393eu1.pdf" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank">pdf</a>) has European Case Law Identifier: </i></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #0b2a43;">ECLI:EP:BA:2021:T239317.20210311</span><span style="background-color: white;"><i>. The file wrapper can be found <a href="https://register.epo.org/espacenet/application?number=EP12190128&tab=doclist" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank">here</a>.</i></span><i style="background-color: white;"> Photo by </i><i style="background-color: white;"><a href="https://pixabay.com/users/congerdesign-509903/" style="background: transparent; color: #da8044;" target="_blank">congerdesign</a> </i><i style="background-color: white;">obtained </i><i style="background-color: white;">via <a href="https://pixabay.com/photos/tableware-dishwasher-kitchen-555203/">PixaBay</a> under </i><a href="https://pixabay.com/service/license/" style="color: #636363; cursor: pointer; margin: 0px; outline: none !important;">Pixabay License</a><i style="background-color: white;"> (no changes made).</i></span></p>Sander van Rijnswouhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08074604101159694993noreply@blogger.com0