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T 1946/17 - blanket statements cannot be considered to address the arguments raised


In this appeal case, the Boards emphasized again that a decision according to the state of the file must, as any other decision, be reasoned and arguments raised must be addressed. The standard form for referring only to an earlier communication can only be used under strict conditions spelled out in the Guidelines. It is only possible to use this form of decision where the previous communication addresses all the arguments raised by the applicant. Further, it is possible by way of exception to refer to more than one communication in the standard form, but then the examiner should carefully consider the requirements of Rule 111(2) EPC. Blanket statements --such as merely stated that the "arguments were carefully considered" but "no new evidence" was provided-- cannot be considered to address the arguments raised and does not comply with the requirement of Rule 111(2) EPC that the decision be reasoned. Also, in view of contradictory statements in the communications referred to in the present standard form decision, it is not clear which of the reasons given by the Examining Division under Articles 54 and 56 EPC, if any, might form part of the reasons for the decision to refuse. Lastly, comments submitted by the applicant after the last communication and before the request for a decision according to the state of the file were ignored. 

T 658/12 - Faulty reasoning does not qualify as insufficient reasoning

In this appeal, the Board agrees with the appellant's argument that the subject-matter of claim 1 involves at least some technical features which are not regarded as notorious knowledge of the skilled person. Apart from business related aspects of order processing the claimed subject-matter also involves aspects concerning authentication and identification of users at different entities of the claimed system. The Board considers the latter to contribute to the technical character of claim 1 so that they cannot be regarded as being part of the non-technical requirement merely to be implemented by the technical skilled person. Further, the examining division interpreted technical features of the claim to be in the administrative, i.e. non-technical domain. The Board in contrast considers those features (related to authentication and identification) to be technical. In the Board's view this was an incorrect application of the COMVIK approach. 
In reason 4.1, the Board indicated that "an insufficiently reasoned decision has to be distinguished from a decision that has faulty or unpersuasive reasoning. The decision under appeal is not based on mere allegations, nor does it lack a clear comprehensive argumentation. The Board agrees with T 690/06 (see reasons, point 13) that notorious prior art, i.e. prior art which cannot reasonably be contested to have been generally known and which is cited without proof, is allowable by the jurisprudence. The COMVIK-approach may have been incorrectly applied, but this is a substantive issue, only involving judgement. Thus, the decision is reasoned in the sense of Rule 111(2) EPC." 
The decision leaves some unsatisfactory feelings... a wrong decision that is -as the Board indicates multiple times- clearly faulty reasoned in several aspects forces the applicant to appeal at the cost of an appeal fee as he would otherwise loose the application, and he will need to pay for the errors made by the first instance division. Some patent attorneys and other stakeholders further expressed their worries that the focus on speed in substantive examination, with only one written round as a main rule, as well as in opposition may lead to more erroneous decisions - which another round of discussion may have prevented. An appeal case like the one below may lead one to consider that also a reimbursement of the appeal fee due to clearly faulty reasoning by the first instance division would be fair, and  not only if there was a substantial procedural violation. 

Keywords:
Remittal - examination of novelty and inventive step (yes - technical features not assessed)
Substantial procedural violation - (no, features incorrectly assessed as non-technical, error of judgement)

T 655/13 - The board does not speak Japanese



If an applicant is capable of understanding Japanese, does the Examiner then still have to provide a translation of a Japanese prior art document? In this case, a PCT application was filed in the Japanese language with Japan as the receiving office. The international search report cites a Japanse language D1 document.  According to the Japanese Examiner, the main claim is not inventive with respect to D1. 

When the application enters the regional phase before the EPO, the supplementary search report cites the same document as the ISR, with the same obviousness objection. The applicant argues that D1 does not disclose all of the feature that the Examiner alleges. 

There are no oral proceedings, as a decision on the state of the file is requested. At no point is a translation of D1 entered into the proceedings. The Examiner does not provide a translation. The applicant does not provide one either; neither during first instance examination nor during the appeal. 


The board of appeal does not like it, and sends the case back with a procedural violation. The following catchwords are provided by the board:

In order for the examining division to make its reasoning on the basis of a pertinent prior-art document in a non-official EPO language comprehensible to the board, it must provide the translation used in the examination proceedings of at least the relevant sections of the document (or even of the whole document, if this is necessary for its overall understanding) into an official language of the EPO. Otherwise, the board is unable to examine the reasons for the decision, and in certain cases even whether the decision was justified or not, which amounts to a violation of the legal requirement for reasoned decisions under Rule 111(2) EPC (Reasons, point 2.4.2(d)(ii)).



T 737/11 - Decision according to the state of the file leaves it to speculate on the applicable reasons by mosaicking various objections and arguments


In examination proceedings, the applicant requested an appealable decision according to the state of the file. The Examining Division issued the decision with its grounds as follows: "In the communication(s) dated 22.07.2010, 25.10.2010 the applicant was informed that the application does not meet the requirements of the European Patent Convention. The applicant was also informed of the reasons therein. The applicant filed no comments or amendments in reply to the latest communication but requested a decision according to the state of the file by a letter received in due time on 08.11.2010. The application must therefore be refused."  The decision does not mention the oral proceedings that were held. The communications referred to different requests.

The Board concludes that in the present case considerable uncertainty exists as to the precise reasons on which the contested decision was based. The written decision leaves it to the appellant and the Board to speculate on the applicable reasons by mosaicking various objections and arguments from two communications and possibly other elements of the file, such as the minutes of the oral proceedings - to which the written decision does not even refer. It is therefore not reasoned within the meaning of Rule 111(2) EPC. This amounts to a substantial procedural violation according to Rule 103(1)(a) EPC and to a fundamental deficiency according to Article 11 RPBA

T 2171/14 - Special reasons for not remitting, despite fundamental deficiencies in first instance


In this decision, the Board concluded that the "impugned decision from the Opposition Division presented a fundamental deficiency in that there is no reasoned decision in regard to the specific objections under Article 100(c) EPC made against Auxiliary Request V, which objections had been made originally against the main request and, as specifically stated in the minutes of the oral proceedings (see point VII above), had been maintained against the subject-matter of claim 1 of Auxiliary Request V found allowable by the opposition division. The impugned decision also does not contain any reasoned decision with respect to the further opposition ground under Article 100(b) EPC, nor with respect to the subject-matter of independent claim 12The missing reasoning on the mentioned opposition grounds together with the remarks made by the opposition division in the "preliminary comments" section of the reasons for its decision, give rise to serious concerns as to the way in which the opposition division approached in particular the objections made under Article 100(c) EPC, as briefly explained below". The Board then carefully considered whether to remit the case -the "normal" procedure in case if fundamental deficiencies in first instance proceedings- or not. And concluded not to (r.5-5.5), but to  examine the opposition themselves. In examining Art. 100(c) EPC / Art.123(2), the Board took explicit care to not limit the the exact text of the application as filed, but to consider what the skilled person would directly and unambiguously derived from the application as filed (e.g., r.6.4.2, r.6.4.3(g)).

T 823/11 Excessive length of proceedings


The Board of Appeal considered the examination proceedings excessively long (11 years between supplementary search report and oral proceedings). This was seen as a substantial procedural violation. The same holds for the lack of reasoning in the communications and decision of the examining division. The Board sets out the case law on both issues.
The Board does not remit the case but takes over and orders the auxiliary request (which was not admitted by the examining division) to be granted.

T 2411/13 - applicants response overlooked


In the decision to refuse, the Examining Division stated that the applicant had already been informed about failing the EPC requirements in an earlier communication. The Examining Division also stated that no comments had been filed in response to that earlier communication. The latter statement was however not correct: the applicant has filed a letter with arguments. The Board decided it an infringement of the right to be heard, resulting in an insufficiently reasoned decision, and a substantial procedural violation.

T 0740/15 - Two substantial procedural violations in one case


It may seem awkward that an opponent wants to continue an opposition even though the opposed patent has lapsed for all designated contracting states during opposition. However, in this particular case, the proprietor did not explicitly surrender his rights in the designated contracting states. Hence, the opponent could not be 100% certain that the proprietor would not try to restore any rights in any of the states as soon as the opposition proceedings would have been terminated. As a result the opponent expressed the wish to continue with the opposition and requested oral proceedings before any decision was reached. Nevertheless, the opposition division terminated the proceedings. This, as the Board in this case clearly indicates, is a substantial procedural violation and is an 'infringement' of Art 116(1) EPC. One may wonder why the opposition division came to their decision although the right to oral proceedings (when requested) is so firmly established in the EPC and the case law of the Boards of Appeal. Even worse, their issued decision did not contain any reasoning, which is also in breach with Rule 111(2) EPC: decisions that are open to appeal should be reasoned. Two substantial procedural violations justifying reimbursement of the appeal fee, in one single case.
Summary of Facts and Submissions
I. The appeal by the Opponent lies from the decision of the Opposition Division dated 18 February 2015 to discontinue the opposition proceedings against European patent No. 2 067 820 (Form 2351).
II. An Opposition had been filed against the patent on 27 January 2012 on the grounds of lack of sufficiency, novelty and inventive step. Oral proceedings were requested as an auxiliary measure.
III. The proprietor responded with a letter dated 17 September 2012, requesting to maintain the patent in amended form according to a new main request or two auxiliary requests filed therewith.
IV. On 11 August 2014, a communication pursuant to Rule 84(1) EPC was sent by the opposition division stating that the opposed patent had been surrendered or lapsed with effect for all the designated contracting states. In the communication it was stated that "the opposition proceedings may be continued at the request of the opponent, provided that within two months from notification of this communication a request is so filed." The communication further advised that the opposition proceedings would be discontinued if no such request was filed in due time "and the state of the files give no grounds for the proceedings to be continued by the European Patent Office".
V. The opponent filed a response to the communication on 15 September 2014, in which it was requested that the opposition proceedings "be continued". It was also stated that "for the avoidance of doubt, the Opponent maintains its previous arguments against the Patent and its request for oral proceedings.".
VI. On 18 February 2015, the opposition division issued the decision to discontinue the opposition proceedings.

T 1724/10 - Contradictory conclusions not a reasoned statement


The present case concerns an appeal against the decision of the Opposition Division to revoke European patent no. 1 462 952.

The following citations from the decision show the Board dealing with an alleged substantial procedural violation. Namely, the patent proprietor argued that the Opposition Division failed to correctly apply the problem-solution approach, and had failed to consider the right of the patent proprietor to reformulate the objective technical problem in a less ambitious manner. This, according to the patent proprietor, amounted to a violation of the right to be heard and thus constituted a further substantial procedural violation justifying the reimbursement of the appeal fee.

Background / Summary of Facts and Submissions
I. The patent proprietor (appellant) appealed against the decision of the Opposition Division to revoke European patent no. 1 462 952.

II. The opposition had been based on Article 100(a) (lack of novelty and inventive step), Article 100(b) and Article 100(c) EPC.

III. In the contested decision the Opposition Division found, inter alia, that claim 1 of the patent did not have a valid basis in the application as filed (Articles 100(c) and 123(2) EPC), and that the subject-matter of claim 1 did not meet the requirements of Article 56 EPC because a technical problem solved by the method of claim 1 could not be identified. The same objections applied to claim 1 of the first and third auxiliary requests. The subject-matter of the second auxiliary request was found not to comply with Article 56 EPC and to extend the protection conferred by the patent.

(...)

VIII. On 27 January 2015, oral proceedings were held as scheduled before the Board. At the end of the oral proceedings the Chairman announced the Board's decision.

(...)

XI. The appellant's arguments may be summarised as follows:

(Main substantive argumentation omitted)

In summary, the subject-matter of claim 1 was not made obvious by any of the cited documents D6, D11 and D23, or their combinations.

The opposition division stated for the first time during the oral proceedings that the technical problem solved by the invention was speculative and not acceptable as a valid objective technical problem. The fact that the patent proprietor was taken by surprise by this objection and was not given the possibility to file amended claims in response to the Opposition Division's new and surprising argument constituted a substantial procedural violation. Furthermore, the Opposition Division failed to correctly apply the problem-solution approach and, in particular, failed to consider the right of the patent proprietor to reformulate the objective technical problem in a less ambitious manner, as it had been suggested. This amounted to a violation of the right to be heard and thus constituted a further substantial procedural violation justifying the reimbursement of the appeal fee.

Reasons for the Decision
1. The appeal is admissible.

(...)

Reimbursement of the appeal fee

9. The appellant has essentially argued that during the oral proceedings the Opposition Division raised a new argument under Article 100(a) EPC and, in particular, stated for the first time that the technical problem solved by the invention was speculative and not acceptable as a valid objective technical problem. The patent proprietor was allegedly taken by surprise. Furthermore, in the appellant's opinion, the right to be heard was violated because the patent proprietor was not given the possibility to file amended claims in response to the new argument.

9.1 The appellant has further submitted that the Opposition Division failed to correctly apply the problem-solution approach and to consider the patent proprietor's right to reformulate the objective technical problem in a "less ambitious" way.

9.2 In the first paragraph of the section of the contested decision relating to Article 56 EPC, the Opposition Division merely identified the aggregating step and hence also the indexing step based on the aggregating step as novel over an unspecified prior art. From the preceding section concerning Article 54 EPC, it can be assumed that either document D6 or D9 constituted the prior art the Opposition Division intended to refer to. In fact, the minutes (section 6.) of the oral proceedings show that the inventive step discussion had focused on D6.

9.2.1 According to paragraph 18 of the contested decision, the aggregating and indexing steps recited in claim 1 provided the technical effect of different aggregated documents and different search results. The Opposition Division appears to have acknowledged the presence of a technical effect in the form of "different aggregated documents" and "different search results".

9.2.2 Having identified the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, the Opposition Division concluded that it was not possible to identify a technical problem solved by the method of the application, which could be the basis of an inventive step.

9.2.3 In paragraph 20 of the decision, the Opposition Division summarised the different attempts of the patent proprietor to define a technical problem starting from the closest prior art document and, in particular, the patent proprietor's view that if no other problem could be formulated, one had to define the problem as how to find an alternate solution to the prior art and ask whether the skilled person would arrive from there at the claimed invention.

9.2.4 In reply to the patent proprietor's arguments, the Opposition Division stated in paragraph 21 of the decision that these argumentations were not convincing because it was not possible to consider the proposed solution as an alternative solution to the one found in the prior art firstly because a technical problem could not be identified and secondly because the results provided by the method of the opposed patent and by the method of the prior art were different.

9.2.5 Finally, in paragraph 21 of the contested decision, the Opposition Division reiterated that claim 1 did not meet the requirements of Article 56 EPC because a technical problem solved by the method of claim 1 could not be identified.

9.3 The Board notes that all the above conclusions of the Opposition Division relating to the lack of inventive step are presented in the contested decision without any prior analysis of the allegedly closest prior art document (D6), or of the problem it addresses. It is also not explained why the technical differences between the claimed subject-matter and the closest prior art identified by the Opposition Division did not allow the definition of a technical problem to be solved according to the problem-solution approach (see also point 6.2 above).

9.3.1 Similarly, the Board finds that the Opposition Division did not explain in the contested decision why, in its opinion, a synonymous use of the terms "link" and "reference" was not plausible and consequently the statement "by use of links such as Uniform Resource Locators" in claim 1 offended against Article 123(2) EPC (see point 16 of the contested decision). In particular, the Opposition Division did not provide any reasons for refuting the patent proprietor's arguments.

9.3.2 In the Board's opinion, the juxtaposition of seemingly contradictory conclusions (e.g. acknowledgement of technical differences but no possibility to define a technical problem), presented in the contested decision as apodictically evident and without any factual support, does not constitute a "reasoned decision" within the meaning of Rule 111(2) EPC.

9.4 In accordance with the case law of the boards of appeal (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, Seventh Edition, September 2013, IV.E.8), the Board considers that in the present case the failure to provide adequate reasoning in a decision is to be regarded as a substantial procedural violation justifying the reimbursement of the appeal fee.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The patent is maintained as granted.

3. The appeal fee is to be reimbursed.

This decision has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2015:T172410.20150127. The whole decision can be found here (pdf). The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Whatever you say ...". by James Jordan obtained via Flickr under CC BY 2.0 license (no changes made).

T 0021/09 - Hear, hear!


The fundamental right to be heard... 
In this decision following opposition the board considers the decision from the OD not to allow additional arguments and experimental evidence as a response to the preliminary opinion just before oral proceedings a violation of the right to be heard under Art 113(1) EPC. It appears that the board was especially unhappy with the fact that the OD failed to address the issue of late-filing and the submission of the evidence it in the minutes of the oral proceedings. The board considers it a fundamental deficiency that there is an absence of reasoning in the decision concerning the experimental evidence filed by the proprietor in support of its line of argument on inventive step, and refers a.o. to decision T 0135/96 of 20 January 1997. 

Summary of Facts and Submissions
I. European patent No. 1 185 695 with the title "Process for high throughput DNA methylation analysis" was granted on European patent application No. 00928969.5, which was filed as international application under the PCT and published as WO 00/70090 (in the following "the application as filed"). The patent was granted with 21 claims.
II. Two oppositions were filed based on the grounds that the claimed subject-matter lacks novelty and inventive step (Article 100(a) in conjunction with Articles 54 and 56 EPC), and extends beyond the content of the application as filed (Article 100(c) EPC), and that the invention as claimed is not disclosed in the patent in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art (Article 100(b) EPC).
III. Opponent 01 withdrew its opposition during the opposition proceedings.
IV. By a decision of an opposition division of the European Patent Office under Articles 101(2),(3)(b) EPC posted on 20 November 2008, the patent was revoked. The opposition division found that the subject-matter of the amended claims according to the main request then on file lacked an inventive step, and that the amendments introduced into the claims according to the second auxiliary request then on file offended against Article 123(2) EPC. A set of claims filed during the oral proceedings as first auxiliary request was not admitted into the proceedings.
V. The patent proprietor (appellant) lodged an appeal against the decision of the opposition division. Together with its statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant submitted a new set of amended claims (claims 1 to 16) "as the main request". The appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and the case be remitted to the opposition division on the grounds that its right to be heard had been violated in opposition proceedings. As a subsidiary request, the appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and the patent be maintained on the basis of the set of claims filed with the statement of grounds of appeal.
VI. The opponent (respondent) replied to the statement of grounds of appeal and requested that the decision under appeal be upheld, the appellant's request for remittal of the case to the opposition division be denied and the outstanding issues be heard by the board. As a subsidiary request, the respondent requested oral proceedings.
VII. By a communication of the board pursuant to Rule 100(2) EPC, the parties were informed that, in spite of being of the provisional opinion that the opposition proceedings suffered from a fundamental procedural deficiency, the board was disinclined to remit the case to the opposition division because the remittal would probably lead to a substantial delay in the procedure. The parties were given the opportunity to submit observations on the issue of remittal.
VIII. The appellant replied to the board's communication maintaining its request for remittal. Further, it requested oral proceedings pursuant to Article 116(1) EPC if the board intended to reject the request for remittal, and reimbursement of the appeal fee in accordance with Rule 103(1)a) EPC.
IX. In its reply to the communication, the respondent submitted further arguments in support of its view that there had been no procedural violation in opposition proceedings. The respondent agreed with the board's provisional opinion that the case should not be remitted to the opposition division.
X. The board summoned the parties to oral proceedings. In a communication under Article 15(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPBA) attached to the summons, the board indicated that the issues to be discussed at the oral proceedings were whether or not there had been a fundamental procedural deficiency in opposition proceedings and, if so, whether or not remittal of the case was justified. It was advanced that, if either of these two issues were decided by the board in the negative, further oral proceedings would have to be scheduled for discussion of the outstanding procedural and substantive issues.
XI. On 7 April 2014, the respondent informed the board that it would not be represented at the oral proceedings. It maintained its request that the case not be remitted to the opposition division, and relied on comments presented in writing.
XII. The oral proceedings were cancelled.
[...]
XIV. The submissions made by the appellant in writing that relate to issues relevant to this decision, were essentially as follows:
Violation of the right to be heard - Article 113(1) EPC
In opposition proceedings, the patent proprietor's right to the be heard had been violated. The opposition division had failed to consider not only experimental data submitted in preparation of the oral proceedings, but also a key argument with respect to one of the two embodiments claimed. Moreover, the opposition division had refused to admit a set of claims submitted as first auxiliary request during the oral proceedings.
[...]
Remittal to the opposition division
The violation of the right to be heard constituted a fundamental procedural deficiency which, pursuant to Article 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal, required remittal of the case. If the board were to take a final decision on the case, the appellant would be deprived of the right to a properly reasoned decision by the opposition division in which the arguments and experimental evidence submitted in support of an inventive step were taken into account.
XV. The submissions made by the respondents in writing concerning issues relevant to this decision, may be summarized as follows:
Violation of the right to be heard - Article 113(1) EPC
The patent proprietor's right to be heard had not been violated in opposition proceedings. The issues of added matter, novelty and inventive step had been considered at length during the course of the oral proceedings before the opposition division. The experimental data submitted by the patent proprietor had not been overlooked. The proprietor had referred to these data during the course of the oral proceedings, and, as was apparent from section 5.4.1 of the decision under appeal, in particular the first full sentence at the top of page 16, and the statements on page 17, the opposition division had taken into account the data, but considered them to be of no assistance in determining inventive step. The decision under appeal was properly reasoned in that it accurately reflected the points that had been made during the course of the oral proceedings.
[...]
The amendment introduced into the claims of the first auxiliary request did not limit the scope of the claims, raised questions of clarity under Article 84 EPC and did not clearly address the objections of lack of inventive step.
Remittal to the opposition division
For the sake of procedural efficiency, the case should not be remitted back to the opposition division. The patent proprietor had had a proper opportunity to present its case before the opposition division. Any remittal at this stage would only cause unnecessary delay in the proceedings.
XVI. The appellant requested that the decision under appeal be set aside and the case be remitted to the opposition division for further prosecution. Additionally, the appellant requested reimbursement of the appeal fee. As a subsidiary request, oral proceedings were requested.
XVII. The respondent requested that the appeal be dismissed. Subsidiarily, the respondent requested that the appellant's request for remittal of the case to the opposition division be dismissed.
Reasons for the Decision
Violation of the right to be heard - Article 113(1) EPC
1. The main issue to be decided is whether or not the right to be heard (Article 113 EPC) of the patent proprietor (the present appellant) was violated in opposition proceedings. The appellant substantiated its allegation of a procedural violation arguing that the opposition division not only failed to consider experimental data and a key argument on inventive step submitted with the reply to the summons to oral proceedings, but also refused to admit into the proceedings the set of amended claims filed during the oral proceedings as first auxiliary request (see section 6.3 of the decision under appeal).
2. As regards the experimental data, the appellant referred to the Annexes 9, 8a, 8b and 7c. These Annexes were submitted by the patent proprietor as a reaction to the preliminary opinion of the opposition division on inventive step expressed in the communication dated 15 April 2008 attached to the summons to oral proceedings. In the communication, the opposition division held that none of the technical effects on which the patent proprietor relied in respect of the method of claim 6 as granted (application B) was "... supported by any corresponding experimental data which thus, pursuant established case law (cf. Case Law 5**(th) Ed. 2006, I.D.4.2), cannot be taken into consideration for the assessment of inventive step" (see paragraph bridging pages 18 and 19 of the communication).
3. According to the appellant, Annex 9 ("Evidence showing inventiveness of Application B") showed the technical performance and the biological and clinical relevance of the claimed method by reference to independent scientific publications of third parties and publications of the patent proprietor, as well as by experimental data (see sections 1.3 and 2). Prima facie, Annex 9 has evidential value for the ability of the method to discriminate between neighbouring methylation levels, in particular between low methylation levels (see section 1.3.3 of Annex 9). Additionally, Annex 9 shows that, applying the method defined as "application B", small amounts of DNA can be detected independently from DNA concentration (see section 1.3.1) with good repeatability (see section 1.3.2).
4. The evidence in Annexes 7c, 8a and 8b relates to application D. Annex 7c presents the results of experiments aimed at the detection of methylation patterns, and Annexes 8a and 8b show the results of comparative experiments in which the claimed method is compared to methods known in the prior art, in particular the Sunrise**(©) (Annex 8a) and the SybrGreen**(TM) technologies (Annex 8b). Prima facie, the experiments show a higher specificity of the claimed method.
5. Annexes 9, 8a, 8b and 7c are not mentioned in the decision under appeal. Nor are the specific experimental data provided therein discussed in the decision in connection with the issue of inventive step. Contrary to the respondent's view, the first full sentence on the top of page 16 of the decision under appeal does not relate to the experimental evidence in the Annexes in question, but only to that in Annex I, which had been filed by the proprietor on 21 November 2007 in response to the notices of opposition. As regards the statements on page 17 of the decision ("The other two technical effects are not supported by any corresponding experimental data ..."), it is not clear to the board whether the opposition division, when arriving at this finding, disregarded the experimental evidence in the Annexes in question, in particular Annex 9, or whether it considered it, but found it not to support the alleged technical effects for reasons not specified in the decision.
6. The minutes of the oral proceedings before the opposition division dated 20 November 2008 do not reflect any discussion on the experimental evidence submitted by the patent proprietor in preparation of the oral proceedings. It is, however, stated in section 3 of the minutes that documents (42) to (75) - which were filed by the patent proprietor with the same submission as the Annexes - were considered to be late-filed, and that the discussion on whether or not they were admitted into the proceedings was postponed. Whether or not the same applied to the Annexes in question, which are not specifically mentioned in this passage, is unclear. In any case it is noted that a discussion on the admission of late-filed evidence - if it took place - has not been recorded in the minutes of the oral proceedings, and that documents (42) to (75) - like the Annexes in question - are not mentioned in the reasons given by the opposition division for its findings on inventive step.
7. Under these circumstances, two possibilities arise: either the opposition division disregarded the experimental evidence in the Annexes in question as late-filed, or it may have considered it, but failed to give proper reasons in its decision as to why this evidence does not support the technical effects on which the patent proprietor relied in its line of argument on inventive step. In the first case, not only the patent proprietor has not been heard on the issue of admission of the evidence into the opposition proceedings, but, more importantly, the decision is absolutely silent about it. In the second case, the decision under appeal suffers from a severe deficiency in the reasons given by the opposition division for the adverse findings on inventive step.
8. In either case, the decision cannot be regarded as being in conformity with Rule 111(2) EPC. Since the opposition division refused the main request for lack of inventive step, the absence of reasoning in the decision concerning the experimental evidence filed by the patent proprietor in support of its line of argument on inventive step is, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal (see, inter alia, decision T 135/96 of 20 January 1997), a fundamental deficiency.
9. The question whether or not the patent proprietor expressly requested admission of the experimental evidence during the oral proceedings is not regarded by the board as a circumstance that would mitigate the severity of the violation. Since the evidence was submitted by the patent proprietor in preparation of the oral proceedings and in clear response to the opposition division's communication, it had to be assumed that the proprietor's intention was to have the experimental evidence admitted into the proceedings and considered by the opposition division.
10. Summarising the above, the board concludes that the opposition division's failure to either consider the experimental evidence brought forward by the patent proprietor, or give reasons as to why it was not admitted into the proceedings, or did not support the purported effects, violated the patent proprietor's right to be heard. Since there is a causal link between the procedural deficiency and the final adverse decision on inventive step, the procedural defect is decisive and hence fundamental.
11. In view of these findings, there is no need to consider the appellant's further allegation of a procedural violation based on the non-admission of the first auxiliary request filed during the oral proceedings.
Remittal to the opposition division
12. According to Article 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal, a board shall remit a case to the department of first instance if fundamental deficiencies are apparent in the first instance proceedings, unless special reasons present themselves for doing otherwise.
13. In the present case, the respondent argued that remittal to the opposition division would entail a delay in reaching a final decision.
14. The board shares the view of the competent board in decision T 48/00 of 12 June 2002 (see section 11 of the Reasons) that a delay of the final decision caused by the remittal is an insufficient reason not to order remittal. The fundamental right of an appellant to a fair hearing before the opposition division must overweigh any advantage that might accrue to the respondent by having the board of appeal deal fully with the case rather than remit it (see decision T 914/98 of 22 September 2000; section 3 of the Reasons).
15. For these reasons, the board decides to remit the case to the opposition division for further prosecution.
[...]
Order
For these reasons it is decided that:
1. The decision under appeal is set aside.
2. The case is remitted to the opposition division for further prosecution.
3. The appeal fee is to be reimbursed.

This decision has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2014:T002109.20141113. The whole decision can be found here. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo obtained via Flickr.

T 0405/12 - The lost request



This opposition appeal remits the case to the first instance together with a reimbursement of the appeal fee. The appeal board could not find out about which claims the opposition devision made its decision. Although the patent proprietor claims that the opposition devision maintained the patent as granted several alternative main requests appear to have been filed and/or considered.

The following catchword is provided

Das Erfordernis der Entscheidungsbegründung gemäß Regel 111 (2) Satz 1 EPÜ ist nicht erfüllt, wenn aus der angefochtenen Entscheidung, ggf. unter Heranziehung anderer Bestandteile der Akte, nicht klar und unmissverständlich (d. h. nicht eindeutig) hervorgeht, auf der Grundlage welchen Antrags bzw. welcher Anträge (einschließlich der ggf. dazugehörigen Unterlagen wie Ansprüche, Beschreibungsseiten und Zeichnungen) diese Entscheidung ergangen ist. Siehe Entscheidungsgründe 6 bis 16.


Below is my attempt at an English translation.

The requirement that a decision in accordance with Rule 111 (2) is reasoned is not satisfied, if it cannot be determined clearly and unmistakably (i.e., unambiguous) from the contested decision, if necessary by reference to other parts of the file, on the basis of which request or requests (including possible corresponding documents such as claims, description and drawings) this decision was taken. See the decision the reasons 6 to 16.

Reasons for the Decision

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6. Das Erfordernis der Entscheidungsbegründung ist nach Ansicht der Kammer nicht erfüllt, wenn aus der angefochtenen Entscheidung, ggf. unter Heranziehung anderer Bestandteile der Akte, nicht klar und unmissverständlich (d. h. nicht eindeutig) hervorgeht, auf der Grundlage welchen Antrags bzw. welcher Anträge (einschließlich der ggf. dazugehörigen Unterlagen wie Ansprüche, Beschreibungsseiten und Zeichnungen) diese Entscheidung ergangen ist.

7. Die Beschwerdegegnerin behauptet, dass es sich bei den Ansprüchen des in der mündlichen Verhandlung vom 12. Dezember 2011 eingereichten Hauptantrags um sämtliche Ansprüche des Streitpatents wie erteilt gehandelt habe. Aus der angefochtenen Entscheidung und aus der Niederschrift sowie aus den im Verfahren eingereichten Schriftsätzen der Beteiligten geht jedoch nicht eindeutig hervor, über welchen Antrag die Einspruchsabteilung in ihrer Entscheidung entschieden hat, da es mehrere Unklarheiten und Widersprüchlichkeiten in den Aktenunterlagen gibt.

8. In der angefochtenen Entscheidung ist unter Punkt "I.3 Anträge" in den Entscheidungsgründen angegeben, welche Anträge die Patentinhaberin im Laufe des Verfahrens vor der Einspruchsabteilung gestellt bzw. eingereicht hat (Punkt XI a) oben).

Es ist zunächst festzustellen, dass die Patentinhaberin nicht, wie in der angefochtenen Entscheidung angegeben, mit Schreiben vom 28. Oktober 2010, sondern mit Schreiben vom 22. Dezember 2010 zu dem Einspruch Stellung genommen und beantragt hat, den Einspruch zurückzuweisen und das Patent wie erteilt aufrechtzuerhalten.

Danach hat die Patentinhaberin, wie dem Punkt "I.3 Anträge" zu entnehmen ist, am 8. Dezember 2011 einen "neuen Hauptantrag und vier Hilfsanträge" eingereicht, sowie zu Beginn der mündlichen Verhandlung am 12. Dezember 2011 einen "anderen" Hauptantrag sowie neun Hilfsanträge.

Der Textpassage unter Punkt "I.3 Anträge" ist jedoch nicht zu entnehmen, wie viele Ansprüche der "neue" Hauptantrag und die vier Hilfsanträge hatten, die am 8. Dezember 2011 eingereicht wurden. Das gleiche gilt für die zu Beginn der mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichten neun Hilfsanträge. Nur zum "anderen" Hauptantrag, der auch zu Beginn der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung eingereicht wurde, ist angegeben "Hauptantrag (entsprechend dem Anspruch 1 des erteilten Patents, wie ursprünglich beantragt)". Aus dieser Angabe geht nach Ansicht der Kammer eindeutig nur hervor, dass der "andere" Hauptantrag einen Anspruch 1 hat, der "entsprechend" dem Anspruch 1 des erteilten Patents ist. Diese Angabe lässt jedoch weder den Schluss zu, dass der Anspruch 1 des "anderen" Hauptantrags identisch mit dem erteilten Anspruch 1 ist (d.h. es könnte ein sich vom erteilten Anspruch 1 unterscheidender Wortlaut gewählt worden sein), noch dass dieser Hauptantrag noch weitere Ansprüche oder gar sämtliche erteilten Ansprüche aufweist. Es kann aus dieser Angabe somit nicht gefolgert werden, dass mit diesem "anderen" Hauptantrag wieder, wie schon vor Einreichung des "neuen" und des "anderen" Hauptantrags, beantragt wurde, das Patent wie erteilt aufrechtzuerhalten, d.h. den Einspruch zurückzuweisen.

In Abschnitt "III. Wortlaut des erteilten Hauptanspruches" der Entscheidungsgründe (Punkt XI b) oben) wird der Wortlaut des Anspruchs 1 des erteilten Patents zitiert und unter dem Abschnitt "IV. Mündliche Verhandlung" (Punkt XI c) oben) wird die Auffassung der Einsprechenden, dass der "Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 des Streitpatents" durch die Dokumente E1 und E7 nahegelegt sei, zusammengefasst und die Gründe angegeben, warum die Einspruchsabteilung diese Auffassung nicht teilt, sondern wie die Patentinhaberin "den Gegenstand des Streitpatents" für erfinderisch hält.

In diesen Abschnitten III. und IV werden der "erteilte Hauptanspruch", der "Anspruch 1 des erteilten Patents", der "Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 des Streitpatents" und der "Gegenstand des Streitpatents" genannt. Der "andere" Hauptantrag wird überhaupt nicht erwähnt oder mit dem Streitpatent in Bezug gesetzt. Nach Ansicht der Kammer geht daher aus diesen Abschnitten nicht eindeutig hervor, dass es darin um den "anderen" Hauptantrag bzw. dessen Anspruch 1 geht.

In den Entscheidungsgründen ist darüber hinaus kein Anhaltspunkt zu finden, ob der "andere" Hauptantrag" außer dem Anspruch 1 noch weitere Ansprüche hat.

9. Da aus den oben zitierten Textstellen der Entscheidungsgründe sich nicht erkennen lässt, welche Ansprüche der "andere" Hauptantrag aufwies und damit die Antragslage nicht eindeutig zu entnehmen ist, ist die Niederschrift heranzuziehen, zumal der "andere" Hauptantrag in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung eingereicht wurde. Auf Seite 1 der Niederschrift (siehe VI a) oben) ist zu den Anträgen angegeben, dass die Patentinhaberin in der mündlichen Verhandlung den am 8. Dezember 2011 eingereichten Hauptantrag zurückzog und "einen neuen Hauptantrag" stellte, "wobei der Anspruch 1 unverändert wie erteilt formuliert ist." Daraus folgert die Kammer zum einen, dass der in der mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichte Hauptantrag in der Niederschrift als "neuer" Hauptantrag bezeichnet wird und in den Entscheidungsgründen als "anderer" Hauptantrag. Zum anderen, dass der Anspruch 1 dieses Hauptantrages mit dem erteilten Anspruch 1 identisch ist. Obgleich der Niederschrift keine Kopien der in der mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichten Anträge beigefügt sind, wurde dies durch die von der Beschwerdeführerin mit Schreiben vom 20. Mai 2014 eingereichten Kopie eines einzigen Anspruchs gemäß Hauptantrag, den die Beschwerdegegnerin unbestritten in der erstinstanzlichen mündlichen Verhandlung vorgelegt hat, bestätigt. Aus dieser Kopie geht klar hervor, dass dieser Hauptantrag nur diesen einzigen Anspruch 1 und keine weiteren Ansprüche hatte.

Die Beschwerdegegnerin bestreitet nicht, dass sie diesen Hauptantrag mit nur einem einzigen Anspruch gemäß Kopie in der erstinstanzlichen mündlichen Verhandlung vorgelegt hat. Sie ist jedoch der Ansicht, dass in Zusammenhang mit diesem Hauptantrag auch der Satz "Ferner beantragt die Patentinhaberin, den Einspruch aufgrund Artikel 102 (2) EPÜ zurückzuweisen und das erteilte Patent in vollem Umfang aufrechtzuerhalten." auf Seite 1 der Niederschrift (siehe VI a) oben) gelesen werden müsse. "Ferner" bedeute in diesem Satz "außerdem" bzw. "zusätzlich". Der Antrag in diesem Satz könne deshalb nur so verstanden werden, dass der Hauptantrag, auch wenn er in der mündlichen Verhandlung mit nur einem Anspruch eingereicht worden sei, den bestehenden Anspruch 1 des Streitpatents sowie als abhängige Ansprüche die bestehenden abhängigen Ansprüche des Streitpatents umfasse. Diese Auslegung werde auch in dem zweiten Teil des Satzes "...und das erteilte Patent in vollem Umfang aufrechtzuerhalten" bestätigt.

Die Kammer kann der Beschwerdegegnerin insoweit folgen, dass man den betreffenden Abschnitt der Niederschrift so wie sie interpretieren könnte (wobei die Kammer davon ausgeht, dass als Rechtsgrundlage für die Zurückweisung des Einspruchs nicht der genannte "Artikel 102 (2) EPÜ", sondern der zum Zeitpunkt der Entscheidung anzuwendende Artikel 101 (2) EPÜ heranzuziehen wäre). Die Kammer kann jedoch der Beschwerdegegnerin nicht zustimmen, dass ihre Auslegung die einzig mögliche ist. Wie im Folgenden dargelegt, ist durchaus auch eine andere mögliche Interpretation des betreffenden Abschnitts in der Niederschrift gerechtfertigt.

Unmittelbar auf den Satz "... und stellt einen neuen Hauptantrag, wobei der Anspruch 1 unverändert wie erteilt formuliert ist." folgt der Satz "Des Weiteren werden die Hilfsanträge 1 bis 9 eingereicht.". Erst danach schließt sich der besagte Satz an, der mit "Ferner beantragt ..." beginnt. Der Antrag in diesem "Ferner" - Satz ist deshalb nicht zweifellos dem Hauptantrag zuzuordnen. Hinzu kommt, dass in der Niederschrift nach den Anträgen der Pateninhaberin steht: "Die Einspruchsabteilung entspricht dem Antrag den neuen Hauptantrag zuzulassen [,] da dieser auf die ursprüngliche Version des Anspruchs 1 zurückgreift." Die Kammer sieht in diesem Satz durch den Bezug "auf die ursprüngliche Version des Anspruchs 1" bestätigt, dass der "neue" Hauptantrag den erteilten Anspruch 1 als Anspruch 1 hatte. Allerdings ist auch aus diesem Satz nicht zweifellos und eindeutig zu entnehmen, dass der neue Hauptantrag, wie von der Beschwerdegegnerin dargelegt, sämtliche Ansprüche des erteilten Streitpatents umfasste. Es stellt sich vielmehr die Frage, wenn der Hauptantrag den kompletten Anspruchssatz des erteilten Patents umfasst hätte, hätte dann in diesem Satz nicht die ursprüngliche Version des gesamten Streitpatents genannt werden müssen? Auch die von der Beschwerdeführerin aufgeworfene Frage ist durchaus berechtigt: warum reichte die Patentinhaberin in der mündlichen Verhandlung einen neuen Hauptantrag mit nur einem einzigen Anspruch ein, wenn es ihr beim Hauptantrag angeblich um das Streitpatent wie erteilt gegangen ist? Wenn die Patentinhaberin wieder auf ihr erteiltes Patent in vollem Umfang zurückgreifen wollte, dann hätte es doch genügt, wieder ihren früheren Antrag zu stellen, d.h. den Antrag auf Zurückweisung des Einspruchs. Oder sie hätte eine Kopie der 13 Ansprüche der Patentschrift einreichen können.

Einen weiteren Anhaltspunkt für die (auch mögliche) Auslegung, dass der neue Hauptantrag nur einen Anspruch umfasste, sieht die Kammer darin, dass in der mündlichen Verhandlung nur diskutiert wurde, ob der Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 des neuen Hauptantrags im Hinblick auf die Dokumente E1 bis E7 erfinderisch ist (siehe Seiten 1 und 2 der Niederschrift). In der Niederschrift ist zu weiteren abhängigen Ansprüchen nichts erwähnt.

Die Kammer hält es deshalb auch für gerechtfertigt, dass der Satz "Ferner beantragt die Patentinhaberin, den Einspruch aufgrund Artikel 102 (2) EPÜ zurückzuweisen und das erteilte Patent in vollem Umfang aufrechtzuerhalten." als ein weiterer Antrag ausgelegt werden könnte. Mit diesem weiteren Antrag, wie auch mit den in der mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichten neun Hilfsanträgen, hätte sich die Einspruchsabteilung in der mündlichen Verhandlung nicht mehr befassen müssen, da sie, wie der Seite 3 der Niederschrift zu entnehmen ist, in der Beratung zu dem Ergebnis kam, dass das europäische Patent gemäß des Hauptantrags aufrechtzuerhalten sei (siehe VI d) oben).

Wie oben dargelegt, sind zwei unterschiedliche, sich erheblich voneinander unterscheidende Interpretationsmöglichkeiten des besagten "Ferner" -Satzes und des betreffenden Abschnitts der Niederschrift möglich und jede der beiden Interpretationen ist durchaus vertretbar. Deshalb kann nach Ansicht der Kammer keine dieser beiden Interpretationsmöglichkeiten als die zweifellos richtige oder wahrscheinliche Interpretation angesehen werden.

10. Aus den oben genannten Gründen ist aus den erörterten Textstellen in den Entscheidungsgründen und der Niederschrift eindeutig nur zu entnehmen, dass der in der mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichte Hauptantrag einen Anspruch 1 hat, der identisch mit dem Anspruch 1 des erteilten Streitpatents ist. Jedoch kann anhand dieser Textstellen nicht zweifelsfrei festgestellt werden, ob dieser Hauptantrag weitere Ansprüche hatte oder nicht. Insbesondere ist nicht eindeutig festzustellen, ob der verbeschiedene Hauptantrag sämtliche Unteransprüche des erteilten Patents hatte.

11. Auch unter Heranziehung der Entscheidungsformeln ergibt sich für die Kammer kein eindeutiges Bild, welcher Antrag von der Einspruchsabteilung verbeschieden wurde. Vor allem sind die Entscheidungsformeln im vorliegenden Fall widersprüchlich, selbst wenn man den Ablauf der mündlichen Verhandlung und die Entscheidungsbegründung mitberücksichtigt.

12. In der mündlichen Verhandlung verkündete der Vorsitzende nach der Beratung der Einspruchsabteilung folgenden Beschluss: "Das Europäische Patent wird in vollem Umfang, gemäß des Hauptantrages, aufrecht erhalten [,] da es den Erfordernissen des EPÜ genügt." (Seite 3 der Niederschrift, siehe VI d) oben)). Diese Entscheidungsformel entspricht in ihrer Begründung ("da es den Erfordernissen des EPÜ genügt") dem Wortlaut des Artikels 101 (3) a) EPÜ, der die Aufrechterhaltung des Patents in geänderter Fassung regelt. Wie oben dargelegt, ist nicht eindeutig anhand der Entscheidungsgründe und der Niederschrift festzustellen, welche Ansprüche der Hauptantrag, der in der ersten Instanz verbeschieden wurde, aufwies. Deshalb ist es nicht auszuschließen, dass mit dieser Entscheidungsformel tatsächlich das Streitpatent in geänderter Fassung mit nur einem Anspruch 1, der mit dem erteilten Anspruch 1 identisch ist, aufrechterhalten wurde.

13. Blatt 2/1 des vom Protokollführer und vom Vorsitzenden unterschriebenen und der Niederschrift beigefügten Formblatts "EPA Form 2309.2 12.07.TRI" enthält hingegen die Entscheidung: "Der Einspruch wird zurückgewiesen." Der Wortlaut dieser Entscheidungsformel entspricht der Rechtsfolge nach Artikel 101 (2) Satz 2 EPÜ, der die Zurückweisung des Einspruchs vorsieht, wenn kein Einspruchsgrund der Aufrechterhaltung des erteilten Patents entgegensteht. Die Entscheidung, den Einspruch nach Artikel 101 (2) EPÜ zurückzuweisen, ist ebenso enthalten in dem von allen drei Mitgliedern der Einspruchsabteilung unterschriebenen Formblatt "EPA Form 2339 (Blatt 1) 12.07TRI" (siehe VIII oben), dem Deckblatt der Entscheidung (siehe X oben), Formblatt "EPA Form 2330 12.07.TRI") und im Abschnitt "V. Entscheidung" der Entscheidungsgründe (siehe XI e) oben). Danach könnte man davon ausgehen, dass das Patent wie erteilt, d.h. in unveränderter Fassung, aufrechterhalten wurde. Dies ist jedoch fraglich, da wie oben dargelegt, die der Entscheidung zugrunde gelegene Antragslage nicht eindeutig ist.

14. Die Beschwerdegegnerin vertrat die Auffassung, dass aus den Entscheidungsformeln in der Niederschrift und in der angefochtenen Entscheidung (einschließlich der jeweiligen Formblätter) klar hervorgehe, dass es bei dem in der mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichten Hauptantrag um das gesamte Streitpatent gehe, da nur auf die Entscheidungsformeln abzustellen sei. Selbst wenn es für die Frage der Antragslage nur auf die Entscheidungsformeln ankäme, dann lassen aus den oben dargestellten Gründen auch die einzelnen Entscheidungsformeln in Zusammenschau den Rückschluss auf eine eindeutige Antragslage nicht zu.

15. Die Beschwerdegegnerin sah auch in der Beschwerdebegründung eine Bestätigung dafür, dass nur das erteilte Streitpatent Gegenstand des Hauptantrags war, da die Beschwerdeführerin die Antragslage nicht in Frage stellte und sich mit sämtlichen Ansprüchen des Streitpatents auseinandersetzte. Die Kammer kann auch daraus nicht den Schluss auf eine eindeutige Antragslage ziehen. Es ist nicht davon auszugehen, dass die beschwerdeführende Einsprechende sich nur mit dem Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags in ihrer Beschwerdebegründung auseinander gesetzt hätte, wenn der Hauptantrag nur den einen Anspruch und keine abhängigen Ansprüche gehabt hätte. Ebenso wenig ist der Schluss zu ziehen, dass die Ansprüche des Hauptantrags identisch mit denjenigen des erteilten Patents sein mussten, da die Beschwerdeführerin zu sämtlichen Ansprüchen des Streitpatents Stellung genommen hat.

16. Aus den oben genannten Gründen ist die Kammer zu der Auffassung gelangt, dass aus der angefochtenen Entscheidung und aus der Niederschrift sowie aus den im Verfahren eingereichten Schriftsätzen der Beteiligten nicht eindeutig hervor geht, aus welchen Ansprüchen der der angefochtenen Entscheidung zugrundeliegende Hauptantrag bestand. Damit ist nicht eindeutig, über welchen Antrag die Einspruchsabteilung in ihrer Entscheidung entschieden hat. Somit ist es der Kammer nicht möglich, die angegriffene Entscheidung zu überprüfen, und allein deshalb weist das erstinstanzliche Verfahren einen wesentlichen Mangel im Sinne von Artikel 11 VOBK auf, der die Aufhebung der angefochtenen Entscheidung rechtfertigt.

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This decision has European Case Law Identifier:  ECLI:EP:BA:2014:T040512.20140605. The whole decision can be found here. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo by Kiran Foster obtained via Flickr (cropped from original).