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New referral to the Enlarged Board by T 0438/19 - is product on the market prior art if undue burden to analyse composition? (G 1/23)

 T 0438/19 of 27-06-2023 referred the following questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal for decision:

1. Is a product put on the market before the date of filing of a European patent application to be excluded from the state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC for the sole reason that its composition or internal structure could not be analysed and reproduced without undue burden by the skilled person before that date?

2. If the answer to question 1 is no, is technical information about said product which was made available to the public before the filing date (e.g. by publication of technical brochure, non-patent or patent literature) state of the art within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC, irrespective of whether the composition or internal structure of the product could be analysed and reproduced without undue burden by the skilled person before that date?

3. If the answer to question 1 is yes or the answer to question 2 is no, which criteria are to be applied in order to determine whether or not the composition or internal structure of the product could be analysed and reproduced without undue burden within the meaning of opinion G 1/92? In particular, is it required that the composition and internal structure of the product be fully analysable and identically reproducible?

The decision discusses alleged conflicting or at least diverging application of G 1/92, as well as G 1/92 itself, in detail. The reasons from the decision are cited below (no changes made except for highlighting in color).

The referral is pending under G 1/23 "solar cell".

T 2239/15 - Private not the same as confidential


The patent application in this case was refused for lack of novelty based on MPEG standards-related documentation cited in the search report. In response to a previous complaint, regarding similar citations against earlier PCT applications, the EPO informed the applicants that examiners had been instructed that MPEG input documents did not constitute prior art and were not to be cited in search reports. In a later communication, however, they were informed that new facts were available regarding the public availability of a particular citation and that the European search report should mention those documents available to the EPO at the time of drawing up the ESR.

The appellants argued that the citation of the documents in the present case constituted a breach of legitimate expectations and further maintained their position that the cited documents were confidential working documents submitted to the MPEG working group in elaboration of a new standard. They also argued that the established procedures of MPEG required members to treat input documents as private, which was to be construed as 'confidential'. 

The Board considered the issue of confidentiality and the public availability of the documents cited in the present case based on the procedures of MPEG and drew a different conclusion. These procedures require, for example, that documents may be shared only with the permission of the authors and that draft documents are made available to meeting participants on a password-protected dedicated MPEG server. The procedures also specifically allow for the discussion at meetings to include consulting other experts with more specific knowledge on the topics addressed, but who are not actually present at the meetings. 

The Board concluded that the MPEG procedures could not guarantee, nor even expect, confidentiality but seemed to be designed to guarantee a certain privacy of data, by controlling access and transmission, while being sufficiently flexible to allow such transmission with other parties. In the absence of strict limitations,the cited documents were deemed to be have been made publicly available.

On the subject of legitimate expectations, the Board ruled that this principle applies to disadvantageous consequences resulting from the omission of procedural steps. It has no bearing on substantive law and cannot render patentable what would otherwise not be.

The appeal was dismissed.


T 1050/12 Public availability, enablement for medicines



Public availability
In this opposition appeal, a discussion took place on when a document was seen as being publically available when made available in a library. The opponent/appellant cited T 834/09 in support of arguments concerning the public availability of documents D3 and D7, The proprietor saw this decision as being divergent from the earlier case law and represented a conceptual shift by promoting the librarian to a member of the public (and not just a person making it available to the puiblic by putting it in the library at a possibly later moment). 

The board  comes to the conclusion that there is evidence on file supporting the conclusion that the document was made available to the public in general (i.e. the users of three libraries) before the priority date. This was the case regardless of whether or not the librarian was a member of the public. Accordingly, even if the board were to come to the conclusion that there was divergent case law as regards the status of a librarian as a member of the public, it would still be able to reach a decision in the present case without the need for an answer on this point from the Enlarged Board of Appeal.

Level of proof
The Board does not want to go into a discussion on which level of proof is most appropriate in this case ('on the balance of probability'  or 'up to the hilt') but applies the concept that what matters is whether or not the deciding body, is - having regard to all evidence and arguments put forward by the parties - convinced that the alleged facts, i.e. the public availability of the documents prior to the priority date, have indeed occurred.  

Enablement for medical use claims.
The proprietor argued that D3's disclosure was not enabling for the claimed medical use, because it only disclosed preliminary experiments for which it lacked many details, and it only hypothesised on a therapeutic effect. Contrary thereto, the patent provided data which made the therapeutic effect plausible. The board notes that enablement of disclosure for medical uses does not require that a therapeutic effect is demonstrated in vivo but rather that it is made plausible (T 609/02, reasons 9). The Board concluded that, while D3 does indeed not show that injected myoblasts as claimed do exert a therapeutic effect in the context of stress urinary incontinence, it nevertheless does provide data and information which render said therapeutic effect plausible. 

Catchwords:
Meeting abstracts published in a supplement to a regular volume of a scientific journal found to be publicly available before the priority date of the patent on the basis of library date-stamps and accompanying declarations of the librarians.

T 1931/14 - Suitable for?



This case concerns an appeal by a patent proprietor against a decision of the opposition division revoking his patent on the ground of lack of novelty of claim 1.

Claim 1 reads: "A process for producing oxygen to fuel an integrated gasifier combined cycle (IGCC) power generation system  at a rate which corresponds to the power demand of the IGCC power production...wherein...
(a) during reduction of the power demand from the IGCC...liquid oxygen is produced in excess of that required by the IGCC...wherein...
(b) during an increase in the power demand from the IGCC system excess liquid oxygen is withdrawn..."

In line with T 848/93 (GL (2017), F-IV, 4.13), the BoA came to the conclusion that the stated purpose of the process "to fuel an IGCC" is not to be interpreted as a mere suitability of the process for that stated purpose but rather as functional feature of the process. In other words, the BoA sees the feature "to fuel an IGCC" as a limiting feature of the process claim.

Furthermore, the BoA stated that two claimed steps (a) and (b) are so inextricably linked to such stated purpose that the claim must be read as to be limited for it. 

Therefore the fact that the document used in opposition for attacking claim 1 on the ground of novelty did not mention the same application of the claim "to fuel IGCC systems", would appear to be sufficient for the BoA to establish novelty of claim 1 over said document.   

T 2101/12 - Non-technical disclosures are prior art


In the appealed decision, D2 (a US patent application) was cited in a reasoning against novelty. One could therefore be led to believe that this document constitutes at least the most suitable starting point for the assessment of inventive step. The board is however of the opinion that such is not the case (r.6.1). The board also does not consider the document mentioned by the appellant, i.e. D3, or other documents cited in the search report, to be more suitable starting points. Instead, the board considers that the most suitable starting point is common general knowledge. The board considers it common general knowledge that documents, such as a will or a contract between parties, may be signed at a notary's office. In the present case, the board holds that the skilled person starts from this prior art method with zero technical features, the problem which consists in the automation of that method being solved entirely with technical means (r.7.15).
The appellant submitted that something can only be state of the art if it is related to a technological field or a field from which, because of its informational character, a skilled person would expect to derive technically relevant information, referring to T 172/03. The board agrees with the appellant that this opinion is not in line with Catchword 2 of T 172/03 (as also relied upon in the Guidelines for Examination G-VII, 2), unless one interprets the expression "technically relevant" in that Catchword in a trivial manner. The board however considers that the interpretation of Article 54(2) EPC given in T 172/03 is incorrect. 
The applicant also requested to refer to the Enlarged Board: In the assessment of the inventive step of subject matter presenting both technical and non-technical aspects, a problem-solution analysis using a publicly known entirely non-technical practice as "closest prior art", notwithstanding the existence of technical teachings in the same field? The Board did not consider this necessary (r.8)


T 1658/12 - When prior art Claims and Description contradict


A cupcake dispensing machine

The Examining division has rejected a patent application for a dispensing system on the basis of a document D2. 
According to the Examining division, the subject-matter of claim 1 was not explicitly disclosed in the description of D2, since it did not explicitly disclose that "the processor sends a signal to said at least one dispensing means" in combination with the feature that "presentation of the user-identifier to the reader causes dispensing of the selected item". However, document D2 did disclose such an automated use of the system in claims 35-38.
The Board does not agree with the Examining division and offers the following catchwords:
In determining what is made available to the public within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC by a prior art patent document, it must be borne in mind that it is the description which chiefly serves to disclose the invention in a manner that it may be carried out, whereas the chief function of the claims is to define the subject-matter for which protection is sought. Where a combination of features is found only in the claims (or only in the claims and a "Summary of the Invention" which merely recites the features of the claims), it must be very carefully considered whether this combination truly corresponds to the technical teaching of the document as it would be understood by a skilled person, or whether it is merely an artefact of the claim drafting process aimed at obtaining maximal scope of protection (see Reasons, point 3.8; also T 312/94, Catchword; T 969/92, Point 3, and in particular, page 4, first paragraph; T 42/92, "Orientierungssatz").



T 1440/09 - Public availability of document submitted for standardisation



In the past several discussions took place whether or not documents submitted to a standardisation organisation were public. After submitting the document to the standardisation organisation, the applicant put the document on the Internet, and only then was a patent application filed. The Board had the impression that the applicant thought that since the submission to the standardisation organisation was to be regarded as confidential, that this gave protection for a later submission of the patent application (a form of priority). The Board destroyed this dream.

T 564/12: proving public prior-use


In this opposition appeal there is initially an interesting discussion about the admissibility of two prior-use cases. The Appellant-proprietor asks the Board to declare these prior-use cases retroactively as non-admissible. Furthermore, the Appellant-proprietor is of the opinion that an author of one of the filed affidavits in one of these prior-use cases should have been called as a witness. According to the Appellant-proprietor, the affidavit should be excluded because the opposition Division did not call this author as a witness. 

The board decides that the prior-use cases are admissible. In general, it is quite difficult to prove public prior-use - the questions "what was disclosed", "when", "where"and "under which circumstances" must be answered. In this case quite a lot of evidence was filed by the Appellant-opponent - it was already filed during the opposition proceedings. This Board extensively examines the evidence to decide whether the prior use is proven or not. If you are interested in the prior-use reasonings, you should read the complete text that is provided below.

The invention relates to a lid of a snuff-box. I found it also interesting to see that the PCT publication of this case has only a 2 page description and has 5 claims in total. The limited amount of words written down in the original patent application have been compensated by all the documents drawn up during the opposition and appeal procedure.


T 2191/13 - Recognition doesn't confer novelty


In this opposition appeal, the proprietor argues that the prior art does not disclose a particular claim feature, namely a selection of a component of a glue-system being made in dependence on knowledge of the substrate and processing condition under which the glue-system is to be used.

The Board considers this difference as follows:

Orientierungssatz:
Ein rein auf gedanklicher Ebene bestehender, nämlich sich ausschließlich auf das Vorhandensein einer Erkenntnis gründender Unterschied zum Stand der Technik kann, ohne dass dieser einen Niederschlag in den technischen Merkmalen des Anspruchsgegenstandes findet, die Neuheit nicht begründen (Punkte 12.3 und 12.4 der Entscheidungsgründe)

Headnote (translated and paraphrased)
A difference with respect to the state of the art which exists solely in an abstract recognition, without there being a manifestation of the abstract recognition in the technical measures of the claimed object, does not confer novelty (points 12.3 and 12.4 of the Reasons)

Of further interest is point 12.4 in which the Board hypothesises that if such a difference were to confer novelty, this would imply that in order to demonstrate infringement, it would have to be proven that such knowledge (on the substrate and processing conditions) would have been in the mind of an infringer when performing the selection, which according to the Board demonstrates the invalidity of this hypothesis.

T 1961/13 - Googling for public availability

In the present case, the Examining Division relied on a document D2 to argue lack of inventive step. To demonstrate that D2 was publicly available before the priority date, the Examining Division referred to a screenshot of search results returned by Google in response to a "quick search on Google cached pages" showing a particular date. 

During first-instance proceedings as well as during appeal proceedings, the Appellant provided various counter-arguments, arguing that the date reported by Google is incorrect.


In the decision, the Board finds that the Examining Division had committed a substantial procedural violation for not commenting on most of these arguments during first-instance proceedings. The Board then comments on the Applicant's arguments. 


Of particular interest are reasons 5.1.5 and 5.1.6, discussing the suitability of dates reported by Google as evidence of the publication date of a document, as well as where the burden of proof should lie with respect to such date indications.



Reasons for the Decision
(...)

3. Arguments and evidence provided by the Examining Division and the appellants


3.1 The Examining Division found that the subject-matter of all claims lacked an inventive step in view of document D2. A prerequisite for this finding is that document D2 forms part of the state of the art pursuant to Article 54(2) EPC, i.e. that it was made available to the public before the priority date of the present application or, if the claimed right to priority is not valid, before the filing date. It is evident from the contested decision that the Examining Division was of the view that document D2 was published before the priority date, so that it was not necessary to investigate whether the claimed priority right was actually valid.


Although document D2 bears the date February 1999, it is apparent from the document itself that this date is meant to refer to an ISO/IEC JTC1/SC29/WG11 MPEG99 meeting that took place in February 1999 in Lancaster, UK, to which document D2 appears to have been submitted. Without further justification, this date can therefore not be taken as the date of public availability within the meaning of Article 54(2) EPC. In the contested decision the Examining Division indeed did not rely solely on the date printed on the document, but presented two lines of reasoning explaining why it considered that document D2 had been made available to the public before the priority date of the application.


3.2 According to the first line of reasoning, document D2 was made available to the public on or before 15 February 1999 through its publication on a website at the URL from which it had been retrieved. As evidence for this assertion, the Examining Division referred to document D7, which was a screenshot of search results returned by Google (in German) in response to a "quick search on Google cached pages" and which showed the URL to document D2 together with a date indication "15 Febr. 1999". According to the Examining Division, this showed that the URL to document D2 had been "snapshot" by Google on 15 February 1999.


3.3 In respect of this line of reasoning, the appellants' arguments can be summarised as follows:


- The URL provided by the Examining Division included the "CiteSeerX" domain, which had not been used until 2008, as shown by http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citeseer#CiteSeerX. The URL had therefore not been available in 1999. There was no evidence of the existence of a URL to document D2 before the priority date.


- Even if a URL had existed, at the priority date it would not have been "discoverable" as required by decision T 1553/06 of 12 March 2012, as Google did not start indexing PDF documents until early 2001.


- The "15 Febr. 1999" date shown by Google was not necessarily the date of indexing. Document D10 showed an example of Google displaying search hits with dates as early as 15 September 1977. These could not represent the date that Google had indexed the documents because Google was not created until 1996. Document D11, which was the document dated by Google as "Sep 15, 1977", merely contained the phrase "September 1977". It seemed that Google had extracted this phrase, had added the specific date of the 15th, and had dated it as "Sep 15, 1977" for listing purposes.


- Inspection of the document properties of the PDF document downloaded from the URL provided by the examiner revealed that its creation date was 25 July 1999. It therefore seemed that no such PDF document existed in February 1999.


These arguments were already presented in the letter of 20 February 2013 filed during the first-instance proceedings in response to the summons to oral proceedings.


3.4 In response to the argument that the domain "CiteSeerX" had not been used until 2008, the Examining Division explained that the screenshot of document D7 showed that document D2 had been available in CiteSeer as of 15 February 1999, and that the link on the same screenshot now showed CiteSeerX as the domain, because all queries to CiteSeer had been redirected to CiteSeerX after its creation.


3.5 The Examining Division did not comment on the other arguments. Instead, it presented a second line of reasoning based on documents D8 and D9.


(...)


4. Procedural violation


4.1 The right to be heard under Article 113(1) EPC encompasses the right of a party to have its comments considered in the written decision (see decision T 763/04 of 22 June 2007, reasons 4.3 and 4.4). Although a decision does not have to address each and every argument of a party in detail, it must comment on the crucial points of dispute in order to give the losing party a fair idea of why its submissions were not considered convincing (cf. decision T 1557/07 of 9 July 2008, reasons 2.6).


4.2 In the present case, the Examining Division did not comment on most of the appellants' arguments in respect of the public availability of document D2.


In particular, since the Examining Division in its first line of reasoning relied on a date indication shown by the Google search engine, it should have addressed the appellants' argument that these date indications were generated by simply extracting a date from the text of a document and were therefore of no evidentiary value in respect of the date on which documents had been available on the Internet.


(...)


4.3 In the Board's view, the failure to comment on most of the appellants' arguments in respect of what was evidently a crucial point of dispute constitutes an infringement of the right to be heard and hence a substantial procedural violation.


5. Evaluation of the evidence presented by the Examining Division


5.1 The Examining Division's first line of reasoning based on the screenshot shown in document D7 (see point 3.23.2 above) has been convincingly refuted.


5.1.1 The Examining Division refers to document D7 as displaying the results of a search on "Google cached pages". This terminology is at least confusing in that it suggests that the search was performed among web pages stored in Google's web cache. This is not the case. Document D7 shows the result, filtered by a data range, of a regular Google search for Internet documents with part of the title of document D2 used as search criterion. The single result returned appears to point to document D2 at the same URL from which it was retrieved, presumably by the Examining Division, on 5 May 2011. This does not mean that document D2 was cached (or "snapshot") by Google, but that Google at some point in time has found and indexed document D2 at this URL.


5.1.2 The screenshot shown in document D7 displays this search result in connection with the date indication "15 Febr. 1999". Although the terminology used by the Examining Division is rather vague and imprecise, it appears to the Board that the Examining Division made the assumption that 15 February 1999 was the date that Google found (and/or indexed) document D2.


If this assumption were correct, then document D7 would indeed give a strong indication that document D2 was published before the priority date of the present application.


5.1.3 In order to challenge this assumption, the appellants submitted documents D10 and D11. Document D10 is a print-out of the results of a Google search on the phrase "information superhighway" filtered by a date range ending at 1 December 1992. One of the search results points to document D11. The associated date indication reads "Sep 15, 1977". Since 1977 is long before the Web, let alone Google's search engine, came into existence, this obviously cannot be the date on which Google found document D11.


As the appellant has pointed out, the significance of "Sep 15, 1977" becomes clear from reading the first full sentence of document D11:


"It all started 30 years ago, in September 1977, one year after Viktor Belenko's defection from the Soviet Union to Japan in his MiG-25 Foxbat jet fighter."


Apparently, Google dated document D11 by scanning its text for a date. When it found "September 1977", it completed the date by adding the 15th to it.


5.1.4 The appellants' challenge is evidently successful. The date shown in document D10 is clearly not indicative of the date on which document D11 was found or indexed by Google. The same applies to 15 February 1999 as shown in document D7, which in all likelihood was derived from document D2 in the same simple way as the date in the example of documents D10 and D11.


5.1.5 What this means is that a date reported by Google is inherently unsuitable to serve as evidence of the publication date of a document. Such a date, extracted from the text of the document, adds nothing to what is already shown by the document itself.


5.1.6 The Board notes that it should not have been necessary for the appellants to investigate the relevance of Google's date indications. It is the task of the examiner to make an objective assessment of what a particular date indication is intended to represent and how reliable it is, and to make further investigations if necessary. If it is not understood how a particular date reported by a search engine was generated, it cannot be used as evidence of a publication date.


5.1.7 The appellants' observations that the "CiteSeerX" domain from which document D2 was retrieved did not exist until 2008 and that the document properties of the corresponding PDF document revealed a creation date of 25 July 1999 are further indications of the incorrectness of the Examining Division's assumption and need no further discussion.


5.1.8 The Board can leave aside the question whether a URL to document D2 would have had to be "discoverable" at the priority date in order for document D2 to have been made available to the public through publication on the Internet.


(...)


5.3 The Board therefore considers that the evidence presented by the Examining Division is insufficient to conclude that document D2 was made publicly available before the priority date.


(...)


Order
For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.


2. The case is remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution.


3. The appeal fee is to be reimbursed.
This decision has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2014:T196113.20140916. The whole decision can be found here. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo from www.freedigitalphotos.net

T1454/08 - Going up and down in a single document



In this appeal the patent proprietor was able to convince the board that a disclosure of several different aspects in a single prior art document does not always mean that all aspects are disclosed in relation to a single embodiment, or elevator system in this case. Where certain features may be discussed as part of other prior art, it may be that such features are not automatically linked to the central system of the document and may therefore not become novelty-destroying.
The board does not say anything about inventive step, since the Opposition Division never discussed inventive step. It may very well be that inventive step will be denied by the OD, but that remains to be seen...

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appellant (patent proprietor) filed an appeal against the opposition division's decision revoking European patent No. 0 970 911 on the basis that the subject matter of claim 1 of the patent was found to lack novelty with respect to:
D1: JP-A-05278962, including English translation.
II. The respondent (opponent) requested dismissal of the appeal.
III. Subsequent to summoning the parties to oral proceedings, the Board issued a communication stating its provisional opinion that certain features of claim 1 appeared indeed to be novel with respect to D1. The Board also stated that if the subject matter of claim 1 was found to be novel over D1, the case might be remitted back to the department of first instance for continued examination of the opposition.
(...)
VI. Claim 1 reads as follows, whereby lettering (a) to (m) has been inserted before each feature in accordance with the lettering system used in the decision under appeal:
"1.
(a) An elevator system, comprising:
(b) a plurality of elevators (1 - 4) each having a car moveable within a related hoistway for transporting passengers vertically between floors of a building;
(c) a controller (82, 88)
(d) for receiving service messages initiated by passengers requesting elevator service from an origin floor to a destination floor,
(e) for providing hall call commands to said elevators to cause a selected elevator to provide service in response to related ones of said service messages,
(f) and for providing car call commands to said elevators to cause each said selected elevator to stop at a corresponding destination floor;
(g) a plurality of remote control devices (100) to be borne and used by passengers requesting elevator service,
(h) each said remote control device having a transmitter for transmitting electromagnetic call messages for requesting elevator service at the origin floor to a receiver for transfer to said controller, wherein
(i) each call message transmitted by said device includes a component identifying the particular device that transmitted the message;
(j) and said remote control devices each has a passenger activated means for initiating transmission of a call cancellation message;
(k) said receiver (39-41) for receiving the electromagnetic messages transmitted in proximity therewith and for providing said call messages to said controller;
(l) said call cancellation message including a component identifying the particular device that transmitted the cancellation message;
(m) and said call messages including a component identifying the destination floor designated by said passenger activated means."
VII. The appellant's arguments may be summarised as follows:
The subject matter of claim 1 was novel with respect to D1 in respect of features (b), (i), (j) and (l).
As to feature (b), paragraph [0002] of D1 disclosed a plurality of elevator cars but only in the discussion of prior art and not with respect to the device disclosed in the invention of D1. The references to the invention of D1 were to singular entities of "the elevator" and "the elevator shaft". In the written submissions the appellant had made reference continually to a singular elevator in D1, never to a plurality of elevators but this had simply not been emphasised in the appeal grounds, since other features were also clearly novel over D1.
As regards features (i) and (l), D1 disclosed a two-way communication, but this did not imply identification of the "particular" device in any message signal; D1 would merely send and receive information to and from any remote on a specific floor. The system essentially allowed the functions conventionally on a fixed operation panel next to a lift opening on each floor to be placed instead on a remote control device, together with some additional door operating functions. This might sometimes result in disadvantages, but did not imply that a message component identifying the particular device should be used to solve such disadvantages. The problems envisaged by the respondent concerning e.g. a door-close command from a different floor were misleading, since the indicators 91 to 95 with transceivers were floor-specific and no disclosure existed that these could react to remote control devices used from a location on a different floor. Also, merely because a telephone was installed on each remote control device was irrelevant to the content of a call or call cancellation message as claimed, as the telephone could be a separate operating system in the device.
Call cancellation as in feature (j) was also not disclosed in D1; instead, paragraph [0010] disclosed that there was a "clear" button and this could simply be a clearing only of the destination information which had been incorrectly entered rather than a cancellation message of the call itself, even if "registration" was mentioned; it was thus not disclosed that a call was cancelled in the sense of the claim.
The respondent's arguments on implicit disclosure in D1 were hindsight-based, relating to perceived problems and their solutions as found in light of the patented invention's advantages.
VIII. The arguments of the respondent may be summarised as follows:
The subject matter of claim 1 lacked novelty over D1. The features of claim 1 which were disputed were either explicitly or implicitly known from D1. It was further not necessary that a feature be "required" in the system of D1 for it to be implicitly disclosed as had been suggested by the Board; the legal standard was whether it was immediately apparent to a skilled person that the feature was present in the prior art.
The appellant had not argued in its appeal grounds that feature (b) was novel compared to D1. Paragraph [0002] clearly referred to multiple elevator cars in a conventional system and the problems of the invention in paragraph [0003] related to those in such a conventional system. Furthermore, paragraph [0004] stated that the invention "was devised in consideration of the points described above", which meant that a multiple-elevator system was the context in which the invention in D1 had to be understood; it was only the preferred example which related to a single elevator. Even the opposed patent itself made only a single reference to a multiple-elevator system, since this was implicitly understood to be present in the patent in the same way as a skilled reader would understand this to be present in D1.
A skilled person in the art of elevator systems would also understand D1 in such a way that it would be immediately apparent that features (i) and (l) were disclosed, i.e. that the individual remote controls were identified by a component of the call message and the call cancellation message. Several factors demonstrated this. First, proper and safe operation of the elevator system required identification of the particular remote control device. For example, the lights 12c or 12d which were lit upon call registration being responded to by control panel 5, were turned off on elements 12a and 12b on the remote control which had made the call when the lift arrived at the appropriate floor, and not on other remote controls on different floors. If the lights were extinguished on other remote controls, possibly on the same floor, the disadvantage of such a system would be immediately apparent, so that a skilled person immediately understood that remote control device identification in the transmitted message was a necessary part of the D1 system. As regards safety, if e.g. a door-close command was sent by a remote control device on a different floor to the one where the elevator car was positioned with an open door, this could obviously endanger someone entering the lift at that time. A skilled person would understand that the system had to exclude such a danger, and thus would only accept door-close commands from the remote control device which called the elevator car to that floor; this was thus inevitably part of the disclosure of D1, and was only possible if the particular remote control device could be identified. Even if the system operated such that only the remote control device on a particular floor was in contact with its own hall transceiver to transmit a call to the control panel 5, the fact that this message could be identified as coming from a specific floor already meant that the call message or call cancellation message included an information component identifying the particular device used, since it was identified as being the remote device on a particular floor that transmitted the message to that particular transceiver. Further, paragraphs [0011] and [0013] disclosed a telephone on each remote control device used for making private calls between the remote control user and someone in the elevator car; this required specific identification of the remote control device from which the call was made. This worked in the same way as the elevator call message system. Even the word "telephone" made the skilled reader immediately understand that private calls were being made, even if this was not explicitly stated, so it was self-evident that the device making the call had to include a signal component identifying the specific device used to make the call, otherwise the telephones would not operate as intended. The appellant's reference to a separate telephone system was contrary to the disclosure in D1; the telephone disclosed in D1 used the same control circuitry.
The call cancellation activation means of feature (j) was disclosed by the clear button in D1, because its operation caused registration of the call signal to be cancelled, and registration occurred in the control panel 5.
Reasons for the Decision
1. Novelty of claim 1
1.1 The four features of claim 1 which the appellant submitted were novel with respect to the disclosure in D1 are features (b), (i), (j) and (l) as identified above.
1.2 Considering feature (b) first, this states:
"a plurality of elevators each having a car moveable within a related hoistway for transporting passengers vertically between floors of a building".
1.2.1 D1 discloses a plurality of elevators in paragraph [0002] when referring to the prior art. Paragraph [0003] relates to problems to be solved by the invention and notes a problem with "such a conventional system", which includes, by this reference, a plurality of elevators. However, the "objective" given in paragraph [0004] and the solution to this in paragraph [0005] are not concerned with a multiple-elevator system, but instead relate merely to use of "an elevator" rather than a system of multiple elevators. In particular, even though paragraph [0004] includes the statement "This invention was devised in consideration of the points described above", the previously mentioned points, understood as being the problems mentioned, relate to those faced by a passenger (who wants to use the elevator) having to directly operate a hall button. No context of a multiple-elevator system is thereby implied. Also, the objective is explained as providing an elevator operating device in relation to "the hall call button", "the car" and "knowledge of the elevator car movement", i.e. always mentioning these in the singular. The abstract of D1 on page 1 of the translation also refers to "the elevator car". The embodiment ("Application example") in paragraph [0007] et seq also describes, consistently throughout, only "the elevator" and not a plurality of elevators. Notably, the elevator shown in Fig. 1 and described in paragraph [0007] "shows the relationship between the elevator provided with this invented operating device and the building". No mention is made of a plurality of elevators in the building, nor any system which should take account of a plurality of elevators in that or any other building.
1.2.2 Thus, whilst D1 has a prior art portion mentioning multiple elevator cars, nothing in the disclosure of the invention of D1 (which is the portion of D1 which contains the features of claim 1 of the opposed patent relating to a system including a plurality of remote control devices), makes any reference to multiple elevators, nor is this implied in any way by technical means or otherwise that are disclosed. In particular, whilst paragraph [0002] of D1 explains how a passenger calls a car in a multiple-elevator system, this does not imply that the description following that (which is concerned with a problem which is itself unrelated to multiple-elevator systems) must be read in a multiple-elevator context.
1.2.3 It is thus not unambiguously derivable from D1 that the remote control device operated system in D1 concerns a multiple elevator system. On the contrary, in relation to the features of granted claim 1, D1 only discloses a system having a single elevator and the arrangement and operation of this system using remote control units on several floors.
1.2.4 The respondent argued that the lack of a plurality of elevators was not a feature of claim 1 which the appellant had argued as being lacking from the disclosure in D1. However, the decision under appeal itself contains reasons for the finding on this point (see item 2.2) which were made in relation to paragraph [0002] of D1. The Board thus reconsidered this matter (see Article 114(1) EPC 1973) in relation to further passages in D1 and in light of other disputed features. It lacks relevance that the appellant did not provide individual arguments to this specific matter in its appeal grounds and the respondent was aware of the issue as this aspect was taken up specifically by the Board in its provisional opinion.
1.2.5 The respondent also argued that because the opposed patent itself made only a single reference to a multiple-elevator system before describing its operation, this would have an implication as to how the skilled person read D1. However, the Board finds such an argument unconvincing. Not only is the disclosure in D1 entirely separate to that of the opposed patent, but the entire opposed patent relates to a system having a plurality of elevators. The claims of the filed application and the patent are directed to this, and the patent depicts only elevator systems with a plurality of elevators, using an example of a four-car system (see e.g. Figs. 1 to 4).
1.2.6 It is also apparent in the system disclosed in D1 that no technical measures have been disclosed which would account for the use of multiple elevators, e.g. such as a car dispatcher arranged to operate with multiple cars in the remote control operating device system described in D1.
1.2.7 The respondent also argued that the correct legal standard to be used in determining whether an implicit disclosure is present is whether the feature in question is immediately apparent to a skilled person and not whether a feature is required.
However, whether a feature is required is simply one way of determining whether a feature is immediately apparent to a skilled person. If a particular feature were required to perform a stated function of the system, even if not mentioned explicitly, it would then normally be understood to be implicitly present. Merely by the respondent stating that a feature being immediately apparent to a skilled person is the standard to be used does not alter the analysis of feature (b), nor of any other contested feature of claim 1 when considering the disclosure in the prior art, since merely using a different definition provides no substance to the argument as to why a feature would be otherwise seen as immediately apparent. Indeed the respondent itself, in its written submissions (see e.g. item 3 of the 22 October 2010 submission) on this matter refers, in relation apparently to features (i) and (l), to the "necessity" of identifying distinct remote control units in D1, which the Board can only understand as being the same as a "requirement". Thus, none of the respondent's arguments in this regard alter the conclusions reached by the Board with regard to any of the contested features.
1.2.8 The Board thus finds that feature (b), as stated above, is not disclosed in D1 in connection with remote control operating devices as defined in claim 1, but only in the context of the prior art in D1. The subject matter of claim 1 is thus novel over D1 already for this reason.
1.2.9 Since a plurality of elevators, as in the claimed system, is not disclosed in D1, the Board also finds that the portions of features (e) and (f) of claim 1 relating to a plurality of elevators are also not disclosed in D1.
1.3 In regard to features (i) and (l), these state:
"(i) each call message transmitted by said device includes a component identifying the particular device that transmitted the message"
and
"(l) said call cancellation message including a component identifying the particular device that transmitted the cancellation message."
1.3.1 The aspect of features (i) and (l) which is not disclosed in D1 is that the messages include a component identifying the particular device that transmitted the message.
In D1, there is no explicit disclosure of a specific control device being identified. This was also not disputed by the respondent. Also, when considering the operation of the system, no disclosure of a specific control device being identified is thereby implied either. As stated in paragraph [0009] of D1, there are hall indicators 91 to 95 on respective floors 1F to 5F. It is also stated that each indicator is equipped with a transceiving part (which is later described as part 28) and that remote controllers 111 to 115 corresponding to each floor are carried by users or that these are installed corresponding to each floor. As depicted also in the Figures, and as described (see e.g. paragraphs [0015], [0022] and [0025]), the operation of the remote control device sends the control message via its own transceiver 26 to the transceiver 28 associated with one of the hall panels 91-95. Each of the hall panels containing its own transceiver is connected via a cable 10 to the control panel 5, which thereby acts as the central control unit.
Communication is thus made only from a remote control device on a specific floor with the hall panel on that same specific floor via transceivers. There is no disclosure that a remote control device on one floor may communicate via its transceiver with a hall panel transceiver on another floor as alleged by the respondent. Figure 1 also depicts by two-way arrows, a two-way communication between a single remote controller 115 on one floor with a single hall panel 95 on that floor. There is thus no implicit disclosure of a call message including a component identifying the particular device which transmitted the message. Since a single elevator is disclosed in D1 for use with remote control devices using a single specific transceiver for each specific floor hall panel (91 - 95), the system is able to function without such means, even if certain disadvantages might on occasion present themselves. Merely because disadvantages might exist does not mean that a skilled person automatically adopts a different solution; such would be hindsight.
1.3.2 The respondent argued that correct and safe functioning would not be possible if the specific remote controller which had sent the message could not be identified, for which reasons an implicit disclosure of features (i) and (l) should allegedly exist. The Board however finds this unconvincing.
Due to each floor having its own floor-specific transceiver in the hall panel 91 to 95 for each floor respectively, the control panel 5 need only operate by communication with the transceiver on a particular floor when providing a two-way communication (see paragraph [0016] referring to transmission of signals and response signals). When the elevator is called using a remote device e.g. remote device 115 on floor 5F, the lights 12c and 12d (see paragraph [0016]) are lit up and then later turned off when the car arrives at that floor. The remote control devices on other floors are not affected, because these use a different hall panel transceiver on their respective floors. The same applies to door commands (e.g. door close) sent from the remote control device; these only need affect the elevator when it arrives at that specific floor via that particular floor transceiver. No danger thus exists by alleged acceptance of a floor close command from a remote control on another floor, since acceptance of such a close-door command from another floor is not disclosed.
Thus, correct and safe operation of the system does not require the identification of the specific remote control device which transmitted the signal. The same applies to a call cancellation signal, since this is related to a call cancellation sent by a remote control device, and will only be transmitted to the control unit 5 by the transceiver on a specific floor.
It is true that if several remote control devices were used on any single floor simultaneously, this might lead to interference in some cases. However, D1 anyway does not disclose the use of more than one remote control device on any one floor at any one time, nor would such necessarily pose a problem in view of the specific floor communication between the different remote control devices and the hall panel on that floor, not least since only a single elevator is disclosed in D1. Thus there is no implicit disclosure in D1 that call messages or call cancellation messages can operate as intended by D1 only if the identification of the specific remote control device is transmitted as part of the message.
Merely because drawbacks might exist in some cases, does not of itself make a different solution, namely that defined in claim 1, necessary or in any other way immediately apparent to a skilled person.
1.3.3 The respondent also argued that an information component was anyway included in the message signal, because the remote control device would be identified from the message signal as being that particular remote control device on a specific floor with which the transceiver 28 in the respective hall panel had communicated.
However, the Board finds this argument unconvincing. According to claim 1, not only is it the call message transmitted by the device which must itself include the component identifying it, as opposed to D1 where only signals from the floor transceiver would be recognised by control panel 5 as coming from that floor, but no identification of the "particular" device is made at all, merely an indirect association to the effect that an unspecified remote control device on a specific floor has sent a message to the hall panel transceiver on that floor.
1.3.4 The respondent further argued that the presence of a telephone as described in e.g. paragraphs [0011] and [0013] would imply identification of the particular remote control device, in particular so that the calls can be personal. This is however also found unconvincing.
First, nothing is stated in D1 as to any similarities between components of call messages transmitted from a remote control and the operation of a telephone as described in D1. Merely because the telephone on the remote control device operates through codec 25 for coding and decoding audio signals (paragraph [0013]) on the same remote control device which is used for call messages via the use of different codec 23 for coding and decoding call messages, does not imply any similarity between the signals let alone the necessity for the identification, by means of an included signal component, of the particular device which sent a call message. Nor does the presence of the word "telephone" imply to a skilled person that private calls are being made between a person outside the lift and an individual inside the lift, particularly not in 1992 when D1 was filed; even paragraph [0011] refers to calls between the remote controller carrier "and passengers" in elevator car (3), rather than to some type of private conversation between only two individuals or individuals each communicating with each other via their own remote controller telephone unit.
(...)
As explained below however, the Board finds that feature (j) is known from D1.
(...)
1.5 The subject matter of claim 1 is thus novel with respect to D1, such that the decision under appeal must be set aside.
2. Remittal of the case (Article 111(1) EPC 1973)
Only novelty of claim 1 with respect to D1 had been decided by the opposition division. Since lack of novelty with respect to a further document was also alleged and since no decision has been issued on that objection or upon the opponent's inventive step objections, the Board in exercising its discretion in accordance with Article 111(1) EPC 1973 concludes that the case should be remitted back to the opposition division for continuation of the opposition proceedings.
Order
For these reasons it is decided that:
1. The decision under appeal is set aside.
2. The case is remitted to the opposition division for continuation of the opposition proceedings.
This decision has European Case Law Identifier ECLI:EP:BA:2010:T145408.20101124. The whole decision can be found here. The file wrapper can be found here

T 0958/11 - 'leaving respondent in the dark'



This appeal decision relates to admissibility of certain arguments regarding a reworked prior art experiment in the context of novelty and relates to sufficiency of disclosure. This is an appeal that lies from the decision of the Opposition Division. In this appeal case one of the opponents is the appellant, the patent proprietor the respondent.
 
The novelty of the product as granted was contested on the basis of two experiments in which a prior art process was reproduced. There was no discussion about the first experiment. Already in response to the ground of appeal
the respondent expressed severe doubts regarding the proper reworking of the second prior art example, in particular as regards the concentration of the starting materials before mixing. Not earlier than at the oral proceedings, the appellant contested these findings. The respondent expressed its surprise regarding the appellant's statements and requested an adjournment of the oral proceedings to carry out counter experiments in case the board would conclude to a lack of novelty on the basis of the second experiment. In this decision the board clearly expressed its annoyance about the behavior of the appellant. The board finds a solution in Art. 13 RPBA to end the discussion about the second experiment.


In this blog posting, the sufficiency of disclosure discussion is ignored but it is interesting for readers who look for case law in which claims are refused because of a lack of sufficiency of disclosure.



Citations from the decision:

[...] 

Reasons for the Decision

1. Main request - Novelty

1.1 The novelty of the product according to claim 1 as granted was contested on the basis of two experiments in which the process disclosed in example 2 of D1 was reproduced.

1.2 Regarding the first experiment, the board agrees with the findings of the opposition division that this reworking is manifestly not acceptable, as it does not correspond to the strict reproduction of said example, the mixing having been carried out in an agitated reactor while in D1 it occurred in a reactor having a Y form.

1.3 Concerning the second experiment, the respondent expressed severe doubts regarding the proper reworking of example 2 of D1, in particular as regards the concentration of the starting materials before mixing.
The appellant contested these findings and stated that the concentrations of the starting materials cerium nitrate and zirconyl nitrate were conventionally expressed in g/l of CeO2 and ZrO2. The concentrated starting materials were then diluted with water so as to exactly obtain the same concentrations before mixing as in example 2 of D1.
The respondent expressed its surprise regarding the appellant's statements and requested an adjournment of the oral proceedings to carry out counter experiments in case the board would conclude to a lack of novelty on the basis of the second experiment.
The board observes that the information provided at the oral proceedings by the appellant is of such an importance that it would have required an adjournment of the oral proceedings, because - as argued by the respondent - the concentration is one of the key features of the invention (see in particular claim 15 as granted which requires a low concentration of the starting materials).
Since the respondent's doubts had already been raised with its response to the grounds of appeal, i.e. almost three years ago, the board objects to the appellant's silence during the written procedure on this important feature. The oral explanations of the appellant revealed that it was perfectly aware of the obscure presentation of the relevant part of its test. Instead of redressing this defect, the appellant chose to leave the respondent in dark until the oral proceedings.
The appellant's behaviour not to comment during the written procedure on this relevant issue could - if done with the intention to surprise the respondent during oral proceedings - amounts to an abuse of procedure.
At least its explanations during the oral proceedings as to the concentrations of the starting materials and as to the calculation method used constitute an amendment to a party's case, the admittance of which lies within the board's discretion (Article 13(1) RPBA).
Amendments sought to be made after oral proceedings have been arranged shall not be admitted if they raise issues that the other party cannot reasonably be expected to deal with without adjournment of the oral proceedings (Article 13(3) RPBA). This is the case here. Having uncovered the concentration of the starting materials and the calculation method, the appellant questioned the relevance of the respondent's doubts as to the proper reworking of example 2 of D1. To show that these doubts prevail it would have now been up to the respondent to perform comparative tests. Whereas these could have been easily performed during the last almost three years, had only the appellant reacted directly to the respondent's response to the grounds of appeal, it is obvious that this is not possible on the day of the oral proceedings.
The Board therefore exercises its discretion not to admit the latest amendment of the appellant's case into the proceedings.
In the absence of a clear and unambiguous reproduction of example 2 of D1, and thus, of a direct and unambiguous disclosure of the claimed subject-matter, the board therefore decides to reject the evidence submitted for lack of novelty.

1.4 The objection of lack of novelty was solely based on the reworked example 2 of D1. None of the documents cited during the opposition proceedings disclose the subject-matter of the four independent claims of the main request at issue. Therefore, the board is satisfied that these claims, and those which depend thereon, meet the requirements of Article 54(1) and (2) EPC.

[...]

This decision has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2014:T095811.20140702. The whole decision can be found here. The file wrapper can be found here.
Photo by Vinoth Chandar obtained from Flickr.