Friday, 13 February 2015

T 2249/13 - Refund after declaration of no search?

No documents were cited

A Claim that is seen to lack technical features can have a hard time at the EPO. The applicant was refused a patent with the following claim:

1. A mobile communication device comprising:
     a transmitter configured to transmit data, messages, and commands;
     a receiver configured to receive data transmissions and information, including via one or more live data feeds;
     one or more input devices for receiving user inputs;
     a display screen; and
     a processor executing software that causes said communication device to generate and display a first interactive graphical user interface (GUI) on said display screen,
     said first interactive GUI simultaneously displaying live market data and information received via at least one of said live data feeds in the form of:
     a dynamic market window displaying user-selected multimedia content,
live market statistics, and
     at least one execution icon that when selected, invokes said communicating device to generate and transmit a transaction execution command."

The applicant had received a no search, and no invitation under R.63(1) to indicating the subject-matter to be searched. Neither the search division nor the examining division cited any prior art document.The applicant is asking the Board to refund the search fee, as no search has actually been performed.

The applicant was refused as not being inventive over a notorious smart phone. The applicant tries to argues that the Claim nevertheless requires technical considerations and cannot be refused in this manner. How can one show that a claim feature implies a technical consideration?

Reasons for the Decision
Main request Article 56 EPC - Inventive step

2. The Board sets out from close prior art represented by a mobile communication device in the form of a notorious smart phone comprising an interactive graphical user interface (touch screen), as acknowledged in the application (A1, column 1, lines 26 to 31).

3. In the light of Article 52(1)(2)(3) EPC, Article 56 EPC requires a non-obvious technical contribution (see e.g. T 641/00-Two identities/COMVIK, Headnote 1, OJ EPO 2003, 352; T 1784/06-Classification method/COMPTEL).

4. The cognitive meaning of information received, displayed and transmitted (multimedia content, market data, transaction execution command) does not have any non-obvious technical implication for the functioning of the communication device and its interactive graphical user interface (GUI). The appellant has argued that a "transaction execution command" implies an automatic (i.e. technical) compilation of a plurality of data items as a "transaction" presupposes information on at least two trading partners, the commodity to be traded, an accepted price and the like. However, the underlying technical operation is carried out by any conventional smartphone used for an online shopping transaction. (If that operation was non-obvious, the application would have to disclose it in enabling detail.)

5. The use of an icon as a means for inputting a command is another notorious GUI feature. Similarly, displaying various types of information simultaneously in one window ("dynamic market window") is anticipated by GUIs of conventional smart phones which display internal and external data and metadata.

6. The appellant's central argument with respect to inventive step was that the claimed communication device was arranged to receive live data feeds, i.e. real-time transmissions updated in "milliseconds" (A1, paragraph 0137), which were significantly more sophisticated than conventional, slower data transmissions. Prior mobile devices were unable to connect to multiple feeds (statement of grounds of appeal, bottom of page 4). Setting out from a conventional communication device, there was no hint for the skilled person to provide live data feeds for improving the mobile retrieval, display and/or interaction with critical market data.

7. The Board first notes that updating a transmission is primarily an operation of the transmitting device (e.g. a server) and may not require any modification of the receiving device (i.e. of the mobile communication device claimed). Once a conventional communication channel to a conventional communication device has been established, transmitted data may be updated by the sender as frequently as desired.

8. Moreover, while the application frequently mentions live data feeds, it does so essentially in the form of catchwords or desiderata without explaining any non-obvious technical background of such feeds. The appellant relied on a single feature in the description (A1, paragraph 0156: data compression) to show that the application provided some technical detail enabling live data feeds. However, that feature represents common general knowledge in data processing (zip files, for example), and it is up to the skilled person to weigh up its well-known advantage (reduced data volume) and disadvantages (compressing/decompressing steps). While a compressed data volume can be transmitted more quickly, the compression and decompression steps may eat up the time saving. This (conventional) compromise is confirmed by the application which states that data compression is used to "optimize" communications (A1, paragraph 0156) rather than to maximise the updating speed. In other words, no non-obvious approach is disclosed for providing the desired real-time market information.

9. As far as multiple real-time feeds to a mobile communication device are concerned, the Board again notes that this is not necessarily a feature of the claimed receiving device as the desired data may be aggregated by a sending server (A1, paragraphs 00010, 0012 etc), the server not being part of claim 1.

Moreover, no non-obvious technical implementation of multiple real-time feeds to a mobile communication device is detailed in the application. The Board accepts that such an implementation was available to the skilled person but pre-existing knowledge cannot be an inventive contribution.

10. The Board finally notes its disagreement with the argument that the skilled person had no obvious reason to enhance a mobile device by live data feeds. Real-time transmissions were demanded by market participants (A1, paragraph 0004), i.e. this user demand is the obvious task addressed by the skilled technical person.

11. Therefore, the Board judges that the mobile communication device according to claim 1 of the main request does not involve an inventive step.


Request for a (partial) refund of the fee for a European search
24. The appellant considers that the EPO has enriched itself unfairly by receiving the search fee without performing a search. According to the appellant, the no-search declaration of the search division cannot be deemed to be a European search report under Rule 63(2) EPC as the search division ignored Rule 63(1) EPC by failing to invite the appellant to file a statement indicating the subject-matter to be searched.

Even in the absence of a specific reimbursement provision in the EPC, the search fee should be reimbursed (partly) according to a pertinent principle of law (condictio ob rem) generally recognised in the Contracting States (Article 125 EPC).

Article 9 of the Rules Relating to Fees is said to reflect the principle of fairness as it grants a refund of the search fee if the European patent application is withdrawn or refused or deemed to be withdrawn at a time when the Office has not yet begun to draw up a search report. By way of analogy, the same principle should apply to cases where the EPO has deliberately chosen not to conduct a search, in particular where the choice is based on an unjustified discrimination of subject-matter according to the Notice from the European Patent Office dated 1 October 2007 concerning business methods (OJ EPO 2007, 592) which announced a no-search policy for claims pertaining to business methods. In similar fields (such as gaming machines), searches are provided even on minor technical features. In any event, the Notice concerning business "methods" is not applicable to the claims of the present application which relate to "devices" comprising technical features. Hence, there has never been any justification for omitting a search.

25. The Board points out that it applies the EPC and associated provisions as they stand. The Rules Relating to Fees do not provide for a refund of the search fee in case of a no-search declaration under Rule 63 EPC. Rule 63(2) EPC states that such a no-search declaration shall be considered as the European search report.

26. The fact that the search division did not comply with Rule 63(1) EPC (failure to communicate with the appellant) does not alter the legal situation. The search division's actions are not open for review by the Board (Article 106(1) EPC) and, for the same reason, the search division's reliance on the Notice from the European Patent Office dated 1 October 2007 concerning business methods is neither.

27. The appellant referred also to Article 125 EPC to postulate a right to a (partial) reimbursement of the search fee when no prior art search has been carried out. Article 125 EPC reads:
"In the absence of procedural provisions in this Convention, the European Patent Office shall take into account the principles of procedural law generally recognised in the Contracting States."
What the appellant claims here is to apply an allegedly pertinent principle of law in the Contracting States, namely the law of unfair enrichment. However, the law of unfair enrichment is provided by substantial law, not procedural law. Thus, Article 125 EPC does not provide any basis for the appellant's claim to reimburse the search fee.

28. For the sake of completeness, the Board wishes to express its awareness of the appellant's fundamental right to judicial review but that does not mean that such a review has to be provided by the Boards of Appeal in all types of disputes between an appellant and the European Patent Office or Organisation.

In particular, the Board is not competent to decide on claims for compensation in respect of a loss or damage allegedly caused by the EPO in the course of patent grant proceedings, see e.g. J 14/87 (OJ EPO 1988, 295, point 13, referring to Article 9 EPC "Liability").

29. Therefore, the Board considers that the request for a (partial) refund of the search fee is inadmissible.


This decision has European Case Law Identifier:  ECLI:EP:BA:2014:T224913.20141017. The whole decision can be found here (pdf). The file wrapper can be found here. Photo "reading in white" by 
Magdalena Roeseler obtained via 500px under CC BY 3.0 license (no changes were made).


  1. I wonder if the board was aware that the search report in this case pretends to be a "real" search report and not a "declaration of no search" under Rule 63.

    According to T 1242/04, a declaration of no search may only be issued if "the entire set of claims including all independent and dependent claims, clearly has no technical character". This was not such a case. The fake search report that was issued in fact states that the claimed subject-matter has technical character.

    The practice of issuing pretended search reports as a creative way of circumventing the "rule" of T 1242/04 seems very questionable to me. If the search division really thinks that a no search is in order, it should do so under Rule 63 and not act ultra vires as it did here.

    I understand that a board in principle has no power to review the work of the search division, but they clearly did so anyway in T 1242/04. I think they could have said something here as well.

  2. I also wondered about the distinction between a 'real' declaration of no search and the 'fake' one issued here. However, it appears that the Board takes the search report as it really is, not as it pretends to be. What is relevant is that no search was performed more than what it calls itself.

    Maybe a bit like it is with decisions: Whether a document constitutes a decision or a communication depends on the substance of its contents, not upon its form. (J8/81)

    T 1242/04 is certainly interesting in this regard. The search division does get a telling off in that case. But in the end the appeal is remitted to the examining division. They will have to do an additional search.

    1. T2249/13 sidesteps the no search vs OJ notice issue (sent out where there are some basic tech features but so basic that no documentary evidence is needed) - because the board has no power over the (non-loss-of-rights) search stage; the board found that the division was justified in refusing without a document anyway - whereas in T1242/04 they (at least initially) felt that some kind of document, at least from the examining division, would be nice. But really... T1242/04 - finish the story! Returned to division. Document provided showing how exceptionally well known such systems were was accepted by board in the re-refusal and re-appeal T946/08. Case closed two years ago already...