Monday, September 03, 2018 T 1403/16 Can an opponent file a request for re-establishment having not timely responded to a R.84(1) invitation

The opposition division noted that the patent in suit had lapsed in all the designated contracting states and issued a communication under R.84(1) EPC inviting the opponent to file, within two months, a request for continuation of the opposition proceedings. By mistake, the opponent's representative failed to timely file the request under R.84(1). A request for re-establishment was filed. It was argued that re-establishment should be allowed in line with the exceptions given by the Enlarged Board in G 1/86. The opposition division did not see a reason to extend the scope of G 1/86 from opposition appeal proceedings to opposition proceedings and decided to declare the re-establishment request inadmissible and to discontinue the opposition. The opponent appealed. 

The Board of Appeal did not go into the issue whether the scope of re-establishment should be extended but came to the concluson that re-establishment would anyhow not apply to missing a time limit under R.84(1). Missing such a time limit does not have a direct loss as a consequence. The opposition division may decide to discontinue the opposition proceedings if no timely request is filed, but this is a separate decision. Such a decision can be appealed.

Thursday, April 26, 2018 J 13/16 - No reestablishment for restoration of right of priority

No priority...

In the present case, the appellant appealed against the decision of the Receiving Section by which the application was deemed not enjoy the right of priority since it was filed after expiry of the 12 month priority period, and by which the request to allow the applicant to submit a new request for restoration of priority was refused. 

In the PCT phase, the USPTO acting as RO had previously granted the request for restoration of priority under the 'unintentional' criterion, but no valid request had been filed at the EPO as dO under Rule 49ter.2 PCT, i.e., within the 1 month of entering the regional phase before the EPO .

A question arising in the present case is whether reestablishment is available for the request for restoration of priority. Its (un)availability may not be immediately evident, as it is not explicitly ruled out by Art. 122(4), Rule 136(3) EPC. The Board, however, considers that the request for restoration of priority is 'perfectly comparable' to reestablishment in respect of the priority period, and thus that its reestablishment is ruled out by Art. 122(4) EPC.

See also catchword point 2.

Catchwords:

1. If, in the international phase, a receiving Office (RO) has restored a right of priority under the "unintentional" criterion of Rule 26bis.3(a)(ii) PCT, the restoration is not effective in proceedings before the EPO acting as designated Office, since the EPO applies the "due care" criterion (Rule 49ter.1(b) PCT). In such cases, within the period specified in Rule 49ter.2(b)(i) PCT, the applicant must file a (new) request for restoration of a right of priority under Rule 49ter.2 PCT with the EPO acting as designated Office. For the purposes of Rule 49ter.2 PCT, the request filed with the RO under Rule 26bis.3(b) PCT cannot be taken into account in the proceedings before the EPO acting as designated Office. (See points 3.2 and 3.3 of the Reasons)

2. In proceedings before the EPO, re-establishment of rights under Article 122 EPC is ruled out in respect of the period under Rule 49ter.2(b)(i) PCT for filing a request for restoration of a right of priority. (See points 4.3 to 4.10 of the Reasons)

Friday, March 30, 2018 T 0198/16 - Yea or Nay to Intention to Pay?

Is the mere intention of an appellant to pay the appeal fee, as expressed by reference to EPO Form 1010 ("Payment of fees and expenses") in the Notice of Appeal, enough to authorise the EPO to debit appellant's deposit account (holding sufficient funds), when said  Form 1010 has erroneously not been sent together with the Notice?

In this examination appeal, the Board held - deviating from T 1265/10 - that regardless of whether or not the EPO would have access to sufficient the funds of the party intending to pay, such an intention can never be considered equivalent to an order.

Referring to R 18/13, the Board further found that - different from a mistake made by an assistant - the mistake made by the representative to not explicitly instruct his assistant to pay the appeal fee and to not properly review the electronic receipt is a mistake that cannot be excused. Accordingly, the request for re-establishment of rights was refused.

As a result, the appeal was deemed not to have been filed.

Catchword:

1. The intention to authorise debiting of the deposit account does NOT already allow the EPO to act on such authorisation and carry out such intent where the EPO, under the deposit account system, already holds such money in trust (deviation in particular from T 1265/10, at point 15), (see point 3.4.3 of the quotation from the summons under point 1 of the Reasons).

2. A representative must give express and clear instructions to an assistant to the effect that the appeal fee has to be paid. It is not enough to rely on the assistant's deducing the duty to file the payment form from the notice of appeal, which includes the sentence: "The appeal fee is paid via the enclosed EPO form 1010."

Tuesday, January 16, 2018 T 2450/16 - Relying on guidance from epoline

Screenshot of epoline at its introduction in 2000

This case concerns the request of re-establishment of rights under Article 122 EPC in respect of the period for filing the notice of appeal against the decision of the Examining Division to refuse a European patent application.

The applicant's instructions to file an appeal were transmitted to the administrative assistant in charge of the present file. The assistant was, however, confronted with completing this task in epoline, which according to the applicant/appellant contained no clear indications concerning the initiation of an appeal procedure, apart from the payment of the appeal fee.

The assistant thus did not find any guidance for filing an appeal other than payment of the appeal fee. In paying the appeal fee, the assistent went ahead firmly but wrongly believing from epoline that this was all that was necessary. She therefore wrongly found it superfluous to consult another administrative assistant or an attorney/engineer. According to the applicant/appellant, this constituted the isolated mistake that had occurred in the present case.

As one may expect, the Board however finds that it would have been the responsibility of the representative in the circumstances to give specific and clear instructions on the filing of an appeal to the assistant.

Wednesday, November 22, 2017 T 2406/16 - Reestablishment when appeal fee not paid

It's another one of those nightmare scenario's. A notice of appeal is filed but the appeal fee is not paid. 

The attorney signed a notice of appeal and instructed his assistant to file the notice and pay the fee as soon as the deposit account contains enough funds. The latter requires checking with the CFO that there are enough funds in the deposit account, and can take a few days. Unfortunately, the assistent accidentally removed the due date from the system when the notice is filed. This  should not have been done until the payment was made. The board did not view this as an isolated mistake and refused to reinstate the case. 

Thursday, October 05, 2017 T 2016/16 - All due care: assistant well-trained but not properly instructed/ not properly supervised by the patent attorney

The applicant timely filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. However, the applicant missed the 4-month period to file the grounds of appeal, because the 4-month period had never been recorded in the internal electronic docketing system.  With the late-filed statement of grounds, the applicant filed a request for re-establishment of rights in respect of the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal was filed and the prescribed fee was paid. A well-trained, competent and experienced assistant, who has the CIPA Patent Administrator Qualification had overlooked to record the 4-month period and the responsible patent attorney did not think to check whether the period for filing the grounds of appeal had been logged in the docketing system. The Board concluded that, even with a system of double checking in place, the representative is not discharged from his or her duty to properly instruct and supervise the assistant (cf. T 1465/07, reasons 18, last paragraph). In the case at hand, the appellants have not shown that the assistant was properly instructed or that she was properly supervised. Thus, the appellants have not discharged their burden to prove the existence of a normally satisfactory monitoring system. The omission from the docketing system of the time limit for filing the statement of grounds can therefore not be said to equate to an isolated mistake in a normally satisfactory monitoring system. The request for re-establishment of rights is to be refused.

Tuesday, December 06, 2016 J 7/15 - Re-establishment for outside payment firm

The applicant uses an outside outside payment firm for paying the renewal fees, as well as an unrelated outside attorney for substantive patent work. The board is not unable to establish exactly why the renewal fees were not paid in time, but finds it sufficient that a historically reliable payment firm was used. 

Sunday, March 13, 2016 T 0629/15 Re-establishment of rights - payment of renewal fee

In this case the board of appeal has to deal with a common situation wherein a renewal fee has been missed and responsibility for payment was lying with the US attorney and a fee payment agency. In such a situation, when does the 2 month period for requesting re-establishment start? 
The European patent attorney is of the opinion that the period starts when he is instructed to affect the payment. The board reviews the case law and concludes that if the loss of rights communication is received earlier, then this communication triggers the period. The request for reestablishment is now inadmissible for being filed too late.

Tuesday, October 27, 2015 T 0970/12 - Yet another grant of re-establishment of right

This is another example where the Board of Appeal granted re-establishment of rights. Under very extraordinary circumstances and a combination of the Christmas and New years holidays, a sudden death of a close relative of the representative and the presence in the office of a trainee that did not know the correct procedures, the date for filing the Notice of Appeal was missed. The Board did not make much fuss and granted the re-establishment of rights.

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The present appeal lies from a decision of the examining division refusing European patent application No. 09166600.8, published as EP 2111855, under Article 97(2) EPC. The application was filed as a divisional application of European patent application No. 07007272.3, published as EP 1847256 (parent application).

Friday, October 23, 2015 T 1171/13: the assistant forgot to fax the statement of grounds of appeal

The Appellant (opponent) filed a request for re-establishment of rights because the assistant of the appellant's representative forgot to fax the statement of grounds of appeal on time while the representative had his holidays. The respondent (patent proprietor) argued that the system of the representative lacks cross-checks and, thus, that the system is not sufficient for showing all due care. The deadline/reminder for submitting the statement of the grounds of appeal was deleted after the representative indicated in the system that he had completed his tasks. The Board is of the opinion that, based on case law, the existing of such cross-checks is not relevant when the error only concerns forgetting to submit the statement to the EPO on time while the statement was ready on time. It seems that the system of registering deadlines and generating reminders is necessary to remind the representative to perform his task on time. On the contrary, it seems not to be necessary to use such a system for reminding the assistant to perform her task on time when it concerns an isolated mistake in a normally well-functioning system and when the assistant is well-trained, experienced, thoroughly component and well-instructed how to handle the letter drafted by the representative. I think that, for example, the Dutch Patent Office will require in such a case that the assistant also uses the system of generating reminders for submitting the letter on time.

Friday, January 30, 2015 T 1101/14 - Don't put the blame on your secretary, if you as a representative failed yourself!

A representative  mistakenly signed a statement of grounds of appeal having most of its pages missing. As a result, the statement of grounds of appeal, did not indicate the reasons for setting aside the impugned decision or the extent to which it was to be amended - and the Board came to the preliminary conclusion that the appeal appeared to be  inadmissible. The representative tried to argue all due care, referring to the secretary's reliability (trying to put all the blame on her), but ignoring the representative's own lack of particular care when checking and signing the documents to be submitted. But: no excuses for not having checked that carefully! 

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal lies against the decision of the examining division [...]

II. The appellant filed a notice of appeal on 31 Janu­a­ry 2014 and paid the appeal fee on the same day. On 11 April 2014, the appellant submitted, electro­nically, amended claims and description pages accor­ding to a main request and auxiliary requests 1-3, accom­panied by a letter stating the following:

"In the matter of the Appeal, we enclose herewith the Grounds of Appeal, to­gether with amended description pages and claims in re­lation to a Main Request and First to Third Auxiliary Re­quests. We request that the decision of the Examining Division be set aside in its entirety, and that a pa­tent be granted based on the application in the form of the Main Request. If the Appeal Board considers that the Main Request is not permissible, we respectfully request an opinion in relation to the allowability of the First to Third Auxiliary Requests. We request Oral Proceedings in the event that any of the Requests are not considered allow­able by the Appeal Board."

No fur­ther reasons were received with that submission, nor did the letter contain a list of intended enclosures.

III. With a summons to oral proceedings, the board informed the appellant of its preliminary opinion that the letter of 11 April 2014, which the board considered to constitute the statement of grounds of appeal, did not indicate the reasons for setting aside the impugned decision or the extent to which it was to be amended. The board therefore came to the preliminary conclusion that the grounds of appeal did not satisfy the require­ments of Rule 99(2) EPC so that the appeal appeared to be inadmissible pursuant to Rule 101(1) EPC. The appellant was also informed that the oral pro­ceedings would be limited to the question of admissibility.

IV. In response to the summons, received on 26 September 2014, the appellant argued that "the Grounds of Appeal which were filed were not the 'full' intended Grounds" and reques­ted re-establishment of the applicant's right in the application under Article 122 EPC in view of the fact that, in spite of all due care required by the cir­cum­stances having been taken, the Applicant was unable to observe the deadline for filing the grounds of appeal under Article 108 EPC.

V. In a communication dated 8 October 2014, the board in­formed the appellant that the request for re-establish­ment would be dealt with in the planned oral procee­dings and raised a number of questions. Since a sub­mission rela­ting to the grounds of appeal was re­ceived in time, it appeared questionable whether a time limit had been missed at all and therefore whe­ther the re­quest for re-establishment was admissible. The board also noted that the appellant had, in res­ponse to its electronic sub­mission, received an imme­di­ate acknow­ledge­ment of re­ceipt from which the omission of a sepa­rate document con­tai­ning the grounds of appeal should have been appa­rent. In view of this it seemed that the cause of non-compliance had been re­moved directly after trans­mission and that consequently the request for re-establish­ment was not filed within the two-month period pre­scribed by the EPC. Moreover, even if the request for re-estab­lish­ment had been made in good time, the presence of the receipt would appear to have a bea­ring on the assessment of whether all due care re­quired by the circumstances had been taken.

VI. The appellant provided further arguments in a letter dated 23 October 2014.

VII. The appellant's case, insofar as it is relevant to the present decision, can be summarized as follows.

a) By 1 April 2014, the appellant and the repre­sen­tative had come to an agreement as to which do­cu­ments were to be filed as and with the grounds of appeal.

b) On 11 April 2014, a bundle of documents was pre­pared for uploading to the electronic filing sys­tem including, in particular, a letter relating to the appeal procedure comprising a cover letter and a twelve-page annex containing the actual grounds of appeal.

c) The procedure normally followed by the represen­ta­tive and her secretary for an electronic filing con­sisted of five steps:

1. The representative would instruct the secretary which documents were to be filed.
2. The secretary would upload these documents to the local end of the electronic filing system.
3. The representative would click through every page of the uploaded documents and, once verified, electronically sign them.
4. The secretary would perform the "send" function of the electronic filing system and thus have the signed documents transmitted to the EPO.
5. The secretary would receive the electronic receipt of transmission and check whether the documents enclosed for transmission were properly transmitted.

d) This procedure was also followed in the present case. However, two errors occurred. The se­cretary failed in step ii) to upload the twelve-page annex containing the grounds of appeal, and the repre­sen­tative failed to notice in step iii) that this annex was missing before elec­tronically signing the documents for trans­mission.

VIII. The oral proceedings were held on 12 December 2014, at the end of which the chairman announced the decision of the board.

Reasons for the Decision

The admissibility of the request for re-establishment

1. According to Article 122(1) EPC, the remedy of re-estab­lishment is available to an applicant or pro­­pri­e­tor who was unable to observe a time-limit vis-à-vis the European patent office. Given that a statement of grounds of appeal was received in time on 11 April 2014, it might be considered that no time limit was missed at all.

1.1 The appellant argued that the letter received on 11 April 2014 did not constitute the grounds of appeal. This was obvious from the letter because it referred to grounds of appeal which were meant to be "enclose[d] herewith" but which were, in fact, not. The appellant also referred to Rule 99(2) EPC which required the statement of grounds of appeal to contain "the reasons for setting aside the decision impugned [...] and the facts and evidence on which the appeal is based" and argued that the submission of 11 April 2014 clearly did not contain reasons, facts or evidence. According to the appellant, therefore, no grounds of appeal were received at all and hence the time limit under Article 108 EPC for filing the grounds of appeal was missed.

1.2 The board is not convinced by the appellant's argument. Rule 99(2) EPC provides that the statement of grounds of appeal "shall indicate the reasons for setting aside the decision impugned, or the extent to which it is to be amen­ded" (emphasis by the board). When an appellant does not maintain the claims as refused but files amen­ded claims, it is a priori reasonable to assume that the appellant may not want to challenge the rea­sons of decision under appeal but rather wants it to be amen­ded. Thus the absence of reasons in the letter of 11 Ap­ril 2014 does not allow the conclusion that the letter does not constitute grounds of appeal in the sense of Article 108 EPC.

1.3 However, even though something was filed within the appropriate time limit which could be understood to be the statement of grounds of appeal, the board accepts that the submission was incomplete with respect to what was meant to be filed at the time. The appellant poin­ted out that not admitting the request for re-estab­lish­­­ment would, in the present case, be tantamount to denying the appellant its access to the boards of appeal and therefore its only remedy against the deci­sion under appeal, and argued that this would be a dis­proportional consequence of the representative's pro­cedural slip.

1.4 The board agrees with the appellant that Article 122 EPC is intended to provide a remedy for the type of error that occurred in the present case.

2. According to Rule 136(1) EPC, the request for re-es­tablishment of rights shall be filed in writing with­in two months from the removal of the cause of non-com­pli­­ance with the time limit. According to the juris­pru­dence of the boards of appeal, the cause of non-compli­ance is removed on the date on which the person respon­sible for the application is made aware of the fact that a time limit has not been observed or when the per­son concerned ought to have noticed the error if all due care had been taken (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 7th ed. 2013, III.E.3.1.1 a)).

2.1 The representative argues that she became aware of her error only when she received the board's communication dated 5 August 2014, so that the two months period started at that point.

2.2 The statement of grounds of appeal was filed electro­nically on 11 April 2014. In immediate response to this filing, the appellant received an acknowledgement of re­ceipt for the submitted documents (see also annex G, filed on 26 September 2014). The pertinent list men­tions a letter of appeal ("APPEAL-LETT-1.pdf") having merely two pages and, apart from that, only amended claims and description pages. In particular, receipt of a twelve-page document containing a statement of grounds was not acknowledged. The board is of the opin­ion that the omission would have been directly apparent to the representative had she checked the acknowledge­ment of receipt.

2.3 The representative has however argued that she [= the representative] does not - and is not required to - check the electronic acknowledgement of receipt, as this is a secretarial task. She explained that, according to the procedure for elec­tronic filing used in her office, the primary pur­pose of the acknowledgement of receipt is to confirm that the documents received at the EPO tally with the trans­mitted ones so that, in the case of a transmission problem, some or all of the documents can be sent again.

2.4 The board considers the electronic fi­ling procedure used in the representative's office and, in particular, the use made of the electronic re­ceipt according to that procedure, to be reasonable. There­fore, the board finds that the date on which the cause of compli­ance was removed was the date when the repre­sen­tative actu­ally learned from the board's summons to oral pro­cee­dings that the statement of grounds had been trans­mitted in­completely. As the board's summons was posted on 5 Au­gust 2014, the appellant's request for re-estab­lishment of rights filed on 26 September 2014 was made within the time-limit prescribed by Rule 136(1) EPC.

3. The request for re-establishment is therefore admissible.

The allowability of the request for re-establishment

4. The appellant has argued that, as required by the ju­ris­­prudence of the boards of appeal, the se­cre­tary was a suitable per­son, properly supervised in the task to be performed, and that the representative had exercised reasonable su­pervision over the secretary's work. Also the re­pre­sentative herself had a hitherto flawless record. Thus, the two errors were uncharacteristic and isolated mis­takes in an otherwise secure system. The appellant did not however give any specific reasons as to why the two errors had occurred in the present case.

5. The board has no doubts regarding the professional qua­lifi­ca­tions of the secretary and no reason to question the quality of her supervision by the representative or the reliability of the filing procedure as described. However, in view of the following, the question of whe­ther the secretary's mistake can be excused need not be decided in the present case.

6. The representative argued that, according to the de­scribed procedure, she clicks through every page of the docu­ments to be transmitted before she electronically signs them (see point VII c) above, step iii)). This corres­pon­ded to leafing through a paper submission page by page before signing it by hand.

6.1 The board agrees that this is a reasonable way of checking whether the representative is signing the right documents. More than that, the board considers that it is the representative's responsibility and ob­li­gation to make sure that what is signed is precise­ly what is meant to be signed.

6.2 The representative argued that she failed to spot the incompleteness in the documents she signed despite exer­cising all due care as required by the circum­stan­ces. The representative thus effectively asked the board, by way of re-establishment, to excuse the re­presentative's mistake of signing the wrong documents.

6.3 The representative referred to T 1095/06 in order to support her case. This decision dealt with the question of whe­ther "re-establishment may be possible even in the event of a culpable error on the part of the assis­tant, if the professional representative is able to show that he has chosen for the work a suitable person properly instructed in the tasks to be performed, and that he has exercised reasonable supervision over the work" so that the error can be considered "an isolated error in an otherwise satisfactory system" (see T 1095/06, reasons 5). The decision stated (reasons 6) that the pertinent jurisprudence could not "be extended to everything that can be described as an 'isolated mis­take'" and that, specifically, this jurisprudence could not "be relied on to ignore a failure to act by the professional representative himself, unless there are special circumstances which make the failure to act compatible with taking all due care."

6.4 The board notes that the representative's error is substantially inde­pen­dent of the specific procedure in place for elec­tro­nic filing, since it would arise in the same way if the representative worked on her own and without the support of a secretary.

6.5 The board need not decide whether the representative's mistake in question is in principle compatible with all due care. It notes however, that the signing of docu­ments is an act that requires particular care on the representative's part, especially when the signature relates to the last legal remedy against an adverse de­cision as is, in the present case, the appeal against the decision by the examining division to refuse the application. The board therefore considers that signing the wrong documents is incompatible with all due care unless special circumstances are in­voked which could justify the representative's mistake in a particular case, thus following the cited reasons of T 1095/06.

6.6 In the absence of such special circumstances the board comes to the conclusion that the representative did not take all due care required by the circumstances in the process of filing the grounds of appeal. The request for re-establishment in the time limit for filing the statement of grounds of appeal is therefore to be refused.

The admissibility of the appeal

7. According to Rule 99(2) EPC, the appellant, in the statement of grounds of appeal, shall in particular indicate the reasons for setting aside the decision impugned, or the extent to which it is to be amended (emphasis by the board).

7.1 The letter of 11 April 2014 contained no reasoning as to the substantive merits of the amended claims. The grounds of appeal do not specify whether the decision is challenged nor, if so, to what extent and why. They also fail to specify whether the amendments made to the claims are meant to overcome the reasons given in the decision or, if they do, why they are deemed sufficient in this respect.

7.2 This assessment, communicated to the appellant with the summons to oral proceedings, was not challenged by the appellant either in writing or orally.

7.3 Therefore, the board concludes that, due to the absence of any reasons, the letter filed on 11 April 2014 does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 99(2) EPC regar­ding the grounds of appeal so that the appeal has to be rejected as inadmissible.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The request for re-establishment of rights is refused.

2. The appeal is rejected as inadmissible.

This decision has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2014:T110114.20141212. The whole decision can be found here. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Signature" by Sébastien Wiertz obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license.

Tuesday, January 20, 2015 T 997/10 - US attorneys in charge

European application 92908098 by Echelon Corporation was refused on 15 October 2009 in oral proceedings, and the written reasons were dispatched to the applicant on 6 November 2009.

Under the EPC, the time limit for filing an appeal expired on 18 January 2010 (16 January being a Saturday), and the time limit for filing the grounds of appeal expired on 16 March 2010.

On 29 March 2010, the applicant filed the notice of appeal and the grounds of appeal, together with a request for establishment of rights, while paying the required fees. 

In the case at issue, the case management was essentially handled by a U.S. firm of patent attorneys, while the European representative acted on instructions from the U.S. firm rather than directly from the patentee. This included the handling of time limits. As this case shows, unfamiliarity with computing time limits under the EPC is likely to be detrimental to demonstrating all due care.

Reasons for the Decision
 
1. Re-establishment of rights is foreseen in cases where missing a time limit would lead to a loss of rights (Art. 122 EPC). The request for re-establishment must be made within two months "of the removal of the cause of non-compliance", Rule 136(1) EPC, state the grounds on which it is based, and complete the omitted act, Rule 136(2) EPC. In the present case, the applicant has complied with all of the above. According to the appellant's submissions, the error was discovered on 28 January, and on 29 March (28 March being a Sunday), a reasoned request for re-establishment including a notice and grounds of appeal was filed, and the corresponding fees were paid.

2. The request for re-establishment of rights can only be granted if "all due care required under the circumstances" has been taken. According to decision J 3/88, once the files are effectively handled by someone other than the authorised representative, as is the case here, it is this person who is required to have taken all due care, including an appropriate selection and supervision of his assistant:

"3. As regards the requirement of "all due care" within the meaning of Article 122(1) EPC, the US patent attorney must be regarded as the agent of the Appellant. Thus, in order to comply with this requirement, it has to be established that the US patent attorney has taken the due care required of an applicant for or proprietor of a European patent by Article 122(1) EPC (cf. J 05/80; OJ EPO 1981, 343). This means among other things that, in case of culpable errors committed by the US patent attorney's assistants, the Appellant may only benefit from the provisions of Article 122 EPC if he is able to prove that these assistants were carefully selected and properly instructed in the tasks to be performed, and that a reasonable supervision of their activity has been exercised (cf. J 05/80, above)."

3. In the further submission of 8 November 2010, the Board was told that both of Mr Nicholson's assistants were certified paralegals in California, and have worked at the firm of Blakely, Sokoloff, Taylor and Zafman LLP for several years. The Board has not been told who these assistants actually were, or how and whether they have been continuously supervised.

4. An important issue for the Appellant's case of re-establishment of rights is the "fail-safe" system as described by Mr Nicholson. In effect, these are the docketing programme that gives out a soft deadline, and the assistant him or herself who writes the deadline on the file, alerts the attorney to the deadline and partakes in weekly docket meetings in which upcoming cases are discussed. In the case at issue, the assistant failed to perform his or her duties due to an illness in the week of 6 January 2010. The date of 6 January 2010 had found its way to the docketing programme as an alleged "soft" deadline and was ignored.

5. When looking at the facts of the case, the Board first of all has difficulties in identifying a proper fail-safe system that requires effective cross-checks. Decision J 9/86 dealt with a similar case where there was an inconsistency between data in the computer file and data in the manual entries. The Board in this case held as follows (point 9, paragraphs 3 to 6 of the Reasons):

"The Statement of Grounds sets out in detail the system used in the representative's office for recording a time limit in a manual diary, a computer file, and in the representative's personal reminder system. However, in spite of the existence of such a seemingly comprehensive entry and checking system, it appears that the failure to observe the time limit was caused primarily by a failure to enter the time limit in the computer file. The lack of data in the computer file for this case was then later accepted as correct, in preference to the manual diary entry of the time limit, which was therefore deleted.

Thus the system in the representative's office which was supposed to ensure that payments to the EPO were made in due time did not include any effective cross-check. A simple failure by one person to make an entry of the time limit into the computer file resulted in non-payment of the fees and failure to file translations of the claims within the time limit specified.

The question whether a particular system used in a particular office to ensure that acts such as the payment of fees are completed in due time satisfies the requirements of "all due care" in Article 122 EPC must depend upon the individual circumstances of each case. However, in a large firm where a large number of dates have to be monitored at any given time, it is normally to be expected that at least one effective cross-check is built into the system. For a cross-check to be effective, it is clearly essential that if the cross-check shows in a particular case an inconsistency between the data being checked and the data which is being used to cross-check, an investigation must then be carried out to ascertain which data is correct.

In the present case, although there was inconsistency between the data in the computer file and the data in the manual entry diary, it appears that the reason for the inconsistency was not investigated. Furthermore, it has not been established that the person who carried out the cross-check was under a duty to investigate an inconsistency in such circumstances. Therefore, on the information at present before the Board, the system in use in the representative's office could be open to criticism."

6. The Board regards it of particular importance in the case at issue that nowhere in Mr Nicholson's statement can the actual time limit for filing an appeal be found. As the decision under appeal dates from 6 November 2009, the time limit for filing the notice of appeal would have been 18 January taking into account the ten day rule of postal delivery (Rule 126(2) EPC) and the fact that 16 January was a Saturday (Rule 134(1) EPC). From Mr Nicholson's statement (and, curiously enough, also from Mr. Wombwell's letter of 29 March 2010 requesting re-establishment of rights), it would seem that 6 January 2010 was thought to be the time limit for filing an appeal, and that Mr Nicholson was (wrongly) told by an assistant "that 16 January 2010 or 6 February 2010 was the deadline for filing the appeal". The vagueness of this statement would already have been a good reason for further inquiries. Mr. Nicholson further mentions that an internal "soft" deadline was assumed to have been set for a date two weeks before the actual "hard" deadline". But neither is 6 January two weeks prior to 16 January, nor is 16 January two weeks prior to 6 February. In respect of the latter two dates, Mr. Nicholson states that "16 January 2010 was approximately two weeks prior to 6 February, [and] we assumed that 16 January was a "soft" deadline and that 6 February was the "hard" deadline". - Again, this statement is rather vague. 6 February was actually three weeks after 16 January. Further, it was a Saturday, and according to Rule 134(1) EPC, no "hard" deadlines fall on days when the Office is closed.

7. According to Mr Nicholson, 6 January 2010 was the due date for filing the notice of appeal. This, first of all, was an incorrect calculation. Next, and admitted by Mr. Nicholson, a mistake was made in noting the date to indicate 16 January as the "hard" deadline. In such case, the computer should presumably have given an alert two weeks prior to this date, and it is not clear from the facts why this was not the case. If, on the other hand, 6 January was the alert for a soft deadline, it is not entirely clear why this was ignored. Further, had Mr. Nicholson taken a look at the case on the alleged "soft" deadline of 16 January, he could still have managed to instruct Mr. Wombwell to file a notice of appeal on 18 January, which was the actual time limit. Finally, no explanation has been given how the date of 6 February 2010 was calculated. The note for this date presumably should have concerned the "grounds of appeal", and not the notice of appeal, giving further credence to the impression that the persons in charge of the file were unfamiliar with procedures and time limits before the EPO, since the actual "hard" deadline for filing the grounds of appeal would have been 16 March, one month and ten days later than the deadline noted. In sum, on the evidence presented, the Board is not convinced that "all due care" was given to calculating and meeting the time limit for filing a notice of appeal.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

This decision has European Case Law Identifier ECLI:EP:BA:2010:T099710.20101207. The whole decision can be found here. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo from freedigitalphotos.net.

Wednesday, October 08, 2014 J 0010/12 - The time (limits) they aren't a-changin'

In G 0001/09 the Board held earlier that further to a decision to grant there is a "deadline" for filing a divisional application one day before the mention of the grant. This final deadline is a point in time that cannot be misinterpreted or stretched and cannot be considered a time limit for re-establishment of rights or further processing (to allow the patent owner to file another divisional application after the day of the mention of the grant), as shown in this anonymous decision:

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal lies from the decision of the Receiving Section of 13 December 2011 rejecting as inadmissible the request for re-establishment of rights and the auxiliary request for further processing in respect of European patent application No. XXXXXXXX.X, and refusing to treat said application as a divisional application of earlier application No. YYYYYYYY.Y (hereinafter the "earlier application").

II. On 30 October 2008, following examination of the earlier application, the examining division issued a decision pursuant to Article 97(1) EPC to grant European patent No. 0 000 000. The applicant was informed that the mention of grant would be published in European Patent Bulletin 00/00 of .....

III. On 23 January 2009, the applicant filed a request pursuant to Article 122(3) EPC to be re-established in its right to file a divisional application, and completed the omitted act by filing European patent application No. XXXXXXXX.X. As an auxiliary request the appellant requested further processing pursuant to Article 121 EPC.

IV. In a first communication pursuant to Article 113 EPC sent on 1 December 2009, the Receiving Section expressed its preliminary opinion that the request for re-establishment of rights was not admissible, since the right to file a divisional application could not be re-established. The Receiving Section cited case law of the Legal Board of Appeal establishing that there was no time limit for filing a divisional application. As to the request for further processing, the Receiving Section informed the applicant that it intended to treat the application as not having been filed and that the request for further processing was thus to be considered as having been filed without legal grounds. The appellant was given the opportunity to file comments.

V. In its reply of 11 February 2010, the appellant pointed to decision J 2/08 which had in the meantime referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal a point of law with respect to the interpretation of Rule 25(1) EPC 1973 and Rule 36(1) EPC. The appellant argued that the board in J 2/08 had favoured the German practice allowing a divisional application to be filed up to the expiry of the period for filing an appeal, and that therefore the expiry of the time limit for filing an appeal was decisive for the possibility of filing a divisional application. Accordingly, this period had to be regarded as a time limit within the meaning of Article 122 EPC. The appellant further pointed to Rule 36(1) EPC as applicable from 1 April 2010 and to the notice dated 20 August 2009 indicating that re-establishment was an available remedy in case of non-observance of the time limits set in amended Rule 36 EPC (OJ EPO 2009, 481, page 485, point III). The appellant suggested that its request of 23 January 2009 should be interpreted as a request for re-establishment in respect of the time limit pursuant to Article 108 EPC (p. 5, section B.3).

VI. A second communication pursuant to Article 113 EPC was issued on 25 June 2010. The Receiving Section maintained its previous opinion and stated that the outcome in the referral G 1/09 did not affect the case under consideration, since decision J 2/08 dealt with the filing of a divisional application after refusal of the earlier application and did not concern the filing of a divisional application after the grant of a patent for the earlier application. The Receiving Section moreover refused to construe the request of 23 January 2009 as a request for re-establishment in respect of the time limit pursuant to Article 108 EPC, since this would amount to a request for correction pursuant to Rule 139 EPC. It pointed out that such a request would fail, since neither the mistake nor the correction was self-evident. Moreover, even assuming that such an interpretation was possible, a request for re-establishment into the time limit pursuant to Article 108 EPC would fail, since the omitted acts, i.e. the filing of a notice of appeal, the filing of grounds of appeal and the payment of the appeal fee, had not been completed. As regards amended Rule 36 EPC, the Receiving Section pointed to the President's comments submitted in the then pending referral G 1/09 stating that the time limits introduced in said rule did not touch on the requirement of pendency which was to be considered as an independent procedural condition and not as a period for filing a divisional application.

(...)

X. On 13 December 2011, the Receiving Section rejected the request for re-establishment and the auxiliary request for further processing as inadmissible.

XI. The appellant lodged an appeal against this decision and filed counter-arguments.

XII. In a communication dated 17 February 2014 sent as an annex to the summons to oral proceedings, the board raised objections as to the admissibility of the main and the second auxiliary requests. The board was of the opinion that the appellant's arguments did not support the main request and even contradicted its own previous submissions. With respect to auxiliary request 2, the board considered the appellant's arguments to be an unallowable venire contra factum proprium. 

(...)

The appellant further requested that a point of law be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal.

Reasons for the Decision

Main request: admission into the appeal proceedings

1. The appellant's main request, which was filed for the first time on appeal, amounts to asserting that the earlier application was still pending on the date of filing of patent application No. XXXXXXXX.X. In support of this request, the appellant essentially argued that the earlier application had to be regarded as pending within the meaning of Rule 36(1) EPC after the mention of the grant of a patent for that application until the (later) date of expiry of the time limit for filing an appeal, even if no appeal was actually filed.

2. In its communication sent as an annex to the summons, the board however indicated that it was not minded to admit the main request into the appeal proceedings. The board objected that the appellant's arguments did not support the main request and even contradicted its own previous submissions. Even if the board were to accept the appellant's assertions, the pending status of the earlier application would have ended in the present case on 9 January 2009 (Article 108 EPC together with Rules 126(2) and 131(4) EPC; the time limit being computed by reference to the dispatch of the decision to grant on 30 October 2008, see point II above), i.e. before the filing on 23 January 2009 of European patent application No. XXXXXXXX.X as a purported divisional application. This result was also conceded by the appellant in its letter of 11 February 2010 (p.5, section B.1).

3. The appellant did not contest the board's preliminary assessment nor did it submit any reasons for not having filed said request with the Receiving Section.

4. For these reasons, the board decided to exercise its discretion pursuant to Article 12(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA) to hold inadmissible the main request.

Auxiliary request 1: availability of re-establishment of rights

5. The appellant argued that re-establishment of rights was a remedy available in case of loss of the right to file a divisional application in respect of the earlier application. The appellant contested the finding in the decision under appeal that the principle of Rule 36(1) EPC (as adopted by decision of the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation of 7 December 2006, Special edition No. 1, OJ EPO 2007, 89), according to which a divisional application may be filed "relating to any pending earlier European patent application", did not impose a time limit in the meaning of Article 122(1) EPC, but was a substantive condition.

6. It is established jurisprudence with regard to Article 76 and Rule 25 EPC 1973 that it is the entitlement acquired by virtue of the earlier application that gives an applicant the right to file a divisional application. This means that the rights derivable for the divisional application from the earlier application correspond to, but are also limited to, the rights existing in respect of the earlier application at the filing date of the divisional application. The entitlement to file a divisional application according to Article 76 and Rule 25 EPC 1973 is thus a procedural right that derives from the applicant's status as applicant under the earlier application (J 2/01, OJ EPO 2005, 88, points 5.1 and 6 of the Reasons; J 20/05 of 6 September 2007, point 2 of the Reasons with further references to the jurisprudence).

7. In line with this jurisprudence, the Legal Board of Appeal held that the requirement of a "pending earlier European patent application" in Rule 25(1) EPC 1973 did not establish a time limit within the meaning of Article 122 EPC 1973, but imposed a substantive requirement for the filing of a divisional application (J 18/04, OJ EPO 2006, 560 with further references to the jurisprudence). This jurisprudence has been confirmed by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in its decision G 1/09 (OJ EPO 2011, 336, point 3.2.4 of the Reasons, concurring with J 18/04, OJ EPO 2006, 560).

8. Rule 36(1) EPC as adopted by decision of the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation of 7 December 2006 (Special edition No. 1, OJ EPO 2007, 89) is still based on the principle that a divisional application may be filed "relating to any pending earlier European patent application". Therefore, the finding in decision G 1/09 that the requirement of a "pending earlier European patent application" imposes a substantive requirement for the filing of a divisional application applies to Rule 36(1) EPC.

9. The board sees no reason to deviate from the established jurisprudence as set out above and is not persuaded by the appellant's arguments.

10. The appellant argues that the Enlarged Board of Appeal, in point 4.3.3 of the Reasons for decision G 1/09 (OJ EPO 2011, 336), used the term "deadline" which refers to a time limit. According to the appellant, this terminology implies that the Enlarged Board acknowledged that the requirement of a pending earlier application pursuant to Rule 25 EPC 1973 (Rule 36(1) EPC) was to be regarded as a time limit within the meaning of Article 122 EPC.

10.1 The board does not agree. First of all, the term "deadline" is broader than the terms "time limit" and "period" (for which the term "Frist" is used in the German text of the EPC). It encompasses any last date for validly performing an action and says nothing about the nature of the underlying time restriction. By contrast, the term "time limit", as a legal concept of the EPC procedural system, has a precise meaning (Rule 131 EPC). It is a period of time of defined duration which is computed by reference to a relevant event (dies a quo). Thus, the last date up until which a procedural act can be validly performed ("deadline") is the result of this computation of the period of time specified in the legal provision establishing the time limit by reference to the dies a quo (see in detail J 18/04, OJ EPO 2006, 560, points 18 to 26 of the Reasons). For these reasons, "deadline" cannot be equated to "time limit".

10.2 It is moreover clear from the context that the Enlarged Board of Appeal did not use the term "deadline" in point 4.3.3 of the Reasons for decision G 1/09 in order to refer to a time limit. 

(...)

11.2 But even taking the reference to Rule 36(1)(a) and (b) EPC as supporting the appellant's objection that there is no meaningful distinction between a condition and a time limit, the board is not persuaded. Considering that Rule 36(1)(a) and (b) EPC sets certain procedural time limits for filing divisional applications during the examination procedure, such situation does not vitiate the findings in the jurisprudence that the entitlement to file a divisional application according to Article 76 and Rule 36 EPC is a procedural right that derives from the applicant's status as applicant in respect of the earlier application, and that the requirement of a "pending earlier European patent application" in Rule 36 EPC imposes a substantive requirement for the filing of a divisional application. Contrary to the appellant's allegation, the coexistence of a (substantive) condition and (procedural) time limits which impose different time restrictions is neither inconsistent nor unacceptable. The Enlarged Board of Appeal was conscious of such a situation and stated that "... the pending status of an earlier European patent application does not mean that a divisional application relating to it can always be filed. This may be excluded by procedural provisions, ..." (G 1/09, OJ EPO 2011, 336, point 3.2.5 of the Reasons). As the appellant itself concedes, procedural time limits are superseded by an earlier termination of the pendency status of the earlier application. Conversely, the filing of a divisional application relating to a pending earlier application may be excluded due to the expiry of one of the time limits in Rule 36(1)(a) and (b) EPC. The board therefore does not see any discrepancy in the coexistence of a (substantive) condition and (procedural) time limits.

11.3 In the light of the analysis of the concept of a time limit in decision J 18/04, the appellant's further objections asserting that there is no viable distinction between a condition and a time limit likewise fail to persuade the board. The fact that the substantive requirement of a "pending earlier European patent application" can only be fulfilled within a certain time frame - and for this reason an applicant needs to proceed as if it were dealing with a proper procedural time limit - does not create a time limit under Rule 36(1) EPC which has to be met by the applicant (see J 18/04, point 7 of the Reasons).

12. Lastly, the appellant contends that re-establishment of rights was intended as an all-encompassing safety net for applicants who failed to complete an act in a timely fashion and lost their application as a result, and that the term "time limit" was not to be viewed in a restrictive manner, but covered all acts for which a time restriction applied.

12.1 The appellant's allegation is on both counts clearly unfounded and not supported by specific references to the travaux préparatoires to the EPC 1973 or EPC 2000. The board notes that the legislator had expressed its view that Article 121 EPC 1973 should be given a narrow interpretation (see the minutes of the Munich diplomatic conference for setting up a European system for the grant of patents, MR/PR/I, p. 57, no. 583). In 2000, the legislator extended the scope of application of further processing whilst at the same time restricting that of re-establishment of rights (see the basic proposal for the revision of the European Patent Convention of 13 October 2000, MR/2/00, p. 157, no. 1, p. 163, no. 6).

Also, the legislator maintained non-compliance with a time limit as an explicit requirement for both re-establishment of rights and further processing. There is no support in the travaux préparatoires for applying re-establishment of rights or further processing to any time restriction, irrespective of whether it is a time limit in accordance with the legal concept of the EPC procedural system.

12.2 The requirement of a "pending earlier European patent application" in Rule 36(1) EPC reflects considerations which take into account legal effects on material rights of the applicant, and the material interests of third parties. If the legislator had intended to find a different balance between legal certainty and substantive justice when it considered the possibility of further processing or re-establishment of rights with respect to the filing of divisional applications, it could and indeed would have substituted a time restriction complying with the legal concept of "time limit" for the substantive condition of Rule 36(1) EPC.

13. Since both further processing (Article 121 EPC) and re-establishment of rights (Article 122 EPC) require that a time limit has been missed, these remedies are not available where the filing of a divisional application does not comply with the substantive requirement of a "pending earlier European patent application" pursuant to Rule 36(1) EPC. There is thus no need for the board to consider the further requirements of these remedies and to determine the appropriate one. The appellant's request for re-establishment of rights in regard to the filing of a divisional application is not admissible. As a consequence, the appellant's first auxiliary request is not allowable.

(...)

Referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal: admission into the appeal proceedings

17. During the oral proceedings, the appellant formulated a question for referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (set out in point XIII above). It argued that this request should be admitted into the appeal proceedings, since it had realised only at that late stage of the proceedings that the board did not concur with the appellant's understanding of the term "deadline" used in point 4.3.3 of the Reasons of decision G 1/09 (OJ EPO 2011, 336). The appellant had not been aware of any decision on this question. Moreover, the distinction between condition and time limit led to a manifestly unreasonable result when applied to Rule 36(1) EPC.

18. The board cannot accept that its disagreement on the point of law became apparent only at the oral proceedings. In the communication accompanying the summons, the board had dealt with this issue in points 4 to 12, especially points 9 and 10, and had given a negative opinion. Moreover, this issue had already been under consideration in the proceedings before the Receiving Section (see the appellant's letter of 22 July 2011, section 2.2). The appellant had thus had ample time and opportunity to request a referral earlier in the appeal proceedings. Instead, it presented this request only at the oral proceedings after the board had given a negative opinion with respect to the first auxiliary request.

19. For these reasons, the board did not admit the appellant's request for a point of law to be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal into the appeal proceedings.

20. Since none of the appellant's requests is allowable, the appeal must be dismissed.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

This decision has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2014:J001012.20140513. The whole decision can be found here. No file wrapper can be linked (anonymous). Photo by Guus Hateboer. 

Tuesday, July 08, 2014 J 5/13: The database contained an outdated address

This appeal decision relates to re-establishment of rights in a case in which the 5th renewal fee was not paid. 

In short, the circumstances of the case are: An European Patent Attorney monitored on behalf of his client the deadlines for the payment of the renewal fees and he had the task to remind his client when a renewal fee was due. The EP attorney used regular mail to remind his client. Three "normal" reminders were sent to a business address stored in his database. When a fourth reminder was sent by registered mail to the same business address, the letter returned and the EP attorney discovered that the business address was probably outdated. Subsequently he used another address (private address of contact person) stored in the database to send a fifth reminder by registered mail. No response was received to the fifth reminder which resulted in the non-payment of the renewal fee. Later, when the loss of rights communication was received by the EP attorney, the private address of the contact person was used again to inform the client of the loss of rights - that time the letter was received by the client. It seems that the fifth reminder was lost somewhere in the postal system. The EP attorney received about a year earlier additional contact details of the client (e.g. an e-mail address and a phone number) but this data was stored in the database and was not used by the EP attorney.

The receiving section concluded that the EP attorney had not exercized all due care.


Citations from the decision:


[...]

Reasons for the Decision

[...]

3. Allowability of the request for re-establishment of rights

[...]

3.2 Regarding the appellant's responsibility, the board shares the opinion of the Receiving Section that the appellant, i.e. Mr Goldberg as the responsible person within the appellant's company, has exercised all due care.

3.2.1 According to the established case law of the boards of appeal, it has to be taken into consideration whether or not the applicant is familiar with the requirements of the EPC or is in possession of an established office organisation attuned to ensuring that procedural deadlines are met (cf. J 5/94 of 28 September 1994, Reasons 3.1; J 1/07 of 25 July 2007, Reasons 4.2).

3.2.2 As the Receiving Section correctly pointed out, Mr Goldberg had no such office organisation, he relied upon his US attorneys and - after they had resigned from representation - upon his European representative.
Mr Goldberg had no reason to doubt that the European representative had his necessary contact details. Additionally, he had provided his European representative with his name, his office telephone number, fax and cell phone numbers and his business email address. Particularly with regard to the renewal fee for the fifth year, which is the subject of this appeal, he could expect that his European representative would contact him by using the same communication means as he had in respect of the renewal fee for the fourth year. To put it another way, because of the experience of the year before, Mr Goldberg had no reason to believe that his representative would fail to contact him by using an outdated address.

3.2.3 Thus, based on the circumstances as they were at that time before the expiration of the time limit for payment of the renewal fee for the fifth year, the appellant exercised all due care to observe this time limit.

3.3 Regarding the European representative's responsibility, the board concludes that the representative too exercised all due care to meet the missed time limit.

3.3.1 If an applicant is represented by a professional representative, a request for re-establishment cannot be acceded to unless the representative himself can show that he has taken the due care required of an applicant or proprietor by Article 122(1) EPC (cf. J 5/80 of 7 July 1981, OJ EPO 1981, 343, Headnote I). The applicant has to accept the actions of his representative, including the actions of the attorney's assistants and employees, on his behalf (J 5/80, loc. cit., 346; J 1/07 of 25 July 2007, Reasons 4.3).

3.3.2 However, the extent of the duties of the representative depends on the agreement between the representative and his client. An appointed representative whose authorisation is silent concerning the payment of the renewal fees and who has not received any funds for this purpose is not expected to pay the fee by advancing money on behalf of the applicant out of his own pocket (J 16/93 of June 1995, Reasons 4.3.3; J 19/04 of 14 July 2005, Reasons 10; J 1/07 of 25 July 2007, Reasons 4.4).
Instead, he retains only a "secondary responsibility" (cf. J 1/07 loc. cit.) to advise the applicant properly either if the applicant addresses him or if he becomes aware of any problem that might affect the applicant's position in respect of the patent application. Thus his responsibility, above all, consists in finding out what his client really intends to do with respect to payment of the renewal fees (cf. J 16/93 loc. cit.). Since he remains responsible in the procedure before the EPO and thus has to take the necessary steps to ensure payment, this includes a reliable monitoring system and sufficient reminders to the applicant (J 11/06 of 18 April 2007, Reasons 8; J 1/07 of 25 July 2007, Reasons 4.3).
Accordingly, the scope of duties of a representative who retains only such a "secondary responsibility" to inform and advise his client with respect to the due date for renewal fees cannot be the same as it would be if he were responsible for the payment itself.

3.3.3 Without error of law, the Receiving Section found that the "PT-204-Annuités" system was in line with the requirements the EPC imposes on the due care of a representative not in charge of the payment of renewal fees. The board also agrees with the finding that the European representative applied this system correctly by sending the first three reminders dated 12 June, 9 September and 8 October 2008 by regular mail to the Silver Lane address.
Nor can there be any objection to the fact that the European representative sent the first three reminders by regular mail to the Silver Lane address. From the European representative's point of view, the Silver Lane address was still valid because this was the address which he had received from the US representatives when he was appointed in March 2006 and which was confirmed two years later when the US law firm informed him that it no longer represented the appellant.
The appellant convincingly argued in the hearing before the board that in 2008 the use of regular mail had been standard practice in the European representative's office. Emails or other means of sending letters (i.e. fax) had been used only at the explicit request of the client. Since no such request had been submitted by the appellant and because - up to the return of the fourth reminder - the European representative had no indication that there could be something wrong with the Silver Lane address, there was no reason not to use regular mail and the Silver Lane address.

3.3.4 The additionally sent fourth reminder, now issued by registered mail and once again addressed to the Silver Lane address, already went beyond the standard procedure laid down in the guidelines ("PT-204-Annuités") used in the representative's law firm. However, because of the special circumstances of the case - i.e. the fact that the fourth reminder was returned - at that point in time the European representative had some reason to assume that the first three reminders, sent to the same address, might have failed to reach the addressee, and accordingly was obliged to try another route to contact the client.

3.3.5 In this situation the crucial question is whether or not the European representative exercised all due care by sending the last (fifth) reminder to the private postal address of Mr Goldberg.
The Receiving Section was right to assume that the use of Mr Goldberg's business email address was a suitable way to get in contact with the appellant because Mr Goldberg himself had used this address in order to communicate with the European representative with respect to payment of the fourth renewal fee only a few months before. On the other hand it has to be taken into account that - according to the credible pleading of the appellant - in the bureau of the European representative, in 2008 the sending of emails had not been a regular means of communication, so that email addresses were not stored in his database. Furthermore, the European representative - at the time when he sent the fifth reminder - had no reason to believe that the postal address of Mr Goldberg - which was stored in his database and which actually worked a short time later when the European representative informed his client about the loss of rights - could be wrong.
Thus, with respect to the scope of the mandate of the European representative, which amounted to nothing more than monitoring the time limit and informing his client of the impending loss of rights, the board considers it to be sufficient that he relied on the postal addresses stored in his database instead of checking his file for any other contact details.
In this context, it has to be observed that monitoring the due date for renewal fees and duly informing the applicant is a mass business which nowadays can be - and in practice is - most reliably performed on a computerised basis. In a situation where the representative is not responsible for paying renewal fees and thus only has a secondary responsibility, he can perform this task on the basis of the database entries, unless special circumstances require additional measures. In the present case, special circumstances required the sending of an additional reminder. However, the circumstances did not require the file to be checked for other contact details, because the database contained an additional postal address under which the applicant could be contacted. The fact that the fifth reminder apparently got lost by mail cannot be blamed on the representative. As has been shown, the Stanley Drive address worked, since the loss-of-rights communication sent there was received by the appellant.
For that reason the board concludes that the European representative exercised all due care by relying on the address data stored in his electronic database.

3.4 Finally the board cannot find that the appellant's US representative, who was not in charge of payment of the renewal fee either, failed to exercise all due care. Although - according to Mr Goldberg's statement in his affidavit dated 12 April 2012 - the appellant vacated the Silver Lane address around June 2007 and despite the fact that the US representative still mentioned the Silver Lane address in his letter sent to his European colleagues informing them of his resignation from representation of the appellant in March 2008, the board has no cause to assume that the US representative had knowledge of the relocation of the appellant and thus gave incorrect information to his European colleagues.
Thus the board has no reason to assume that the US representative did not exercise all due care required by the circumstances.

4. Thus, the appellant's request for re-establishment is allowable. Accordingly, the appellant's auxiliary requests for remittal to the department of first instance and referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal are redundant.


This decision has European Case Law Identifier: : ECLI:EP:BA:2014:J000513.20140117. The whole decision can be found here. The file wrapper can be found here.
Photo by Eirik Stavelin obtained from Flickr.