Monday, February 16, 2015 T 1495/09 - Patent granted for Great Britain despite missing designation

This opposition appeal played a role in a series of court cases explained in an article by Gordon Harris. The appeal before the EPO is interesting in its own right. We have also blogged about this case in the context of the unitary patent. 


The request for grant form for the patent contained the following: "GB is expressly NOT designated in this application." However, it appears that the EPO overlooked this statement and granted a patent for GB anyway.

The opponents challenge this grant for a member state that seems explicitly abandoned, both with the opposition division and with the Examining division; the latter under R.140 EPC.

However, the Board of appeal does not allow the opposition division to correct an error in a decision of the Examining division. The Examining division did not correct this 'error' either. This leads the way to court cases in which the proprietor tries to enforce the GB validation. In the end, the latter is unsuccessful but only because the patent is considered not infringed. Also the judge would not review the administrative procedure leading up to the grant.

I've put error in quotes since the board does not address the question whether this grant really was an error. The Examining division itself does not seem to think so; in a communication of 17/4/2009 it considers the abandonment of the UK designation to ambiguous.



Summary of Facts and Submissions
I. All parties, the patent proprietors (henceforth "Virgin"), opponents 01 (henceforth "Cathay"), opponents 02 (henceforth "Airbus") and opponents 03 (henceforth "Premium") appealed against the interlocutory decision of the Opposition Division dated 18 June 2009. In its decision the Opposition Division maintained the patent in amended form on the basis of the claims of the first auxiliary request then on file.

II. In the course of the oral proceedings held 9 September 2010 before the Board, Virgin withdrew all former requests and filed a new sole request and requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that the patent be maintained in amended form on the basis of this sole request.

Premium and Airbus requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and that the patent be revoked. This request had also been made in writing by Cathay, who informed the Board with letter dated 1 September 2010 that they would not be represented at the oral proceedings.

Premium further requested the correction of the decision to grant by deleting the designation of GB. This request had also been made by Cathay in writing.

(...)

Reasons for the Decision
(...)


7. Request for correction of the decision to grant under Rule 140 EPC


Premium and Cathay requested the Board to correct the decision to grant under Rule 140 EPC by deleting the designation of the Contracting State GB since in their view, said designation contained an obvious mistake.

Premium and Cathay assert that it lies within the competence of the Opposition Division to correct the Examining division's decision to grant a patent pursuant to Rule 140 EPC (identical with former Rule 89 EPC 1973). However, the present Board agrees with Virgin and believes that only the Examining Division is entitled to correct its own decision.

Rule 140 EPC reads as follows: "In decisions of the European Patent Office, only linguistic errors, errors of transcription and obvious mistakes may be corrected."

The Board agrees with Premium and Cathay that Rule 140 EPC does not specify the competence to correct errors in a decision. The Board also notes that there is no other provision in the EPC specifying the competence for such a correction decision. Therefore, an interpretation of Rule 140 EPC is necessary on this issue. The case law of the Enlarged Board of Appeal and the Boards of Appeal has dealt with the question of which EPO department of first instance is competent to correct the decision for grant. In its decision G 8/95 (OJ EPO 1996, 481) the Enlarged Board of Appeal held: "The competence to correct errors in a decision under Rule 89 EPC [1973] lies with the body which has given the decision. Hence, in the examination procedure the Examining Division has to decide on a request to correct errors in the decision to grant." (Reasons 3.4). In the decision T 850/95 (OJ EPO 1996, 455) leading to the referral, the facts indeed differed from those of the present case since the request for correction was submitted prior to the mention of the grant of the patent and therefore prior to the date on which the decision to grant took effect according to Article 97(4) EPC 1973. Consequently, no opposition proceedings were pending at the time when the request for correction was filed. However, according to the case law of the Boards of Appeal, the Examining Division has the competence to correct its own decision to grant also in situations where the request for correction was submitted after the initiation of opposition proceedings (T 226/02 and T 268/02, both decisions not published in the OJ EPO). In both decisions the Board referred to G 8/95 (loc. cit.) and held that the competence to correct errors in a grant decision lied with the Examining Division which had taken that decision. In T 226/02, where the Opposition Division had corrected the grant decision pursuant to Rule 89 EPC 1973, the Board came to the conclusion that "the Opposition Division acted ultra vires in taking a decision under Rule 89 EPC [1973] to correct a decision of the Examining Division" (Reasons 5.1). In decision T 79/07 (not published in the OJ EPO) the Board acknowledged the Examining Division's competence for correcting the grant decision even after the Opposition Division had revoked the patent by a decision which was the subject of the appeal proceedings. In the Board's view the reason for acknowledging the Examining Division's exclusive competence to decide on a request for correction of the grant decision could be seen in the requirement developed by case law that the correction of a decision is admissible only if the text of the decision is manifestly other than intended by the department concerned. Hence there is an obvious mistake in a grant decision within the meaning of Rule 140 EPC, if the text given for grant is not and obviously cannot be what the Examining Division actually intended, and the text erroneously indicated can be replaced by that on which the Examining Division actually wanted to base its decision (see T 850/95, loc. cit., Reasons 3. and T 1093/05, Reasons 7.).

Premium argue that, in accordance with Article 114(1) EPC 1973, the Opposition Division had to correct the grant decision since, as stated in decision T 156/84 (OJ EPO 1988, 372), it had the duty vis-à-vis the public not to grant or maintain patents which were not legally valid, irrelevant of how and when the EPO became aware of the circumstances being relevant for the legal validity of a patent. The Board, however, does not agree with this argument. The principle of examination by the EPO of its own motion as set out in Article 114(1) EPC 1973 applies in all proceedings before the EPO. However, this principle cannot justify acting ultra vires and it therefore only applies to the extent to which the EPO department acts within its competence. This finding is also in line with decision T 156/84 (loc. cit.). The Board of Appeal concluded there that for establishing whether a granted patent can be maintained the Opposition Division was obliged to examine the relevance of cited state of the art even if it was introduced after expiry of the opposition period because the principle of examination by the EPO of its own motion (Article 114(1) EPC 1973) took precedence over the possibility to disregard late-filed facts or evidence (Article 114(2) EPC 1973). Decision T 156/84 (loc. cit.) concerned the question of how the Opposition Division had to deal with late-filed evidence which was filed in support of the ground for opposition under Article 100(a) EPC 1973.
 However, there is no indication in decision T 156/84 (loc. cit.) that Article 114(1) EPC 1973 could establish any competence. Consequently, neither Article 114(1) EPC 1973 nor decision T 156/84 (loc. cit.) provides a basis for a competence of the Opposition Division for correcting the grant decision.

Lastly, the Board turns to the argument that the principle of good faith and the principle of proportionality, which were applicable pursuant to Article 125 EPC 1973 in proceedings before the EPO, would establish a competence of the Opposition Division for correcting the grant decision. The purpose of Article 125 EPC 1973 is to fill any gaps that may occur in the application of the procedural provisions of the EPC. However, the Board considers that these principles also do not establish a competence of the Opposition Division to correct the grant decision for the following reasons.

According to Article 19(1) EPC 1973 the Opposition Divisions are responsible for the examination of oppositions against any European patent. The substantive examination of the opposition is prescribed in Article 101 EPC. If the opposition is admissible, the Opposition Division examines whether at least one ground for opposition laid down in Article 100 EPC 1973 prejudices the maintenance of the European patent (Article 101(1) EPC).

Article 100 EPC 1973 lays down the exclusive grounds for opposition being limited to and essentially the same as some grounds for revocation under national law (Article 138(1)(a)-(c) EPC 1973). The function of this provision is to provide, within the framework of the EPC, a limited number of legal bases, i.e. a limited number of objections on which an opposition can be based (G 1/95, OJ EPO 1996, 615, Reasons, point 4.1). An incorrect designation of a Contracting State is not one of the grounds for opposition under Article 100 EPC 1973. This has also not been disputed by Premium and Cathay. It is established Board of Appeal case law that further grounds which would lead to a refusal of a European patent application in the examination proceedings cannot be successfully presented in opposition proceedings (see for example G 1/91, OJ EPO 1992, 253; J 22/86, OJ EPO 1987, 280, Reasons, point 18; T 99/85, OJ EPO 1987, 413, Reasons, point 4; T 127/85, OJ EPO 1989, 271; T 301/87, OJ EPO 1990, 335, Reasons, point 3.3 and 3.4; T 550/88, OJ EPO 1992, 117, Reasons, point 4; T 428/95, not published in the OJ EPO, Reasons, point 4.2). In view of this established case law and the relevant EPC provision, the Board considers that the opposition procedure is not designed to remedy all possible deficiencies of the granting procedure or of a granted patent. For example, an objection on the basis that the granted patent claims are not concise and clear cannot be considered by the Opposition Division (see for example T 336/96, not published in the EPO). Also defects and errors of a purely formal character in the granting procedure cannot lead to a revocation of the patent in opposition proceedings since such defects are properly regarded as cured by the act of grant (J 22/86, loc. cit., Reasons 18.). Hence the scope of opposition proceedings is limited as regards the grounds for challenge to granted European patents.

Also after grant observations of third parties under Article 115, first sentence EPC are only admissible if they oppose the patentability of the invention to which the patent relates. "Patentability" refers only to the substantive requirements set out in Articles 52 to 57 EPC as the identical heading of Chapter I, Part II of the EPC suggests.

The provisions of Articles 99 et seq. and Article 115 EPC were drafted with the public interest in mind (see also T 60/91 (OJ EPO 1993, 551, Reasons 9.5). Therefore, in inter partes opposition proceedings before the EPO account must not only be taken of the interests of the parties involved. The Board shares the view that the EPO also has a duty vis-à-vis the public not to grant or maintain patents which it is convinced are not legally valid and that the public has to be enabled to rely as far as possible on the legal validity of a patent granted by the EPO (see T 156/84, loc. cit., Reasons 3.5). However, this duty is subject to restrictions. As set out above, opponents in opposition proceedings and third parties filing observations can challenge the patent only in a limited scope. This means that neither the public nor opponents have legitimate expectations that any deficiency of the granted patent would be remedied by the EPO. Consequently, in the present case, the public could not legitimately expect that the designation of the Contracting State GB would be corrected in opposition proceedings. Therefore, the principle of good faith does not apply in the present case.

For similar reasons the principle of proportionality does not apply in the present case. It is obvious from the EPC provisions concerning post-grant proceedings that the legislator did not envisage empowering the Opposition Division to set aside all legal and factual consequences of any mistake which occurred in examination proceedings. It is therefore the Board's view that the authority conferred to the Opposition Division by the EPC provisions cannot be extended because of the principle of proportionality.

In view of the above the Board concludes that in the present case the Opposition Division in opposition proceedings had no competence to correct the decision taken by the Examining Division. Thus the Opposition Division would have acted ultra vires if it had corrected the grant decision. The same applies to the Board of Appeal in opposition appeal proceedings (Article 111(1), second sentence EPC 1973). Consequently, the request for correction of the decision to grant must be rejected.
ORDER
For these reasons it is decided that:
1. The decision under appeal is set aside.
2. The case is remitted to the first instance with the order to maintain the patent on the basis of the following documents:
- Claims 1 to 8 filed as sole request during the oral proceedings;
- Pages 2 to 8 of the description filed during the oral proceedings;
- Drawings as granted.
3. The request for correction of the decision to grant is rejected.
 

This decision has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2010:T149509.20100909. The whole decision can be found here (pdf). The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "The Queen's Guards
" by Swaminathan obtained via 500px under CC BY 3.0 license (no changes made).