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T 1362/15 - No special consideration for US-style claim dependencies

This board is not a big fan of US-style claim dependencies
This is an opposition appeal for a patent that originated from a US-PCT application. In opposition, the granted claims are found not to be inventive (see point 1 and further). Auxiliary requests then run into added subject matter problems, in part, because the claims have 'US style' dependencies. The proprietor requests that questions are referred that ask whether the Board should take into account that these claims were originally drafted with a US style. The board did not consider this to be necessary though (see point 3 and further). 
Claim 10 of the main request reads as follows:
"A catalytic converter (10) comprising an outer tube (24) formed without any weld and comprising a tubular first side portion (22), a tubular second side portion (28), and a tubular intermediate portion (32) positioned between the first and second side portions (22, 28), (...) and
a tubular heat shield (18) positioned in the intermediate portion (32) around the longitudinal axis to inhibit transfer of heat from exhaust gas present in the intermediate portion (32) to the intermediate portion (32)."

T 1218/14 - No accidental anticipation; relevant for inventive step?

Does the finding that (a disclosure in) a prior art document D1 does not qualify as an accidental anticipation (thus not allowing the use of an undisclosed disclaimer) because it does not fulfill the criterion laid down in G 1/03 that it is so unrelated to and remote from the claimed invention that the skilled person would never have taken it into consideration when making the invention, imply that it is automatically relevant for inventive step? Or, turned around, if it is found that the claimed subject matter is inventive in view of D1, does this mean that D1 is in fact irrelevant for inventive step, such that the criterion in G 1/03 is met and that D1 is an accidental anticipation after all?

Not necessarily - according to this decision. Herein, the Board argued that the requirement in G 1/03 that an accidental novelty-destroying disclosure has to be completely irrelevant for assessing inventive step is to be understood not as an alternative, or additional criterion, but as a consequence of the criterion that, from a technical point of view, said disclosure is so unrelated and remote that the person skilled in the art would never have taken it into consideration when making or working on the invention.

Consequently, if this criterion is met, it follows that said disclosure is completely irrelevant for assessing inventive step. However, not meeting said criterion does not necessarily imply the opposite, namely that the disclosure in question will contribute to a finding that inventive step is lacking.

Accordingly, in the present case, as D1 was considered to deal with a side aspect of the claimed subject matter, the patentee was not able to maintain his broader claims by disclaiming a relevant disclosure of D1; the subject matter of duly limited claims was however deemed inventive in view of D1 as secondary document.

T 437/14 (Minutes of oral proceedings) - Disclaimer decision following the decision on its referral (G 1/16)


In this case, the Board referred questions to the Enlarged Board about the applicability of the gold standard disclosure test as defined in decision G 2/10 to undisclosed disclaimers (no), and the applicability of criteria as defined in decisions G 1/03 and G 2/03 (yes). The Enlarged Board handled the case as G 1/16 and answered that "For the purpose of considering whether a claim amended by the introduction of an undisclosed disclaimer is allowable under Article 123(2) EPC, the disclaimer must fulfil one of the criteria set out in point 2.1 of the order of decision G 1/03. The introduction of such a disclaimer may not provide a technical contribution to the subject-matter disclosed in the application as filed. In particular, it may not be or become relevant for the assessment of inventive step or for the question of sufficiency of disclosure. The disclaimer may not remove more than necessary either to restore novelty or to disclaim subject-matter excluded from patentability for non-technical reasons." The referring Board has no issued the Minutes of the subequent oral proceedings before it.

T 1399/13 - On the size of the hole


The allowability of an undisclosed disclaimer to establish novelty over an Art.54(3) prior right was challenged in opposition. Major topics of the debate were whether the disclaimer removed more than necessary to restore novelty over the prior right and whether the disclaimer and the claim with the disclaimer were clear and concise. 'With regard to the conditions that the disclaimer meets the requirements of clarity and conciseness and does not remove more than necessary to restore novelty, both explicitly indicated in G 1/03 (see headnote, points 2.2 and 2.4), the Board concurs with the positions expressed in T 2130/11, points 2.9 and 2.10*. In particular, the difficulty for a patent proprietor in formulating an allowable disclaimer cannot justify an exception in the application of Article 84 EPC which is not foreseen in the Convention, not even with regard to the condition on the allowability of a disclaimer requiring that a "disclaimer should not remove more than is necessary to restore novelty". Rather, that condition should be applied while taking into consideration its purpose, namely that the "necessity for a disclaimer is not an opportunity for the applicant to reshape his claims arbitrarily" (G 1/03, supra, point 3 in the reasons, second paragraph, last but one sentence).'  Although not the reason for selecting it for this blog, the decision also has another interesting aspect: the decision applies the partial priority decision G 1/15 in reasons 1.4.2-1.4.5.

T 660/14 - an undisclosed disclaimer after G 1/16

In this appeal, the proprietor gave as a basis for the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 4 meeting the requirement of Article 123(2) EPC that the subject-matter of claim 1 includes an undisclosed disclaimer. The undisclosed disclaimer was not of the most common type of disclaiming a Art.54(3) EPC prior right disclosure. The proprietor considered the alleged undisclosed features as either one or two undisclosed disclaimers. The proprietor submitted that the disclaimed feature/features provided no technical contribution to the claimed device, and had no real meaning apart from excluding an incorrect interpretation of claim 1, such that the requirements for disclaimers to be allowed under Article 123(2) EPC as mentioned in G1/16 were fulfilled. The Board of Appeal disagreed: according to the Enlarged Board of Appeal decision G1/16 (see e.g. Headnote), to be allowable under Article 123(2) EPC, the introduction of an undisclosed disclaimer may not provide a technical contribution to the subject-matter disclosed in the application as filed. In particular it may not become relevant for the assessment of inventive step (G 1/16 Reasons, point 49.1). 

G 1/16 - The final word (?) about disclaimers

The referral relates to the allowability of undisclosed disclaimers. The referring Board asked about the applicability of the gold standard disclosure test as defined in decision G 2/10 to undisclosed disclaimers (no), and the applicability of criteria as defined in decisions G 1/03 and G 2/03 (yes). The decision G 1/16 (Disclaimers III) noted that in drafting of undisclosed disclaimers as amendments, no technical contribution to the claimed subject-matter of the application as filed may be provided. 

T 287/14 - Disclaimers: do not try this at home!


Amendments introducing disclaimers have probably led to more pain than joy. Disclaiming subject-matter in the application-as-filed usually is acceptable, but often has a high risk of lacking inventive step. Disclaiming subject-matter not in the application-as-filed led to G 1/03 already quite some years ago and is well-documented in many later decisions as well as in the Guidelines - strict conditions, which can basically only work out well if there is only one Art.54(3) EPC prior right document with a  single, clear disclosure. Disclaiming embodiments in the application as filed led to G 2/10, which has a quite cryptically phrased headnote, but when read as a whole also gives very clear conditions -it usually is possible, as long as it is clear that something remains and that you do not sneakily change to a different inventive concept-  and it is also well documented in the Guidelines. G 1/03 and G 2/10 relate to different cases, so cannot prima facie be considered as somehow conflicting, but Board 3.3.09 made the currently pending referral G 1/16 while handling appeal T 0437/14 asking a.o. whether the G 2/10 decision effects how some aspects of G 1/03 shall be interpreted. The current decision shows again that even of a disclaimer is made in good faith, it can easily be done wrongly and, as here, of the disclaimer is introduced before grant, one may all too easily end up in an inescapable Art.123(2)-123(3) trap... And the trouble was in this case actually not even in how the disclaimers needs to be drafted, but how novelty has to be assessed... which the opponent did correctly, but the examining division and the applicant/proprietor had not/did not... As to the aux requests, Art. 13(1) and 13(3) RPBA prevented further chances to remedy the trouble.

T 2502/13 - Positive feature allowed as Art. 54(3) disclaimer?


In the opposition appeal to which this decision pertains (which has been suggested by a reader), the proprietor appealed against the decision of the Opposition Division to revoke the patent on the basis of all requests extending beyond the content of the application as filed (Article 123(2) EPC).

Of interest is the first auxiliary request of the appellant, by which the claim of the main request is further limited by: "further wherein the third ply of interlayer material comprises a plasticizer".

The appellant argues that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the first auxiliary request amounted to a disclaimer allowable in view of A8, which was prior art according to Article 54(3) EPC.

Gold standard poll results

In T 437/14 the board of appeal referred questions on disclaimers to the enlarged board. The central question is how the gold standard of G 2/10 is to be squared with the disclaimers that are allowed for accidental anticipations under G 1/03. The case has been discussed in the comments, and various directions were suggested in which the enlarged board could go.

The past two weeks we placed a poll at our blog in which our readers could make their predictions. Polling is now closed and the results are in.




So there is a clear majority that does not expect that G1/03 is any in danger. I'm looking forward to the enlarged board's decision to see how well this poll matches reality.

T 1808/13 Destruction of human embryos



The appeal lies from a decision to revoke the patent in opposition based on the main request incorporating an unallowable disclaimer [Art.123(2)].

The original claims tried to overcome an objection under Art.53(a) in conjunction with Rule 28 (c), as involving the destruction of human embryos, following the Enlarged Board decisions G 1/03 and G 2/10.

In summary, the claim of the main request looked like:

1. Non-tumorigenic cell composition derived from embryonic stem cells of mammals, comprising […] with the proviso that the method does not involve the destruction of human embryos.

The claim of the auxiliary request looked like

1. Non-tumorigenic cell composition derived from embryonic stem cells from established ES cell lines or from ES cell-like cells of mammals

In this claim no disclaimer was required, since this claim does not relate to human embryonic stem cells or methods for their preparation, but neural progenitor cells, and methods for their preparation. In the claimed process, which is always directed to existing ES cell lines, no human embryos would be destroyed, according to the proprietor. How the ES cell lines were derived would then be irrelevant for the embodiment of the invention.

The Board of Appeal followed the reasoning of T 2221/10 (same Board, other composition). That Board came to the conclusion that to answer the question whether the use of established human ES cell lines under Rule 28 (c) is excluded from patentability needs to be assessed by looking at necessary steps to produce the cells, even if not claimed. That board, after thorough analysis of the prior art, came to the conclusion that at the filing date all available human ES cell lines were originally isolated from embryos, which were destroyed during the extraction of cells (see points 28 and 29 of that decision). Since in this case the application is even filed earlier that also applies here.

The auxiliary request thus violates Art.53(a) in conjunction with Rule 28 (c), as interpreted in G 1/03 and G 2/10.

To assess the disclaimer in the main request, the Board concluded that it was undisputed that the disclaimer was added to exclude subject-matter for non-technical reasons, complying with one of the criteria in G 1/03. However, the matter remaining in the claim was not properly supported by the description, thus failing another main criterion for disclaimers. At the moment of filing the application, all available ES cell lines were originally isolated from embryos that were destroyed during the extraction of these cells . Thus the main request violates Art.123(2).

A request for a referral to the Enlarged Board of Appeal was not granted. The Board answered all four questions. 



T 2130/11: disclaimers and Art. 84 EPC: an inescapable trap?


Disclaimers are always a nice subject for a complicated and expensive appeal procedure and quite often result in "important" case law. In this appeal, which lies from a decision of the Opposition Division, claim 1 of the main request comprises a long disclaimer which tries to disclaim embodiments of a relevant Art. 54(3) prior art document. According to this Board, G1/03 defines that the disclaimer has to fulfill the requirement of Art. 84 EPC. G1/03 defines that the patent owner may not disclaim more than strictly necessary to be novel over the Art. 54(3) document. In order to disclaim all embodiments of the relevant Art. 54(3) prior art document, but not disclaim more than strictly necessary, the patent owner considered it necessary to introduce the long disclaimer. However, this disclaimer has to fulfill Art. 84 EPC.
It seems to be an inescapable trap. How to disclaim not more than strictly necessary when the embodiments as disclosed in the Art. 54(3) document do not fulfill the requirements of the Art. 84 EPC (e.g. clarity and conciseness).
In this decision the Board refused the main request because the disclaimer did not fulfill the requirements of Art. 84 EPC (clarity). However, the Board formulated its decision in such a way that the requirements of G1/03 and Art. 84 EPC are not directly an inescapable trap.

Catchwords
 
The difficulty for the applicant or patent proprietor in formulating an allowable disclaimer cannot justify an exception in the application of Article 84 EPC which is not foreseen in the Convention. Not even a condition on the allowability of a disclaimer made explicit in a decision of the Enlarged Board as the condition that a "disclaimer should not remove more than is necessary to restore novelty" (G 1/03, point 3 in the reasons, second paragraph, last sentence) may have as a consequence the watering down of one of the requirements of the EPC. The requirements of Article 84 EPC must therefore apply for a disclaimer as for any other feature of a patent claim (see point 2.9).
On the other side, the condition that the disclaimer should not remove more than is necessary to restore novelty should be applied while taking into consideration its purpose, namely that the "necessity for a disclaimer is not an opportunity for the applicant to reshape his claims arbitrarily" (G 1/03, point 3 in the reasons, second paragraph, last but one sentence). In this respect situations can be foreseen, in which, while fulfilment of the condition taken in a strictly literal way would not be possible, a definition of the disclaimed subject-matter which satisfies the requirements of Article 84 EPC and fulfils the purpose of the condition (i.e. to avoid an arbitrary reshaping of the claims) may be achievable. In other words, a disclaimer removing more than strictly necessary to restore novelty would not be in contradiction with the spirit of G 1/03, if it were required to satisfy Article 84 EPC and it did not lead to an arbitrary reshaping of the claims (see point 2.10).

T 1441/13 - The difficulty of disclaiming


The examining division considered the claims not to fulfil the requirements of Article 53(a) EPC in combination with Rule 28(c) EPC - no EP patents shall be granted in respect of invention which at the filing date could exclusively be performed by use (involving the destruction) of human embryos for industrial of commercial purposes, including where the implementation of the invention presupposes such a destructive use to have taken place at some point in time before the filing date, whether or not this is described in the application (G 2/06). In appeal, the applicant tried to overcome the objection by introducing disclaimers in two  auxiliary requests, but without success: the "remaining subject-matter" test of G 2/10 was not met, and/or the claims with the disclaimer lacked clarity.

Summary of Facts and Submissions
[...]
VIII. Claims 1 and 5 of the Main Request read as follow:
"1. A method for obtaining polypeptide-secreting cells, comprising culturing pPS cells in activin A to differentiate the pPS cells to form gut endothelium, and culturing the gut endothelium in a mixture of islet cell differentiation factors comprising one or more of cyclopamine, betacellulin, exendin-4, glucagon-like peptide-1, hepatocyte growth factor, nicotinamide, IGF-1, n-butyrate, retinoic acid (all trans), growth hormone, placental lactogen, VEGF, IGF-II, IBMX, wortmannin, gastrin, cholecystokinin, NGF, EGF, KGF, PDGF, Reg or INGAP, thereby obtaining a cell population in which at least 5% of the cells secrete at least one of the following proteins from an endogenous gene: insulin, glucagon, somatostatin, and pancreatic polypeptide."
"5. A method of producing islet cells from primate pluripotent stem cells comprising
1) differentiating pPS cells to gut endoderm by culturing the pPS cells in a medium comprising activin A or retinoic acid;
2) differentiating the gut endoderm to a pancreas precursor by culturing the gut endoderm in a medium comprising a TGFß antagonist, a member of FGF family and EGF; and
3) differentiating the pancreas precursor to a mature islet cell by culturing the pancreas precursor in a medium comprising nicotinamide."
wherein "pPS" stands for "primate pluripotent stem". Claims 2-4 and 6-11 were directed to preferred embodiments of claims 1 and 5, respectively.
IX. Claims 1 and 5 of Auxiliary Request 1 were identical to claims 1 and 5 of the Main Request except for the following disclaimer at the end of both claims:
"... wherein said pPS cells are not obtained by means of a process in which human embryos are destroyed."
[..,]
X. Claims 1 and 5 of Auxiliary Request 2 were identical to claims 1 and 5 of the Main Request except for the following disclaimer at the end of both claims:
"... wherein the method does not involve use of a human embryo for industrial or commercial purposes."
[...]
Reasons for the Decision
Main Request
1. The Main Request is identical to the request on which the examining division decided to refuse the present application.
Article 53(a) EPC, Rule 28(c) EPC
2. The method of claim 1 for obtaining polypeptide-secreting cells requires the use of a culture of primate pluripotent stem cells (pPS) which, according to the description of the application, includes human embryonic stem (hES) cells (cf. page 6, lines 19 to 20 of the application as filed). In the decision G 2/06 (supra), the Enlarged Board of Appeal considered that "(b)efore human embryonic stem cell cultures can be used they have to be made" and that, if the "only teaching of how to perform the invention to make human embryonic stem cell cultures is the use (involving their destruction) of human embryos, this invention falls under the prohibition of Rule 28(c) EPC" (cf. G 2/06, supra, point 22 of the Reasons). The Enlarged Board of Appeal further decided that the argument of the appellant that, for the assessment of patentability of these inventions, "all the steps preceding an invention for the purposes of Rule 28(c) EPC" should not be taken into account, was not relevant. Thus, the Enlarged Board decided that these steps had to be considered (cf. G 2/06, supra, point 23 of the Reasons).
3. At the relevant date of the patent in suit, the known and practised method for achieving cultures of hES cells, i.e. the starting material of the method of claim 1, included preceding steps that involved the destruction of human embryos. These destructive methods are not excluded from the scope of claim 1. Thus, in accordance with decision G 2/06 (supra), the board decides that the Main Request is not allowable under Article 53(a) EPC and Rule 28(c) EPC.
Admissibility of Auxiliary Requests 1 to 4 and of the new documentary evidence
[...]
Auxiliary Request 1
8. Claims 1 and 5 of Auxiliary Request 1 contain a disclaimer that excludes methods involving the destruction of human embryos, reading: "... wherein said pPS cells are not obtained by means of a process in which human embryos are destroyed" (cf. point IX supra). This disclaimer intends to overcome the objection raised against the Main Request (cf. points 2 and 3 supra).
9. The criteria for allowability of disclaimers have been laid down in the decisions of the Enlarged Board of Appeal G 1/03 (supra, see in particular point 2.4.1 of the Reasons) and G 2/10 (supra). According to decision G 2/10 (supra), the subject-matter remaining in the claim after the introduction of the disclaimer must be - explicitly or implicitly - directly and unambiguously disclosed to the skilled person using common general knowledge, in the application as filed (cf. G 2/10, supra, Headnote answer to question 1(a)). In fact, this is "the overriding principle for any amendment to be allowable under Article 123(2) EPC ... that applies equally to the subject-matter of a claim the scope of which is determined by a disclaimer", be it an undisclosed or a disclosed disclaimer (cf. G 2/10, supra, point 4.7 of the Reasons).
10. In the present case, the subject-matter remaining in claims 1 and 5 of Auxiliary Request 1 after the introduction of the disclaimer, namely a method for obtaining polypeptide-secreting cells which includes the culture of hES cells derived only and exclusively from non-destructive methods, was not available at the priority date of the application (7 December 2001) and thus, was not directly and unambiguously disclosed to a skilled person as required by decision G 2/10 (supra). The board does not consider this "remaining subject-matter" to be disclosed in the application as filed. For the board to arrive at this decision, the following points are relevant:
10.1 According to the appellant, a single hES cell could be obtained from a human pre-implantation embryo by using methods developed in 2000 for pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PIGD) of in vitro fertilised (IVF) embryos. Document Verlinsky et al. (2001) has been filed in order to show that a single blastomere cell could be obtained from day 3 cleaving embryos without destroying the embryo. This evidence allegedly supports the availability of hES cells at the priority date of the application by methods that do not involve the destruction of human embryos.
10.2 However, for carrying out the methods of claims 1 and 5, it is not enough to be in possession of single hES cells but it is further necessary to culture these cells in order to obtain an established culture of hES cells or a hES cell line, i.e. in vitro culturing and expansion of hES cells (derivation).
It is acknowledged that derivation methods of embryonic stem cells from mice and from some primates were known and available to a skilled person at the priority date of the application, as shown by the bibliographic references in the application as filed cited by the appellant (cf. page 6, third full paragraph and page 8, first and second full paragraphs of the application as filed). However, none of these derivation methods has been successfully used with hES cells.
Indeed, document Klimanskaya et al. (2006) states that the derivation of hES cells "currently requires the destruction of ex utero embryos" (cf. page 481, left-hand column, lines 1-2). Only by using a new method disclosed in this document, it was for the first time possible to obtain two hES cell lines (cf. page 481, right-hand column, last paragraph to page 482, left-hand column, first paragraph). In document Chung et al. (2008), this method is referred to as being highly inefficient (cf. page 1, middle column, first paragraph). Incidentally, Chung et al. (2008) also states that "(t)o date, the derivation of all human embryonic stem cell (hSEC) lines has involved destruction of embryos" (cf. page 1, left-hand column, lines 1-3).
10.3 It is worth noting that the derivation method disclosed in document Klimanskaya et al. (2006) is based on a co-culture of hES cells with green fluorescent protein (GFP)-positive hES cells (cf. page 482, left-hand column, first paragraph). The source of these GFP-positive hES is not mentioned in this document but, in view of the comments made in all these post-published documents (cf. point 10.2 supra), these hES cells were also obtained by methods involving the destruction of human embryos. It is thus only the derivation method disclosed by Chung et al. in 2008, seven years after the priority date of the present application (7 December 2001), which for the first time has allowed the provision of hES cultures (cell lines) without destroying a human embryo in any production step.
11. Appellant's further argument based on the public availability of established hES cell lines cannot be followed by the board, since these cell lines were also originally obtained using methods that, at some preceding step, involved the destruction of a human embryo (cf. point 2 supra, last sentence). This has not been contested by the appellant and there is no evidence on file to demonstrate the contrary.
In this respect, appellant's attention has also been drawn to decision T 2221/10 (supra) (cf. point V supra). In this decision, this board in a different composition considered methods using commercially or otherwise publicly available hES cell lines, including most of the hES cell lines referred to by the appellant in the present case (inter alia, Thomson et al., 1998). Although methods using these hES cell lines did not require de novo destruction of human embryos, the board concluded that all these hES cell lines were initially derived from a process which had destroyed human embryos.
Therefore, the board, following the criteria established in decision G 2/06 (supra), decided that "(i)nventions which make use of publicly available human embryonic stem cell lines which were initially derived by a process resulting in the destruction of the human embryos are excluded from patentability under the provisions of Article 53(a) EPC in combination with Rule 28(c) EPC" (cf. T 2221/10, supra, Headnote and points 10 to 29 of the Reasons).
Accordingly, the board dismissed the appeal against the decision of the examining division to refuse European patent application No. 03 751 238.1 claiming the priority dates of 7 October 2002 and 19 February 2003, i.e. almost one year after the priority date of the present application (7 December 2001).
12. Thus, the board does not accept appellant's argument that the application discloses a method for obtaining polypeptide-secreting cells which uses hES cultures or cell lines produced without involving the destruction of a human embryo, in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out - without undue burden or inventive skill - by a person skilled in the art. Rather the methods available to the skilled person at the relevant date all included, at some point in time, the destruction of a human embryo.
13. In view thereof, the board does not consider it necessary to examine whether the disclaimer introduced into claims 1 and 5 of Auxiliary Request 1 fulfils the other criteria established in decision G 1/03 (supra), such as for instance whether the disclaimer is complete, i.e. whether it actually excludes all subject-matter not allowable under Article 53(a) EPC in combination with Rule 28(c) EPC (see in this respect the disclaimer introduced into Auxiliary Request 2, points 15 to 17 infra).
14. In conclusion, the board considers the disclaimer introduced into claims 1 and 5 of Auxiliary Request 1 not to be allowable since the application as filed does not disclose the "remaining subject-matter" of the invention (a method which includes the culture of hES cells derived, only and exclusively, from non-destructive methods). Only with information available seven years after the claimed priority date, a skilled person would have been in a position to put into practice this "remaining subject-matter" (cf. point 9 supra).
Auxiliary Request 1 does not meet the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC.
Auxiliary Request 2
15. Claims 1 and 5 of Auxiliary Request 2 contain a disclaimer reading: "... wherein the method does not involve use of a human embryo for industrial or commercial purposes" (cf. point X supra).
16. Without entering into the question whether this disclaimer overcomes the objection raised against the disclaimer introduced into Auxiliary Request 1 (cf. points 10 and 11 supra), the board considers the disclaimer in Auxiliary Request 2 not to be clear and to be contradictory in itself. The fact that industrial protection is sought for the claimed subject-matter, i.e. a method comprising culturing pPS cells, already indicates that a human embryo is used for industrial or commercial purposes. Thus, claims 1 and 5 of Auxiliary Request 2 are not clear and contravene the requirements of Article 84 EPC.
17. If it is the aim of the introduced disclaimer to restrict the later use of the differentiated pPS cells produced by the claimed method, namely to be used exclusively for the embryo (or the human being derived therefrom) which was used for obtaining the starting material of the claimed method, then the disclaimer is directed to subject-matter which is not covered by the claim. Such disclaimer does not meet the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC is not allowable (cf. T 1836/10 of 9 April 2013, points 11 and 13 of the Reasons).
[...]

This decision has European Case Law Identifier: ECLI:EP:BA:2014:T144113.20140909. The whole decision can be found here. The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "Islets of Langerhans by Sarah Richardson" by University of Exeter obtained via Flickr (no changes made, CC-BY-2.0 license).