Monday, June 18, 2018 R 7/16 - Decision on remittal before discussing substantive issues

The auxiliary police... could they have helped the petitioner?

This case is a petition for review following an appeal against a decision of the opposition division. Briefly speaking, auxiliary request V was held allowable during the opposition proceedings, but was found to contravene Article 100(c), 123(2) EPC during the appeal proceedings.

In its written decision (the decision under review), the BoA found that the decision of the opposition division presented a fundamental deficiency. Despite the fundamental deficiency, the BoA decided not to remit the case to the opposition division, thereby exercising its discretion under Art. 11 RPBA.

The petitioner's argues in the petition that the substance of the issues, to which the fundamental deficiency pertained, was not taken into consideration by the BoA when the remittal was discussed, and that this represented a fundamental violation of Article 113 EPC.

The EBoA notes that a detailed discussion of the substantive issues before a decision on the remittal would have rendered any remittal pointless since the first instance would have been bound by the considerations of the Board of Appeal or could have expected that its decision would be reversed if it was not in line with the considerations of the Board of Appeal. It was therefore only logical to limit the discussion on the requested remittal to procedural aspects. See also points 3.2.5 and 3.2.6.

Thursday, February 15, 2018 R 4/17 - Four is a party

In the present case, the Opponent appealed the decision of the Opposition Division to maintain the patent as granted. The Board of Appeal sent three registered - but without advice of delivery - communications (notice of appeal; statement of the grounds of appeal; further letter) to the Respondent-Proprietor. In the absence of any response from the Proprietor to these letters, the Board of Appeal considered itself to be in a position to issue a decision revoking the patent without the need to hold oral proceedings. This decision of the Board was sent to the parties under cover of a registered letter with advice of delivery. 

The Proprietor filed a petition for review of the decision, arguing that it had no record of ever having received the first three letters, thus depriving him of his right to be heard.

The Enlarged Board now deals with this petition for review, and finds that in the present case, the Proprietor had, within the meaning of Article 113(1) EPC, no opportunity at all to comment on the grounds for the decision under review. This qualifies as a fundamental violation of his right to be heard.


Catchwords:
In the event of any dispute about whether a letter from the EPO reached the addressee or on which date, it is incumbent on the EPO to establish that the letter has reached its destination or to establish the date on which the letter was delivered to the addressee (Reasons, point 2).

[...] parties must be able to rely on the EPO complying with the relevant provisions of the EPC and, at least for the purposes of Article 113(1) EPC, they and their representatives have no duty to monitor the proceedings themselves by regularly inspecting the electronic file (Reasons, point 4).

In respect of the implausibility of the non-arrival of letters put forward by the Other Party the Enlarged Board considers that it cannot be expected that the Petitioner should prove a negative, that is the nonreceipt of a letter, or provide a plausible explanation for non-receipt (Reasons, point 4). 

Tuesday, July 12, 2016 R 2/14 - Is there an undue burden?

Undue burden?

This is a successful petition for review.  

Claim 1 as granted refers to an amino acid sequence "SEQ ID NO:4". Unfortunately, the sequence contains an error and does not provide the required desaturase activity. The opposition division revoked the patent as not complying to Art. 83 EPC. In the appeal, the proprietor countered that the skilled person could nevertheless prepare a protein having the desired activity. 

In the appeal decision, the board rejects this argument. The relevant part of the decision is the following:

"30. Since the skilled person relying on the patent application was not informed that the protein defined by SEQ ID NO:4 was inactive, and since the patent application neither disclosed any active sequence variants having at least 60% sequence identity nor which positions of SEQ ID NO:4 had to be modified in order to obtain a functional desaturase, it had to go back to E. gracilis and redone the desaturase in order to put the claimed invention into practice. Even though each of the steps necessary for recloning could be performed by a person skilled in the art,- it is the combination of all the necessary steps (isolation of total mRNA, PCR amplification and selection of a group of amplification products with homology to known desaturases, completion of the 5' and 3' ends by RACE amplification, cloning and expression of the full length sequence to assess its function) which creates an undue burden on the skilled person trying to perform the invention. The same applies to the two alternative approaches mentioned by the appellant.

31. Thus, contrary to the requirements of Article 83 EPC, the skilled person would not have been in a position to perform the claimed invention readily and without undue burden across essentially the entire scope of claim 1."

The proprietor raised two complaints against the decision, the second of which is that the board based its decision on facts and arguments in respect of which the parties were not heard and did not reason its conclusions about the objection under Articles 100(b) and 83 EPC.

Friday, June 19, 2015 R 6/14 - "The minutes clearly indicate that there were no further requests"

In this petition for review (in German), the appellant (proprietor in opposition appeal against the decision to revoke the patent) argued that his right to be heard on auxiliary requests was violated. The minutes of the oral proceedings indicated that the appellant had withdrawn all requests that were submitted in the written procedure, including the request to maintain the patent as granted. Earlier filed first auxiliary request was maintained as main request. The minutes further indicated that, during further discussion of the factual and legal framework of the appeal, the appellant filed a reformulation of the earlier filed first auxiliary request with handwritten additions, and requested to maintain the patent in amended form according to this "first auxiliary request with handwritten additions", or according to earlier filed aux 4 and aux 7 (current aux 1 and 2) with "the same handwritten additions". All earlier requests were withdrawn. After the chairman asked whether the appellant wanted to filed more requests or remarks, the appellant indicated he did not wish to do so. The chairman subsequently called the debate closed, and, after deliberation, the Board rejected the petition as the claims with the handwritten additions were not prima facie clear. The written decision indicated that the Board exercised its discretion under Art 12(4) and 13(1) RPBA to not admit any of the lastly submitted request into the procedure, so that no requests were pending.

In the petition for review, the appellant submitted that his right to be heard as to the exact formulation of the claims of aux 4 and aux 7 with "the same handwritten additions" was violated, and that the decision was based on an indication about the direction into which the actual amendments would be directed, but that no concrete claim formulation had been submitted yet as reformulations of aux 4 and aux 7 with "the same handwritten additions". The appellant further submitted, in response to a communication of the Enlarged Board, that the minutes did not contain all details as to how the dialogue between the appellant and the Board had taken place.

The Enlarged Board concluded, in a 3-member composition, that the petition was not clearly not inadmissible, but was clearly not allowable, as the minutes clearly indicated what the appellant's request were and that the appellant has no further requests (reason 5-6 and 8), and because the appellant had not immediately challenged the accurateness of the minutes after its notification (reason 7 and 11).

The request for revision was rejected.

Friday, June 12, 2015 R 1/14 - Too late raising of a procedural objection

This is a petition for review against a decision of the board of appeal in an opposition case. The appellant requests the representative to request postponement of the oral proceedings, partly based on an explosion which has happened at the site of the appellant.
The board refused the request. The representative did attend the oral proceedings. At the end of the proceedings he filed an objection in respect of procedural defects: 
"The refusal of the request for postponement of oral proceedings in view of the explosion in the proprietor's facility and the refusal to admit documents E55, E56 and E60 into the proceedings, although filed at least four weeks before the oral proceedings represent a fundamental violation of our right to be heard and constitutes a procedural defect."

The board dismissed this objection raised under R.106 EPC.

The appellant filed a petition for review. The petition was found inadmissible since the objection was not raised in good time. The board was in no position to remedy the issue of postponement once the proceedings were more or less over.

Tuesday, June 09, 2015 R 16/13 - Surprise!

This is a Petition for review against a decision of a board of appeal in an opposition case. Although such petitions are rarely successful, here the patent proprietor convinced the Enlarged Board of Appeal that its right to be heard was violated.

Claim 1 of the main request, refused by the Board of Appeal, concerned micronised crystalline tiotropium bromide characterized by the following parameters: particle size, specific surface area value, specific heat of solution and water content.

Early in the procedure the applicant had filed document D11A with comparative test results. In its decision the board of appeal considered this document to be insufficient to prove the advantages of the claimed substance because the parameters used in the claim were not specified in document D11A. 

In its decision the board of appeal considered document D25 to represent the closest state of the art and reformulated the objective technical problem to produce a different micronised crystalline tiotropium bromide. This task was found not inventive. 
 
The decisive reason [maßgebliche Grund] that D11A does not give complete parameter values, was never an issue in the entire procedure preceding the decision. Accordingly Enlarged board sets aside the appeal decision.

In the meantime, the board of appeal has issued a new summons for oral proceedings in appeal case T 379/10.

Tuesday, May 05, 2015 T 2541/11 - "Right to be heard not absolute, but must be balanced"

The appellant-opponent lodged an appeal against the interlocutory decision of the opposition division  on the amended form in which European patent no. 1394387 could be maintained. The appellant-proprietor also lodged an appeal against the above interlocutory decision. The appellant-opponent filed a new document, E12, with their grounds of appeal. The Board did not admit this new document.

Background / Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appellant-opponent lodged an appeal, received 12 December 2011, against the interlocutory decision of the opposition division posted on 13 October 2011 on the amended form in which European patent no. 1394387 could be maintained and paid the appeal fee simultaneously. The statement setting out the grounds of appeal was filed on 23 February 2012.

The appellant-proprietor also lodged an appeal, received 14 December 2011 against the above interlocutory decision and paid the appeal fee simultaneously. The statement setting out the grounds of appeal was filed on 20 February 2012.

II. The opposition was filed against the patent as a whole and based inter alia on Article 100(a) together with Articles 52(1) and 54(3) EPC for lack of novelty and Article 56 EPC for lack of inventive step.

The division held, inter alia, that the grounds for opposition (novelty and inventive step) mentioned in Article 100(a) EPC did not prejudice maintenance of the patent as amended according to an auxiliary request, having regard to the following documents, amongst others: E1, E4, E6, E9.

III. The appellant-opponent filed the following document with their grounds of appeal: E12.

IV. Oral proceedings before the Board were duly held on 17 December 2014. During the oral proceedings, the appellant-opponent filed an objection under Rule 106 EPC in writing. It reads as follows:

Objection acc. to Rule 106 EPC; in the name of the opponent.

The decision to not admit reference E12 into the proceedings constitutes a violation against the right to be heard for the following reasons:

Friday, March 13, 2015 R 2/14 - Normative concordance solving a normative conflict?

 
Catchwords:

1. The simultaneous entrustment of the Chairman of the Enlarged Board of Appeal with judicial tasks in his capacity as judge appointed in accordance with Article 11(3) EPC and with executive tasks in his capacity as Vice-President Appeals appointed pursuant to Article 11(2) EPC causes an inherent "normative conflict" between the institutional provisions of Article 10(2)(f)and (3) EPC and Article 23(3) EPC, which cannot be completely resolved without changes to the current institutional structure of the European Patent Organisation. However, in the meantime, its impact can and must be mitigated by a continuous balancing of these potentially conflicting duties ("normative concordance") (points 36 to 40).

2. The factual scope of an objection pursuant to Article 24(3) EPC is defined in the statement of grounds of objection initiating the interlocutory proceedings under Article 24(4) EPC. Apart from a subsequent elaboration of said objection by supporting facts, evidence and arguments, the subject-matter of the proceedings, in principle, cannot be extended or changed, whether by new facts or by a new objection (points 56.3 to 56.6).

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The patent proprietor (hereinafter: the petitioner) filed a petition for review against decision ... of Technical Board of Appeal ... (hereinafter: the Technical Board of Appeal) dated ... dismissing its appeal against the decision of the opposition division dated ... revoking European patent No. ... . The petitioner based its petition for review on a fundamental violation by the Technical Board of Appeal of its right to be heard (Articles 112a(2)(c) and 113 EPC). In essence, the petition contained the assertion that, when taking the decision under review, the Technical Board of Appeal either had disregarded essential facts or arguments submitted by the petitioner or had based its decision on facts or arguments unknown to the petitioner.

II. The present proceedings relate to the petitioner's objections to all the members of the Enlarged Board of Appeal in its original composition pursuant to Rule 109(2)(a) EPC, consisting of Mr ... as the first and Mr ... second legally qualified members (the second legally qualified member being the chairman) and Mr ... the technically qualified member (hereinafter: the Enlarged Board). The petitioner raised and reasoned these objections in its letter of 8 July 2014 (hereinafter: the statement of grounds of objection).

Tuesday, July 22, 2014 R 5/13, R 9/13, R 10/13, R 11/13, R 12/13 and R 13/13 - Limits to the right to be heard?

This is a decision by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in consolidated proceedings on six petitions for review  - R 5/13, R 9/13, R 10/13, R 11/13, R 12/13 and R 13/13, all filed against decision T 1760/11. The petitioners argued essentially a fundamental infringement of the right to be heard (Articles 112a(2)(c) and 113(1) EPC). 
All petitioners in essence argued that the Board not only "fundamentally erred" in denying that document D1 was a feasible starting point for the assessment of inventive step according to the problem-solution approach. In addition, the petitioners argued, choosing document D2 instead of document D1, the Board made a number of "basic errors in the evaluation of the technical information before it and the application of established EPO case law to that information". 
The petitioners argued that the Board took a decision without hearing the petitioners' complete case by concluding that the subject-matter claimed involved an inventive step, after the debate on the issue of inventive step in the light of document D2 as the closest prior art, without a debate on the ground of lack of inventive step starting from document D1.  
The petitioners further argued that, in addition, the Board applied the problem-solution approach wrongly in allowing only one document as the starting point for discussing inventive step, where the case law allowed for more than one document to be considered as the closest prior art and for a discussion of lack of inventive step starting from any of those documents. That denial implied an infringement of the right to be heard according to Article 113(1) EPC. 
The petitioners further argued that, in addition, the Board based its decision not to consider document D1 as a starting point for inventive step merely on the parties' written submissions, and that the Board hereby deprived the petitioners of their right fully to present their arguments by not giving them the opportunity to present oral submissions on this point, even if the Board had a different view.

The decision extensively discusses how far the right to be heard extends, and when it is violated - as to procedural aspects and substantive aspects to the merits. The decision also emphasizes that a petition for review can not be used to assess whether the BoA correctly applied substantive patent law, in particular in using the problem-solution approach. 

Reasons for the Decision

1. All petitioners are adversely affected by the decision under review. The provisions of Article 112a(4) EPC and Rule 107 EPC are satisfied.

Scope of the petitions

2. The petitioners invoke multiple grounds for their respective petitions for review.

3. The petitions for review are founded mainly on the allegation that the appeal proceedings leading to the decision under review involved a fundamental infringement of the petitioners' right to be heard (Articles 112a(2)(c) and 113(1) EPC) in that the Board took its decision on the patent proprietor's first auxiliary request without allowing the petitioners to complete their submissions on the ground of lack of inventive step, in particular in view of document D1.

4. Additionally, the petitioners claim that the Board should have followed their requests to refer the questions submitted by them concerning the selection of the closest prior art and the concept of res judicata to the Enlarged Board of Appeal according to Article 112(1)(a) EPC, or that the Board either ignored the requested referral of the second question or failed to reason why it rejected the referral.

[...]

Allowability of the petitions for review

9. The petitions essentially invoke the ground of petition for review according to Articles 112a(2)(c) and 113(1) EPC.
Article 113(1) EPC provides:
"The decisions of the European Patent Office may only be based on grounds or evidence on which the parties concerned have had an opportunity to present their comments."

10. The petitioners submit that the Board decided on the appeal in infringement of Article 113(1) EPC in a manner that gave the petitioners no opportunity to present orally all their arguments on the issue of inventive step of the claims according to the patent proprietor's first auxiliary request.
As established in case R 3/10 of 29 September 2011 (Reasons, point 2.10), "the right to be heard is a fundamental right of the parties which has to be safeguarded, irrespective of the merits of the party's submissions. The necessity to respect it is absolute and therefore cannot be made dependent on a prior assessment of the merits of the party's submissions, which in the present case would involve an assessment of the degree of likelihood that the arguments of the petitioner would have convinced the Board to acknowledge inventive step. It is the very essence of the right to be heard that the party is given a full opportunity to defend its case and to persuade the deciding body that its position is the correct one. This right would be undermined if it were made dependent on an evaluation as to whether the party's standpoint is likely to be justified. In order to answer the question of whether a fundamental infringement of the petitioner's right to be heard occurred as a result of the petitioner's not having been heard on inventive step, it is therefore irrelevant whether the respondents are right in their assessment of the clear obviousness of the claimed solution."

11. The petitioners' key objection lies with the Board's decision to choose document D2 as the (only) closest prior art, rather than documents D1 and D11, which had been proposed by the petitioners and the patent proprietor respectively, and to limit the discussion of the issue of inventive step of the claimed subject-matter according to the patent proprietor's first auxiliary request on document D2 as the (only) starting point in applying the problem-solution approach. According to the petitioners, had the Board allowed a continued discussion of the issue of inventive step starting from document D1, the petitioners would have demonstrated that the subject-matter of the claims according to the first auxiliary request was obvious to the skilled person. Since the Board refused that continued debate, it deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to present arguments on this matter.

12. In support of this, the petitioners in their concluding submissions during the oral proceedings put forward essentially three lines of argument:
(1) that the closest prior art could only be determined at the end of a complete discussion of inventive step starting from all the documents that a party or the parties chose to rely on (point 15 below);
(2) that the Board failed both to inform the parties of its intention to select of its own motion document D2 and to invite the parties to comment on this in order to convince the Board of the inaccuracy of its choice (point 16 below);
(3) that document D1 should also have been considered as a realistic starting point for the discussion of inventive step (point 17 below).

13. Before investigating the aforementioned arguments, the Enlarged Board notes that the examination whether or not the subject-matter of a patent claim involves an inventive step according to the well-established problem-solution approach is a matter of substantive law. That is equally true for the determination of the closest prior art as the first step in the multi-stage method of the problem-solution approach, whether one document alone or a plurality of documents was taken as the starting point or most promising springboard aiming at the invention.

14. In view of this, it has to be borne in mind that review proceedings based on Article 112a(2)(c) EPC are confined to procedural defects so fundamental as to be intolerable. It follows from the essential interest of legal certainty that appeal proceedings leading to a final decision shall be re-opened only if one of the grounds provided for in Article 112a EPC applies. The petition for review is no means to review the correct application of substantive law (consistent case law since R 1/08 of 15 July 2008, citing the travaux préparatoires, and R 2/08 of 11 September 2008).

15. In respect of the first line of argument, the Enlarged Board cannot follow the petitioners' view point that the closest prior art – at least in the present case – could have been chosen only after all stages of the problem-solution approach were completed.
According to the established case law of the boards of appeal, the problem-solution approach is the key element for the assessment of inventive step and is the one which is applied first and foremost. It follows a clear method consisting of three main stages, of which the determination of the closest prior state of the art is the first (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 7th edition 2013, section I.D.2., p. 165 et seq.).
The petitioners put forward that the first stage of the problem-solution approach could and should have been concluded only after the other two stages had been gone through (i.e. after the "objective technical problem" to be solved had been established and after it had been considered whether or not the claimed invention, starting from the closest prior art and in view of the objective technical problem, was obvious to the skilled person). In other words, the petitioners argue that they should have been allowed to discuss all the issues of inventive step of any stage of the problem-solution approach in respect of all possible starting points they wished to rely on, despite the fact that the Board structured the discussion by first establishing which document or documents constituted the most promising starting point for an obvious development leading to the invention. In this, the Board not only followed the sequence for the debate announced in its communication annexed to the summons to oral proceedings (page 8, second paragraph; page 9, last paragraph), but by doing so it also systematically applied the standard method of the problem-solution approach.
In so far as the petitioners alleged that the Board deviated from the problem-solution approach by relying on a criterion that was irrelevant for the determination of the closest prior art (i.e. the Board's opinion that "taking document D1 as a starting point for the analysis of inventive step relies on a hindsight knowledge of what is claimed and is therefore inappropriate for an objective assessment of inventive step"; Reasons page 56), this allegation concerns a substantive matter.
However, petition for review proceedings may not be used to review the exercise by a Board of its discretionary power if that would involve an impermissible consideration of substantive issues (see R 1/08 of 15 July 2008, Reasons, point 2.1; R 10/09 of 22 June 2010, Reasons, point 2.2; R 9/10 of 10 September 2010, Reasons, point 10; R 13/11 of 20 April 2012, Reasons, point 4).
In petition proceedings, the Enlarged Board cannot act as a third instance or second-tier appellate tribunal, nor can it examine whether or not the substantive conclusions arrived at by the Board were justified; under no circumstances may the petition for review be a means to review the correct application of substantive law (see Case Law, supra, section IV.E.9.2.4.b), p. 1066 et seq.; R 1/08 of 15 July 2008, Reasons, point 2.1; R 2/08 of 11 September 2008, Reasons, point 5; R 9/08 of 21 January 2009, Reasons, point 6.3), which includes issues falling within the discretion of the Board (R 10/09 of 22 June 2010, Reasons, point 2).
However, that is exactly what the petitioners seek by requesting the Enlarged Board to reconsider the appeal proceedings on its merits and thereby to put its evaluation of the merits above that of the Board. A technical review of the Board's evaluation of inventive step in terms of whether it is objectively correct or appropriate, is outside the jurisdiction of the Enlarged Board.
Finally, the Enlarged Board cannot accept the petitioners' contention that a party, in principle, should be allowed to discuss any particular issue that it relies on or even forms the subject of a request.
Neither the EPC nor the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal provide any legal basis for such a general approach in appeal proceedings, in particular in inter partes appeal proceedings. Nor is the existence of any such entitlement supported by the principle of party disposition. That principle relates merely to the parties' right of disposal over their requests by advancing, withholding or withdrawing them as they see fit.
More relevant to the present case is another principle of appeal proceedings, the principle of procedural economy, which requires a board of appeal to focus on those points that are relevant for the decision. In the present case, the Board considered that the case could be decided in respect of the issue of inventive step by systematically applying the problem-solution approach stage by stage. Thus, it systematically limited its decision-making and accordingly the discussion with the parties to determining the closest prior art first, before discussing the other aspects of the inventive step of the subject-matter claimed according to the patent proprietor's first auxiliary request.
Consequently, the Enlarged Board does not follow the petitioners' argument that the Board was obliged to let them continue to argue on the alleged lack of inventive step starting from document D1 despite the Board's conclusion not to take that document as the closest prior art and starting point for the further discussion of inventive step.
Since the petitioners were given the opportunity to submit their arguments with regard to the issue of determining the closest prior art, their right to be heard has been observed. Once the Board had reached a substantive conclusion by already excluding one or more documents (here: documents D1 and D11) as starting points for the assessment of inventive step, it was logically consistent to exclude all other prior art not found to be the closest prior art as starting point for the further discussion of inventive step according to the second and third stages of the problem-solution approach. By following this methodology the Board did not infringe the right to be heard, because – as indicated above – a party is not entitled to be additionally heard on the application of the problem-solution approach starting from other pieces of prior art than the closest prior art.
Hence, no infringement of Article 113(1) EPC was committed by the Board.

16. With regard to the second line of argument, the Enlarged Board notes that there is no evidence to support the petitioners' allegation that the Board failed to inform the parties of its intention to select document D2 as the closest prior art and to invite the parties to comment on this so that they might convince the Board of the inaccuracy of its choice.
Rather, there is evidence that the Board actually indicated the possible selection of document D2 as the closest prior art, at a point in time during the proceedings that still allowed the petitioners to react to it.
First, in its communication annexed to the summons to oral proceedings, the Board explicitly pointed to document D2 as one of the documents to be considered in the choice of the closest prior art.
Secondly, according to the minutes of the oral proceedings (pages 5 to 7) and the Board's communication dated 10 January 2013, the discussion concerning the determination of the closest prior art among all of documents D1, D2 and D11 started on 14 November 2012 and continued the next day. The parties were invited to present their arguments. During the debate, the Board first indicated its preliminary opinion in respect of the teaching of document D1 and continued the discussion regarding the choice of the closest prior art. After deliberation, the parties were informed that the Board considered document D2 to be the closest state of the art and subsequently they were invited to address the questions of what the objective problem starting from that document was and whether that problem had been solved.
For this reason, the Enlarged Board cannot find a basis for the petitioners' allegation submitted with its second line of argument.

17. Concerning the third line of argument, that document D1 should also have been considered as a realistic starting point for the discussion of inventive step, the Enlarged Board cannot identify any procedural defect.
The minutes of the oral proceedings show that the issue of whether or not the document preferred by the petitioners (D1) was to be determined as an additional starting point for the evaluation of inventive step was exhaustively discussed with the parties (minutes, pages 5 and 6).
Furthermore, in the decision under review, the Board recapitulated in detail the key arguments submitted by the parties, in particular the petitioners, in this respect during the written as well as the oral proceedings (Facts and Submissions points XII and XIII). The Board gave its reasons for not choosing document D1 (as well as document D11) as the closest prior art and for considering document D2 to be the starting point on the basis of which to apply the problem-solution approach in order to decide on the issue of inventive step (Reasons, points 4 and 10 et seq.).
The minutes further record an intervention by inter alia petitioner IV against the Board's approach of determining only one single document as the starting point for the discussion on inventive step, and also a request to give the petitioners the opportunity to address inventive step of the subject-matter of the first auxiliary request starting from document D1, which the Board rejected (minutes, pages 6 and 7).
Thus, the Board was obviously aware of the petitioners' arguments in favour of document D1 as at least a second closest prior art document and gave reasons why it came to a different conclusion (Reasons, points 4 and 10 et seq.).
Hence, the petitions, again, concentrate on the substantive decision of the Board and on the petitioners' disagreement with the Board's determination of the closest prior art as the starting point for the problem-solution approach when assessing the issue of inventive step. The petitioners dispute neither the sequence of events during the oral proceedings (the request for correction of the minutes, although refused, confirms the petitioners' objection to the Board's refusal to discuss the issue of inventive step starting from document D1) nor the fact that the question of which document or documents were to be chosen as the closest prior art was discussed first.
Their ground for review rather lies with the Board's substantive decision not to take document D1 into consideration as a starting point in the subsequent discussion of whether or not the claims according to the patent proprietor's first auxiliary request involved an inventive step. It is this "refusal" that the petitioners find to imply an infringement of their right to be heard. Their argument is based on their opinion that, on the one hand, the Board was legally bound by decision T 401/04 of 19 December 2006 regarding the choice of document D1 as the closest prior art or that, on the other hand, from a technical point of view document D1 should have been determined at least as a second starting point for the discussion of inventive step.

18. Consequently, none of the three lines of argument by the petitioners can lead to the conclusion that the petitioners did not have sufficient opportunity to comment on all aspects on which the decision was taken, so that no infringement of Article 113(1) EPC was committed by the Board.

19. To investigate any further would mean assessing whether the Board correctly understood the substantive arguments submitted by the parties and, above all, whether it gave the right answer to them. The (mere) fact that the petitioners do not share the view of the Board and do not accept the outcome of the decision under review would be a matter for a review of the merits of the decision, which is not a means of redress provided for in the EPC.

20. Consequently, to the extent that the petitions for review are not clearly inadmissible (see points 7 and 8 above), they are clearly unallowable.

[...]

This decision has European Case Law Identifier:  ECLI:EP:BA:2014:R000513.20140210. The decision was put online on 16.07.2014 The whole decision can be found here. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Hear No See No Speak No EVIL" by Billy Rowlinson obtained via Flickr , no changes made, CC by 2.0 license.